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Throughout his work, Kant regularly glosses ‘morality’ (and cognate expres-
sions) as ‘worthiness to be happy’ (Würdigkeit glücklich zu sein). As a rule, Kant’s 
commentators do not find this remarkable. Correctly understood, however, Kant’s 
gloss on ‘morality’ is remarkable indeed. This thesis shows why. 
In it, I argue that whenever we encounter Kant’s gloss, we are faced with an im-
plicit, durable cluster of unjustified commitments; that these commitments both an-
tedate and survive his ‘critical period’; that they are fundamentally practical in nature 
(i.e., that they are unexamined commitments to particular practices); and that these 
commitments entail a number of problematic theological consequences. 
I argue, in particular, that Kant’s gloss is a habit that signals, obscurely and im-
plicitly, his antecedent commitments to the practice of capital punishment, on the one 
hand, and to a particular set of practical attitudes towards the happiness and unhappi-
ness of immoral agents, on the other. I show that this habit has key implications for 
Kant’s thinking about the agent that he calls ‘God.’ 
My point of departure is Kant’s claim, in his Religion, that the human being’s 
particular deeds are imputable to her ‘all the way down,’ only on condition that the 
underlying ‘disposition’ (Gesinnung) from which they arise (according to their kind, 
qua moral or immoral) is imputable to her as well—that is, only if her (im)moral 
character may be regarded as the upshot of, or in some sense identical to, an utterly 
unassisted, unmotivated, originary deed on her part. I argue that Kant evades the 
question whether we really are permitted, without further ado, to regard this disposi-
tion (and with it an agent’s deeds) as so imputable. He simply affirms his commit-
ment to the practice of imputing particular deeds to particular agents and, with this 
affirmation, affirms that he takes the warrant that it requires (the imputability of 
‘Gesinnung’) to be secure. 
I argue, then, that the theoretical significance of imputation, as expressed in this 
extraordinary, evasive leap, supervenes on the urgency of the commitments that are 
expressed in Kant’s habitual glossing of ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy.’ The 
practice for which we would lack a warrant if the human being’s character were not 
imputable to her is the imputation of her deeds under a description (of imputation) 
that has immediate reference to this same ‘one’s’ punishment—specifically and only, 
however, to the extent that Kant takes punishments to be justifiable in none but 
strictly retributivist terms. These stakes and the constraining role of Kant’s habitual 
gloss are clearest, I argue, in his thinking about the practice of putting murderers to 






























…it is from the necessity of punishment that the infer-
ence to a future life is drawn. 
 
— Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals
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Throughout his work, Kant regularly glosses ‘morality’ (and cognate expressions) as 
‘worthiness to be happy’ (Würdigkeit glücklich zu sein).1 As a rule, Kant’s commen-
tators do not find this remarkable.2 Correctly understood, however, Kant’s gloss on 
‘morality’ is remarkable indeed. This thesis shows why. In it, I argue that whenever 
we encounter Kant’s gloss, we are faced with an implicit, durable cluster of unjusti-
fied commitments on his part. I contend that these commitments both antedate and 
survive his ‘critical period.’  I show that they are fundamentally practical in nature—
i.e., that they are unexamined commitments to particular practices. And I demon-
strate that these commitments entail problematic theological consequences. 
The main motivation for the descriptive and analytical task encapsulated here—
the unearthing and detailed unpacking of Kant’s gloss on ‘morality’—is one whose 
full articulation would take us far beyond the limits of the present project. The re-
search embodied in this thesis constitutes the first part of a far more extensive ac-
count of the developments in Kant’s thinking about freedom and moral 
accountability that terminate, ultimately, in his theory of ‘radical evil’ (radikales Bö-
se). In short, I hypothesize that the commitments that find expression in Kant’s gloss 
on ‘morality’ condition the trajectory by which his ‘critical period’ thinking about 
freedom and moral accountability passes from its initial state in (roughly) the ‘Third 
Antinomy’ section of the first Critique (1781) to its final state in the Religion’s 
(1793) theory of the imputable ‘Gesinnung’ (see below). The limitations of this the-
sis do not allow me to identify and account for the various phases of this trajectory.3 
                                                
1 In the main, I will refer to this practice as ‘Kant’s gloss,’ or ‘Kant’s glossing “morality” as “worthi-
ness to be happy.”’ Other locutions, however, will convey the same basic idea. Sometimes I will 
speak, for example, of Kant’s deploying the notion or concept of ‘worthiness to be happy’ and, at oth-
ers, of his use of the ‘“worthiness to be happy” idiom.’ 
2 I discuss exceptions to this rule—and distinguish my position from theirs—in chapter 1. 
3 In my conclusion, however, I sketch the contours of this line of development and demonstrate in a 
rudimentary fashion that Kant’s thinking may be fruitfully read in these terms. 
 
 2 
I leave these matters aside for the present in order to pursue a more preliminary, fun-
damental aim. 
In what follows I execute a task akin to the one a cosmologist takes up, when, 
having made a close study of the puzzling movements of some heavenly body, he 
proposes that the presence of a second massive, but invisible body explains the cur-
rent, or last observed, position of the first. This thesis does not deal directly with the-
se puzzling movements (the developments leading to Kant’s theory of radical evil); 
and it deals only briefly (i.e., here in this introduction) with the ultimate disposition 
of Kant’s explicit claims about freedom and moral accountability. My immediate 
goal rather, which I pursue in the main body of this work, is to identify and describe 
the ‘invisible body’ in question. 
I contend, then, that Kant’s theory of radical evil lies at the further end of a se-
ries of theoretical developments whose trajectory is constrained, in part, by some of 
his deepest practical commitments. I argue that these commitments are unexamined 
ones. And I demonstrate that these find their earliest, subsequently most pervasive, 
and yet least noticed mode of expression in Kant’s regular glossing of ‘morality’ as 
‘worthiness to be happy.’ In particular, as I will show, these commitments are Kant’s 
deeply antecedent allegiance to the practice of capital punishment, on the one hand, 
and his commitment to a particular set of practical attitudes towards the happiness 
and unhappiness of immoral agents—with key implications for Kant’s thinking about 
God—on the other. I will qualify and temper this rather strong and still somewhat 
vague proposal as we go along. In order to do this, it is necessary to begin where 
Kant’s thinking about moral accountability ends: with his theory of radical evil. 
The latter is a highly complex machine.4 Fortunately, for the purposes of this in-
troduction I need focus on no more than one very circumscribed (but integral) aspect 
of it: Kant’s claims regarding the imputability (to her) of the human being’s deepest, 
                                                
4 Beyond what I have to say in this introduction, I will not go very deeply into this topic. For helpful 
readings in this area see Henry E. Allison, ‘On the Very Idea of a Propensity to Evil,’ Journal of 
Value Inquiry 36, no. 2-3 (2002); Richard J. Bernstein, Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); Peter Dews, The Idea of Evil (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2007); 
P. Formosa, ‘Is Radical Evil Banal?  Is Banal Evil Radical?,’ Philosophy & Social Criticism 33, no. 6 
(2007); Robert Gressis, ‘How to Be Evil: Kant's Moral Psychology of Immorality,’ in Rethinking 
Kant, ed. P. Muchnik (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008); Paul Guyer, 
Kant, Routledge Philosophers (London: Routledge, 2006), 226-30; Gordon E. Michalson, Fallen 




radical, most fundamental character, that is, the moral or immoral ‘disposition’ 
(Gesinnung) from which her deeds spring and relative to which (alone) each and all 
of her particular deeds may be deemed determinately and ‘rigoristically’5 either mor-
al or immoral. 
In his Religion, Kant argues that an agent’s particular deeds are imputable to her 
only on condition that the underlying disposition that governs and determines these 
deeds (according to their kind, qua moral or immoral) is itself imputable. First, after 
describing what he calls ‘the subjective ground…of the exercise of the human be-
ing’s freedom in general’ and after pointing out that as ‘ground’ and as ‘general’ this 
must be ‘antecedent to every deed that falls within the scope of the senses,’ Kant ar-
gues that this ‘ground’ must itself arise from freedom—and be itself regarded as a 
deed6—because ‘otherwise [denn sonst] the use or abuse of the human being’s power 
of choice with respect to the moral law could not be imputed to him.’7 Then later, 
describing this ‘disposition’ as the unified, ‘first subjective ground of the adoption 
of…maxims,’ a principle that ‘applies to [the individual agent’s] entire use of free-
dom universally,’ Kant insists that ‘[t]his disposition…must be adopted through the 
free power of choice, for otherwise [denn sonst] it could not be imputed.’8 And 
again, in another instance, Kant argues that ‘[t]he human being must make or have 
made himself into whatever he is or should become in a moral sense, good or evil.’ 
He continues in the now familiar vein: ‘[t]hese two [characters] must be an effect of 
his free power of choice, for otherwise [denn sonst] they could not be imputed to him 
and, consequently, he could be neither morally good nor evil.’9 
Taken together, these three passages set forth two distinct, but closely related 
conditionals. The first conditional states that:  
(i) If an agent’s ‘Gesinnung,’ or, more precisely, her will’s having the kind 
of ‘Gesinnung’ (moral or immoral) that it has, is not in some (sufficiently 
robust) sense the upshot of ‘an intelligible deed’10 (which means, for 
                                                
5 Cf. Rel 6: 22-5 (71-3). 
6 For more on Kant’s unusual use of ‘deed’ (Tat) in this context see Rel 6: 31 (78-9). 
7 Rel 6: 21 (70) (my emphasis).  
8 Rel 6: 25 (74) (my emphasis). 
9 Rel 6: 44 (89) (the first italicization is mine). 
10 Rel 6: 31 (79). 
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Kant, among other things, that she is its author, wholly and simply), then 
her ‘Gesinnung’ cannot be imputed to her. 
The second conditional states that: 
(ii) If an agent’s ‘Gesinnung’ cannot be imputed to her (in the sense that fol-
lows, for Kant, from her ‘Gesinnung’s’ being, or in some sense being 
grounded in, ‘an intelligible deed’), then her individual empirical 
deeds—which, for Kant, must be (in principle) qualifiable, with strict 
reference to the fundamental quality of the ‘Gesinnung’ that governs 
their production, ‘rigoristically’ (that is, without any ambiguity), as either 
wholly moral or wholly immoral—cannot be imputed to her (i.e., in 
Kantian terms, both ascribed to her, as their dynamic source or cause, 
and qualified in moral terms as instances of the kinds ‘moral’ or ‘immor-
al’). 
Note the relationship between these two conditionals: (i)’s antecedent (‘an agent’s 
“Gesinnung” is in no sense ‘a deed of freedom’) directs us to a consequent that fig-
ures, in turn, as (ii)’s antecedent (namely, the claim that ‘this same agent’s “Gesin-
nung” cannot be imputed to her’). If we schematize (i) and (ii) as  ~P  ~Qand ~Q 
 ~R, respectively, where ‘~R’ refers to the claim that ‘individual deeds cannot be 
imputed to this agent,’ then, by transitive inference, we also have ~P  ~R, or the 
claim that: 
(iii) If an agent’s ‘Gesinnung’ is not ‘a deed of freedom’ on her part, then her 
individual deeds cannot be imputed to her. 
Or again, we are presented with a series of conditionals such that: 
(i.a) ~(‘Gesinnung’ is ‘a deed of freedom’)   ~(‘Gesinnung’ is imputable) 
(ii.a) ~(‘Gesinnung’ is imputable)  ~(individual deeds, d1, d2, d3…dn, are 
imputable) 
and 
(iii.a) ~(‘Gesinnung’ is ‘a deed of freedom’)  ~(individual deeds, d1, d2, 
d3…dn, are imputable) 
But by contraposition we may deduce from (iii.a) that: 
(iv.a) ~~(individual deeds, d1, d2, d3…dn, are imputable)  ~~(‘Gesinnung’ is 
‘a deed of freedom’) 
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which is to say (by the definition of double negation) that: 
(v.a) individual deeds, d1, d2, d3…dn, are imputable  ‘Gesinnung’ is ‘a deed 
of freedom’ 
Of course, in order to infer from (v.a) that an agent’s ‘Gesinnung’ really is ‘a deed of 
freedom,’ we (or Kant) would have to show, first, that the antecedent in this case (the 
claim that individual deeds, d1, d2, d3…dn, are imputable) really is true. It is not pos-
sible to demonstrate that this is true so, however, and Kant does not attempt to do so.  
The claim that an agent’s particular deeds really are imputable to her, wholly and 
simply, so that she is identified as their unique author, can only be presupposed. And 
Kant, I suggest, is always already committed to the practice that consists in the im-
putation of particular deeds to their agents, a practice in the course of whose enact-
ment it does seem simply to be taken for granted that particular deeds really are 
imputable, that is, a practice by which the individual agent really is identified, wholly 
and simply, as the author of her particular deeds. This emphatic qualification, ‘whol-
ly and simply,’ gives expression, furthermore, to Kant’s equally antecedent commit-
ment to the practice of punishment, but under a description of this practice (which 
remains, perhaps, implicit in the unthematized self-understanding of its practitioners) 
that marks it as an undertaking that is addressed, also ‘wholly and simply,’ to indi-
viduals and not—as for example in the practice of ‘restorative justice’—to the com-
munity (under which alternative conception it might be regarded, instead, as a 
strategy for navigating a shared predicament—shared in a way that guilt, as Kant 
conceives of the latter, cannot be). 
Now, it might be objected that I ought really to focus directly on the question 
how the individual human being’s ‘Gesinnung’ can qualify, after all, as a peculiar 
kind of ‘intelligible deed,’ an authentic deed of freedom, as Kant claims that it does.  
Someone might object that it would be better to simply move straightaway to a dis-
putation of Kant’s claim that this is so. My reply to this objection would be that to 
take Kant to task in this regard, at once—to deny that ‘Gesinnung’ can be regarded 
as a ‘deed of freedom’ and to argue that Kant shows no more than that a particular 
pair of practices (the imputation of particular deeds, the punishment of guilty parties) 
cannot be warranted without this sheer presupposition—would be to say too much, 
given the main purpose of this thesis. The main aim of this thesis is to show, rather, 
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that Kant is simply committed to these practices and that this suffices to explain why 
he makes the claims concerning ‘Gesinnung’ that he makes in the Religion.  It is pos-
sible that those claims are overdetermined—that his making them can be explained 
both without reference to any argumentation on his part for the claim that an agent’s 
‘Gesinnung’ really is an ‘intelligible deed’ and, at the same time, that Kant also 
seeks to justify this claim (he does not), and does not simply presuppose it in order to 
stabilize and perpetuate of those practices. 
But to argue directly with Kant about the freedom (and so, too, the imputability) 
of ‘Gesinnung’ would take us too far afield. My foray into the form (the logic) of 
Kant’s reasoning, which I pursued above, serves a point that does not require that I 
argue for more substantive claims about the content of Kant’s argumentation in the 
Religion. This point is actually a central one for this thesis, which is to show what is 
at stake here for Kant—namely, the practice that consists in identifying individual 
agents as the authors of particular deeds and in qualifying those deeds as either moral 
or immoral—to show, that is, why it is that ‘Gesinnung’s’ being a ‘deed of freedom’ 
matters to Kant at all, in the first place, from the outset—before he ever thematizes 
this commitment. For the moment, in other words, I am not going to argue with Kant 
about whether the underlying character of the individual human agent’s will really is 
like that, or even about whether we are warranted in so regarding it. My claim here 
is simply that, whatever its status (true or false, warranted or unwarranted), and 
whatever the arguments that Kant adduces for it, he is constrained (in advance of, 
and in spite of, any argumentation) to a theoretical description of the human agent as 
a free being the character of whose will is imputable to her, without remainder; and 
that he is constrained to this description of the human agent to the extent that he is 
deeply and durably committed to the practice of imputing deeds to agents—but again 
more particularly, that is, in a manner that opens onto the practice of punishment un-
der a retributivist (hence entirely individualistic) description of that practice. 
The main point in this context, then, is not that Kant claims (problematically) 
that ‘Gesinnung’ is a deed of freedom (something for which he should be taken to 
task, certainly), but that there are practical reasons (again, I bracket out the question 
of whether Kant adduces any theoretical reasons, ultimately, in support of this move) 
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for taking it for granted that the claim that particular deeds are not imputable is in-
deed a counterfactual one. 
One of this thesis’ main contributions, then, is to prepare the ground for an ac-
count of how Kant ends up claiming that ‘Gesinnung’ is a deed of freedom—which 
is distinct from an account that follows his reasoning to that claim (which I simply 
deny is present, in any case, but without arguing the point in this context).  And I 
prepare the ground, here, by way of an analysis of his habitual deployment of the 
‘worthiness to be happy’ idiom, offering an account of this habit of thought and ex-
pression that finds in Kant’s deployment of this idiom a sign of his commitment to 
the practice of imputation under a particular description, namely, again, one that has 
direct reference to the practice of punishment—with capital punishment as its para-
digmatic instance. 
To sum up: in each of the three passages that I referred to above Kant’s ‘for oth-
erwise’ (denn sonst) expresses an implicit claim in conditional form. In the first 
place, Kant holds that if we cannot impute an agent’s underlying disposition to her, 
then we cannot impute her particular deeds to her (in any sense that is relevant for 
‘morality’). But then, too, he holds that if her disposition is a not a product of (her) 
freedom and so in some sense a deed (of hers) like her other deeds, then we cannot 
impute it. There is a palpable urgency here: if we cannot do this, then we cannot do 
that. And that matters. The resolution of this urgent problem consists in Kant’s tak-
ing the consequent in each case (we cannot impute her particular deeds to her; we 
cannot impute her character to her) to be a counterfactual claim. Implicitly, in each 
case, he denies the consequent and thus, by contraposition, is entitled to deny the an-
tecedent as well. He presupposes that we can impute the human being’s actions to 
her—we do and we may. Thus we may impute to her the underlying disposition from 
which these spring as well. Indeed, when we impute her actions to her, this shows 
that we already regard her disposition to act in the ‘way’ that she does as something 
of which she is the author too. And if we are entitled to regard her as the author of 
that, then we must already regard her underlying character, at least implicitly, as a 
product of her freedom. 
In a sense, this is simply to describe what we do and to assert of what we do that 
it shows that we are already thinking in a certain way, implicitly, just by doing it. 
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Kant does not actually claim that the human being’s particular deeds, along with her 
underlying character, really are imputable to her. He claims only that if we are not 
entitled to affirm that her underlying character is imputable to her, then a particular 
practice—one in which we are always already engaged in any case—would be called 
into question in some way. However, Kant does not take the practice in question to 
be problematic. To the contrary, he takes it to be unproblematic; and he takes it 
therefore, too, that any condition whose absence would inevitably render it problem-
atic must then be present. We must impute the agent’s character to her, as something 
that she has done, ‘for otherwise’ the practice of imputing to her ‘the use or abuse of 
[her] power of choice with respect to the moral law’ (i.e., the ‘use or abuse’ of free-
dom on this or that occasion, as manifest in particular deeds) would be without foun-
dation and, in some sense, impermissible. 
Admittedly, this reasoning involves a crass leap and I hesitate to attribute it to 
Kant. I do not attribute it to him, however, as a piece of reasoning. I attribute it to 
him as an antecedent, unexamined commitment—a kind of bias—whose inevitability 
and goodness he simply takes for granted. Thus it is not simply a position, or thesis, 
or intellectual point of view that is at stake here. Rather, it is a particular practice: the 
practice of imputing deeds to agents. This gets near to the heart of the matter. And 
Kant proceeds as though we are called to this practice inexorably, as though we were 
barred from the outset from saying, ‘It is going too far to impute an agent’s character 
to her in this way. If by “imputation” we mean something that cannot be done at all, 
save on condition that we do that, then let us simply give up imputing her deeds to 
her. Let us do something else, instead.’ Or, alternatively, ‘Let us think about whether 
or not we might not give a different account of what we are doing when we identify 
someone as “the one that did it” and then see where that gets us.’ For Kant, the prac-
tice of imputing agents’ deeds to them—in a mode that expresses the idea that they 
are these deeds’ authors all the way down11—is so important and so untouchable that 
Kant does not really investigate it. 
                                                
11 For a cognate use of this idiom, which I will deploy from time to time throughout this thesis, see for 
example Pablo Muchnik, Kant's Theory of Evil: An Essay on the Dangers of Self-Love and the 
Aprioricity of History (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009), 52 and cf. J. B. Schneewind, ‘Kant and 
Stoic Ethics,’ in Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty, ed. S. P. Engstrom 
and J. Whiting (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1994), 290. 
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In order to see why this is so, it is important to recognize, first, that what Kant 
holds too dear to investigate is not just imputation, but ‘imputation’ precisely in a 
sense that demands that, in addition to all of her particular deeds, an agent’s ‘Gesin-
nung’ be imputable to her as well. Not every description of that practice—the prac-
tice that consists, say (roughly), in identifying, relative to some event ‘that falls with-
within the scope of the senses,’ ‘the one that did it’ and qualifying this ‘it’ as either 
good or bad in some sense—not every further specification of this practice picks out 
a practice that we may legitimately undertake only on condition that the underlying 
disposition from which an agent acts is itself imputable to her as though it too were 
one of her deeds. For Kant, however, ‘imputation’ does refer to such a practice—
and, again, it is so important that it is immune to investigation. 
I submit that, for Kant, the practice for which we would (counterfactually, he as-
sumes) lack a warrant if ‘Gesinnung’ does not arise from, and express, an originary 
free choice of ‘the one that did it,’ is the imputation of an agent’s deeds under a de-
scription (of imputation) that has immediate reference to this same ‘one’s’ punish-
ment, specifically and only, moreover, to the extent that Kant takes each instance of 
punishment to be justifiable (if at all) in none but strictly retributivist terms.12 We 
might refer to this condition as the originary and terminal unity of the acting and suf-
fering subject: ‘the one that did it’ and ‘the one that ought to be punished’ have to be 
unambiguously one and the same, an utterly consolidated identity. The reason that 
Kant is interested in the imputability of the agent’s disposition in the first place, then, 
is that the imputation of deeds—precisely in this retribution-sensitive sense—is a 
practice to which he is antecedently committed. And his commitment to the practice 
of imputation (in this special sense) is a function of his antecedent commitment to 
the practice of punishment, so construed. This conception of punishment, as we shall 
see, is clearest in Kant’s thinking about the practice of putting murderers to death, 
but it has a much wider scope of application. In fact, as I will argue, in its ‘capital’ 
mode, punishment has both a political and an eschatological character for Kant: the 
                                                
12 My claim that this antecedent commitment is to be taken in precisely retributivist terms sounds par-
ticularly odd. It is as though I am claiming that Kant was a retributivist before he ever reflected on the 
problem of justifying punishment. In a sense this is what I claim. Kant’s retributivism, as I show in 
chapter 3, translates the extreme immediacy of his commitment to the practice of capital punishment 
into the language of a justifying account of the latter. The answer to the question: ‘Why put murderers 
to death?’ is always, ‘Because it is absolutely necessary that they die.’ 
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murderer, an agent that deserves to die for what she has done, deserves to die in light 
of a deed which, even in the empirical context of the polis, exhibits the same ‘inner 
wickedness’ that, in the case of immoral agents in general, demands their eschatolog-
ical unhappiness. Unique among criminals, the murderer deserves to die, not merely 
for what she has done, but for who she is, as it were, ‘deep inside.’ Kant is commit-
ted, not merely to the political practice of punishment, conceived as retribution, but 
to a practice that shades off, as it were, into (Kant’s) God’s practice of infernal retri-
bution. 
As Kant’s brief foray into eschatology at the end of The Metaphysics of Morals 
shows, he takes it that the ultimate punishment of immoral agents is an absolute ‘ne-
cessity.’  Indeed, as Kant puts it there, ‘it is from the necessity of punishment that the 
inference to a future life is drawn.’13 And he means that eschatologically rendered 
punishment is necessary, I suggest, in the same sense and for the same reason as the 
temporal sovereign’s punishment of murder by way of death on the scaffold.  This 
necessity and the assimilation of punishing action to action that makes-unhappy—
that denies happiness to agents who, by failing to be moral, are unworthy to be hap-
py—allows me to generalize from Kant’s ‘law of punishment,’ which he explicitly 
asserts is a categorical imperative,14 to what I will be calling Kant’s ‘law of unhappi-
ness.’ 
I will elaborate on Kant’s ‘law of punishment’ and the latter’s relation to this so-
called ‘law of unhappiness’ in due course.  First, however, by way of preventing a 
serious misunderstanding, which threatens to arise in connection with this expres-
sion—that is, my use specifically of ‘law’ in the expression ‘law of unhappiness’—I 
must offer an initial clarification of my intentions in this regard. In fact, Kant’s use 
of ‘law’ in his reference to a ‘law of punishment’ poses a similar problem.  But since 
Kant asserts the existence of the latter and clearly expresses his commitment to what 
it prescribes, while (as I will argue) only implying that he is committed to the ‘law of 
unhappiness’ (or to what it prescribes), it is particularly pressing that I address the 
ostensible ‘lawfulness’ (the universal bindingness or practical necessity) of the Kant-
ian principle that immoral agents ought to be unhappy.  In addressing this matter, I 
                                                
13 MdS 6: 490 n. (232 n.) (my emphasis).  I discuss this remarkable claim, which I have made the epi-
graph of this thesis, in chapter 3. 
14 MdS 6: 331 (105). 
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will be obliged to refer in a rudimentary manner to a number of key points whose full 
elaboration must be deferred to the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
In particular, I must acknowledge the appearance of a problem here, which 
would bear on my understanding of the relationship that Kant takes, at least some of 
the time, to hold between immorality, on the one hand, and unhappiness, on the oth-
er. I need to be as clear as possible about my treatment of Kant’s notion of ‘practical 
law,’ specifically that is, in regards to what I will characterize as the eschatological 
‘reach’ of the retributivism expressed by Kant’s key claim that ‘the law of punish-
ment is a categorical imperative.’15 
Let me be very clear: I will not be claiming that the ‘matter’ of this or that em-
pirical notion of ‘unhappiness’ can, just as such, give content to a genuinely Kantian 
‘practical law,’ or categorical imperative—a law that commands as its primary end 
that the empirical state of affairs consisting in this or that agent’s being unhappy be 
realized. 
In the following, as too in Kant’s thinking on this topic, ‘unhappiness’ refers to a 
particular state of this or that agent’s practical affairs, namely, the state of affairs that 
obtains when things do not go her way, or do not conform to the empirical desires 
that she happens to have (whether this is taken to be so at some particular time, or on 
the whole). I shall regard an agent as unhappy, in other words, when her experience 
of the world fails to include the realization of the particular ends that she has just in 
virtue of her empirically (and so contingently) given inclinations.  One way in which 
the thwarting of her desires might come about is through such an agent’s being pun-
ished. This is so to the extent, particularly, that punishment (which is always, for 
Kant, an unwanted imposition,16 that is, ‘unilateral,’ but nevertheless ‘rightful’ coer-
cion17) consists fundamentally in ‘physical harm,’18 or the infliction of ‘pain,’19 and 
so (according to what I regard as a centrally important definition) in the punished 
agent’s forfeiture of (some measure of) happiness.20 
                                                
15 MdS 6: 331 (105). 
16 MdS 6: 331 (104). 
17 MdS 6: 363 n. (130 n.). 
18 See KpV 5: 37 (34). 
19 MdS 6: 331 (104). 
20 KpV 5: 37 (34).  For more detailed discussion of Kant’s definition of punishment see chapter 3. 
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When I refer to Kant’s ‘law of unhappiness’ and indicate that I take the latter to 
be an implicit principle in Kant’s thinking which, when thematized (as Kant does not 
do), turns out to have the dignity for Kant of a ‘law’ (always with the qualification 
that, unlike his ‘law of punishment,’ of which the ‘law of unhappiness’ is a kind of 
eschatological analogue, Kant’s taking this to be a ‘law,’ along with his endorsement 
of it and of what it commands, is almost entirely implicit in his thinking) I do not at 
all mean to say that ‘the law of unhappiness’ is an imperative that commands its sub-
ject to be unhappy. Nor do I mean to say that this law is an imperative that com-
mands an end that is determined by reflection on the empirical ‘matter’ of 
unhappiness. 
This would be a truly problematic claim. In general, on Kant’s understanding of 
them, the ends that are practically necessitated by categorical imperatives cannot be 
ends, after all, whose content is given by this or that finite subject’s inclinations or, 
as in the case of unhappiness, her disinclinations. The ends that categorical impera-
tives prescribe cannot be ones that are given, in other words, by any finite agent’s 
pragmatic insight into, or ‘wisdom’ concerning, what would actually render this or 
that particular human being happy or unhappy. Reflection on the latter, as Kant ar-
gues, can only offer up hypothetical imperatives (e.g., ‘If you would be happy, do X’; 
‘If you would render so-and-so unhappy, do Y’). 
If this were what I meant by the claim that, for Kant, ‘the law of punishment,’ 
which he does claim to be a true practical law (i.e., an authentically categorical im-
perative), finds an eschatological ‘extension’ in his implicit ‘law of unhappiness,’ 
then a critic would be right to assert that there can no more be a ‘law of unhappiness’ 
than there can be a ‘law of happiness.’  Such a critic would also be correct to point to 
a serious confusion, on my part, concerning the distinction between what Kant means 
by ‘punishment’ (when he explicitly makes the latter the aim of a categorical practi-
cal principle, that is, The Metaphysics of Morals’ ‘law of punishment’) and what 
Kant means by ‘unhappiness.’  But without ever suggesting that such a thing is pos-
sible, I claim no more than to find in Kant’s regular use of his ‘worthiness to be hap-
py’ idiom (that is, his habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy’) a sign 
of his commitment to an implicit eschatological/ethical analogue of his ‘law of pun-
ishment.’  And, regarding this eschatological/ethical analogue as a principle that in-
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herits the categorical nature that, for Kant, qualifies his ‘law of punishment,’ I refer 
to this as ‘the law of unhappiness.’ 
Again too, as I have intimated, this might also be expressed in terms of what I 
claim is an eschatological and so also a theological ‘extension’ of the ‘reach’ of 
Kant’s politically situated ‘law of punishment.’  This means that Kant’s undefended, 
but nevertheless clear, explicit assertion that ‘the law of punishment is a categorical 
imperative,’ gives expression to a certain thought about the notional relationship be-
tween an essential property of the murderous will (what Kant refers to as the murder-
er’s ‘inner wickedness’) and the putting to death of that will’s ‘bearer,’ which 
thought ‘shades off,’ as I put it, into a related conviction bearing on the relationship 
between immorality (again, too, construed as ‘inner wickedness’) and unhappiness 
more generally (i.e, beyond the definitive forfeiture of happiness that occurs in capi-
tal punishment). 
For Kant, as we shall see, the law of punishment (at least where the crime in 
question is murder) commands, unconditionally, that the supposedly a priori (which 
aprioricity is implied by the claim that the injunction is a categorical command), no-
tional connection between the concepts of ‘inner wickedness’ and ‘death-for-murder’ 
be actualized, in practice—by the sovereign or the latter’s representative in the expe-
rience of the criminal—and it calls upon our approbation, which affective state sig-
nifies (I argue) our impotent, or ‘virtual’ and ‘deferred,’ intention or will that this 
notional connection be actualized. The law of punishment commands, indeed, not 
only that the sovereign make the occlusion of the murderer’s access to happiness (in 
short, I suggest, her unhappiness) his or her end, but also forbids the sovereign’s par-
ticular subjects to creep ‘through the windings of eudaemonism’21 in order to find a 
way out of the endorsement that is demanded of them. 
However, Kant’s reference to the ‘law of punishment,’ in the literary context of 
his Metaphysics of Morals, bears on something that he thinks ought (unconditionally, 
not simply in service of some other end, however laudable) to happen in the spatio-
temporal milieu of the human polis: the putting-to-death of the members of a particu-
lar class of criminals. By contrast, the ‘law of unhappiness’ commands that a particu-
lar subject, that is, (one version of) Kant’s ‘God,’ insure (ultimately) that immoral 
                                                
21 MdS 6: 331 (105). 
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agents are unhappy—that this subject (‘God’) make their unhappiness an end. Of 
course, this eschatological unhappiness may be regarded as punishment (and Kant 
does so regard it), but it is punishment in a sense that is distinct from (if also analo-
gous to) punishment in the sense that Kant intends when he refers to the political 
‘law of punishment.’  What both ‘laws’ have in common is the retributivism of the 
procedure that asserts (but does not show) that their aim is warranted.  Again, this 
aim is not punishment, or the ‘forfeiture’ of happiness (hence unhappiness), ‘per se,’ 
but rather the actualization of the notional relationship that is supposed to hold be-
tween the concepts of crime and punishment (or punishing), on the one hand, and 
immorality and unhappiness (or making-unhappy), on the other.  
In order to avoid misunderstanding here, too, it is important to recognize that I 
do not see unhappiness, in Kant’s thinking, as a mere effect of punishment. If this 
were my view, then a critic would be right to claim that my use of the expression 
‘law of unhappiness’ refers to a law that, unlike Kant’s ‘law of punishment,’ com-
mands something other than, or in addition to, punishment—whether the latter be 
conceived of in limited political, or more broadly eschatological-ethical terms. 
Someone might protest that ‘unhappiness’ refers to a sensible state of affairs while 
‘punishment’ refers to a particular concept—to the extent, that is, that for Kant ‘pun-
ishment’ (Straf) names a kind of logical equivalence between two modes of unilat-
eral limitation of ‘external’ freedom, one unjustified (crime), the other justified (the 
sovereign’s punishing action). 
This latter claim stands, certainly: punishment can be regarded in these strictly 
formal terms, prescinding from its content (the specific making-unhappy of particu-
lar human beings). But nevertheless, according to Kant’s own definition, the pun-
ishment of a human being may also be regarded as identical to her forfeiture of 
happiness (in whatever degree, up to and including the total occlusion of an agent’s 
happiness by way of her being put to death). Or, better, punishment consists, from 
the point of view of its agent, in action that aims at occluding the punished subject’s 
happiness (or the opportunity to be happy, or to pursue happiness) while, from the 
point of view of its object (the one that suffers it), punishment is constituted by this 
forfeiture. There is a certain formalism in the background, here, in that Kant thinks 
that the calculus by which we judge what is deserved by law-breakers is as a priori 
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as that which determines ‘right’ in general—the right to property, to the truth, to 
freedom from unwarranted external constraint. That Kant regards punishment as a 
forfeiture of happiness shows, however, that he has (among his several other modes 
of thinking about this matter) an implicit account of happiness according to which 
the latter is constituted by action whose execution depends upon the absence of such 
constraints. 
I might have designated the strange imperative that prescribes the relevant action 
here (or, more radically, the taking-as-an-end of the goal of such action), which is 
binding on ‘God’ and, too, on us in the ‘virtual’ and ‘deferred’ format that I will de-
scribe (as approbation and as the will that-it-be-so), ‘the law of the-making-unhappy-
of-immoral-agents,’ where the action that ‘makes unhappy’ is simply what is meant 
by ‘punishment’ in an eschatological context. But this strikes me as awkward. In-
stead, I call this imperative ‘the law of unhappiness,’ but mean by ‘unhappiness’ 
something that subsumes the achievement that is secured, too, by punishment (alt-
hough it might just happen to be the case, in the course of things, that an agent is un-
happy—without any agent’s having to intervene to bring this about). Obviously, as I 
said earlier (but this key point needs to be emphasized), this ‘law’ does not command 
its subject (primarily ‘God,’ secondarily us) to be unhappy, nor simply (‘per se’) to 
make this or that other agent unhappy, but rather to bring it about that a certain, sup-
posedly a priori, notional connection (the one that Kant’s use of the ‘worthiness to 
be happiness idiom’ shows, obliquely, that he thinks holds between immorality and 
happiness) is actualized. The connection’s actualization is, of course, an empirically 
contingent matter—it is an extrinsic connection, rather than one that just happens as 
a matter of course in the unfolding of nature, or one that holds by definition when an 
agent is immoral. But the command that this connection, already present in reason, 
be ‘forged,’ in fact, by ‘God,’ as I will put it, and, at the same time, the command 
that we will and approve of this forging prospectively, is practically necessary, for 
reasons that I will explain later. 
For now, let us note that there are two distinct issues here: the question of what 
this ostensible ‘law’ commands and the question whether this principle really is au-
thentically law-like in Kant’s sense, that is, categorical. The claim that the law is cat-
egorical, taken together with the fact that it is framed by a ‘hypothetical’ reference to 
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some established fact about its object (If A is guilty of X, then she absolutely must 
suffer Y), implies the claim that the notions of being-guilty-of-X and suffering-Y are 
bound together a priori. This belonging-together, however, cannot be conceived in 
physical or analytic terms. Instead the connection, as expressed here by the inexora-
ble ‘must,’ is a normative relationship, one that ought to be actualized, even if it is 
not—which is what I mean by saying, as I will do later, that ‘deserves to suffer Y’ 
subsumes ‘ought to suffer Y’ and also ‘is such that someone-or-other ought to bring it 
about that A suffers Y.’ 
Certainly, a will that aims at some agent’s unhappiness, just as such, cannot be a 
will whose willing has the formal property of being a will constrained to what it wills 
by a categorical law—anymore than a will that aims at happiness, just as such, would 
be. In both cases—whether with a view to unhappiness or happiness—the ‘matter’ of 
the end, which would be contingent, particular, or empirical would be determinative 
and not, after all, the sheer universality and necessity of the form of willing in ques-
tion. Each agent’s happiness is a distinct, contingent, particular matter; so, too, each 
one’s unhappiness. But if the action of making-unhappy aims at an end whose uni-
versal form is in the foreground, then the maxim of such action may at the same time 
be regarded as a law. I am not saying that the (divine) action that (ex hypothesi) con-
sists in the ‘making-unhappy’ of human agents really does qualify as action that 
could conform to a categorical imperative (given that the objects of such action were 
immoral). In fact, I do not think that the eschatological ‘making-unhappy’ of immor-
al agents can or would conform to this requirement. But neither, I suggest, does the 
sovereign’s punishing action in its political context do so 
I propose only that Kant holds, implicitly, that the same qualification applies in 
respect of the notional relationship between the concepts of immorality and unhappi-
ness as holds—just in case (only in case) the ‘law of punishment’ really is a categor-
ical imperative’ (which Kant claims, but not does not show)—between the concepts 
of the murderous will and the concept of death-for-murder. The end that the law of 
unhappiness practically necessitates is that the happiness of immoral agents be oc-
cluded, eschatologically, whatever each such agent’s unhappiness actually happens 
to consist in. The law of unhappiness does not look to the agent’s parochial idea of 
her own unhappiness in the determination of its aim, but rather to her will and its 
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misuse of freedom—and to the sheer, supposedly a priori norm that precludes such a 
will’s being allowed to have its (contingent, parochial) ‘way.’ 
The objection that I am anticipating and addressing here would be based, then, 
on the idea that the law of unhappiness—if there were such a thing—would have un-
happiness precisely ‘per se’ in its sights, rather than the effecting, in some agent’s 
experience, of the notional relationship that is supposed to hold a priori between the 
concepts that her immoral deeds and her actual unhappiness instantiate (or would 
instantiate). But I am not suggesting that this is Kant’s view. Instead, I will claim that 
this ‘law’ is blind to what it is exactly that the unhappiness of this or that agent actu-
ally consists in—and that this is because the latter’s constitution is empirical—and 
looks only to the will’s forfeiture of whatever happiness is possible or desirable to it, 
given the agent’s empirical constitution, that is, where happiness is given a most 
general, ideal definition as what the agent wills when she wills her ends independent-
ly of any consideration of what morality demands that she will. Happiness and un-
happiness, here, are ideals. The law of unhappiness commands the occlusion of the 
actualization of the first ideal (happiness) and it commands that the second (unhappi-
ness) be actualized instead. 
That the ideal, ‘unhappiness,’ ought unconditionally to be actualized in the expe-
rience of immoral agents—so that even ‘God’ is bound to forego mercy just in case 
an agent persists in a state of immorality (in a sense of ‘immorality’ that is untouched 
by any possible transformation of her will, even its being rendered a good one, that is 
not effected by her)—Kant does not demonstrate. Nor, in my view, can he demon-
strate this. But neither does he, nor can he, show that the ‘law of punishment’ really 
is a categorical imperative rather than a hypothetical one (as I show in chapter 3, 
Kant sometimes entertains the latter possibility).  He is simply aware—and rightly 
so—that if the law of punishment were not a categorical imperative, then the practice 
of putting murderers to death would have to be justified instrumentally. 
And this, as Kant recognizes, would render capital punishment a hideous thing. 
Implicitly, however, Kant sees eternal punishment, or the eschatological making-
unhappy of immoral agents (which ‘making-unhappy’ is regarded as their punish-
ment for having preferred immorality to morality), in the same terms. In Kant’s 
terms, the rationale for claiming that the notional connection between immorality and 
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unhappiness is no merely ‘reactive attitude’ (resentment, or a desire for revenge, 
say), but rather anticipates a form of action and a result that would be absolutely 
good, has to take a retributivist form. But this is because Kant conceives of eternal 
punishment on the model of capital punishment. Just as the latter is a permanent 
ejection of its object from the human community, a placing of the executed person 
outside the context in which she might be drawn back into and reconciled with her 
community, so too, eternal punishment places its object beyond all help, all assis-
tance, all drawing-back-in. 
In other words, Kant rightly sees capital punishment as an undertaking that can 
never be regarded as an invitation to return to the community, let alone a mode of 
rehabilitative assistance or support. Kant is not obviously warranted in taking escha-
tological ‘punishment’ in the same terms. But he shows that he does so precisely by 
giving the distorted, highly individualistic account of agency (and of grace and origi-
nal sin) that he gives in the Religion. He would not need to give such an account, I 
claim, save for the fact that (i) he regards the connection between the notions of un-
happiness and immorality by way of an analogy with the connection that he takes to 
hold between the notions of murder and death-for-murder (in short, he takes action 
that would aim at the occlusion of an immoral agent’s happiness to be an eschatolog-
ically inflection of the action by which actual sovereigns occlude the happiness of 
actual murderers, on the scaffold); and (ii) he (rightly) regards capital punishment as 
a practice the objective goodness of whose end (the murderer’s death) can only be 
asserted in retributivist terms. 
In other words, the Religion’s treatment of ‘Gesinnung’ expresses Kant’s aware-
ness that the practice of (retributive) punishment, the approbation of its (justified) 
instances, and the (prospective) approbation of the unhappiness of immoral agents 
(also regarded as retribution), is called into question by the counter-claim that, while 
we may in some sense ascribe her deeds to her as their source, we are not entitled to 
impute the punishable agent’s deeds to her all the way down, to the point where our 
imputation subsumes the very character relative to which her deeds are deemed good 
or bad ones in the first place. Kant does not demonstrate that we are not entitled to 
this counter-claim; he simply forestalls it. He does not demonstrate that the practice 
of (retributive) punishment to which he is antecedently committed is unproblematic; 
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he forestalls objections to that too. He does this with great perspicacity, offering in 
the Religion a description of human agency that includes, from the outset, an account 
of the human being’s susceptibility to the imputation of deeds that is retro-fitted, as it 
were, to the ambiguously political-eschatological practice of punishment qua retribu-
tion. 
For Kant, the practice of punishment—in a mode that expresses the idea that the 
punishable agent is the author of her punishable deed(s) all the way down—is too 
important to give up. When it comes to the ‘radical’ imputation of deeds, we can an-
swer the question why this is so important for Kant: this imputation’s importance is a 
function of the importance that Kant places on punishment. With respect to the latter, 
however, this thesis cannot answer the question why punishment is so important to 
Kant. I only establish that it is, show how Kant’s commitment to the practice of pun-
ishment is expressed, and argue that this has significant consequences. 
In this thesis, then, I argue that Kant’s regular glossing of ‘morality’ as ‘worthi-
ness to be happy’ is the place in his thinking where these antecedent commitments to 
(retributive) punishment and (retribution-sensitive) imputation are sheltered and 
passed along throughout his work. The theory of radical evil is the place where the 
practical-theoretical denizens of that topos come most nearly into the light. Kant’s 
gloss signifies a blind spot in his thinking. The Religion discloses that blind spot’s 
contents. Neither that work nor any other, however, thematizes this obscurity and 
come to grips with it. 
I do not claim, of course, that the practical commitments that I have described 
are decisive for all of Kant’s thinking about freedom and moral accountability. The 
Religion’s description of human agency is foreshadowed in various ways throughout 
the whole body of his writings about morality, but the interests that motivate it do not 
determine everything that one finds there. Kant’s thinking about morality exhibits 
other tendencies as well and proceeds, accordingly, along other avenues that, just as 
such, would never have encountered the theory of radical evil. This thesis is no exer-
cise in unlimited suspicion. And yet Nietzsche is onto something when he claims to 
detect a ‘certain odor of blood and torture’ in Kant’s moral theory.22  This ‘odor’ is 
                                                
22 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic, trans., Alan J. Swensen and 
Maudemarie Clark (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1998), 41. For a similar, more recent 
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by no means omnipresent, but it is there—and it signals a problem. The commit-
ments with which this thesis is concerned—constraints that do suggest a kind of 
‘bloodiness’—entail a particularly strong tendency in Kant’s thinking and this ex-
plains a particular progression of theoretical moves. This introduction adverts to the 
last of these: the Religion’s treatment of ‘Gesinnung’ in the context of that work’s 
theory of radical evil. Again, however, the full story of the operation of these con-
straints and a detailed account of the moves by which Kant’s thinking progresses to-
wards that theory, lie outside the scope of this project. 
For now, I claim only that the tendency of Kant’s thinking, to the extent that the-
se antecedent commitments condition it, is always already a leaning that inclines—or 
will have inclined—towards something like the theory of radical evil. The practice of 
punishment—and of capital punishment in particular—plays the role of a ‘strange 
attractor,’ so to speak, which, given the initial state of Kant’s critical period thinking 
about freedom and moral accountability, explains some aspects of the latter’s devel-
opment and ultimate disposition. I do not claim that Kant’s thinking about the imput-
able ‘Gesinnung,’ or any of the other moves along the trajectory leading to it, can be 
straightforwardly deduced from this initial state, or from any of these other moves, in 
advance. Nor do I claim that Kant’s commitments somehow cause him inevitably to 
end up where he does. I propose, rather, that Kant is attracted to what will turn out to 
have been his account of an imputable ‘Gesinnung,’ because assent to something like 
this notion is always already implicit in the practices to which he is committed, the 
practices to which his glossing of ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy’ draw atten-
tion. In a sense, Kant comes to his notion of the human being’s radically imputable, 
originary disposition towards good or evil and brings it to expression because, given 
certain of his practical commitments and intellectual discomfitures, something along 
these lines had been where he was heading, all along.23 
Now, while Kant’s regular glossing of ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy’ 
signifies the practical commitments that I have described, it does not do so directly. 
                                                                                                                                     
critique see Annette C. Baier, ‘Moralism and Cruelty: Reflections on Hume and Kant,’ in Moral 
Prejudices (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994). 
23 In broad strokes at least, the distinction that I make here, between a causal account, on the one hand, 
and an account that demonstrates the attractiveness of a particular idea (to someone in particular, giv-
en his or her practical commitments and a certain strain of intellectual uneasiness), even as that idea is 
still in the process of formation, is inspired by Charles Taylor (see Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: 
The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 202-3). 
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Rather, prima facie, it expresses a particular thought about the relationship between 
morality and happiness. Kant’s gloss expresses the thought that morality and happi-
ness are states of the human agent’s practical and empirical affairs that are related to 
one another; and, albeit more obscurely, it indicates the nature of this relation. In this 
thesis, I will remedy this obscurity. I will show that Kant’s gloss expresses the com-
plex thought that unhappiness and immorality, in particular, are extrinsically and 
normatively related,24 that this normativity is a matter of universal practical necessi-
ty,25 and that the claim that they are related in this way (i.e., as concepts whose a 
priori combination ought to be realized in fact) is an instance (along with all categor-
ical imperatives, including ‘the law of punishment’ to which, in its eschatological 
extension, the actualization of this notional combination would conform) of what 
Kant will ultimately characterize as ‘a priori synthetic practical proposition[s].’26 The 
practices to which Kant’s gloss shows him to be committed, the practice of punish-
ment (understood in an implicitly retributivist manner) and the practice of imputation 
(understood with reference to punishment, so construed), are practices that put into 
effect what this norm prescribes. 
The somewhat convoluted thought that Kant’s gloss expresses, however, is not a 
conclusion that he reaches in the course of his many decades of thinking about the 
primary question of ethics, ‘What ought I to do?’.27 Rather, the thought expressed 
here is both anterior to Kant’s ‘critical’ moral theory, in the sense that it represents 
his settled view well in advance of the latter’s development, and exterior to it, in the 
sense that none of that theory’s claims are deduced or even deducible from it. I ad-
                                                
24 By saying that these notions are ‘normatively related’ I am adverting to Kant’s conviction that im-
moral agents ought, actually, to be unhappy and that their unhappiness is not simply assured just given 
that they are immoral (as with the happiness of moral agents, the unhappiness of immoral ones would 
have to be connected with their being-immoral by way of an ‘extra step’ [cf. Paul Guyer, Kant on 
Freedom, Law, and Happiness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 118]). 
25 This is the necessity that Kant ascribes to the eschatologically situated practice of divine punish-
ment when, in The Metaphysics of Morals, he avers that ‘it is from the necessity of punishment that 
the inference to a future life is drawn’ (MdS 6: 490 n. [232 n.]).  I discuss this remarkable claim, 
which I have set as the epigraph to this thesis, in chapter 3. 
26 Gr 4: 420 (30). Kant is speaking here, of course, of the ‘categorical imperative or law of morality.’  
See also ibid., 4: 440, 454. 
27 In what follows, I will refer to the ‘science,’ ‘doctrine,’ ‘inquiry,’ ‘interest,’ etc. that pertains to this 
and cognate questions as ‘morals’ or ‘morality’ in Kant’s ‘primary,’ or ‘forward-looking’ sense. I will 
refer to the ‘science,’ ‘doctrine,’ etc. that pertains to the question ‘How are morality and happiness 
related?’ and other, cognate questions, as ‘morals’ or ‘morality’ in Kant’s ‘secondary,’ or ‘backward-
looking’ sense. I take this distinction up again, briefly, in this thesis’ conclusion. Sustained discussion 
of it, however, lies without the limits of this project. 
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vert to this anteriority and exteriority by characterizing Kant’s regular glossing of 
‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy’ as a habit—as both a habitual mode of expres-
sion and as a habitual mode of thinking. It is a habitual mode of thinking, moreover, 
that remains simply habitual, for Kant. Contrast this situation with Kant’s ‘transcen-
dental deduction,’ or a priori justification, of our ‘habit’ (so construed by Hume) of 
subsuming spatio-temporal events, qua effects, under the concept of causality (as, 
too, for the whole class of cognate cognitive ‘habits’). Kant’s habitual thought that 
immorality and unhappiness really are related to one another in the way that he (or 
whoever) takes them to be, remains a mere habit, without a ‘deduction’ of its own—
indeed, without ever being thematized like this at all. The commitments that the habit 
expresses are simply too deeply rooted and too important and too questionable—and, 
one surmises, too much under threat—to be brought fully into view. 
Here, then, is why Kant’s habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be hap-
py’ is so remarkable: because of it, Kant’s writing is strewn with oblique references 
to fundamental thoughts and commitments that this same writing fails ever to really 
address. Given the significance that I claim for it, it is also remarkable that this habit 
has not attracted the direct attention of more readers. In the rare instances where it is 
taken up for discussion, the attention that it receives does not, in any case, penetrate 
to the bedrock that this thesis uncovers.28 
My argument unfolds in the course of four chapters, as follows. 
Chapter 1 has four main aims. First I establish the originary presence, pervasive-
ness, and longevity of Kant’s habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be hap-
py.’ I show that the habit is in effect early on, that it is pervasive throughout Kant’s 
critical period, and that it survives the latter intact. 
Second, I discuss the expression’s logical structure. I characterize ‘worthiness to 
be happy’ as a particular kind of predicate: a three-place relation. In this connection, 
I point out that the expression’s main effect is not to identify morality with worthi-
ness to be happy (as it sometimes seems to do), but rather to represent the moral 
agent’s morality, on the one hand, and her (mainly prospective) happiness, on the 
                                                
28 Other commentator’s ranging from Nietzsche to Bernard Williams, have noticed, certainly, that 
Kantian ‘morality’ is geared towards ‘backward-looking’ questions of blame and praise, punishment 
and reward, but they do not disentangle the two main threads in Kant’s thinking as I do here, or isolate 
Kant’s habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy’ for special treatment. 
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other, as distinct states of her affairs that stand in a particular relationship to one an-
other. I characterize this as a ‘conditioned-by’ relation in which morality relates to 
happiness as one of its necessary conditions. I argue that the idiom’s typical form 
tends to draw Kant’s readers’ attention away from the fact that the gloss adds some-
thing to ‘morality’ and that it does so without Kant’s justifying the implication that 
what is added is somehow internal to the latter, or an immediately obvious corollary 
of it. 
Third, I distinguish the relata whose connection the idiom represents (the agent, 
her happiness, her morality) and show that the variety of ways in which Kant repre-
sents ‘morality,’ in the latter’s primary, ‘forward-looking’ sense,29 are independent 
of the idiom’s representation of the relationship between that (i.e., morality, irrespec-
tive of what that turns out to be) and happiness. In other words, I argue, while Kant’s 
thinking about morality varies and changes, his thinking about the relationship be-
tween morality and happiness, to the extent that this is encapsulated in his regular 
glossing of ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy,’ remains the same. In other words, 
I suggest, the expression, ‘worthiness to be happy,’ always has more or less the same 
sense. 
Fourth, I point to the paucity of commentary on Kant’s use of the ‘worthiness to 
be happy’ idiom, problematize this lack, and discuss its significance. I also 
acknowledge that there are, nevertheless, a handful of readers who have addressed 
this topic directly. I discuss their explanations of Kant’s use of the concept in ques-
tion and distinguish my approach to it in from theirs. 
In chapter 2, I present what I take to be Kant’s answer to the question, ‘How are 
morality and happiness related?’ as this answer is encapsulated, specifically, in his 
gloss. This, I argue, is the gloss’s most proximate, theoretical (as opposed to practi-
cal) sense. The main upshot of this chapter’s discussion is my claim that, for Kant, 
immoral agents are just as capable of happiness as moral ones, but that they ought 
not to be happy—that, to the contrary, there is a special sense in which Kant thinks 
that immoral agents ought to be unhappy.  
This chapter executes three main tasks. First, I show that Kant’s gloss represents 
morality and happiness as states of an agent’s affairs that are extrinsically related. 
                                                
29 See note 27 above. 
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Next, I specify this claim more closely by arguing that Kant’s gloss represents hap-
piness and morality as states of affairs that are not only extrinsically, but also neces-
sarily and normatively related. I concede that some of Kant’s thinking about 
happiness, in particular, entails that the latter is intrinsically related to morality, or 
that happiness is constituted in such a way that morality is internal to it, so that the 
happiness of immoral agents is precluded from the outset. I also concede that, partic-
ularly in the second Critique, Kant expresses the view that, given certain of our aims 
as practical-rational beings, morality may be regarded as a cause of happiness—or as 
able, at least under some ideal set of circumstances, to bring happiness into exist-
ence. Certainly, on Kant’s view of causality, this way of relating morality to happi-
ness entails that the connection between them is a necessary one. 
I argue, however, that while Kant certainly entertains these views, neither of the-
se represents the relationship between morality and happiness in the way that his 
gloss does. Neither of these is the representation to which his gloss refers. Indeed, 
admittedly, Kant associates a variety of representations with his concept of worthi-
ness to be happy—but not all of them fit there. The causal account comes closest, I 
argue, relating the two elements, happiness and morality, extrinsically and necessari-
ly. But it does not capture the normativity that is implicit in the notion of ‘worthiness 
to be happy.’ And this is of the essence. The necessity in Kant’s causal account of 
the relationship between morality and happiness makes the ultimately perfect dispo-
sition of these elements physically inexorable (i.e., given the posit of God’s author-
ship of the laws of nature).30 But Kant’s gloss directs us to a way of conceiving of 
the relationship between morality and happiness where the relevant necessity is not 
physical (not even in this peculiar, theologically inflected sense), but rather norma-
tive, and where the ultimately perfect disposition would have to be forged by being 
put, as it were, into practice—by a third party for whom this task was merely practi-
cally necessary. In short, Kant’s gloss expresses the idea that immoral agents are per-
fectly capable of happiness (my extrinsicness thesis), but that they ought to be 
                                                
30 By using the phrase ‘physically inexorable,’ here, I am signaling that Kant takes everything that 
happens in nature to be governed by universally binding laws. If there is a natural law to the effect 
that P  Q, then given P, Q. This is all that I mean when I say that, for Kant, the connection between 
P and Q, in this case, would be ‘physically’ inexorable. That is, given the law that (physically) neces-
sitates Q’s obtaining, Q cannot fail to obtain.  I call this inexorability ‘physical’ in order to distinguish 
it from both practical (hypothetical or categorical) and analytic modes of necessitation. 
 
 25 
unhappy (my normativity claim) and, indeed, that they unconditionally must be un-
happy (my necessity thesis). 
Third, I point out that the necessity to which Kant’s gloss adverts does not per-
tain to the relationship between morality and happiness. Certainly, as per his gloss, 
Kant takes morality and happiness to be normatively related, but he does not take it 
to be the case that morality necessitates happiness. Kant does not hold that moral 
agents positively ought to be happy. 
Obviously, I am not saying that Kant holds that moral agents ought not to be 
happy. In order to clarify what I mean and, at the same time, to clear up a particularly 
widespread bit of confusion in the commentary, I treat the practical necessity implied 
by Kant’s gloss as a particular kind of deservingness. Indeed, Kant’s commentators 
regularly take ‘is worthy to be happy’ and ‘deserves to be happy’ (or equivalent con-
structions) to be synonymous expressions. To a certain extent, I argue, they are onto 
something: Kant’s gloss does have reference to a particular notion of desert. I argue, 
however, that in spite of some rare instances in which Kant appears to proceed oth-
erwise, whenever he deploys his notion of ‘worthiness to be happy,’ he refers to an 
extrinsic, normative, necessary relation—in short, an ‘ought’—that holds, not be-
tween morality and happiness, but between unhappiness and immorality. 
In chapter 3 I explicate this ‘ought’ more fully and demonstrate its retributivist 
connections. In other words, I demonstrate that a form of retributivism is present 
(mostly in abeyance) whenever we encounter Kant’s gloss. To this end, chapter 3 has 
three main aims. First, I explore Kant’s thinking about punishment and affirm that 
when it comes to the latter’s specification and justification Kant is a kind of retribu-
tivist. My defense of this claim, here, follows majority consensus, but is qualified in 
a number of ways. 
Second, I show that, especially in his late treatment of the topic in The Meta-
physics of Morals, Kant’s conceptions of the legal and the ethical encounter one an-
other in the practice and justification of capital punishment. Indeed, I characterize 
Kant’s ‘scaffold’ as a liminal topos in which his thinking about law and politics 
punctures and extends deep into his thinking about ethics and eschatology. I argue 
that the unconditional, immediate necessity that Kant ascribes to capital punishment 
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in cases of murder is key to understanding the retributivist tendencies of his thinking 
about politically situated punishment and eschatological unhappiness more generally. 
Third, I argue that the ‘ought’ that arises from Kant’s implicit conviction that 
immoral agents deserve to be unhappy (the ‘ought’ implicit in his gloss) may be ex-
pressed in the form of a categorical law: ‘It is practically necessary that all immoral 
agents be unhappy.’ I refer to this as Kant’s ‘law of unhappiness’ and argue that it is 
the ethical and ultimately eschatological expression of his political ‘law of punish-
ment.’31 Kant takes ‘the law of punishment,’ ‘Punish all (and only) criminals (in pro-
portion to their crimes)!’ to be a categorical imperative. I argue that ‘the law of 
unhappiness’ (‘Let all immoral agents be unhappy!) is a categorical imperative as 
well. By so characterizing it, however, I suggest that this law and so, too, Kant’s 
gloss have ‘action-guiding’ significance.32 
In chapter 4 I discuss the ‘action-guiding’ significance of the law of unhappi-
ness. This chapter has four main tasks. First, I open with a brief discussion of the 
practical significance of Kant’s law of punishment. I point out that Kant’s commit-
ment to the thesis that all murderers ought to die (just given that they are murderers) 
is a fundamentally practical one. My discussion sets up a framework for the chapter’s 
main inquiry. 
Second, I demonstrate that Kant’s commitment to the thesis that immoral agents 
ought to be unhappy is also fundamentally practical. I argue that, by implying that 
there is such a law (the categorical ‘law of unhappiness’), Kant’s gloss suggests indi-
rectly, too, that someone or other is bound by it and that there is (or are) a practice 
(or practices) that would count as enactments of that law. In other words, I argue, the 
‘action-guiding’ significance of Kant’s gloss is, at the same time, the action-guiding 
significance of the law of unhappiness to which it adverts. And whenever Kant 
                                                
31 Note, however, that the law of punishment states that ‘all and only malefactors ought to be pun-
ished.’ The punishment of law-abiding citizens is problematic from the point of view of the order 
within which the law of punishment is binding. Their punishment would be positively unjust (not 
‘right’) and hence illegal. The unhappiness of moral agents is not problematic, however, from the 
point of view of the order within which the law of unhappiness is binding; their unhappiness offends 
kindness, not justice, but so too does the unhappiness of immoral ones. Kindness may be present, 
here, but its deliverances do not give expression to any law (see chapter 4). 
32 I borrow the epithet from Smith who applies, it in a related vein, to Kant’s use of the ‘worthiness to 
be happy idiom’ (see Steven G. Smith, ‘Worthiness to Be Happy and Kant's Concept of the Highest 
Good,’ Kant-Studien 75, no. 2 (1984)). See also Thomas E. Hill, Jr., ‘Wrongdoing, Desert, and 
Punishment,’ in Human Welfare and Moral Worth: Kantian Perspectives, ed. Thomas E. Hill, Jr. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 324. 
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glosses ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy,’ I argue, he signals his commitment to 
a practice (or practices) that execute(s) and conform(s) to this law. 
Third, I answer the questions, ‘Who is subject to Kant’s law of unhappiness?’ 
and ‘How is it enacted?’ I argue that, for Kant, there are two kinds of agent that this 
law binds and two contexts in which it does so. These distinct contexts correspond to 
two distinct ways in which the law of unhappiness is put into practice. Kant’s God is 
subject to the law of unhappiness. Human beings are too. The first context in which 
the law of unhappiness is enacted is the mundane context in which human beings are 
called to live in accordance with the demands of morality in Kant’s primary, for-
ward-looking sense and the demands of the political law of punishment. This mun-
dane context has both an external aspect, in so far as it the spatio-temporal context in 
which the deeds of moral or immoral agents are enacted, and an internal one, which 
is the individual human being’s conscience. 
With respect to the second context in which the law of unhappiness is enacted 
my task is to make explicit a point of view that is generally implicit in Kant’s think-
ing. This second context is the eschatological scenario in which God is called upon 
to omit the mercy to which he is universally inclined (as benevolent) and to act in 
strict accordance with the law of unhappiness. Far from being a law of God’s very 
nature (as Kant takes the primary, forward-looking moral law to be), the law of un-
happiness is an imperative that puts pressure33 on that nature, to the extent that 
Kant’s God is a kind being. In respect of this law, I construe Kant’s God not as ‘ho-
ly’ (as Kant takes him to be vis-à-vis the primary moral law) but ‘virtuous.’ In order 
to ‘obey’ the law here, as I make explicit, he must overcome his powerful, inelimi-
nable desire to make and see his creatures happy. Relative to the happiness of im-
moral agents, God’s desire to show mercy has the form of a constant temptation to 
disobey. 
Fourth, I argue that the mundane and the eschatological contexts coincide to the 
extent that, under the law of punishment (but not under the primary moral law), we, 
together with God, are members in common of a single community, a community for 
                                                
33 I owe this very evocative mode of expression to Ameriks, who uses it in a distinct, but related con-
nection. See Karl Ameriks, Kant and the Fate of Autonomy: Problems in the Appropriation of the 




which the law of unhappiness is uniquely constitutive. The upshot of this constitu-
tion, I argue, is that, like the merely human polis, this larger community is a mercy-
free zone—here, however, with a view to the broad scope of immorality (regarded, in 
a sense, as crime against morality), as such, rather than the narrow scope, merely, of 
external crimes against ‘right,’ or ‘public law.’ I characterize this coinciding in terms 
of a certain porousness of the ethical, by which the latter is susceptible to incursions 





Morality, id est, Worthiness to be Happy 
[M]orals is the doctrine…of how we are to be-
come worthy of happiness.34 
Introduction 
In this chapter I execute four main tasks. First, I establish the originary presence, 
pervasiveness, and longevity of Kant’s habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to 
be happy.’ Second, I discuss the expression’s logical structure. I characterize ‘wor-
thiness to be happy’ as a particular kind of predicate: a three-place relation. Third, I 
distinguish the relata whose connection the idiom represents and argue that the va-
riety of ways in which Kant represents ‘morality,’ in the latter’s primary, ‘forward-
looking’ sense are independent of the idiom’s representation of the relationship be-
tween that (i.e., morality, irrespective of what that turns out to be) and happiness. 
Fourth, I observe that there is a surprising lack of commentary in this area. I 
acknowledge, however, that a handful of Kant’s readers have addressed this topic 
directly. I discuss their explanations of his use of the concept of worthiness to be 
happy and distinguish my approach to it in from theirs. 
 
                                                




In this section I show that Kant’s habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be 
happy’ is in effect early on, that it is pervasive throughout his critical period, and that 
it survives the latter intact. 
In a wide variety of published and unpublished contexts, Kant deploys variants 
of the idiomatic formula, ‘Würdigkeit glücklich zu sein,’ on over three hundred occa-
sions.35 It first appears in some of his earliest handwritten notes to Baumgarten’s Ini-
tia Philosophiae Practicae36 (hereafter IPP) and shows up frequently in other 
Reflexionen and marginalia, up to and including instances in the incomplete Opus 
Postumum (1804). It is also pervasive throughout Kant’s published authorship. In 
order to demonstrate my claim that the idiom appears early in Kant’s work and then 
frequently, again, throughout his career, I will briefly review a number of typical 
cases. After that, I will offer a more sustained discussion of some key instances that 
support my practice of characterizing Kant’s habitual usage as a ‘gloss’ on ‘morali-
ty.’ 
In an early note to IPP, likely from the mid to late 1760s, Kant equates ‘worthi-
ness to be happy’ with ‘morality [Sittlichkeit],’ asserting that the latter ‘lies in con-
duct,’ and affirms that ‘[a]ll worthiness lies in the use of freedom.’37 An entry in 
Kant’s Stammbuchblätter for 1772-7 shows that in the fall of 1772 he instructed a 
young Ernst Theodor Langer to defend the thesis that ‘[t]he human being’s first con-
cern [Sorge] is: not how he becomes happy, but rather how he becomes worthy of 
happiness.’38 The first Critique (1781) provides a well-know example when Kant 
                                                
35 I will not cite all of these here; I cite many of them, however, in the following. In any case, Kant’s 
‘use of the language of desert to characterize the relation between virtue and Glückseligkeit’ is hardly 
‘occasional,’ as Engstrom claims (S. Engstrom, ‘Happiness and the Highest Good in Aristotle and 
Kant,’ in Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty, ed. S. P. Engstrom and J. 
Whiting (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1994), 128; I discuss the relationship between ‘worthiness’ and 
‘desert’ in chapter 2). Nor, as Henrich seems to imply, is ‘the thesis…that morality is the worthiness 
to be happy’ an especially regular theme in Kant’s ‘literary remains’ only (see Dieter Henrich, ‘The 
Concept of Moral Insight and Kant's Doctrine of the Fact of Reason,’ in The Unity of Reason: Essays 
on Kant's Philosophy, ed. R. Velkley (London: Harvard University Press, 1994), 78). Hill’s reference, 
in this connection, to ‘remarks, sprinkled throughout [Kant’s] works’ (Hill, ‘Wrongdoing, Desert, and 
Punishment’, 326) comes closer to the truth, but strikes me as an understatement. 
36 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Initia Philosophiae Practicae Primae (Halle: 1760). Baumgarten’s 
text is included at KGS 19: 7-91. 
37 R 6611 19: 110 (424). Kant says substantially the same, much later, in KpV 5: 130 (108-9). 
38 Stammbuchblätter (1772-7) 12: 416. The entry is dated 19 October, 1772. E. T. Langer (1743-1820) 
was a friend of Lessing and Goethe and librarian to Charles William Ferdinand, Duke of Brunswick. 
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answers the primary question of ethics, ‘What ought I to do?’ by asserting that ‘you’ 
ought to ‘[d]o that through which you will become worthy to be happy.’39 About a 
decade later (ca. 1792-4), in a text that rehearses the ‘moral catechism’ of his later 
Metaphysics of Morals (1797), Kant describes worthiness to be happy as the ‘first of 
all [the human being’s] wishes.’40 In the Religion (1793) he argues that, given ‘our 
nature…as a substance endowed with reason and freedom,’ not happiness, but only 
worthiness to be happy can be ‘the object of our maxims unconditionally.’41 In a re-
lated vein, Kant’s Vorarbeiten (preparatory notes) for the Metaphysic of Morals refer 
to worthiness to be happy as the human being’s ‘ultimate purpose [Endzweck].’42 
The remarkable longevity of the notion in Kant’s thinking is evident, finally, in the 
somewhat obscure interpolation of the phrase, ‘[t]o be worthy or unworthy of happi-
ness,’ into a draft passage of the Opus Postumum (1804).43 
From its earliest appearance until its last, Kant’s use of this idiom correlates an 
agent’s ‘morality,’ on the one hand, with her ‘worthiness to be happy,’ on the other. 
‘Worthiness to be happy’ serves repeatedly as a kind of gloss on ‘morality.’ It serves, 
that is, as a kind of regular elaboration of what Kant means by the latter term—at 
least some of the time. Sometimes Kant seems to identify or equate worthiness to be 
happy with morality, using ‘worthiness to be happy’ as an apparent synonym for ex-
pressions deploying not only ‘morality’ (‘Sittlichkeit’ and cognate terminology), but 
closely allied terms and locutions such as ‘virtue’ (Tugend),44 ‘right conduct,’45 
‘moral perfection,’46 ‘the agreement of all our maxims with the moral law,’47 ‘inner 
goodness,’48 the ‘perfection of freedom,’49 and so forth.50 Sometimes Kant makes 
                                                                                                                                     
He occupied his position at the Herzog August Bibliothek in Wolfenbüttel (other famous staff includ-
ed Leibniz and J. Burckhardt) from 1781, when he took over from Lessing, until 1820. 
39 KrV A808-9/B836-7. 
40 R 7315 19: 312. 
41 Rel 6: 46 n. (91 n.). 
42 Vorarbeiten-MdS 23: 402-3. 
43 OP 22: 129 (208). 
44 See, for example, KrV A315/B372; KpV 5: 110 (92); ÜdG 8: 283 (285); R 7196 19: 270 (461); 
LEM2 29: 599-600 (227). 
45 See, for example, Rel 6: 161 (182-3). 
46 Vorlesungen-Religionslehre 28: 1100 (429). 
47 Rel 6: 46 (42). 
48 R 6890 19: 195 (446). 
49 R 7197 19: 270 (461). 
50 Again, R 6611 19: 110 (424), a note to from the mid-late 1760s, provides a good early example. 
Other relatively early instances (ca. mid-late 70s) include R 5100 18: 87 (212) and R 6892 19: 195 
(447). Published work and lecture notes from Kant’s critical period offer a number of cognate instanc-
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definitive claims about worthiness to be happy that are indistinguishable from the 
kinds of things that he says about morality (virtue, etc.) in other contexts. For exam-
ple, Kant takes the command to do what is morally required—and so, more general-
ly, to be moral—to be equivalent to the command to be (or to become) worthy to be 
happy (or to omit becoming unworthy to be happy). In the second Critique, for ex-
ample, Kant asserts that ‘morals is the doctrine…of how we are to become worthy of 
happiness.’51 This echoes a key moment in the Canon section of the first Critique 
when he contrasts the pragmatic ‘rule of prudence,’ which ‘advises us what to do if 
we want to partake of happiness’ with the moral law, which he defines as the law 
that ‘commands how we should behave in order even to become worthy of happiness 
[um nur der Glückseligkeit würdig zu werden].’52 For Kant, the association between 
the notions of morality and worthiness to be happy is so intimate that, mere pages 
later, he is able to frame his definitive reply to the fundamental question of ethics, 
‘What must I do?’ without deploying ‘moral,’ or ‘morality,’ or any cognate terms at 
all: ‘[d]o that through which you will become worthy to be happy,’ he writes.53 And 
such glosses are no early-critical-period anomaly. In his much later Metaphysics of 
Morals (1797), Kant says that an agent’s ‘worthiness to be happy is identical [ein 
und dasselbe] with his observance of duty.’54 Thus, too, Kant does not hesitate to 
identify the prospect of being worthy to be happy as a properly moral incentive. In-
deed, as he says in the first Critique, the moral law is ‘that [law] which is such that it 
has no other motive than the worthiness to be happy.’55 
Repeatedly, then, Kant slides—and invites his readers to slide—from ‘morality’ 
and ‘moral’ (and these expressions’ various cognates) to ‘worthiness to be happy’ 
                                                                                                                                     
es. See, for example, KrV A810/B838; KpV 5: 130 (108-9); KdU 5: 450 (315); ÜdG 8: 278, 281 (281, 
283); MdS 6: 481-2 (224-5); Anthro 7: 326 (231); LEC 27: 247-8, 358 (44, 136); LEM2 29: 623-4 
(242); DWL 24: 751 (485); LEV 27: 664-5, 717, 726 (399, 440, 447); LMK2 28: 767 (407); OP 21: 
195. See also R 7211 19: 286 (472); R 6856 19: 181 (441); R 6858 19: 181 (441); R 7202 19: 279 
(467). And see Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, 97, 100, 117. 
51 KpV 5: 130 (108). 
52 KrV A806/B834 (translation modified). 
53 A808-9/B836-7. Cf. Smith, ‘Worthiness to Be Happy’: 173. 
54 MdS 6: 482 (225) (my emphasis). See also LEV 27: 718 (441); LML1 28: 288, 301 (96, 106); LEC 
27: 249 (46); LEV 27: 717 (440); R 4461 17: 560 (137); R 5100 18: 87 (212); R 5477 18: 193 (416); R 
6910 19: 203 (449); R 6133 18: 465 (338-9); R 7315 19: 312. 
55 KrV A806/B834. For a much earlier statement of this position, likely from the mid-late 1760s, see R 
6628 19: 117 (427). There is much evidence to suggest that Kant continues to take this approach deep 
into his the critical period. See, for example, KrV A806/B834; Gr 4: 450 (55); LMM 29: 774 (131); 




and ‘worthy to be happy.’ He does not draw attention to this move; he simply exe-
cutes it. And the naturalness, the lack of friction, as it were, suggests that he has al-
ways already made this move, somewhere in the background of his thinking, well in 
advance of the contexts in which we happen to witness it. 
This ‘slide’ from ‘morality’ to ‘worthiness to be happy’ may be characterized as 
a generally implicit, always frictionless ‘id est’ (or ‘das Heißt’) in Kant’s thinking—
not merely a gloss on ‘morality,’ as I will be characterizing it throughout this thesis, 
but a habitual one. For example, in a relatively late (1793) instance that echoes the 
thesis assigned to Langer nearly a quarter of a century earlier, Kant writes: 
By our nature as beings dependent upon circumstances of sensibility, we crave happiness first 
and unconditionally. Yet by this same nature of ours…as beings endowed with reason and 
freedom, this happiness is far from being first, nor indeed is it unconditionally an object of our 
maxims; rather this first object is worthiness to be happy, i.e., the agreement of all our max-
ims with the moral law.56 
Here, the explicitly rendered ‘id est’ (actually, ‘das Heißt’) captures the essence of 
every instance in which Kant uses the idiom. It is the unmarked, habitual channel 
along which his thinking slips from ‘morality’ to ‘worthiness to be happy’ and back 
again.57 Surely ‘worthiness to be happy’ is not simply equivalent to ‘the agreement 
of all our maxims with the moral law.’ And yet, at first glance, this seems to be what 
Kant is saying. He does not claim, as we might expect him to, that the primary ‘ob-
ject of our maxims’ is ‘the agreement of all our maxims with the moral law’ (alt-
hough he would of course affirm this). He does not simply and straightforwardly 
claim, either, that given that we are ‘beings endowed with reason and freedom,’ our 
most fundamental aim is simply ‘to be moral,’ or ‘to pursue morality,’ or ‘to under-
take moral actions,’ or ‘to live a moral life’ (although he would affirm all of this as 
well). Nor does Kant treat the expression, ‘the agreement of all our maxims with the 
moral law’ (die Übereinstimmung aller unserer Maximen mit dem moralischen Ge-
setze) as a gloss on something like ‘our morality,’ or ‘the absolute moral worth of our 
actions,’ or ‘the absolute, unconditional goodness of the subjective ground of our 
                                                
56 Rel 6: 46 n. (41-2 n.) (Kant’s emphasis modified). 
57 For the most part, this ‘id est,’ or ‘das Heißt’ (also ‘das ist’), is implicit (but see, for example, 
Kant’s ‘d[as] i[st]’ at ÜdM 8: 257 n. [26 n.] and R 6610 19: 107 [422-3]). Where it is lacking it easily 
interpolated—as, for example, when Kant uses parenthetical constructions like ‘virtue (as worthiness 
to be happy)’ (KpV 5: 110 [92]). Moreover, the gloss is commutative. In the instance cited here, the 
explicit ‘das Heißt’ works in the opposite direction: Kant glosses ‘worthiness to be happy’ as ‘morali-
ty,’ under the description, ‘the agreement of all our maxims with the moral law.’ 
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good deeds’ (the Groundwork’s ‘good will,’58 say). In short, Kant does not say that 
as beings endowed with reason and freedom the first object of our maxims is morali-
ty—and then go on to gloss that, by way of his ‘das Heißt’, as ‘the agreement of all 
our maxims with the moral law.’ He does not do this, even though, at the time in 
question, he does of course hold this view. And he does not do this, even though a 
locution like ‘the agreement of all our maxims with the moral law’ seems more obvi-
ously and directly to explicate and clarify what Kant means by ‘morality’ than it 
seems to explicate and clarify what he means by ‘worthiness to be happy.’ 
Instead, Kant uses this occasion, as he does every instance in which he connects 
morality in this way with worthiness to be happy, to assert, in a remarkably offhand 
manner, that happiness is a state of the human being’s empirical affairs that is related 
in some sense to ‘the agreement of all [her] maxims with the moral law’ (etc.), that 
is, to her morality. His use of the idiom says nothing explicit about this relationship 
(although, as I will show in subsequent chapters, taken together with other considera-
tions, it points us obscurely in a certain direction). It merely affirms that Kant takes 
there to be one. The immediate directness of the gloss—its frictionless ‘id est’—
gives the impression of something rather unremarkable. It is as though Kant were 
merely glossing ‘morality’ as ‘goodness in all circumstances,’ or some such con-
struction. His offhand mode of expression, here, not to mention the fact that he never 
thematizes and justifies his use of the concept, gives the impression that his repeated 
interpolations of the expression ‘worthiness to be happy’ into his discussions of mo-
rality, do not interrupt, or import extraneous material into, his discussions of the lat-
ter. But these interpolations do advert to something extraneous here. Worthiness to 
be happy is not simply equivalent to morality. 
No matter how vast and deep, a catalogue of the numerous instances in which 
Kant uses this idiom shows little more than that a particularly stable mode of expres-
sion appears with some frequency across the various stages of Kant’s thinking about 
morality. Of course, my claim is rather more robust than this. I claim that the stabil-
ity of the idiom corresponds to the stability of an idée fixe that plays a consistent role 
throughout these stages. And I suggest that the frequency of the idiom’s deployment 
                                                
58 Gr 4: 393 (7). 
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is a sign of the importance of Kant’s commitment to the theoretical and practical ter-
rain of which the idiom is a kind of extremely concise map. 
In the next section, I trace the outlines of that map. I defer the task of filling in 
its details until chapter 2. 
‘Worthiness to be happy’: a three-place relation 
As we saw above, Kant sometimes writes as though he takes worthiness to be happy 
to be equivalent or identical to morality. He can hardly mean this in a straightforward 
sense, however. On its face, ‘moral’ (like ‘virtuous’ and ‘good’) is a one-place predi-
cate.59 To qualify an agent, her will, or her deeds as morally good is not to specify, 
by way of the same epithet, her (or her will’s, or her deeds’) relation to anything ex-
traneous to her, qua moral subject, or extraneous to her will, or to her deeds and their 
immediate consequences.60 
Instead, the predicate ‘worthy to be happy’ refers to a three-place relation in 
which (1) a finite, rational will (i.e., a practical-rational human subject) is related to 
(2) the realization of (a maximally integrated complement of) her empirical, non-
moral ends (her happiness), by way of (3) a mediating basis or condition for the lat-
ter. For Kant, the sole objectively and universally necessary ‘worthiness-basis’61 is 
an agent’s morality, which is here, ultimately, the moral goodness of her will or, 
equivalently, the goodness of her will’s radically basic disposition vis-à-vis the moral 
law. 
Note that, short of my explication of the ‘worthiness-basis’ (morality) which 
Kant takes to condition happiness, none of (1), (2), or (3) makes explicit reference to 
either ‘worthiness,’ or ‘morality.’ All that we have, in accordance with this schema, 
                                                
59 Other one-place predicates include adjectives such as ‘blue,’ ‘ragged,’ and ‘omnivorous,’ while 
‘taller than,’ ‘larger than,’ and ‘the father of’ are two-place predicates. N-place predicates, where n ≥ 
2, give expression to relations. Some such relations hold between triples of relata: thus Calgary is 
between Vancouver and Toronto, my mother travels to France by train, the sunset deserves admiration 
in view of its beauty, the murderer deserves death in view of his crime, and Jones is worthy of happi-
ness in view of his morality. For a different view see Hill, ‘Is a Good Will Overrated?’, 50 and cf. G. 
E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903); G. E. Moore, Ethics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1912). 
60 This, I take it, is one implication of Kant’s claim that a good will ‘is good in itself’ and that its 
‘[u]sefulness or fruitfulness can neither add anything to [its] worth nor take anything away from it’ 
(Gr 4: 394 [8]). See also Engstrom, ‘Happiness and the Highest Good’, 112. 
61 This is deliberately reminiscent of the language of desert and, in particular, the notion of a ‘desert-
basis.’ For a basic discussion see Louis P. Pojman and Owen McLeod, eds., What Do We Deserve?: A 
Reader on Justice and Desert (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 61-2. 
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is the formal idea of a relationship between something (‘happiness’) and one of it 
conditions (whatever this may be): (1) enjoys (2) on condition that (3) holds. Much 
turns, however, upon how (3) is taken to condition (2). 
‘Morality,’ then, is not simply synonymous with the expression, ‘worthiness to 
be happy.’ Rather, ‘worthiness to be happy’ is a three-place predicate, or three-place 
relation, in which morality appears as one element, one of three relata, along with a 
subject (the agent) and a second predicate (‘happiness’). The expression’s main ef-
fect is not to identify or equate morality with worthiness to be happy (as it sometimes 
seems to do62), nor to advert to any of the particular ways in which Kant understands 
‘morality.’ Rather, its main effect is to represent the moral agent’s morality (whatev-
er Kant takes this to be), on the one hand, and her (mainly prospective) happiness, on 
the other, as distinct states of her affairs that stand in a particular relationship to one 
another. Abstractly put, on Kant’s representation of matters, moral agents stand in a 
‘worthy-of’ relation to their (mainly prospective) happiness.63 In the abstract merely, 
too, this is a particular kind of ‘conditioned-by’ relation: one in which one thing (an 
agent’s morality) relates to another (her happiness) as one of its (in some sense) nec-
essary conditions. Kant’s glossing of ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy’ is his 
favoured way of adverting to this conditioned-by relation. Whenever he deploys the 
idiom he identifies morality as the ‘worthiness-basis’ sine qua non for happiness. 
This, I take it, is the force of what sometimes appears syntactically to be a straight-
forward identification. 
The idiom’s typical form, however, tends to draw Kant’s readers’ attention away 
from the fact that the gloss adds something to ‘morality.’ At times Kant’s usage 
seems to imply—supposing it goes too far to say that morality just is in some sense 
worthiness to be happy—that the referent of ‘worthiness to be happy’ is nevertheless 
somehow internal to morality, or an immediately obvious corollary of it. But this im-
pression is never justified. 
                                                
62 See, for example, Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, 119. 
63 Of course there are, for Kant, any number of things, apart from happiness, to which agents quali-
fied, too, as moral, can stand in a worthy-of relation. It is not as though ‘worthiness’ has to be ‘wor-
thiness to be happy’ merely. Agents (or their actions) can be worthy of worship, praise, emulation, 
and such things as ‘approval’ (R 6858 19: 181 [441]),’esteem’ (LEC 27: 357 [135]), ‘liking’ or ‘love’ 
(LEC 27: 420-1 [183]), ‘friendship’ (LEC 27: 429 [189]), or ‘humanity’ (LEV 27: 664-5 [399]).  
 
 37 
‘Worthiness to be happy’: the relata 
In this section I briefly discuss Kant’s notions of morality and happiness. First, I dis-
cuss morality. Then I discuss happiness. In each case, I restrict my discussion to a 
minimal, core characterization of these matters, which leaves the two elements disen-
tangled. (I discuss ways in which they might be entangled in chapter 2 in order to 
show that Kant’s notion of worthiness to be happy does not refer to morality or hap-
piness under any description that entangles them.) I then argue that the sense of 
Kant’s gloss is stable throughout his career and that its sense is independent of any of 
the particular answers that he gives to the primary, forward-looking question of eth-
ics, ‘What ought I to do?’ 
Morality 
In the present context, all that we really need to know about morality is that the term 
‘morality’ (and cognate expressions) refers to the way that an agent has to be in order 
to be worthy to be happy. As we shall see in the next chapter, according to the repre-
sentation inherent in Kant’s gloss, nothing connects happiness and morality direct-
ly—certainly nothing about morality—and only an extraneous ‘forging’ connects 
immorality (assuredly) to unhappiness. That said, the only thing that we really need 
to show about Kantian morality, in connection with the present topic (viz., Kant’s 
gloss’s representation of the relationship between happiness and morality), is that, in 
some basic sense, Kant always already regards it as a property that can be ascribed to 
agents and not merely, say, to actions. 
Beyond this, we can concede that Kant’s account of morality develops and 
changes in various ways in the course of his career and that the extent to which ‘mo-
rality’ and ‘absolute goodness,’ along with ‘immorality’ and ‘radical evil,’ become 
radically affixed to the agent’s absolutely discrete, totally consolidated, autocratic, 
and also self-legislating will, is a product of Kant’s thinking, not its explicit point of 
departure. In advance of his critical period—but of course not in advance of the in-
stauration of his habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy’ which pre-
dates the latter by a good margin—Kant’s understanding of morality resembles, in 
key respects, the thinking of some of his British predecessors and is also marked by 
the influence by Rousseau. 
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In the earlier type of view morality is just cooperation amongst human beings, as 
such, the coordination and hierarchization of their ends, community.64 The moral law 
is an empirical discovery and pertains to the rational, but still earthly pursuit of natu-
ral ends: as Ward puts it, ‘the richest possible development of one’s powers, conso-
nant with the greatest possible social harmony.’65 It is an ‘anthroponomy’ that 
organizes structures of empirical psychology and anthropology. This is not yet au-
tonomy, but rather ‘the autocracy of freedom,’ here identified as the ‘principium of 
morals,’ and conceived in terms of the agent’s self-governance ‘with regard to…the 
epigenesis of happiness,’66 but still in accordance with heteronomous principles.  
Of course, Kant’s pre-critical notion of morality, which is grounded in nothing 
more radical than contestable observations about the typical features of the human 
being, is later superseded. What had been pre-critically conceived of as ‘morality’ 
turns out to be a qualified mode of prudence, still heteronomy, a source of merely 
hypothetical imperatives. What had appeared to be laws turn out to be mere rules, 
‘universally’ applicable to the anthropological ‘universe’ only, to the changing con-
ditions of ‘humanity’ alone. 
As Kant asks, ‘by what right could we bring into unlimited respect, as a univer-
sal precept for every rational nature, what is perhaps valid only under the contingent 
conditions of humanity?’67 Kant’s critical position puts him in conflict, not merely 
with the earlier, largely British tradition of thinking for which morality has constitu-
tive, if carefully qualified, reference to the emotions and within which freedom is 
understood with reference to the specificity of human nature (whatever that turns out 
to be).68 It also puts him at odds with Rousseau, an important influence just in ad-
vance of the critical period,69 and contemporaries such as Schiller and Herder.70 
                                                
64 See, for example, R 7199 19: 272 (462-3). See also R 7052 19: 235, 272-3 (458, 462-3); R 7200 19: 
274 (463). See also D. O’Connor, ‘Kant's Conception of Happiness,’ The Journal of Value Inquiry 16, 
no. 3 (1982): 193. 
65 Keith Ward, The Development of Kant's View of Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972), 85. 
66 R 6867 19: 186 (444). 
67 Gr 4: 408 (20-21). In other words, on Kant’s ultimate view, morality cannot pertain to what holds 
true of mankind alone. See Henry E. Allison, Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kant's Theoretical 
and Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 117; Lewis White Beck, A 
Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 
82; Tom Sorell, ‘Kant's Good Will and Our Good Nature: Second Thoughts About Henson and 
Herman,’ Kant-Studien 78, no. 1 (1987): 95-6; Allen Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 69-70, 76. 
68 See Gr 4: 406ff. For a compact overview that situates Kant in relation to various key predecessors 
both in Britain and on the Continent see David Fate Norton and Manfred Kuehn, ‘The Foundations of 
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None of these influences gets as far as the radically agent-centred approach to 
which Kant ultimately attains.71 Kant comes to that point rather later (in his Religion, 
ultimately, of course). And yet, I suggest, this focus is already present in the thinking 
that is expressed by his gloss. From start to finish, whatever else ‘morality’ signifies, 
to be moral is to be worthy to be happy. This entails, at least, that Kant regards mo-
rality as a property, not merely of particular actions, motives, maxims, and so forth, 
but of agents. The main development in this regard is a deeper penetration of the 
predicate, ‘moral,’ to the very core of the agent and the absolute consolidation of the 
latter’s identity. 
This focusing in of ‘morality,’ however, is not always obvious. The unevenness 
and differentiations that characterize Kant’s thinking as it develops entail that his ul-
timate views on morality can be explicated in a number of ways. To be moral is to 
undertake deeds that give expression to maxims that have a particular form (i.e., that 
assert the unconditional practical necessity and universality of what they prescribe). 
To be moral is to be motivated in a particular way, to be possessed of an unqualified-
ly ‘good will,’ or to enjoy a particular mode of integrity in the radical source of one’s 
practical life as a whole, in one’s character (also regarded as the good character of 
one’s good will). 
In general, Kant predicates ‘morality’ under the rubric of ‘moral worth,’ and 
predicates it of an apparent variety of subjects. He predicates it of particular actions, 
of the choices that these express, of the maxims that they instantiate and so, in a 
sense, of ‘types’ or classes of actions,72 of the will from which these flow, of the 
                                                                                                                                     
Morality,’ in The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy, ed. K. Haakonssen 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Walker is also helpful (Ralph C. S. Walker, 
‘Achtung in the Grundlegung,’ in Grundlegung Zur Metaphysik Der Sitten: Ein Kooperativer 
Kommentar, ed. Ottfried Höffe (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989), 108). Cf. H. H. 
Schroeder, ‘Some Common Misinterpretations of the Kantian Ethics,’ The Philosophical Review 49, 
no. (1940): 427. 
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Cambridge University Press, 1996), 186 n. 21. 
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Kant's Moral Religion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 45. 
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character of that will, and of the manner in which the latter is motivated (i.e., of the 
class of incentives to which the agent’s effective, actually enticing incentives be-
long). Of course, none of these things is altogether discrete: Kant’s understanding of 
each is bound up in his understanding of the others. The various concepts in play 
here are interdependent.73 They form a complex whose various elements correspond 
to the variety of ways in which the subject of ‘morality’ or ‘moral worth’ is speci-
fied. 
This variety is a matter of purpose and focus. Kant illustrates this interdepend-
ence when, in the second Critique, he writes that ‘[w]hat is essential to any moral 
worth of actions is that the moral law determine the will immediately.’74 Later, treat-
ing the will’s deep, underlying character as a kind of fundamental maxim to act al-
ways and only in accordance with, or in contravention of, the moral law, he identifies 
this ‘maxim [as the ultimate factor] by the goodness of which all the moral worth of 
the person must be assessed.’75 Similarly, Kant describes a jaded philanthropist who, 
though ‘no longer incited to [beneficence] by any inclination…nevertheless tears 
himself out of this deadly insensibility and does the [required] action without any 
inclination, simply from duty.’ And, Kant goes on to say, it is ‘then [that] the action 
first has its genuine moral worth’ and, at the same time, that ‘[i]t is just then that the 
worth of character comes out, which is moral and incomparably the highest, namely 
that he is beneficent not from inclination but from duty.’76 
Again, however, to the extent that ‘worthiness to be happy’ is a predicate of the 
agent, and to the extent that morality is thereby construed as a condition that bears on 
that same agent’s happiness, Kant’s thinking tends towards an account of ‘morality’ 
that focuses, ultimately, on the agent: ‘the one that did it.’ Actions or maxims are not 
worthy to be happy, after all; agents are. From this agent-centred point of view, mo-
rality and immorality are properties that subsume the overall organization (nature, 
                                                
73 Allison, for example, sets forth a closely connected constellation of key concepts, writing that 
Kant’s ‘view is that we can be said to have a good will just in case we act from duty alone or, equiva-
lently, just in case our actions possess moral worth’ (Henry E. Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 108). See also the less succinct Paul Benson, ‘Moral 
Worth,’ Philosophical Studies 51, no. 3 (1987): 375-6, 379-80. 
74 KpV 5: 71 (62) (Kant’s emphasis modified). 
75 Rel 6: 30 (78) (my emphasis). 
76 Gr 4: 398 (12) (my emphasis). See also R 6133 18: 465 (338-9). 
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character, disposition) of the moral or immoral agent’s will, that is, her very self77 
regarded as a consolidated, identical ‘thing’ from which all of her particular choices 
and actions flow. The overall character of her choices and actions (simply good, or 
simply evil78) is a function of this deeper fact about her. An agent whose will, char-
acter, or motives are ‘moral’ is an agent whose actions have ‘moral worth.’ But her 
actions have ‘moral worth’ precisely because they are the actions of an agent whose 
will, character, or motives are good ones.79 
Even as I come down, firmly, in favour of this ultimately agent-centred reading 
of Kant, I do not want to trivialize the interpretive challenges that come up on a regu-
lar basis, in connection with Kant’s discussion of ‘moral worth.’80  I do not want to 
simply elide the subtle ways in which this concept is entangled with a whole host of 
other moral qualities: properties such as ‘praiseworthiness,’81 for example, or moral 
‘rightness,’82 ‘merit,’83 ‘value,’84 or ‘virtue.’85 Nor do I want to simply overlook the 
                                                
77 See Robert Paul Wolff, The Autonomy of Reason: A Commentary on Kant's Groundwork of the 
Metaphysic of Morals, Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 59. 
78 See Rel 6: 22-5 (71-3). See also Curzer, ‘From Duty’: 307. 
79 In general, however, it is unusual for Kant or his commentators to predicate ‘moral worth,’ specifi-
cally, of agents. See, however, Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, 298, 329 and cf. Judith 
Baker, ‘Do One's Motives Have to Be Pure?,’ in Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, 
Categories, Ends, ed. Richard E. Grandy and Richard Warner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1986), 459-60, 463, 465; S. Sverdlik, ‘Kant, Nonaccidentalness and the Availability of Moral Worth,’ 
Journal of Ethics 5, no. 4 (2001): 296. 
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Worth: A Reply to Murphy,’ Kant-Studien 59, no. (1968); J. G. Murphy, ‘Kant's Concept of a Right 
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in Kant's Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mark Timmons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
83 See especially Robert N. Johnson, ‘Kant's Conception of Merit: ‘Metaphysics of Morals’ and 
Evaluating Actions,’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77, no. 4 (1996): 311-12) and cf. Gr 4: 424 (33). 
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Kantian Ethics’: 429-430. 
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ambiguity that arises from the apparent, but inconsistent, interchangeability, of some 
of the main terminology that Kant deploys in his discussions of morality.86 
These difficulties acknowledged, my main point is this: Kant’s inquiries in this 
area are affected by the fact that, antecedently to posing any of the questions to 
which his thinking about ‘moral worth’ offers answers, he takes the human being’s 
morality to be the ‘worthiness-basis’ for her happiness. Thus, to the extent that he 
associates morality with worthiness to be happy, his focus falls upon the agent her-
self, first, and then entails an account of the morality of her maxims, choices, and 
actions that is relative to this focus. But this is so only to the extent that he makes this 
association; the latter does not determine the whole of his thinking about morality. 
The great variety of ways in which his commentators are able to characterize Kant’s 
thinking about ‘moral worth’ attests to the independence of his thinking about that 
from the thinking that is conditioned by his antecedently fixed take on the relation-
ship between morality and happiness. This variety is a function of the fact that, as 
soon as the association of morality with worthiness to be happy is bracketed out (as it 
almost always is by Kant’s readers), Kant’s thinking—and his commentators’—
evinces a considerable degree of latitude. His antecedent commitment to a particular 
conception of the relationship between morality and happiness, rather than any other 
factor, necessitates an agent-centre approach. Such an approach is possible and sen-
sible and present in Kant, independently of this commitment, but it is not demanded 
or called for, otherwise, with the same urgency. 
Independently of this demand, Kant’s understanding of moral worth can be con-
strued in a manner that swings all the way to the other extreme. In other words, it is 
certainly possible to argue that, for Kant, morality qua ‘moral worth’ is a property of 
actions alone, rather than a property of an agent’s character, or will, or any other fea-
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ture proper to her.87 In the main, however, Kant’s commentators offer a more nu-
anced reading, seeing ‘moral worth’ as a predicate whose immediate subject is this or 
that particular action, to be sure, but which also refers, more basically, to maxims,88 
or motives,89 or to the will90 or to the will’s character.91 
The dominant line of interpretation converges on the view that, for Kant, moral 
worth is a property that actions have in virtue of the way that they are motivated.92 
An action has moral worth if it both accords with what duty requires (if it is legal or 
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law-conforming in the broadest sense) and if it is actually done ‘from’ duty.93 In this 
connection too, however, Kant’s thinking evinces a considerable variety of emphases 
and qualifications, which is reflected in the host of readings that his thinking about 
duty invites.94 Simply put, its various instantiations aside, Kant’s ultimate, more or 
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less canonical, recourse to the idea of action ‘from’ duty tends naturally towards a 
focus on the agent as well. Moral worth is a property that actions have when they are 
motivated in a particular way. But ultimately, an agent’s being motivated to her par-
ticular actions in precisely this or that way is a function of her having a particular 
kind of will (a good or an evil one). 
This approach tends to focus on the agent, then, to the extent that it focuses on 
the manner in which her will is moved and entails her having and, in as sense, being 
a particular kind of will. But there is no theoretical demand, here, that such a will be 
like this—be a will so motivated—rigorously, always and only. For Kant, some ar-
gue, whatever value duty-conforming, but non-moral actions (or agents) may have, 
they have this value only accidentally.95 Thus duty-conforming and actually moral 
actions, on this account, are moral in virtue of something non-accidental: the agent’s 
free self-alignment (on the occasion in question) with respect to the moral law96 or 
her rational interest (at the time) in doing what it is actually good to do.97 But this 
can be construed as an occasional matter—an occasional goodness of the agent (or 
her will) that her actions inherit and put on display, but a property that is no more 
stable or permanent than the actions themselves. 
In the main then, independently of Kant’s antecedent commitment to the idea 
that an agent’s morality is a condition bearing (somehow) on her happiness, his at-
tention is focused upon questions about the morality of particular actions and about 
their motivation (on this or that occasion). The underlying, stable structures of char-
acter and will are in view as well—even prominently so. But here, in connection with 
questions about what it is unconditionally good to do or to have done, the will and its 
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character are not the absolutely urgent focus that they get to be in Kant’s ultimate 
thinking (in the Religion and its critical period foreshadowings) about the possibility 
of imputing the agent’s most radical ‘Gesinnung’ to her and his worries about the 
consequences that would accrue if this were somehow disallowed. Again, this lack of 
urgency is possible because there really is a current in Kant’s thinking about morality 
whose dynamism is conditioned only by the primary question of ethics, ‘What ought 
I to do?’ and therefore runs its course independently of the thinking that is expressed 
by his habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy.’ 
In other words, Kant’s specific account of what counts as a will’s or an agent’s 
‘morality,’ or of what constitutes the ‘moral worth’ of her motives, maxims, or ac-
tions, develops independently of, but also sometimes coincides with, his account of 
the conditions that have to be met if this agent or will is to be identified, wholly and 
simply, not only as the unique source of particular deeds, but as their cause, so to 
speak, according to their kind (qua moral or immoral)—that is, such that their impu-
tation subsumes and ascribes to the agent herself the very character (of her will) rela-
tive to which her deeds are deemed good or bad ones in the first place. This is the 
outcome that is so urgent, for Kant, given his understanding of the relationship be-
tween morality and happiness, to the extent that this understanding finds expression 
in his habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy.’ 
From both the point of view of the primary question of ethics, then, and from the 
point of view of Kant’s secondary, but no less urgent, worries concerning the rela-
tionship between morality and happiness (his thinking about that relationship’s na-
ture and his worries about its actualization), the agent, or rather the will, which is ‘in 
a sense…the very person himself,’98 stands at the nearer end of an evaluative contin-
uum that begins with what is most apparent, but least decisive—particular actions—
and proceeds through maxims and motives to what is most radical, decisive, but least 
accessible: namely, the agent herself or, again, her will. As Henrich says, for Kant 
‘our esteem concerns only the will which is directed to the “good,” regardless of 
whether it actualizes the good, or whether stronger forces thwart its intentions.’99 
There is a sense in which actions are important, then, but not fundamental for 
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Kant.100 An agent is not worthy to be happy because she does good deeds. She is 
worthy to be happy because she has a good will, because her will has a good charac-
ter, because her will is so configured that when she does her duty she is motivated to 
do so by the consideration that her duty binds her absolutely, because she frames and 
acts on maxims that legislate universally for all rational beings. Her good deeds 
show, or would show if only we could establish that they really were good (we can-
not of course), that she—she herself—is worthy to be happy. 
Happiness 
What does Kant take moral agents to be worthy of? Well, happiness—of course.101 
But matters are not at all straightforward in this respect. Kant’s notion of worthiness 
to be happy entails a view of happiness that, as I will show in chapter 2, does not fit 
perfectly with any of the theories of happiness that can be drawn out of his work.102 
For now, I will outline just enough of Kant’s thinking about happiness to delineate a 
kind of core conception of the ‘thing’ of which he takes moral agents to be worthy (a 
core whose aspects it shares with Kant’s other main conceptions of happiness). In 
chapter 2, I will further specify this core so as to distinguish between happiness re-
garded as a state of affairs of which moral agents are worthy and immoral ones un-
worthy, and happiness regarded (also sometimes by Kant) as something that is 
inconsistent with the sense of his habitual gloss. 
For now, then, I distinguish between five core features of Kant’s understanding 
of happiness. It will soon be evident that some of these elements of his thinking are 
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in tension with one another; they do not offer up an entirely coherent picture. This 
‘core’ is not monolithic by any means. 
First, for Kant, ‘happiness’ (or ‘Glückseligkeit’) refers to a state of their affairs 
that human beings desire universally, inevitably, ineradicably, and, just as such, in-
nocently.103 Second, happiness is a state of the human being’s empirical affairs. Kant 
always conceives of happiness in a way that has integral reference to the experience 
of having at least some of one’s actual inclinations gratified.104 It is going too far to 
say that happiness is ‘a state that Kant always associates exclusively with the 
body,’105 but we must also reject the claim that mere moral contentment or self-
satisfaction, just as such, is ever what Kant means by ‘Glückseligkeit.’106 
In fact, some commentators have held that, for Kant, moral contentment or mor-
al self-satisfaction is a kind of happiness, or even that this is just what Kant takes au-
thentic happiness consists in.107 Admittedly, in the Religion, Kant does contrast 
‘moral happiness’ and ‘physical happiness’108 and in The Metaphysics of Morals he 
juxtaposes ‘pathological pleasure’ and ‘moral pleasure.’109 Nevertheless, Kant says 
(a page earlier) that the idea of ‘a certain moral happiness not based on empirical 
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causes’ is ‘a self-contradictory absurdity.’ Rather, this is ‘a state that could well be 
called happiness, a state of contentment and peace of soul in which virtue is its own 
reward.’110 Or again, ‘moral happiness’ is ‘a misuse of the word happiness’ and ‘al-
ready involves a contradiction.’111 At most, Kant allows that moral self-contentment 
is analogous to happiness.112 
It is almost universally agreed, in any case, that Kant’s dominant practice is to 
distinguish between moral contentment or moral self-satisfaction and happiness, and 
not to conflate them.113 As we shall see in chapter 2, moral self-satisfaction is some-
times, for Kant, a kind of moral-psychological condition without which happiness 
(though not impossible) will tend to be eroded or undermined.114 And sometimes he 
takes moral contentment (or, really, the well-ordered freedom that it discloses) to be 
a necessary formal condition for happiness.115 
Third, some commentators have found in Kant a seemingly hedonistic sense of 
‘happiness’ that pertains to the pleasure of the moment, the fulfillment of this or that 
desire, here and now, the gratification of particular inclinations at a particular time. 
This perspective has an ambiguous position relative to what I am characterizing as an 
analysis of the common ‘core’ of Kant’s thinking about happiness. It attaches to that 
core, as it were, to the extent that it holds forth the first and most obvious possible 
sense of happiness which, as I will argue in the next chapter, might be connected 
with Kant’s habitual gloss (I will problematize this association and propose a more 
nuanced possibility in chapter 4). On this view, happiness is a matter of the occa-
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sional, pleasurable ‘satisfaction of desire and impulse.’116 Indeed, the commentary 
demonstrates that it is possible to read Kant on happiness in this way, at least some 
of the time; it also demonstrates that this reading is problematic.117 With one im-
portant exception,118 Kant’s published work offers little evidence to support the view 
that he ever thinks about happiness in such terms.119 If this approach is present in 
Kant then—not merely in the form of the odd imprecision of expression, but as a 
view that he holds systematically—it is problematic and, evidently, extremely muted. 
Nevertheless, as I said above, for reasons that will become clear in chapter 2, this 
notion attaches to the core of Kant’s thinking about happiness as a kind of implicit, 
most basic, default possibility for answering the question: Of what does Kant take 
moral agents to be worthy and immoral ones unworthy? 
Fourth, Kant observes that individual human beings have distinct ‘concepts of 
happiness,’ that each agent’s concept of happiness is distinct in some respect(s) or 
other from her neighbours’.120 On this view, as Paton puts it, happiness can only be 
regarded as ‘the good for me or my good.’121 Here, the notion of happiness depends 
for its content upon the particular desires that particular agents happen to have at par-
ticular times. So regarded, happiness is a ‘relative’ concept,122 entirely ‘subjective’123 
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and ‘variable.’124 More strongly put, on this view, one subject’s notion of happiness 
is incommensurate with another’s.125 Indeed, at times, Kant seems to put the individ-
ual agent in the position of being unable to determine her own concept of happiness 
in advance, thus rendering happiness a state of affairs that she cannot really determi-
nately plan for or anticipate.126 On this view, happiness appears to be a general con-
cept, but is not one. The idea of ‘happiness’ that agents hold in common, here, is not 
a general concept of happiness, but rather the brute idea of the state of affairs that 
would consists in ‘all’ of each individual agents’ particular inclinations being satis-
fied.127 
Fifth, however, Kant’s dominant tendency is to construe happiness as a kind of 
shared ideal, ‘the genuinely a priori concept of a systematic whole of intra- and in-
terpersonal happiness.’128 On this view, happiness remains ‘a mere idea,’ impossible 
to think concretely, and impossible for a finite being to achieve in merely natural 
terms.129 This tendency in Kant’s core thinking about happiness construes happiness 
as an ideal state of affairs that would consist in the actualization of the ‘absolute 
whole,’130 or as the ‘the natural end of the sum of all inclinations,’131 a scenario in 
which ‘everything’ goes one’s way,132 a continuous, uninterrupted state of affairs in 
which one ‘always’ gets what one wants.133 Even though they do not always take it 
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to be the only concept of happiness that he deploys, many commentators emphasize 
Kant’s notion of happiness in terms of this ideal of ‘an absolute whole’ and continu-
ous ‘maximum of well-being.’134 
Of course, Kant has to qualify these references to ‘all,’ ‘everything,’ and ‘al-
ways’ in various ways in order to render the concept to which they belong relevant in 
practice. It would be incoherent to speak of—or to strive for—the joint realization of 
mutually exclusive ends, for example. Instead Kant tends to see the ‘thing’ desired 
under the concept of ‘happiness’ as an object whose counterfactual, ultimately de-
ferred actualization would consist in the maximal fulfillment or realization of a max-
imally harmonized sum, or systematized complex, or hierarchy of one’s jointly 
realizable empirical ends.135 Since not all of a human being’s projects are mutually 
achievable, she must anticipate and seek (by way of what Kant characterizes as 
‘skill’) to realize the best overall organization of her aims and so, too, of the action 
that aims at their realization. Because inclinations conflict with one another, they 
must be organized in a hierarchical scheme and harmonized under the notion of hap-
piness.136 Kant points out, however, that given the great complexity and obscurity of 
this project, the human being can have no ‘determinate concept of what he really 
wills here.’137 
 For Kant, then, in the main, ‘happiness’ is not a general term covering each of 
the particular ends for which inclination ‘strives [strebt]’138 (as though they were 
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mere instances of a kind). Rather, ‘happiness’ refers to this whole—whether to the 
inconsistent totality of such ends, or to the harmonized hierarchy that entails com-
plex compromises between them. In either of these perspectives, there can be no ac-
tual instances of happiness as such. As Kant says in his philosophy of religion 
lectures, ‘[w]e do, to be sure, have an idea of the complete entirety of well-being and 
of the highest contentment; but we cannot cite a case in concreto where this idea of 
happiness is entirely realized.’139 
Happiness, in Kant’s dominant view, would depend so profoundly upon the hu-
man agent’s own skill and foresight and power and, too, upon the cooperation of 
both nature and other agents that it would be unattainable, as such—an aspiration, 
merely. Happiness is out of reach, both as ‘all,’ ‘everything,’ and ‘always,’ and as an 
internally coherent, limited, but still ideal whole. All of this suggests that happiness 
lies always out of the human being’s reach, beyond our ability to think it and beyond 
our ability practically to achieve it.140 ‘[W]e have no concept of the whole [of all 
ends],’ Kant argues. It is unthinkable by us. We certainly ‘cannot direct our actions 
according to [it].’141 Indeed, as Wood points out, there is a sense in which, on Kant’s 
thinking, unhappiness alone is assured so that the latter must be our lot, ‘even when 
our present needs are satisfied.’142 
Note, however, that happiness’ impossibility, here, is not a matter of the human 
being’s failure to be moral. On this account, not morality, but the cooperation of ex-
ternal (natural and social) factors, in combination with the right kind of skill, fore-
sight, and power are necessary and sufficient conditions without which happiness 
turns out to be impossible. Given these conditions, happiness would be assured. The 
human being’s finitude, rather than her immorality, militates here against her happi-
ness. Thus far, given the degree to which I have isolated these core components of 
Kant’s thinking about happiness from the rest of his theoretical concerns, it would 
appear that if the human being were a kind of adequately skilled, insightful, and 
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powerful demigod, and if she entered into an adequately far-sighted compact with 
adequately cooperative, pragmatically motivated companions, and if nature happened 
to be adequately amenable or pliant, then she could be happy—even if, as demigods 
too often are, she were profoundly immoral. 
But in some sense Kant takes morality to be a necessary condition for happiness. 
As I show in chapter 2, to the extent that Kant glosses ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be 
happy,’ he regards the happiness of which moral agents are worthy and immoral ones 
unworthy to be something to which they might possibly attain, morality aside. Spe-
cifically, however, he regards this happiness as a state of affairs that would have to 
be forged, then, on behalf of such agents, by God—or occluded (just in case they had 
attained the rank, as it were, of immoral demigods). The notion of worthiness to be 
happy, therefore, has a fundamentally eschatological orientation (see chapter 4). It 
also entails a particular specification of Kant’s concept of happiness, beyond what 
we have been exploring here. Again, I take this up in the next chapter. 
The independence of the idiom 
In the foregoing, I have at times already touched upon the subject matter of this sub-
section. I will now consolidate and explicate the claim that, while Kant’s thinking 
about morality (in its primary, forward-looking sense, in constant connection with 
the question, ‘What ought I to do?’) varies and develops in the course of his career, 
his understanding of the relationship between morality and happiness—to the extent 
that this is encapsulated in his regular glossing of ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be 
happy’—remains constant. In other words, the expression, ‘worthiness to be happy,’ 
always has more or less the same sense. 
This means that even as he is working out his ‘critical’ answer to the primary 
question of ethics, ‘What ought I to do?’, Kant’s gloss indicates, repeatedly, that he 
is always already committed to a particular answer to the question: ‘How are morali-
ty and happiness related?’ Obliquely and obscurely, Kant answers this question in 
the same manner every time he glosses ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy.’ While 
his thinking about morality (in its primary, forward-looking sense) develops and 
deepens, the core of his thinking about the relationship between morality and happi-
ness does not. The stability of this core is evident in the stability and frequent de-
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ployment of the expression itself. The stubborn incorrigibility of its referent, howev-
er, is evidenced by the expression’s regular interpolation into contexts where it adds 
nothing to the discussion at hand. Its obscurity—its virtually submarine character—is 
on display in the fact that these interpolations make no waves, neither in the immedi-
ate context of Kant’s text, nor in the reading of most of his commentators. 
Kant’s assumption concerning the relationship between happiness and morality, 
as encapsulated in his habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy,’ is 
both deep and silent. It is logically antecedent to almost all of his thinking about both 
morality and happiness. There are, however, a number of exceptions. Kant’s assump-
tion affirms, first, that irrespective of any of the other uses to which he puts ‘moral,’ 
‘immoral,’ ‘happy,’ and ‘unhappy,’ it is possible for immoral agents to be happy (see 
chapter 2). It affirms, second (as we have seen in this chapter), that irrespective of 
any of the other uses to which he puts ‘moral’ and ‘immoral,’ Kant is able to turn 
these notions around, disentangle them from their primary reference to the possible 
maxims, motives, incentives, and actions that would answer to the forward-looking 
questions, ‘What ought I to do?’ and ‘What ought I not to do?’, and assign them to 
antecedently established actual properties of active agents—of their wills and their 
will’s characters. And it affirms, third, that immoral agents ought not to be happy 
(which affirmation has the major entailments that I discuss in the rest of this thesis). 
The thoughts that find implicit expression in Kant’s habitual gloss pertain to a 
topos, then, whose special character does not depend upon any particular outcome of 
the primary, forward-looking mode of moral inquiry whose fundamental question is: 
What ought I to do? By contrast, the thoughts that find expression in Kant’s habitual 
gloss bear profoundly on the outcome of the secondary, backward-looking mode of 
moral inquiry whose fundamental questions are not only, ‘How are happiness and 
morality (in its forward-looking sense) related?’, but also ‘Who ought actually to be 
unhappy?’ 
Indeed, this is not quite right. Kant’s gloss does not exactly answer these ques-
tions. Rather, it declares, in the obscure, almost silent manner with which this thesis 
must contend, that they have already been answered, in advance. 
Thus, to put a sharp point on my claim, the representation of the relationship be-
tween morality and happiness that is implicit in Kant’s glossing of ‘morality’ as 
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‘worthiness to be happy’ has priority over all of the particular claims that Kant 
makes about morality and happiness in his ‘critical’ period. This priority has signifi-
cant consequences. It is in the nature of the ‘worthy-of’ relation to which his gloss 
refers that it is possible to elucidate the latter without having to say very much at all 
about what ‘morality’ consists in. ‘Morality’ can be allowed to denote a variety of 
possible states of an agent’s practical affairs (obviously, however, not just any old 
state of her practical affairs), without this variation’s affecting morality’s basic func-
tion—as represented by Kant’s use of this idiom—in relation to happiness: that is, its 
role as a necessary condition for the latter. What then of this necessity, this condi-
tioned-by relation? What exactly does Kant mean when he affirms that moral agents 
are worthy and immoral ones unworthy of happiness? I answer these questions in 
chapter 2. 
‘Worthiness to be happy’ in the commentary 
In the course of this section I will refrain, as far as possible, from referring to the var-
ious ways in which this thesis’ position on Kant’s use of the ‘worthiness to be happy 
idiom’ differs from the positions espoused by the handful of commentators that take 
the matter up for discussion. I do not want to jump too far ahead by making substan-
tive claims about my understanding of Kant’s gloss—a sense of the latter that will be 
best clarified by a process of accrual over the course of this work’s subsequent chap-
ters. Instead, this chapter’s conclusion will offer a bare sketch of the main ways in 
which I take these other readers’ interpretations to differ from mine. But it will be a 
task of the rest of this thesis to demonstrate, bit by bit, the extent to which the read-
ings of these other commentators are mistaken, or inadequate, or beside the point. 
Before beginning, I want to take a moment to deplore the paucity of such read-
ings—to note this lacuna and to take issue with it. Aside from the very few excep-
tions that I discuss below, the commentary pays no special attention to the Kantian 
habit with which this thesis is concerned. In general the idiom encounters a kind of 
oblivious complacency. Reader’s whose citations of the Kantian text include the ex-
pression, ‘worthiness to be happy’ (or any of its cognates), read right through the lat-
ter as though it were not there at all. They do not pause to interrogate it, to ask what 
it is doing there in the midst (as it so often is) of Kant’s discussions of morality in the 
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latter’s primary, forward-looking sense. They do not ask Kant to explain himself. 
They simply proceed as Kant does, sliding without noticeable friction from the lan-
guage of ‘morality,’ ‘moral worth,’ ‘inner worth,’ ‘good will,’ (moral) ‘character,’ 
and ‘virtue’ to talk of ‘worthiness to be happy.’143 It must be (I surmise) that these 
readers take the gloss to effect a theoretical move so obvious and of such peripheral 
significance that it merits no discussion. Or perhaps they do not even notice it. Per-
haps they really do simply take the expressions ‘morality’ (‘virtue,’ etc.) and ‘wor-
thiness to be happy’ to be simply and unremarkably synonymous. 
The immediacy of this inherited, habitual procedure, however, gives the impres-
sion of endorsing a theoretical move: Kant’s repeated affirmation of a particular con-
nection between happiness and morality. But this move is not obviously warranted at 
all. And it is incumbent on Kant’s readers not to make it—unless they are prepared to 
make it explicitly. It is simply not obvious that the ‘inner worth’ of my will, in 
Kant’s sense—the worth of my will ‘as compared not with others, but with the moral 
law’—is simply equivalent to my worthiness to be happy.144 This is what Kant says, 
to be sure; but what does he mean? Much turns on the nature of the ‘worthy-of’ rela-
tion in which Kant takes moral agents to stand to their own (perhaps mainly prospec-
tive) happiness. Perhaps nothing interesting lies that way; perhaps something very 
interesting does. In any case, this ought to be carefully investigated before Kant’s 
move is endorsed. In general, though, it is not remarked upon at all. 
                                                
143 Allison, for example, simply follows the pattern set by Kant, leaving this move entirely implicit, 
unexamined, and unjustified. He says that moral laws do not merely tell us what we ought uncondi-
tionally to do; they ‘tell us what we have to do to be worthy of happiness’ (Henry E. Allison, ‘The 
Concept of Freedom in Kant's Semi-Critical Ethics,’ Archiv Fur Geschichte Der Philosophie 68, no. 1 
(1986): 101; Allison, Theory of Freedom, 66). Similarly, Beck makes the ‘state of being worthy of 
happiness’ an ‘a priori condition’ of happiness without explicating the conceptual relationship be-
tween ‘worthiness to be happy’ and morality (Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical 
Reason, 215). Or again, simply following along after Kant, Carnois avers that ‘moral laws absolutely 
command the way we must act if we would make ourselves worthy of happiness’ (Bernard Carnois, 
The Coherence of Kant's Doctrine of Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 26). In a 
related vein, Sverdlik conflates ‘morality’ as the doctrine of ‘what we ought to do’ with ‘morality’ as 
the doctrine of ‘what we deserve praise for doing’ (Sverdlik, ‘Kant, Nonaccidentalness and the 
Availability of Moral Worth’: 293). See also Henson, ‘What Kant Might Have Said: Moral Worth and 
the Overdetermination of Dutiful Action’: 42; Murphy, ‘Kant's Concept of a Right Action’: 591. Gun-
kel comes close to thematizing Kant’s habit, but his implicit observation that, for Kant, ‘morality’ is 
somehow ‘morality as worthiness to be happy’ is simply an occasion for his critique of the role that 
Kant assigns (in the Canon) to belief in God and immortality, in connection with morality (Andreas 
Gunkel, Spontaneität Und Moralische Autonomie: Kants Philosophie Der Freiheit, Berner Reihe 
Philosophischer Studien (Bern: Verlag Paul Haupt, 1989), 101-2). 
144 Thus Allen Wood, Kantian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 220. 
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As I said above, however, a small handful of commentators do encounter a kind 
of friction when they read through Kant’s gloss and recognize that it stands in need 
of explanation, at least. 
Dieter Henrich, to begin with, in his essay on ‘The Concept of Moral Insight and 
Kant’s Doctrine of the Fact of Reason,’ elucidates ‘the theoretical reason for the the-
sis…that morality is the worthiness to be happy.’ As an ‘ideal,’ he argues, happiness 
has its source in a longing of reason for unconditioned unity even in action. Because this unity 
cannot be achieved on the basis of content, reason, in order to satisfy its principle, must place 
happiness under a condition which does not take into consideration the accidental distribution 
of luck and the contradiction of desires. This condition is that happiness should be distributed 
only in the form of rational universality for the sake of the idea of universality. Reason places 
all striving for happiness under the condition that it must correspond to the form of rational 
order. This is the theoretical reason for the thesis that continually returns in Kant’s literary 
remains, namely, that morality is the worthiness to be happy.145 
I will make two main observations here and draw a conclusion from them. My first 
observation is that Henrich’s argument depends upon two distinct notions of happi-
ness. On the one hand, there is happiness as an ‘ideal’ that ‘has its source in a long-
ing of reason for unconditioned unity even in action.’ On the other hand, Henrich 
adverts implicitly to a distinct possibility: happiness as a product of mere ‘luck’ and 
as a state of affairs that would haphazardly gratify (at least some of) the ultimately 
contradictory desires that human beings just happen to have. 
My second observation is that Henrich refers to the relationship between happi-
ness and ‘the form of rational order’ in a manner that has direct reference to happi-
ness’ ‘distribution’—and that there seem to be two senses of this term in play as 
well. On the one hand, there is ‘the accidental distribution of luck’ (which is corre-
lated with ‘the contradiction of desires’). On the other hand, there is ‘dis-
tribut[ion]…in the form of rational universality.’ This ‘form’ contrasts, of course, 
with the ‘accidentalness’ and ‘contradiction’ of the merely empirical ‘content’ that 
contaminates reason’s ‘ideal’ of happiness, which is antecedently grounded in its 
pure ‘longing,’ and conceived of as the upshot of ‘unity even in action’ from the out-
set. 
Reason places happiness or, more precisely, ‘all striving for happiness’ under a 
condition such that, if the aim of this striving were realized (by the agent herself), 
then the agent’s happiness just would be distributed along the contours of morality 
                                                
145 Henrich, ‘The Concept of Moral Insight and Kant's Doctrine of the Fact of Reason’, 77-8. 
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and ‘for the sake of the idea of universality.’ Henrich does not use the term ‘morali-
ty’ here, of course, at all, but refers instead to such things as ‘rational universality,’ 
‘the idea of universality,’ and ‘the form of rational order.’ 
Thus, I conclude, Henrich defines happiness, from the outset, in such a way that 
the happiness of which moral agents are worthy, on his reading of Kant’s expression, 
can only be happiness qua pleasing to reason. In other words, the happiness of which 
moral agents are worthy is, at the same time, happiness that is distributed (or rather 
striven for and achieved) in a manner that answer’s to reason’s antecedent ‘longing.’ 
Happiness in this sense is correlated with morality from the outset. The baser state of 
affairs that is ‘distributed’ haphazardly, by mere chance, along the discontinuous, 
frayed contours of contradiction-riven desire is not the state of affairs at which the 
unified action (or ‘striving’) of moral agents aims in the first place. 
This suggests that Henrich’s use of ‘distributed,’ or ‘distribution’ here, is not 
univocal. Happiness, in the sense of the ‘ideal’ that ‘has its source in a longing of 
reason for unconditioned unity’ is not something that even could be ‘distributed’ to 
immoral agents; nor could their striving count as striving for that. Thus, Henrich 
makes morality internal to the happiness of which moral agents are worthy. Reason’s 
strategy for getting what it wants, by placing ‘all striving for happiness under the 
condition that it must correspond to the form of rational order,’146 empties Kant’s 
identification of morality as worthiness to be happy (‘the thesis…that morality is the 
worthiness to be happy’) of the normative significance that it appears, at least, to 
have. On Henrich’s reading, to say that an agent is worthy to be happy is to say that 
her striving for happiness has a form such that, if she were ever to attain what she 
sought, then what she had attained would satisfy her—and otherwise not. On this 
reading, the haphazardly distributed/achieved ‘happiness’ of immoral agents would 
be too odd an incarnation of the thing (by not being satisfying to them) to count as 
happiness at all. 
While Henrich has a ready explanation for Kant’s ‘thesis…that morality is the 
worthiness to be happy,’ Morris Cohen finds it puzzling—at least at first. ‘Why,’ he 
asks, ‘after Kant has gone to so much labor to prove that we must do our duty for 
duty’s sake and for no other reason, does he in the end spring the demand that virtue 
                                                
146 Ibid.,  78. 
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be rewarded in accordance with “worthiness to be happy.”’147 Evidently, Cohen’s 
first thought, when faced with Kant’s use of the idiom, is that the latter’s primary 
role is to represent the potential for reward that inheres in doing what is right—a 
possibility that he takes Kant to be holding forth as an apparent incentive (something 
that Kant ought not to be doing). More than this, Cohen seems to take Kant to hold 
that virtue in some sense ‘demands’ reward. 
Cohen then proceeds to the rather judicious observation that ‘worthiness to be 
happy’ is an ‘unanalyzed concept [that] seems to be dragged in ab extra without any 
relevance to, or agreement with, Kant’s other ethical ideas.’148 Again, Cohen finds 
this puzzling. But then he declares that 
the puzzle is clarified when we take into account Kant’s philosophy of law, according to 
which it is a moral imperative that offenses be punished and worthy labor properly rewarded. 
A society or universe in which this is not the case is not moral or just.149 
Cohen’s clarification of the originally puzzling, apparently ‘ab extra,’ seemingly 
theoretically ‘irrelevant’ intrusion of Kant’s notion of worthiness to be happy, is ra-
ther reminiscent of his original (puzzled) sense of the concept: Kant’s deployment of 
this notion communicates his view that ‘offenses [ought to] be punished and worthy 
labor properly rewarded,’ which last claim corresponds to Cohen’s earlier sense that 
the idiom refers to the idea that ‘virtue [ought to] be rewarded.’ Cohen’s reference to 
Kant’s notion of justice and to his ‘philosophy of law’ marks an important differ-
ence, though, between the puzzled reading and the clarified one. 
On the former reading, the possibility of reward is held forth as an apparent en-
ticement (or as a possible enticement, in any case, where no enticement should en-
ter). On the latter reading the concept of worthiness to be happy reminds us that ‘it is 
a moral imperative that offenses be punished and worthy labor properly rewarded.’ 
Evidently, Cohen takes Kant’s concept, here, to express the view that morality ne-
cessitates happiness. He also implies that the notion of justice that is associated with 
the concept of worthiness to be happy has both a political and an eschatological 
character, applying to both ‘society’ and the ‘universe.’ 
                                                
147 Morris Cohen, ‘A Critique of Kant's Philosophy of Law,’ in The Heritage of Kant, ed. George 
Tapley Whitney and David Frederick Bowers (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1939), 280. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid.,  280-1. 
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Allan Wood perceives the need for an explanation here as well. His approach is 
as follows. Kant refers to ‘virtue,’ or ‘the moral good,’ as ‘the condition of our wor-
thiness to be happy.’ He does this because he sees the moral good (virtue) as both 
‘the unconditioned good’ and ‘the supreme condition of all else which is good.’ In 
other words, for Kant, an agent’s happiness (the sum of her ‘natural ends’) lacks 
‘goodness,’ in the sense of ‘moral validity,’ if she is not moral or virtuous. It is vir-
tue’s ‘role,’ here, to ‘provide the condition’ without which our happiness is (objec-
tively) bad, or morally invalid. And this, Wood concludes, is why Kant characterizes 
virtue as ‘the condition of our worthiness to be happy.’150 The question that Wood 
takes Kant to be answering goes something like this. Under what condition(s) is hap-
piness a good for morality, or good from morality’s point of view, or good from a 
point of view that is itself moral? Kant’s answer, according to Wood, is that happi-
ness ‘is a good for morality only insofar as it is conditioned by [virtue].’151 Evident-
ly, at least on its face, Wood’s reading conflates virtue’s being a condition for 
worthiness to be happy with virtue’s being a condition without which happiness is 
not a good for morality. 
In spite of this ambiguity, Wood’s approach captures fairly clearly the idea that 
there is an objective point of view—the point of view of ‘morality’ in some sense—
from which the happiness of immoral agents may be judged to be a bad thing. And 
Wood opens a path, at least, to Kant’s idea that, from this point of view, while they 
can be happy, immoral agents ought not to be. He does not make morality a condi-
tion that is simply internal to happiness in the way that Henrich does. Nor does he 
promote the idea (present in Cohen’s reading) that, from the point of view of Kantian 
‘morality,’ virtue positively demands the happiness of its bearers. 
Paul Guyer offers the most sustained discussion of Kant’s practice in regard to 
this idiom. He begins by characterizing Kant’s ‘frequently reiterated characterization 
of virtue as the worthiness to be happy’ as a ‘profound mystery in [his] ethics’ and 
identifies the notion of worthiness to be happy as the main concept ‘through’ which 
Kant represents the connection between ‘virtue and happiness.’152 Guyer observes, 
too, that ‘by the time of his published writings’ Kant’s ‘equation of virtue with wor-
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152 Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, 117. 
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thiness to be happy…had come to seem so obvious to him as to need no real explana-
tion.’153 
In the course of clearing up this ‘profound mystery,’ Guyer makes at least the 
following five useful points. First, he recognizes that Kant’s use of the ‘worthiness to 
be happy’ idiom expresses a distinctive point of view, one that Kant simply takes for 
granted. Second, Guyer sees that the idiom’s sense is far from obvious and that an 
explanation is in order. Third, he recognizes that the idiom comes into currency well 
in advance of Kant’s critical period. Fourth, Guyer understands that it gives expres-
sion to a single (if complex), more or less consolidated, intellectual commitment. 
Fifth, he recognizes that the notion of worthiness to be happy has something to do 
with desert.154 
Guyer favours a reading that makes Kant’s use of the idiom the end product of a 
relatively straightforward line of antecedent reasoning. And he sees this reasoning as 
focused on the conditions under which agents deserve to be happy. He interprets 
Kant’s ‘equation’ of virtue with worthiness to be happy as the expression of a certain 
construal of distributive justice; a notion, here, that has reference to ‘merit,’ right,’ 
and ‘entitlement.’ And he identifies two main ideas, prevalent across a number of 
Reflexionen from the mid-late 1770s, which appear to be the basis for Kant’s ‘equa-
tion of virtue with the worthiness to be happy.’155 First, there is 
the general claim that worthiness to enjoy a good, whether natural or otherwise, presupposes 
that one merits it, or has earned the right to it by one’s own actions, and that as the product of 
our only genuine free actions, or, in other words, as one of the two possible outcomes of our 
only genuine actions at all, virtue is the only ground for any merit at all.156 
Guyer’s interpretation assimilates ‘worthiness’ to ‘merit.’ He glosses ‘merits it’ as 
‘has earned the right to it,’ specifies this ‘right’ as a consequence of ‘one’s own ac-
tions,’ and characterizes the relevant actions as ‘free’ ones. The thrust of Guyer’s 
interpretation to this point may be summed up in what he takes to be Kant’s dictum 
                                                
153 Ibid.,  119. Guyer does not balk at referring to Kant’s gloss as an ‘equation,’ which, strictly speak-
ing, is misleading, although this does of course reflect Kant’s own way of expressing himself. 
154 Guyer goes to the heart of the matter when he asks ‘[w]here…the element of desert that it seems 
natural to associate with the idea of worthiness come from?’ (ibid.,  118). 
155 Ibid.,  119. See, for example, R 7204 (19: 283 [470]); R 7211 (19: 286 [472]); R 6280 (18: 547 




here: that ‘it is from an agent’s free actions that his entitlement to happiness aris-
es.’157 The second idea is that 
since universal happiness or a system of happiness is not a merely natural good or a product 
of merely natural behavior but something that even under the best of circumstances would be 
produced only by virtuous action, enjoyment of one’s own share of universal happiness is the 
appropriate reward for genuine merit—payment in kind, as it were.158 
Guyer’s reading (and indeed, presumably, the pre- or semi-critical thinking that he is 
interpreting) makes morality internal to happiness—at least, that is, to ‘universal 
happiness.’ On this reading, the happiness of which virtuous agents are worthy is not 
their ‘own’ happiness (which, presumably, could be attained by immoral means159), 
but their ‘own share of universal happiness.’ Guyer construes this as ‘reward’ and 
‘payment in kind.’ Virtuous action, defined as action that aims at the happiness of 
all, entails ‘genuine merit.’ And ‘virtue is worthiness to be happy precisely because 
virtue concerns the universal distribution of a good in which one is then entitled to 
one’s own fair share.’160 As Guyer puts it earlier, ‘only insofar as our own happiness 
as part of this larger whole is a product of our own free will do we in any sense de-
serve it.’161 
Here again, as we saw in the case of Henrich’s reading of Kant’s idiom, we have 
a notion of ‘distribution’ that is not really what it appears to be. The ‘system of hap-
piness’ that Kant has in mind is here conceived of as ‘the systematic distribution’ of 
happiness,’162 but the object of the distribution (happiness qua the happiness of 
which moral agents are worthy, or happiness in the sense of one’s ‘own share of uni-
versal happiness’) is such that full participation in the universally binding task of 
making that distribution a reality, is internal to it. If virtue ‘concerns’ this ‘universal 
distribution,’ it is a matter of virtuous action’s consisting in a striving for that, in ef-
fort aimed at that state of affairs. Happiness ‘is…the appropriate consequence of vir-
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159 As Guyer points out later, there is a major difference between ‘aiming at one’s own happiness 
alone’ and ‘aiming at the happiness of all including oneself’ (ibid.,  344). Indeed, practical reason’s 
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tue because it would be an inevitable consequence of virtue under ideal circumstanc-
es—that is, if virtuous action necessarily had its intended effect.’163 Thus Guyer 
avers that, on the pre-critical view expressed in Kant’s ongoing deployment of the 
‘worthiness to be happy’ idiom, it is because happiness would follow inevitably from 
virtue ‘under ideal circumstances’ that happiness is connected to virtue as its ‘appro-
priate consequence.’ And, as we saw above, he avers that it is ‘precisely because vir-
tue concerns the universal distribution of a good in which one is…entitled to one’s 
own fair share,’ that is, just to the extent that one has also freely and fully worked for 
that universal distribution, that ‘ virtue is worthiness to be happy.’ In each of these 
formulations, Guyer’s interpretation makes morality internal to happiness. But he 
also represents the relationship between morality and happiness—the sense of Kant’s 
concept of worthiness to be happy—as a variety of desert. 
To sum up, Guyer takes Kant’s idiomatic ‘equation’ of virtue with worthiness to 
be happy to express the idea, pre-formed just in advance of the critical period, that 
happiness is the ‘appropriate reward’ for virtue, that virtue entails ‘genuine merit,’ 
that virtuous agents have a ‘right’ to happiness, that happiness is ‘payment in kind’ 
and something to which they are ‘entitled.’ And this view tends, at the same time, to 
shade off into the view that happiness is an ‘appropriate consequence,’ or ‘effect’ of 
morality, to the extent that, ‘under ideal circumstances’ (given the presupposition 
that nature and its laws are the work of a wise and omnipotent author whose own 
‘holy’ nature it is, also, to embody and promulgate the moral law), the happiness of 
virtuous agents would be simply ‘an inevitable consequence’ of their morality. But 
the form in which this latter view is expressed, as I have suggested, belies the fact 
that Guyer interprets Kant, here, in a manner that makes morality and happiness not 
extrinsically related (as cause and effect, or as normative condition for distribution 
and object thereof), but intrinsically so.164 Guyer takes this to be the point of view 
that we encounter here, first, in these Reflexionen, in the process of its formation. 
                                                
163 Ibid.,  120 (my emphasis). This same mechanism is expressed in Kant’s claim, in the Groundwork, 
that ‘a kingdom of ends would actually come into existence through maxims which the categorical 
imperative prescribes as a rule for all rational beings, if these maxims were universally followed’ (Gr 
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164 In chapter 2, I discuss a different facet of Guyer’s reading of Kant’s ‘worthiness to be happy’ idi-
om—one that does represent happiness and morality as extrinsically related. 
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And he understands it to be a point of view that Kant simply takes for granted hence-
forth. 
Finally, Steven Smith reads Kant’s regular glossing of ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness 
to be happy’ as a more or less well-defined strategy for dealing, preemptively, with a 
particular problem. Smith argues that 
Kant has anticipated the objection that the interests of reason [i.e., pure reason’s interest in 
morality and embodied reason’s interest in the unification, harmonization, and realization of 
the particular agent’s empirical interests, in short, her happiness] are simply heterogeneous 
and irreconcilable by consistently formulating the moral law with reference to happiness; he 
never speaks of moral worth merely, but always of ‘worthiness to be happy.’165 
More pointedly, Smith takes this consistent practice in respect of Kant’s formulations 
of the moral law to express the latter’s view that ‘moral worth is necessarily inter-
preted by moral reason as “worthiness to be happy,”’166 that ‘a rational agent ap-
proves a priori of a strict proportion between virtue and happiness,’167 and that this 
means that ‘some unexplained scheme of deserving is presupposed.’168 
Smith observes, in short, that Kant’s idiomatic use of the notion of worthiness to 
be happy shows that Kant takes there to be an ‘obvious’ and ‘ideal linkage between 
virtue and happiness.’169 But this means, more specifically, that ‘“worthiness to be 
happy” implies desert’ and that this ‘in turn implies some kind of contractual 
scheme.’170 Again, though, Smith takes this presupposed ‘scheme of deserving’ to be 
precisely ‘unexplained.’ He goes on to explain it, making explicit what he takes to be 
Kant’s implicit strategy. 
He argues that ‘[o]n Kant’s view, virtue is deserving, even though it is not un-
dertaken in order to earn.’171 He argues, too, that the implied ‘scheme’ is one ‘in 
which rewards can be earned.’ And he observes that this then warrants the introduc-
tion of ‘God,’ or a being who ‘reward[s] those who have made themselves worthy of 
happiness, i.e., [those who] have earned it.’172 Smith observes, however, that in his 
Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion ‘Kant rejects precisely this idea’ 
(i.e., the idea that, by their morality, human beings can put God in their debt, so that 
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God is bound to reward them for it).173 Smith resolves this apparent tension by re-
stricting Kant’s notion of reward for virtue (precisely, that is, in connection with the 
concept of worthiness to be happy) to a primarily political frame of reference. He 
defines the ‘scheme of deserving’ with which he began in terms of a primarily hu-
man community—of which God is a possible member (but such that God’s member-
ship remains an open question)—in which virtue does not after all necessitate happi-
happiness, but in which the latter is rather an expression of kindness and a correlate 
of praise (of the moral subject). He argues that 
[t]he judgment that God should reward a virtuous person with happiness is cognate with the 
desire to praise him [i.e., the virtuous person]; it is a completion of his [moral] gesture, and is 
morally motivated insofar as it expresses respect for and concurrence in the virtuous maxim of 
the act of the one praised.174 
The ‘true basis of the idea of virtue as “worthiness to be happy,”’ writes Smith, given 
the latter concept’s implications with respect to desert, of an anterior ‘contract,’ or ‘a 
solicited concurrence of free will,’ is that there is a kind of ‘moral contract offered by 
the universalizing will’—a contract to reward virtue with praise and, to whatever ex-
tent possible, with happiness. This is a contract whose execution by the moral com-
munity may or may not be realized with God’s assistance—just depending upon 
whether the latter exists or not. If God is taken to exist, however, then the sense of 
Kant’s gloss is that ‘[w]hen the order of things represented by the concept of the 
highest good is realized, only righteous purposes will be crowned with success, and 
thus people will only be happy when they are moral (although not necessarily happy 
because they are moral).’175 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I executed four main tasks. First, I established the originary presence, 
pervasiveness, and longevity of Kant’s habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to 
be happy.’ Next, I discussed the expression’s logical structure. I characterized ‘wor-
thiness to be happy’ as a particular kind of predicate, that is, as a three-place relation. 
Third, I distinguished the relata whose connection the idiom represents and argued 
that the variety of ways in which Kant represents ‘morality,’ in the latter’s primary, 
‘forward-looking’ sense are independent of the idiom’s representation of the rela-
                                                
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid.,  187. 
175 Ibid.,  180. 
 
 67 
tionship between that (morality, irrespective of what that turns out to be for Kant) 
and happiness. Fourth, I pointed to the paucity of commentary on Kant’s use of the 
‘worthiness to be happy idiom,’ problematized this oversight, and discussed its sig-
nificance. I also acknowledged that there are, nevertheless, a handful of readers who 
have addressed this topic directly. I discussed their explanations of Kant’s use of the 
concept in question. Now, by way of concluding this chapter and setting the scene 
for what follows, I will briefly note some of the key features that distinguish my ap-
proach from theirs. 
Taken together, these commentators provide useful insight into the background, 
sense, and purpose of Kant’s original and ongoing deployment of his concept of 
‘worthiness to be happy.’ Their readings do not, however, penetrate deeply enough 
into what I take to be the bedrock of Kant’s critical period thinking about freedom 
and moral accountability. The constitution of that substrate is more obscure than 
their readings suggest. The substrate itself is also more deeply set. This thesis as a 
whole contends with this obscurity and seeks to clarify what it conceals. For now, 
however, I simply offer, without embellishment, a series of counterclaims, which 
will be familiar from my introduction, but which I repeat here in direct response to 
these other commentators (or rather my reading of them).  
First, the happiness of which moral agents are worthy is not distinct from the 
happiness of which immoral ones are unworthy. To the extent that Kant glosses ‘mo-
rality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy,’ he does not take morality to be internal to happi-
ness. Kant’s gloss shows that he presupposes that immoral agents can be happy (in 
the same sense that moral ones can) and it promulgates his strong view that they 
ought not to be. 
Second, the gloss represents a certain order of necessitation: it reflects Kant’s 
view that immoral agents ought necessarily (i.e., categorically) to be unhappy. This 
is the point at which Kant’s notion of desert shows up in relation to the concept of 
worthiness to be happy. Kant’s gloss does not communicate the idea that virtue ought 
necessarily to be rewarded. Kant’s ‘philosophy of law’ does subsume the view that 
offenses must (necessarily) be punished and that labourers, for example, who have 
fulfilled the terms of their contracts must (necessarily) receive the remuneration 
promised them; but the relationship, in that thinking, between contracted labour and 
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remuneration, on the one hand, and morality and happiness, on the other, is not 
symmetrical. 
Third, Kant’s gloss expresses a concern for something beyond the mere ‘moral 
validity’ or ‘moral invalidity’ of the human being’s happiness. The main idea that is 
implicit in Kant’s use of the ‘worthiness to be happy’ idiom is that ‘morality,’ in 
Kant’s secondary, backward-looking sense, demands not only that happiness be 
‘morally valid,’ but positively demands the unhappiness of immoral agents, demands 
that this be actualized, and declares (prospectively at least) that this unhappiness is 
good and morally valid in turn. 
Fourth, Kant’s use of his ‘worthiness to be happy’ idiom does give expression to 
a single (albeit complex), more or less consolidated, intellectual commitment (I have 
detailed some of its main parts in the three foregoing paragraphs). But it expresses 
something more immediate and basic as well. It also gives expression to Kant’s ante-
cedent, fundamental commitments to the practices of (retributive) punishment and 
(retribution-sensitive) imputation. 
Fifth, Kant’s gloss is not a self-conscious strategy for forestalling the objection 
that morality and happiness constitute ‘heterogeneous’ and ‘irreconcilable’ ends. It 
achieves this aim, to be sure, but it does not do so as a piece of reasoning on Kant’s 
part. If it may be regarded as a ‘strategy’ at all, then it is one that serves the practical 
commitments that Kant has in advance of the development of his ‘critical’ moral 
theory’s even getting under way. Kant’s gloss is a habit and, like all habits, it is of 
course also a strategy. It shows up in his argumentation, however, as an intractable, 
axiomatic body of implicit thoughts and commitments. But it is there in advance of 
Kant’s reasoning about the relationship between morality and happiness. It is not a 
result of the latter. 
In this chapter I have argued that Kant’s gloss represents morality and happiness 
as two states of the human being’s affairs that stand in a particular relationship to one 
another. In the next chapter I discuss this relationship and so explicate the signifi-




‘Worthiness to be Happy’ and the Relationship be-
tween Morality and Happiness 
[T]he system of morality is…inseparably com-
bined with the system of happiness.176 
Introduction 
It is generally agreed that resolution of the apparent tension between morality and 
happiness is a centrally important problem for moral theory.177 In the first Critique, 
Kant refers to his basic position on this matter when he asserts that ‘the system of 
morality is…inseparably combined with the system of happiness.’178 As a whole, 
however, Kant’s body of work offers resources for several disparate answers to the 
question how this ‘combination’ and its ‘inseparability’ are to be construed. 
This thesis focuses on one way in which Kant answers this question: the way 
that is encapsulated in his habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy.’ 
This chapter, in particular, presents the rudiments of this answer by making a number 
of key distinctions. In the next two chapters I will fill this picture out and argue that, 
within the ambit of this habit—in it and under it as it were—Kant really does, most 
fundamentally (albeit not always and only), take morality and happiness to be related 
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in the way that the gloss suggests. The aim of this chapter is a first, preliminary step 
in that direction: to show that Kant’s gloss expresses the presupposition that immoral 
agents can be happy (in the same sense that moral ones can) and that it promulgates 
his strong view that they ought not to be. 
In order to demonstrate my claim that Kant’s gloss represents happiness as a 
state of affairs such that immoral agents can enjoy it, but ought not to, this chapter 
executes three main tasks. First, I show that Kant’s gloss represents morality and 
happiness as states of an agent’s affairs that are extrinsically related. Second, I speci-
fy this claim more closely by arguing that Kant’s gloss represents these states of an 
agent’s affairs as ones that are not only extrinsically, but also necessarily and norma-
tively related. Third, I argue that Kant’s notion of worthiness to be happy points to an 
extrinsic, normative, necessary relation that holds, not between morality and happi-
ness, but between unhappiness and immorality. In other words, I argue, Kant’s gloss 
pertains to the normative necessity of a particular kind of desert—the immoral 
agent’s desert of unhappiness. However, as I also show, worthiness to be happy is 
not desert of happiness. This is a key asymmetry in Kant’s thinking, generally over-
looked. Indeed, Kant’s use of the expression, ‘worthiness to be happy,’ does not, 
strictly speaking, represent happiness and morality as elements that are immediately 
related at all. Rather, it evinces a thought about the relationship between morality 
and the deontic possibility of happiness, a possibility that, in its ultimately theologi-
cal inflection, requires benevolence (in addition to the normative dictates of pure 
practical reason) for its realization. The deontic possibility of happiness (but only 
given morality) is formally equivalent, as I show, to the deontic necessity of unhap-
piness (given immorality). Thus Kant’s habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to 
be happy’ is able to represent this dreadful necessity without adverting to it explicit-
ly. 
It might be objected here that, in a very un-Kantian spirit, I am playing on the 
asymmetry that characterizes the ‘practical-rational’ distinction between ‘deontic 
possibility’ and ‘deontic necessity’ in order to assert that there is an associated 
asymmetry between the ‘sensible’ notions of ‘happiness’ (the production of which, 
with my various qualifications, I claim is permitted just in case the object of that 
‘production’ is a moral agent) and ‘unhappiness’ (the production of which state of 
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affairs I take to be commanded, that is, just case in the object of said ‘production’ is 
an immoral agent—given, especially, that the making- or leaving-happy of immoral 
agents would be forbidden to a particular kind of agent). Given that this objection is 
on the horizon, here, I must pause to address the possible misunderstanding upon 
which such an objection would turn. 
Let me begin this excursus by pointing out, once again, that it is Kant’s explicit 
contention that the law of punishment—where the latter is regarded as a law com-
manding that a particular course of action be executed (by the sovereign or her legal 
representative) within the polis—is a categorical imperative.179 This means, in Kanti-
an terms, that the course of action that the law of punishment prescribes actualizes 
the more fundamental command that a particular end (namely, the punishment of 
criminals) be adopted in general. Here, however, in Kant’s thinking about the rela-
tionship between crime and punishment—without even referring, that is, to the rela-
tionship that I claim that Kant takes to hold between immorality and unhappiness—
we are already faced with the very asymmetry that the objection (set forth above) 
would put into question. 
To reward those who abide—or do more than is required—by the laws of the 
land is an option for the sovereign, it is permitted him or her.  It is ‘deontically pos-
sible’ for the latter. The sovereign is permitted to make the happiness of his or her 
subjects an end and so, too, to make them actually happy—given the law-
conformingness, or the supererogatory character, of their concrete participation in the 
life of the polis. But there is no constraining, necessitating ‘law of reward’ (although, 
for Kant, rightful ‘remuneration’—for contracted effort, or effort for which payment 
is promised—is mandated a priori).  In any case, if such a principle (of reward) were 
instituted by way of positive law, this principle would be no genuinely categorical 
(i.e., moral) law. 
By contrast, if the law of punishment (in the political context of its enactment) is 
a categorical imperative, as Kant says it is, then, while the sovereign is permitted to 
take action to render particularly meritorious or even simply law-abiding citizens 
happy (so that such action and the having of the end at which such action aims is de-
ontically possible), the same subject (the sovereign) is commanded to take action to 
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insure a forfeiture of happiness (to the degree required by the ius talionis) on the part 
of law-breakers.180 And this forfeiture, which is instantiated as an empirical state of 
the punished subject’s practical affairs (addressed, that is, to the will that wrongfully 
wills both crime and happiness, in the form of a coercive limitation of such a will’s 
capacity for the realization of its empirically given desires), effects an end, the hav-
ing and pursuing of which (i.e., just in case the law of punishment really is a categor-
ical imperative, as Kant claims) is deontically necessary. This already involves a 
kind of ‘transfer,’ then, of the asymmetry that I identified above from the ‘practical-
rational’ to the ‘sensible.’  In other words, when it comes to the sovereign’s aim of 
actualizing, or of making concrete, the a priori relationship that Kant takes to hold 
between the notions of ‘transgression’ (here, for the moment, ‘political’ crime) and 
‘punishment,’181 we are already presented (by Kant himself) with an intimate associ-
ation, on the one hand, between ‘deontic possibility’ and ‘reward,’ which (regarded 
under the rubric of the action that offers the latter) effects, funds, enables happiness, 
and, on the other hand, between ‘deontic necessity’ and ‘punishment,’ which (re-
garded under the rubric of the action that metes out punishment-for-transgression) 
effects the punished agent’s unhappiness. 
The ‘transference’ that allows me to say that, by Kant’s use of the ‘worthiness to 
be happy’ idiom, he signals his commitment to the idea of a ‘law of unhappiness,’ is 
grounded in the following two considerations.  I set these forth here, now, in the 
most rudimentary fashion and in service of my attempt to forestall the objection that 
my argument surreptitiously conflates the ‘rational’ and the ‘sensible.’ The first of 
these considerations, then, is that for Kant the concept of death-for-murder has a spe-
cial status; that is, that unique among politically situated punishments, death-for-
murder punishes the ‘inner wickedness’ of the murderer and, as such, is aimed not at 
her punishable deed only, but at her, at her will, given the latter’s radically immoral 
character. The second consideration is that, in Kant’s view, to suffer punishment is, 
in general, to be rendered unhappy. 
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The move by which I shift from talking about an explicitly Kantian ‘law of pun-
ishment’ to talking about an equally Kantian, but mostly implicit ‘law of unhappi-
ness’ turns on the definitional proximity—indeed the identity, I suggest, when 
properly qualified in terms of the sovereign or divine action that aims (or would aim) 
at their actualization—of the notions of ‘being-rendered-unhappy’ and ‘being-
punished’; and on the extremely close definitional proximity of the notions of ‘im-
morality’ and ‘crime,’ specifically in Kant’s thinking about the crime of murder. The 
move by which I make this shift also turns on an analogy between the notional rela-
tionship (which Kant clearly construes as one that is cognized a priori, that belongs 
to pure practical reason itself) between politically-contextualized ‘transgression’ and 
‘punishment,’ on the one hand, and between eschatologically- or ethically-
contextualized ‘transgression’ and ‘punishment,’ on the other. I suggest that, on the 
Kantian scaffold, we are confronted, however, with a relationship that exceeds the 
merely analogical, since the practice that actually enacts the ‘thought’ that crime and 
punishment, immorality and unhappiness, are normatively related a priori ‘literally’ 
identifies the respective analogues (the pairs ‘crime-punishment’ and ‘immorality-
unhappiness’) with one another. 
The main sticking point, here—the point upon which the objection would largely 
turn—pertains largely to the manner in which I am associating the notions of pun-
ishment and unhappiness (the claim that Kant identifies criminality and immorality 
in the limiting case of murder—but not elsewhere—is likely to be more readily ac-
cepted). Once it is recognized, however, that an ‘asymmetry,’ which falls between 
‘sensible’ states of affairs whose willing and production are deontically possible and 
deontically necessary respectively, is already implicit in Kant’s committed thinking 
about the relationship between political crime and punishment (and between law-
abidingness and reward), it still remains to show that the ‘thing’ that is deontically 
necessitated, given the ostensibly a priori notional connection of crime and punish-
ment—namely the execution of (proportionate) punishment on criminals in a politi-
cal context—is equivalent to the ‘thing’ that is deontically necessitated by the a 
priori notional connection that I claim holds, for Kant, between immorality and un-
happiness. In other words, it remains to be argued that a criminal’s being-punished is 
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in some important sense equivalent to her being-rendered-unhappy (and so, too, that 
the having of these states of affairs as ends is also equivalent in the relevant sense). 
Now, I claim that Kant’s deeply rooted habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthi-
ness to be happy’ shows in a somewhat oblique manner that he takes there to be an a 
priori notional relationship between immorality and unhappiness.  And I claim that 
his mostly implicit thinking about this relationship endorses and, eschatologically 
speaking, extends the ‘reach’ of his explicit thinking about the relationship between 
politically-situated ‘transgression’ and politically-contextualized ‘punishment.’ I also 
assert that Kant appears to simply take the aprioricity of this thinking about the rela-
tionship between immorality and unhappiness for granted. He asserts, but does not 
demonstrate, in other words, that reason, rather than nature, or habits of judging so-
cially acquired, is the source of this thinking. 
Note, however, that these major claims (core elements of the subject matter of 
this thesis) are independent of the one that I am advancing now. For the moment, in 
anticipation, again, of the possible objection to which I adverted above, I am propos-
ing only that a certain asymmetry divides what the political sovereign is (morally) 
permitted to do in behalf of law-abiding agents from what this same subject is (mor-
ally) constrained to effect in the experience of law-transgressing ones.  This is what 
it means to claim that Kant takes ‘the law of punishment’ to be a categorical impera-
tive (although he never shows that it is), while he does not take there to be any such 
thing as a ‘law of reward’ (with the caveat regarding ‘rightful remuneration’ cited 
above). And I am proposing that the ‘thing’ that is (morally) practically necessary 
under the rubric of ‘punishment,’ takes shape in a ‘sensible,’ spatio-temporal state of 
affairs. 
In order to show that, given the overlap between the political and the ethical that 
belongs to his conception of what takes place in cases of capital punishment for mur-
der, Kant also holds that the principle that demands the ‘making-unhappy’ of immor-
al agents (by ‘God,’ finally) may be regarded as a categorical imperative (just in 
case, Kant’s ‘law of punishment’ can be—which perhaps it cannot), I do not have to 
justify the claim that ‘the law of unhappiness’ really is a categorical imperative. I 
only have to show that there is an equivalent asymmetry between what is thought ‘in’ 
Kant’s explicit glossing of ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy’ and in his implicit 
 
 75 
association of ‘immorality’ with ‘unworthiness to be happy.’  The fact that ‘happi-
ness’ and ‘unhappiness’ refer to states of agents’ ‘sensible’ affairs is beside the 
point—since this is also true for Kant of ‘punishment’ and since the latter refers to a 
particular mode of ‘being-rendered-unhappy.’ 
Again, then, punishment, is an empirical and sensible matter—precisely be-
cause, from the point of view of the agent that enacts it, it unilaterally coerces its 
empirical object (the political subject) in such a way that she forfeits happiness; pun-
ishment renders its object unhappy, that is, by occluding access to happiness (or to 
the means to happiness). For certain purposes, we may prefer to regard unhappiness 
as distinct from punishment; in particular, we may prefer to regard unhappiness as 
punishment’s effect. But this conceptual distinction remains ambiguous when actual 
instances of punishment come into view. From the perspective of the patient, to suf-
fer punishment is simply to be rendered unhappy; to punish (in a political context) is 
to render-unhappy. The asymmetry between what the law permits and what the law 
commands, here—namely (and respectively), the sovereign’s making it her end that 
some law-abiding agent or other be happy and that some criminal or other be unhap-
py—does involve a kind of ‘transfer’ from the ‘practical-rational,’ which is the sup-
posedly a priori, notional connection between the concepts of transgression and 
punishment (both of which are actualized empirically), to the ‘sensible,’ which is the 
actual punishment of particular criminals.  But this move is present, already, in 
Kant. I am not forcing it onto his thinking. To the extent that there is something ‘un-
Kantian’ about my way of proceeding, here, this is simply another instance of the 
tension that characterizes Kant’s own rather varied and uneven thinking about the 
relationship between crime and punishment—and between immorality and unhappi-
ness. 
I will now proceed with my analysis of Kant’s thinking about the latter, but must 
do so indirectly, by way of an exploration, rather, of his thinking about the relation-
ship between morality and happiness. 
Morality and happiness as extrinsically related 
When it comes to answering the question how morality and happiness are related, we 
are presented with at least the following four options, each of which implies distinct 
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conceptualizations of its relata. Either (1) morality is in some sense identical to hap-
piness; (2) morality (or moral deeds) is (are) a (physical) cause of happiness; (3) mo-
rality (along with some other necessary, but material conditions) is a 
formal/transcendental condition of the possibility of happiness; or (4) morality is a 
deontic-normative condition for the permissibility (the deontic possibility) of action 
that aims at happiness (or its distribution). 
Now, it is generally agreed that Kant’s thinking about the relationship between 
morality and happiness differs markedly from the views of his predecessors, both 
ancient and early modern.182 There are two clear ways in which it does so. First, it is 
a central and distinctive feature of Kant’s moral theory, at least in its ultimate form, 
that he denies happiness any constitutive role (as incentive, motive, interest, or what-
ever) that would make the latter a condition of the very possibility morality (or moral 
deeds) in the first place.183 Second, it is clear that, unlike the Stoics and Epicureans 
who, each in their own way, took happiness and morality to be identical, Kant never 
takes the relationship between morality and happiness to be an analytic one (i.e., as 
in [1], above).184 Apart from these two core features of his moral theory, however, 
Kant’s thinking about morality and happiness invites a significant variety of read-
ings. 
Kant is sometimes taken to hold that morality and happiness are entirely hetero-
geneous and irreducibly alien to one another, not only conceptually distinct, but such 
that they share no deeper affinity of any kind at all (in contrast, say, to triangularity 
and trilaterality).185 Some view Kant’s treatment of happiness in relation to morality 
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as distorted and inhumane.186 Others allow that morality might well entail unhappi-
ness, but that it need not do so.187 Others argue that, while Kant restricts the role of 
happiness in moral matters, he does not disregard it altogether.188 Yet other readers 
understand Kant in a manner that implies, at least, that he takes morality to be ‘inter-
nal’ to happiness. As Guyer puts it, ‘virtue and happiness are not separated but at 
least ideally joined at the hip’;189 conceptually, at least, there is an intimate relation-
ship between them.190 In 1944 H. J. Paton found it necessary to assert that 
‘[h]appiness…play[s] a much greater part in Kant’s moral philosophy than is com-
monly recognized.’191 The first part of Paton’s claim (concerning the significant role 
of happiness in Kant’s moral theory) remains apposite today, of course, but the prob-
lem that he identifies is no longer so pressing. 
In this section, I argue that Kant’s gloss represents morality and happiness as 
distinct states of an agent’s affairs that are extrinsically related.192 An important im-
plication of this claim is that Kant’s regular use of the ‘worthiness to be happy idi-
om’ shows that he takes the notion of an immoral, thus unworthy, but nevertheless 
happy agent to be perfectly coherent. An immoral agent’s happiness is deontically 
impossible, but not impossible in any other (inherent) sense. It is impermissible (in a 
sense to be explained below), or ‘impossible’ in the sense that my driving an eight-
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een-wheeler is impossible, given that I am not licensed by my government to operate 
a vehicle with air brakes. 
Now, someone might object that I am sliding in an unjustifiable, or at least sus-
pect, manner from the notion of ‘impermissibility’ to that of ‘impossibility’—and 
vice versa. Note, however, that this is a matter of definition. The ‘impossibility’ in 
question is deontic, not material, and is directly connected with the normativity, for 
Kant, of the representation of the relationship between morality and happiness that is 
expressed by his habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy.’ In the pre-
critical period, as I will show below, Kant sometimes represents the relationship be-
tween happiness and morality as intrinsic in the sense that he sees morality as a con-
dition of the possibility of happiness (which entails a particular account of happiness; 
an account of happiness, in other words, that regards morality as internal to it). In the 
critical period, however—particularly in the second Critique—he tends to see the 
relationship between morality and happiness as an extrinsic one. He thinks that we 
are permitted, at least, to regard moral action as action that would lead, on the 
whole, to happiness, under natural law—so that moral deeds, which are empirical 
events (but for Kant, of course, not only that), are regarded as the cause of happiness 
(which entails a teleological account of the laws of nature that sees the latter as the 
legislation of a divine author). 
On neither of these accounts is the relationship between morality and happiness 
represented in a manner whose explication calls for the notions of ‘deontic possibil-
ity,’ ‘deontic impossibility,’ and ‘deontic necessity’ that I am deploying now. The 
‘extrinsicness’ or ‘intrinsicness’ of the relationship between morality and happiness 
is not the decisive factor, here, just as such.  Rather, again, the decisive factor is the 
normativity of the representation of the ostensibly a priori notional relationship be-
tween (im)morality and (un)happiness that is expressed by Kant’s gloss—a relation-
ship whose empirical instantiation is conceived of in terms that are neither analytic, 
nor natural-causal. By contrast with these other approaches, Kant’s habit of glossing 
‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy,’ which both predates and persists throughout 
his critical period, gives expression to a conception of the relationship between mo-
rality and happiness in whose elucidation the notion of ‘deontic impossibility,’ for 
example, regarded as a kind of ‘impermissibility,’ does have a role to play. 
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This is the tendency in his thinking to which Kant’s gloss gives expression. But 
again, Kant’s gloss gives expression to just one of several such tendencies. Of course 
I claim that Kant’s gloss represents the relationship between morality and happiness 
in a distinctive (i.e., extrinsic and normative) manner—but I do not claim that this is 
the only way in which he represents the relationship between them. Again, in some 
unusual instances, for example, Kant’s thinking about happiness does entail that 
happiness is constituted in such a way that morality is internal to it (as we have seen, 
Guyer and others put this approach in the foreground, but mistakenly connect it with 
the ‘worthiness to be happy’ idiom). This has at least one important implication. If 
morality is internal to happiness, then of course the idea of an immoral, but happy 
agent is simply incoherent. 
But some of the compelling force of Kant’s repeated gloss lies in the fact that it 
evinces a strong (mainly prospective) disapprobation of the happiness of immoral 
agents. This would make no sense if Kant held, in general, that immoral agents were 
simply incapable of being happy. Their unhappiness would be assured, in that case, 
from the outset. Nevertheless, Kant does sometimes take such an approach. Before 
taking up the primary claim of this section, then, I will acknowledge and assess the 
significance of this other tendency in Kant’s thinking. 
Morality and happiness: intrinsically related? 
Some of Kant’s rather varied thinking about happiness proceeds independently of the 
thought expressed by his gloss: that somewhere, somehow, it might turn out to be the 
case that immoral, unworthy agents were numbered among the happy. Indeed, Kant 
sometimes seems to regard happiness in a way that would block immoral agents’ ac-
cess to it, not by their happiness’ occlusion by some extraneous force, say, but just in 
the nature of the phenomenon. Here, emphasis falls heavily upon the issue of what an 
agent has to be like even to be capable of happiness. 
Morality as a transcendental condition of the possibility of happiness 
The main source for this earlier approach is an important fragment (R 7202) from the 
so-called Duisburg Nachlass.193 In it, while also insisting that happiness ‘consists in 
                                                
193 This is the main showpiece in a whole body of notes, originating in the 1770s, in which, according 
to Guyer, ‘Kant hardly separates morality and happiness’ (Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law, and 
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[empirical] well-being,’ Kant identifies ‘the a priori condition under which alone one 
can be capable of happiness,’194 ‘its [i.e., happiness’] possibility and its idea,’195 or 
‘the necessary condition of its possibility and its essence.’196 
Obviously, this is rather reminiscent of Kant’s critical project of uncovering the 
a priori conditions of the possibility of experience more generally. While happiness 
is an empirical state of the agent’s affairs, Kant takes it to consist, from the outset, in 
an arrangement that ‘is not externally contingent, also not empirically dependent, but 
[that] rests on our own choice.’197 Happiness is empirical well-being that satisfies. 
But nothing is more satisfying to the human being than the exercise of her freedom, 
or the ‘[c]onsciousness of one’s own power.’ Indeed, this is both an intellectual 
‘pleasure’ and an ‘essential formal condition of happiness.’198 Elsewhere, Kant avers, 
too, that pleasures (comforts, gratifications, etc.) that one achieves freely, for oneself, 
on one’s own, are satisfying; those that fall to one by mere chance far less so—
indeed they may even be shameful.199 On the present account, however, gratifica-
tions that fall to one’s lot by luck do not count as instances of what Kant means by 
happiness (here) at all.200 
On the account that we are now rehearsing, the mere fact that one achieves what 
one desires, freely, is not sufficient either, just as such, for happiness. Immoral deeds 
                                                                                                                                     
Happiness, 100). Schilpp calls R 7202 ‘a most remarkable document’ (Schilpp, Kant's Pre-Critical 
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publication of the first Critique (Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, 11, 
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Glückseligkeit in Kants Reflexionen’; Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, 106, 115; 
O’Connor, ‘Kant's Conception of Happiness’: 202-3; Wike, ‘Kant on Happiness’: 81; Wike, Kant on 
Happiness in Ethics, 15-16. R 7202 belies Watson’s claim that ‘there is no direct evidence’ for his 
view that, for Kant, happiness is equivalent to moral contentment (Watson, ‘Kant on Happiness in the 
Moral Life’: 83). 
194 R 7202 19: 278-9 (467) (my emphasis). Cf. Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical 
Reason, 215. 
195 R 7202 19: 276 (465). 
196 R 7202 19: 277 (465). 
197 R 7202 19: 277 (466). See also R 6910 19: 203 (449); R 6849 19: 178 (439); R 7149 19: 258. 
198 R 7202 19: 276-7 (465). See Schilpp, Kant's Pre-Critical Ethics, 131. For more on why freedom—
or its unifying capacity—satisfies see Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, 98, 117; 
Römpp, ‘Kant’s Ethics as a Philosophy of Happiness: Reflections on the “Reflexionen”’: 278, 283. 
199 See, for example, Kant’s discussion of games of chance at Anthro 7: 238 (134). See also the trans-
lator’s note to KdU, § 87 (395 n. 33); Idee 8: 20; Anthro-M 25: 1334-5; and Menschenkunde 25: 1142-
3. Cf. Howard Caygill, A Kant Dictionary, The Blackwell Philosopher Dictionaries (Oxford: 
Blackwell Reference, 1995), 222. 
200 Cf., however, ibid; O’Connor, ‘Kant's Conception of Happiness’: 189-90. 
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are as free as moral ones. Thus the manner in which freedom operates in the course 
of an agent’s striving for happiness is of the essence as well. The integrity with 
which one proceeds extends further too, however, than the merely technical integrity 
of skill.201 Freedom must stand under ‘a priori laws of its consensus with itself.’202 
As Kant puts it in his philosophy of religion lectures, ‘self-contentment is a pleasure 
in one’s own freedom,’ but he glosses this as ‘the quality of one’s will’ and ‘the con-
soling consciousness of rectitude.’203 In short, the exercise of freedom in the attain-
ment of one’s desires is only satisfying when its operations are properly ordered, if 
its exercise in the pursuit of happiness is moral.204 At the relevant stage in Kant’s 
thinking, this means, for example, that this exercise aims at ‘the systematic and 
therefore maximal happiness of all,’205 or at a ‘maximally consistent system of pur-
poses.’206 The a priori unity that Kant identifies as a condition of the possibility of 
happiness turns out to be morality, then, which he glosses as ‘freedom under univer-
sal laws of the power of choice.’207 
The form and matter of happiness 
As I have already intimated, Kant’s approach, here, turns on a distinction between 
the ‘form’ and the ‘matter’ of happiness—the latter ‘sensible,’ the former, ‘intellec-
tual.’208 The mere gratification of desires, the immediate feeling of enjoyment, no 
matter how superlative, does not count as happiness.209 Just as on Kant’s ‘critical’ 
view intuition cannot be regarded as a moment within (discursive) cognition, but is 
nevertheless an ‘element’ of it, so mere pleasure or sensual enjoyment is an element 
of happiness, but not happiness as such.210 Inclinations, as Kant says in the second 
                                                
201 See Gr 4: 414-16 (25-27). See also Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, 
97; Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought, 54, 65. 
202 R 7202 19: 276 (465). See also Streit 7: 87 n. (303 n.). 
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204 In this regard see, for example, R 6805 19: 167; R 7049 19: 235 (457); Vorlesungen-Religionslehre 
28: 1057 [394]). 
205 Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, 100-1. 
206 Ibid.,  94. 
207 R 7202 19: 277 (465). See O’Connor, ‘Kant's Conception of Happiness’: 201; Römpp, ‘Kant’s 
Ethics as a Philosophy of Happiness: Reflections on the “Reflexionen”’: 279-80. 
208R 7202 19: 276 (465). See also R 6820 19: 172 (437-8). 
209 R 7202 19: 276 (465). See also R 6910 19: 203 (449); R 7200 19: 274 (463); R 6820 19: 172; and 
Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, 104; Ward, The Development of Kant's View of 
Ethics, 56. 
210 Römpp notes the same parallel (Römpp, ‘Kant’s Ethics as a Philosophy of Happiness: Reflections 
on the “Reflexionen”’: 276-7). See also Schilpp, Kant's Pre-Critical Ethics, 131, 133. 
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Critique, are ‘blind and servile,’211 their immediate gratification formless. Again, just 
as intuition—a mode of representation that, while being representation indeed, is 
nevertheless antecedent to thought—is only constitutive for cognition under the un-
derstanding’s guidance; so, too, inclination requires guidance if action that aims at 
the fulfillment of one’s desires is to count as action aiming at happiness, rather than 
at the chaotic pursuit of momentary pleasures.212 
On this account, morality gives the form of happiness to one’s empirical satis-
factions and, too, the form of the pursuit of happiness to one’s particular, desire-
targeted actions. In one sense, Kant could not be clearer: morality ‘makes happiness 
as such possible’; morality is ‘the original form of happiness’; and happiness ‘origi-
nate[s] in an a priori ground of which reason approves.’213 But how does morality 
play this role? Kant’s answer is, first, that ‘the principle of self-satisfaction a priori 
[is] the formal condition of all happiness’ and, second, that self-satisfaction runs in 
‘parallel with apperception.’214 
‘I am moral’ 
These references to ‘self-satisfaction a priori’ and ‘apperception’ are fairly unhelpful 
at first glance. But Kant’s meaning can be clarified with help from other texts. Notes 
from Kant’s anthropology lectures of 1772-3 assert that ‘a creature which cannot say 
“I,”’ even if it ‘can suffer much pain,’ cannot be unhappy. And ‘[o]nly through [the] 
“I” are we capable of happiness and unhappiness.’215 Kant says, too, that ‘pure rea-
son is universally necessary for happiness’ and that the latter is ‘not something felt 
but thought.’216 This emphasis on the necessity of the ‘I’ does not get us as far as an 
answer to the question how morality ‘makes happiness as such possible,’ of course. 
But the ability to ‘say “I”’ does have direct reference to the human being’s capacity 
                                                
211 KpV 5: 118 (99). 
212 Cf. Langton, ‘Duty and Desolation’: 497-8. 
213 R 7202 19: 277 (465). 
214 R 7202 19: 280 (467) (my emphasis). 
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for ‘prudential reasoning,’217 which gets us part way to morality, as it were, and into 
close proximity to the topic of happiness.218 
In ‘parallel with apperception’ 
As I mentioned above, the second aspect of morality’s role as ‘the original form of 
happiness’ is that moral self-satisfaction (the affective correlate of the reflexive 
judgment ‘I am moral’) runs in ‘parallel with apperception.’219 Moral self-
satisfaction is ‘a spontaneity of well-being.’220 In terms of Kant’s first Critique, tran-
scendental apperception is the absolutely spontaneous ‘act’ that unifies conscious-
ness—that founds the subject and grounds the objectivity of objects. Analogously, 
moral self-satisfaction is not happiness, but is (or discloses) the activity of freedom 
‘before’ and ‘in’ happiness that constitutes happiness’ unity, the conceptual unity of 
its diverse particular instances (e.g., the enjoyment of this ice-cream cone, of that 
sunset, of the company of this friend, etc.).221 In R 7202 Kant designates this satisfac-
tion, which is a feeling, but which is also grounded in morality’s freedom, ‘happiness 
a priori.’222 But he is quick to say that ‘there is nothing real’ in it. It is only ‘the for-
mal condition of unity, which is essential to it.’223 
In this way, Kant implies that if all of the particular expressions of one’s free 
agency have the right form (if they are moral), then there is a sense in which one al-
ready knows what happiness is like, even without reference to the ‘matter’ of happi-
ness. Just as the pure concepts of the understanding ‘extend further than sensible 
intuition, since they think objects in general,’224 the ‘original form of happiness,’ mo-
rality—in the affective guise of moral self-satisfaction—extends further than all of 
                                                
217 Sikka, ‘On the Value of Happiness: Herder Contra Kant’: 518-19. 
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Roger J. Sullivan, ‘The Categorical Imperative and the Natural Law,’ in Proceedings of the Sixth 
International Kant Congress, ed. G. Funke and T. M. Seebohm (Washington, D.C.: University Press 
of America, 1989), 228. 
219 R 7202 19: 280 (467). See also R 6861 19: 183 and Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, 
115. 
220 R 7202 19: 278 (466). Cf. Römpp, ‘Kant’s Ethics as a Philosophy of Happiness: Reflections on the 
“Reflexionen”’: 277. 
221 By contrast the ‘material’ of happiness owes everything to nature and other agents, empirical con-
ditions that ‘create differences’ rather than unity (R 7204 19: 284 [470]). 
222 R 7202 19: 279 (467). See also R 6911 19: 203-4 (449); R 7029 19: 230-1; R 7204 19: 284 (470). 
Cf. Gr 5: 117-18 (98). 
223 R 7202 19: 278 (466). 
224 KrV A253-4/B309. 
 
 84 
the particular instances in which one’s inclinations are gratified. Moral self-
satisfaction allows us to represent the satisfactions of a rational, but also inclined, 
being in general, which representation is the concept of happiness, in general. In oth-
er words, on this account (still pursuing my ‘critical’ analogy), just as the paradigm 
for any object of experience lies, already, in the categories through which, even 
without the ‘matter’ of intuition, one is able to think an object ‘in general,’ the para-
digm or reference point for happiness is moral self-satisfaction. The latter, rather 
than individual instances of mere pleasure or gratification tell us what counts as hap-
piness. The moral agent is, in a sense, virtually happy: she ‘contains happiness’ in 
herself, as Kant says elsewhere.225 
Unity 
Again, in the feeling of moral self-satisfaction we have a paradigm for the satisfac-
tions of inclined beings (such as we are) in general. But what is it about morality that 
shines through here, as it were, and gives this unity to the concept? 
On the present account, ‘transcendental unity in the use of freedom’226 is the 
condition through which the empirical well-being that I enjoy is not merely the expe-
rience, but the happiness, of someone in particular: it is mine, it belongs to the same 
‘one’ whose disparate inclinations, where satisfied, provide the matter through which 
happiness is given. It is only through the unity of the one ‘desirer’ (the ‘I’ in ‘I am 
moral’), that each and every one of these instances (e.g., again, enjoying this ice-
cream cone, admiring that sunset, enjoying the company of this friend, etc.) counts 
as an instance of one kind of thing, that is, as something that I have desired and fore-
seen in a consistent, integrated manner, now realized under the aspect of diverse par-
ticulars. To echo a well-know thesis of the first Critique, an ‘I am moral’ must be 
able to accompany each of an agent’s particular empirical satisfactions if these are to 
count as instances of the one kind of thing, (‘my’) happiness. Any satisfaction that 
does not evince this unity with all other possible satisfactions is just not an instance 
of happiness at all. 
                                                
225 R 6867 19: 186 (444). See also R 7202 19: 277 (465); R 7204 19: 283 (470). 




This unity is an achievement of the subject—again, ‘in parallel with apperception.’ It 
is an integrity that the subject herself must forge. But what is required here is not 
merely the integrity of the subject of experience, which is nothing specifically moral, 
but the ‘integrity of willing’227 and the connection of this integrity to happiness.228 
This involves a single, but complex task. The human agent must organize and stand-
ardize her own free activity;229 forego mere habit and instinct; reflect on, harmonize, 
and prioritize her inclinations; rationally order the efforts that she makes for their 
realization;230 take care to avoid the acquisition of new (inevitably diverse and mutu-
ally conflicting) desires; harmonize her practical activity with the practical activity of 
the other members of the human community; and (to extend matters as far as Kant’s 
ultimate point of view) see to it (at all times) that her actions conform to the norms 
that would be constitutive for any possible community of rational subjects (i.e., she 
must always do her duty from an absolutely objective motive).231 The form of happi-
ness, then, is also the form of a particular gathering-together of the subject, a consol-
idation of ends and an integration of action that already resembles morality at various 
points in its articulation—and might be mistaken for it (in advance) to the extent that 
it entails the operation of reason from the outset and tends towards greater and great-
er degrees of rationality.232 
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Critical period instances of the transcendental construal of the conditioned-by 
relation 
Apart from R 7202 (and related notes), one finds hints of a similar conception of the 
relationship between morality and happiness later, too, well within the limits of 
Kant’s critical period. In the second Critique, for example, Kant argues that ‘virtue’ 
is ‘the supreme condition of whatever can even seem to us desirable and hence of all 
our pursuit of happiness.’233 Here we are presented with the idea that our desires ap-
pear to us, upon reflection, in direct relation to the primary question of ethics, ‘What 
ought I to do.’ As Römpp puts it, ‘[t]he viewpoint of happiness projects a horizon 
from which the particular satisfactions of needs and desires win a new significance 
and are rated by a new measure.’234 Our satisfactions do not satisfy us, just as such 
(as merely empirical gratifications). They (or our enjoyment of them) can be called 
into question. In the Metaphysics of Morals, too, Kant asserts that happiness is ‘satis-
faction with what nature bestows, and so with what one enjoys as a gift from with-
out.’235 To be sure, then, there is, on the one hand, ‘what nature bestows,’ the 
external gift of the moment, which involves a certain possibility of pleasure or en-
joyment. On the other hand, however, there is ‘satisfaction’ with this ‘gift,’ which is 
not something that ‘nature bestows.’ Happiness has its material and formal elements 
here too then: the ‘gift from without,’ on the one hand, and this satisfaction ‘with’ it, 
on the other. 
If the prospect of empirical contentment cannot even ‘seem desirable’ when pur-
sued independently of moral considerations, then this is because it does not consti-
tute something that a rational being (of any kind) could pursue in a systematic way. 
The only thing that has the right kind of unity and integrity is the pursuit of practical-
systematic unity as such, or morality, which subsumes happiness. Without morality 
in this sense—having no reference to the peculiarly human, let alone to that which is 
merely ‘mine’ qua individual animal—happiness is no ‘intelligible’ system. Instead 
it is a mere concatenation of pathologically contingent instances of idiosyncratic sat-
isfaction, or (at best) socially, and so for Kant only contingently, sanctioned ones. 
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The ultimately satisfying ‘thing’ (unity, organization) subsumes happiness as the end 
that consists in the harmonized totality of mutually realizable empirical ends. 
On the foregoing account (or, to speak more loosely, account-type) the human 
being’s happiness is impossible without the antecedent satisfaction of reason. This is 
a mode of satisfaction that has no reference to the human being’s empirical state, but 
which is nevertheless felt in it (as, too, the feeling of respect for the moral law): self-
satisfaction as consciousness of one’s morality. Here the incapacity of the immoral 
agent for happiness is implicit in the axiomatic elements of the transcendental logic 
of ‘happy experience,’ as such. On this view, if an immoral agent’s happiness is im-
possible, this is not because the latter would have to be constituted all at once as an 
‘absolute whole’ and realized per impossibile at some particular time and place (a 
possibility—or impossibility—that we encountered in chapter 1), but because the 
agent that seeks the gratification of her inclinations is not moral. 
On this account, too, the claim that moral agents were worthy to be happy would 
have reference, at most, to the material conditions that would have to be added to 
their morality and the latter’s immediate affective sequelae (i.e., added to their ante-
cedently established moral self-satisfaction) in order for the happiness of which they 
were formally capable (given that they were moral) to be actualized. In other words, 
the idiom would have reference to those ‘other material conditions’236 over which, in 
contrast to her morality, the moral agent would remain powerless. 
But the notion of ‘unworthiness to be happy’ would be simply superfluous. The 
claim that immoral agents were unworthy to be happy would be oddly out of place. 
Given their immorality, such agents would lack any capacity for happiness in the 
first place. This would be so even given the realization of the relevant material con-
ditions (again, the satisfaction of an agent’s particular desires). Here, to declare an 
agent immoral would be to declare her unhappy and to declare that she could not 
help but remain unhappy as long as she was immoral—irrespective of any merely 
empirical satisfactions that she happened to enjoy. The idea of a happy, but immoral, 
agent would be simply incoherent. On this view, not only the agent herself, but God 
as well, would be powerless to bring it about that an immoral agent is happy. 
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If this were the end of the story, then Kant’s habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘wor-
thiness to be happy,’ would be rather excessive, or (barely better) an empty rhetorical 
habit. If the happiness of which immoral agents are ‘unworthy’ were, in the end, 
something of which they are constitutively incapable, then the notion of worthiness 
to be happy would be at best a kind of inept juridical metaphor that expresses an ul-
timately illusory feeling, based in a mistake in thinking about the nature of happi-
ness. 
To the contrary, however, to the extent that Kant’s habit of glossing ‘morality’ 
as ‘worthiness to be happy’ expresses his thinking about morality and happiness, he 
takes it that human beings in general, and immoral ones in particular, can be happy. 
He takes it that the aspiration to happiness is realizable, in principle, given the right 
mix of prudent effort, natural circumstances, and assistance from other agents. As I 
show below, only a normative conception of the relationship between morality and 
happiness makes any sense of Kant’s use of this idiom. The transcendental concep-
tion of this relationship, in any case, is ill served by it. 
Morality and happiness as extrinsically related states of an 
agent’s affairs 
The ‘extrinsicness’ thesis as the claim that an immoral, but happy agent is 
possible 
To the extent that he deploys it, Kant mediates his references to morality (or ‘virtue,’ 
or ‘goodness’), the ‘conditionem sine qua non’ for happiness,237 by way of his im-
mediate use of the ‘worthiness to be happy’ idiom. The human being is worthy to be 
happy only on condition that he is moral—in possession of a ‘good will,’238 a ‘good 
man,’239 an agent who enjoys a ‘pure disposition of…heart.’240 But the mere asser-
tion that something—‘morality’ (however construed)—is a condition of the possibil-
ity of happiness does not settle the question whether this relationship, even qualified 
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as one that is subject to a ‘fundamental principle of reason,’241 is a transcendental 
one, a causal one, or a normative one. 
Taken at face value, the assertion that worthiness to be happy is the condition in 
question settles this matter outright: it points to a normative conception of morality’s 
relation to happiness. The nature of happiness is also settled—that is, specifically as 
far as its being a possibility for immoral agents goes. In the idea of a unity of ends, 
for example, secured through far-reaching prudence, prudence that considers what is 
true of human beings in general, but without giving special priority to their capacity 
for pure practical rationality, we have already encountered the idea of happiness as 
both a unified whole of empirical gratifications and a state of the human agent’s em-
pirical affairs that is compatible with her immorality in Kant’s ultimate sense. Here, 
moral self-satisfaction, or moral contentment as the consciousness of one’s deeds’ 
ascribability to oneself (their ‘negative’ freedom) and of their conformity to the mor-
al law (in the manner of their being motivated, etc.) and, too, of this conformity’s 
ascribability as well, is not integral for happiness, as such.  
Disapproval of the happiness of immoral agents is disapproval of something for 
which the ground of this same disapproval (i.e., the immorality that gives rise to self-
contempt) is not, of itself, already a sufficient negating condition. It is disapproval of 
happiness where the latter is regarded as something that ought, perhaps, to be oc-
cluded (where morality is lacking), but that would have to be blocked extraneously. 
Thus the claim that morality and happiness are extrinsically related, on the one 
hand, and the claim that immoral agents are capable of happiness, on the other, are 
reciprocally related. But further qualifications must be put into play. How should we 
characterize the happiness of which both moral and immoral agents are capable, but 
not equally worthy? 
Does Kant’s gloss imply a particular theory of happiness? 
We saw in chapter 1 that Kant sometimes represents happiness as an ideal and hence 
perpetually deferred state of affairs. If happiness were something to which no one 
could attain, then it would follow a fortiori that it was something of which immoral 
agents were incapable. We can reject this representation of happiness out of hand, 
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then, to the extent that we allow that Kant’s gloss expresses his view that immoral 
agent’s are capable of happiness. We need not quite agree, however, that ‘for Kant 
happiness is a subjective state of satisfaction rather than the achievement of some 
objective ideal.’242 Kant evinces both views, even if he emphasises the activity of 
thinking particular instances of empirical gratification under this ‘objective ideal,’ 
over the merely (practically) regulative notion of the ideal’s (at best perpetually de-
ferred) ‘achievement.’ 
In fact, Kant does not explicitly articulate a theory of happiness that is consistent 
with his use of the ‘worthiness to be happy’ idiom. Rather, his habit implies three 
main possibilities. The happiness of which immoral agents are both unworthy and 
capable is either: (1) the pleasure of the moment; (2) a mode of empirical well-being 
constituted in such a way that skill and prudence and freedom are internal to it; i.e., 
the rational organization of the agent’s empirical desires and the organized realiza-
tion of some mutually compatible subset of them that falls short, by definition, of the 
integrity that is involved in Kantian morality (whatever this integrity may entail at 
any stage in his forward-looking thinking about morality); or (3) a mode of empirical 
well-being that resembles (2) in terms of its empirical content, but which is forged by 
a third party acting in the agent’s behalf, and offered her as a gift. Both (2) and (3) 
entail, further, that happiness is a mode of satisfaction that either (α) subsists in spite 
of the immoral agent’s (lively) bad conscience; or (β) subsists only thanks to the 
deadness of her bad conscience; or (γ) subsists only thanks to an antecedent healing 
of her will and bad conscience, together, that leaves the first good and the second 
unburdened. 
In spite of at least one prominent counter-example,243 it seems unlikely that the 
happiness of which Kant takes immoral, unworthy agents to be capable is simply the 
pleasure of the moment. No human being, even the least disposed to morality, can 
really live for the moment; she cannot inhabit her gratifications immediately and 
suppress her interest in questions about whether she will ever be satisfied again, 
whether the present satisfaction will last, whether it might be improved upon next 
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time, whether other satisfactions might be joined to it, or whether other satisfactions 
might, to the contrary, occlude (or be occluded by) the realization of this one. 
What Wood calls ‘the pleasure of the moment’ contrasts with ‘happiness on the 
whole’244 and, while human beings often sacrifice the latter in order to obtain the 
former, this does not meant that the pleasure of the moment counts as happiness. It is 
hardly likely that these states of affairs are equivalent for Kant. It is more plausible to 
claim that, for Kant, happiness always has reference to reason’s organizing capacity. 
As Adorno puts it in his lectures on Kant’s moral theory, ‘the individual [who] re-
nounce[s] momentarily a certain amount of happiness or pleasure…gets it back with 
interest in terms of the rational organization of his life.’245 Adorno’s apparent confla-
tion of ‘happiness’ and ‘pleasure’ aside, Kant makes some degree of ‘rational organ-
ization’ central to his thinking about happiness (again, ‘on the whole’). Here as 
elsewhere, however, ‘reason requires some sensuous material to carry out its regula-
tive function.’246 As the mere concept of the empirical object of human striving in 
general, happiness remains empty, a kind of blank.247 The requisite content is ‘sup-
plied by the individual’s inclinations.’248 And where this content is supplied, and to 
the extent that an identical ‘I have desired this’ (a kind of intellectual sigh of pleas-
ure) is able to accompany each particular instance of empirical satisfaction that she 
enjoys, there is happiness. Thus it would seem that (2), above, is a more probable 
candidate than (1) for the happiness of which both moral and immoral, worthy and 
unworthy, agents are capable. 
But it seems improbable, at best, that Kant would allow happiness in the sense of 
(2), above, to count, without qualification, as the apogee of empirical well-being for 
the human agent. It is possible for happiness in that sense to subsist with the presence 
of a guilty conscience. But bear in mind that the experience of the bad conscience is 
a matter of affect—of painful affect. It is hard to see how an agent’s empirical well-
being, no matter how deeply grounded in ‘the rational organization of his life,’ and 
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no matter how much an expression of that organization, could be ultimately satisfy-
ing to him, if he had a bad conscience and suffered from it. 
The problem of moral self-satisfaction 
In the second Critique, Kant makes a pair of observations about the moral psycholo-
gy of two kinds of human agent: a cheat, on the one hand, and an ‘upright man,’ on 
the other. On the one hand, Kant describes an agent who enriches himself through 
dishonesty and then avers ‘to himself’ both that ‘I am a prudent man, for I have en-
riched my cash box,’ and that ‘I am a worthless man although I have filled my 
purse.’249 On the other hand, the ‘upright man’ finds himself ‘in the greatest distress’ 
and is aware that ‘he could have avoided [this suffering] if he could only have disre-
garded duty.’ But, Kant argues, he is ‘sustained [in his superlative state of distress] 
by the consciousness that he has maintained humanity in its proper dignity in his own 
person and honored it’ and ‘that he has no cause to shame himself in his own eyes 
and to dread the inward view of self-examination.’ His consciousness that he is not 
‘unworthy of life in his own eyes’ is ‘consolation,’ Kant says, but it ‘is not happi-
ness, not even the smallest part of it.’250 
Conversely, ‘the greatest distress,’ ‘shame,’ and ‘dread’ that are associated with 
an agent’s consciousness that she is ‘unworthy of life,’ are not simply equivalent to 
unhappiness. To have an empty ‘purse’ or an impoverished ‘cash box’ is of a differ-
ent order from the experience of having to concede (even if only secretly) that one is 
‘a worthless man.’ Two ‘different criteri[a] of judgment’ are in play.251 
I take it that Kant is simply describing some well-attested facts about ordinary 
human psychology. The human being wishes to avoid ‘distress.’ She wants to have a 
full purse. But she also cares about her own ‘humanity in its proper dignity’; she 
wants to avoid ‘shame’; she ‘dread[s] the inward view of self-examination’ when she 
knows that she has acted immorally. She does not want to have to acknowledge that 
she is morally ‘worthless.’  For Kant, the relationship between ‘recognition that one 
has done something morally wrong,’ as Hill puts it, and ‘painful self-reproach and 
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alienation from others’ is a necessary one.252 In other words, ‘[t]he tendency to suf-
fer, though perhaps blocked in some cases, is inevitable’253 and is an ‘inherent liabil-
ity’254 for immoral agents. But this is not simply equivalent to unhappiness. 
In this respect, the account of their relationship that makes morality a transcen-
dental condition of the possibility of happiness, which was heavily dependent upon R 
7202, included a decidedly ambiguous moment.255 One of that document’s main in-
sights is that the human being’s conscience and its state cannot be ignored when it 
comes to happiness. But it is not clear that the role that Kant gives to self-satisfaction 
with respect to happiness necessarily entails that morality is internal to happiness. 
On my reading, it does not. The pangs of conscience are a source of unhappiness, to 
be sure, but this does not mean that immorality makes happiness simply impossible. 
Instead, by way of the pangs of a bad conscience, immorality is a possible source of 
inner suffering, which tends to undermine and erode any happiness that the agent has 
secured. (Here, again, happiness might be regarded as either the pleasure of the mo-
ment or, more realistically in reference to Kant, as the outcome of natural factors, 
clever foresight, prudent action, and contributions from other agents.) 
On this account, how an agent lives, in general, and how she comes by her em-
pirical gratifications, in particular, affects whether or not she can take satisfaction in 
the outcomes that satisfy her inclinations. But this is so in a distinctly non-
transcendental sense. The gratification of her desires as the outcome of cleverness or 
prudence is not in question qua happiness. The problem, here, is that this happiness 
would tend to be undermined by the equally empirical fact that her conscience tor-
ments her. Emphasis falls on this affect, not on its source. Unhappiness ensues, if her 
conscience is a sensitive one, as the result of a countervailing, heartfelt suffering, ir-
respective of the latter’s ground. In short, the absence of a wounded conscience (ei-
ther because the latter is insensate, or because it is ‘healed’) is internal to 
happiness—but this leaves the relationship between morality and happiness an ex-
trinsic one. 
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This view makes sense even if happiness is regarded as the mere pleasure of the 
moment. In general, however, this is not how Kant proceeds. Instead, as Kant puts it 
in his philosophy of religion lectures, happiness is an overall ‘[w]ell-pleasedness 
with one’s own existence.’256 Even regarded as pleasure, this well-pleasedness ‘ap-
plies to the entirety of our existence’ and not to our state at some time or other. It ‘is 
consequently pleasure in our state as a whole.’257  Thus ‘consciousness of one’s own 
dignity, or self contentment, belongs to perfect happiness.’ But at the same time there 
is a distinction between ‘self-contentment,’ which ‘arises from morality,’ and happi-
ness, which ‘depends on physical conditions.’258 
In R 7202, Kant asserts that ‘[a] certain basis (capital, property) of satisfaction is 
necessary…without which no happiness is possible.’259 He construes self-satisfaction 
as ‘pure happiness,’ but also refers to ‘the principle of self-satisfaction’ as ‘the condi-
tion of all happiness.’260 In the Groundwork, too, Kant says that happiness is ‘com-
plete well-being,’ adding that this entails ‘satisfaction with one’s condition.’261 This 
‘satisfaction’ has a special status. Like ‘well-being’ (Wohlbefinden), it pertains to the 
agent’s affective state, but it must be carefully distinguished from the latter. In the 
Religion, Kant expresses this distinction in the strongest terms by contrasting merely 
empirical satisfaction with an ‘unconditional good pleasure in oneself’ that is alto-
gether ‘independent of gain or loss resulting from action,’ that is, ‘a contentment on-
ly possible for us on condition that our maxims are subordinated to the moral law.’262 
In a draft version of The Metaphysics of Morals’ ‘moral catechism,’ Kant gives the 
distinction a slightly different emphasis, writing that it is not enough to be ‘satisfied 
[zufrieden]’ with one’s ‘state,’ but that one needs to be satisfied with oneself as 
well.263 
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R 7202 gives rather unsystematic expression, then, to two closely related, but 
distinct ideas. The first is that happiness is impossible without morality for the sim-
ple reason that the concept of happiness is subsumed under the concept of morality. 
The agent cannot think of herself as happy if she thinks of herself as immoral. In 
other words, here, the unity and integrity of practical agency that find their ultimate 
embodiment in Kant’s critical notion of morality mark a kind of paradigm for think-
ing the unity of what it is that satisfies me, in particular (all of the diverse instances 
of empirical satisfaction that I happen to enjoy and that are a function of what I actu-
ally happen to desire), with what it is that satisfies agents like me, in general. 
The second view is that empirical satisfaction is not adequate for happiness to 
the extent that happiness also entails ‘satisfaction with one’s existence.’  Equivalent-
ly, Kant says the same of moral contentment, which is what allows him to say that 
happiness and moral contentment are analogous.264 The difference between this per-
spective and the transcendental one is that happiness, which does not internalize sat-
isfaction with oneself qua moral agent, is undermined and eroded by the feeling of 
moral self-contempt, which is a kind of painful feeling of shame.265 
Kant’s description of the cheat and the upright man brings us close to saying that 
morality is a condition without which immoral agents could not be happy in the first 
place. Of course, to the extent that we are trying to hone in on the sense of Kant’s 
gloss, we do not want to say this. We want to say, rather, that it really is happiness 
that is eroded by a cheat’s bad conscience and that such a person’s happiness is not 
simply impossible, from the outset. But we also want to reject the idea that the hap-
piness of which moral and immoral agents are equally capable goes on being that in 
the ongoing, sustained presence of the affective suffering that comes from having a 
guilty conscience. This way of relating morality and happiness is an extrinsic one to 
the extent that it leaves open the possibility of an immoral agent’s having an insen-
sate conscience (take, for example, the immediacy of Kierkegaard’s ‘aesthetic’ sub-
jectivity) and being happy in spite of her own wickedness.266 But it also leaves open 
a more (for Kant) concerning possibility: the idea of an agent whose conscience is 
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whole, whose will has been healed and made good (in spite of, not thanks to, her dis-
crete freedom, which was enslaved), and whose conscience has been unburdened by 
forgiveness. 
This means that (α), above, is out. Thus, on Kant’s gloss, the happiness of which 
we are all capable is either a mode of well-being such that any immoral agent that 
enjoys it has an insensate conscience (viz., [β] above), or such that any immoral 
agent that enjoys it has been ‘healed’ in conscience and in will, in such a way that 
she neither feels, nor takes herself to have cause for feeling, the pangs of conscience 
any more than a moral agent would (viz., [γ] above). 
Of course these possibilities integrate, in turn, with (2) and (3), above—the ideas 
of happiness as a mode of empirical well-being constituted in such a way that skill 
and prudence and freedom are internal to it or as an endowment that resembles the 
latter in its upshot, but is rather a gift than a product of the agent’s freedom. If Kant’s 
gloss represents the relationship between morality and happiness in terms of a nor-
mative connection between them, then—given either an insensate conscience or a 
‘healed’ one—happiness as either a product of the agent’s own optimally, rationally 
organized (but ultimately immoral) efforts, or a product (in whole or in part) of the 
efforts of another (hence, in part or in whole, a gift), would be happiness of which 
the immoral agent was capable and unworthy. In either case, we would be faced with 
a happiness that, on the view embodied in Kant’s gloss, she ought not to enjoy.267 
Morality and happiness as necessarily and normatively relat-
ed 
Immoral agents ought not to be happy. In some cases, the problem of an immoral 
agent’s happiness is resolved when her guilty conscience robs her of the satisfaction 
that she would otherwise take in her empirical well-being. Such an agent ought not to 
be happy—and is in any case not happy (or not for long, or not very). The idea that 
immoral agents ought not to be happy has its real traction, then, in regard to the other 
two scenarios that I described above. I will address Kant’s way of addressing these in 
chapters 3 and 4. First, however, it remains to be shown that Kant’s gloss really does 
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represent morality and happiness as states of an agent’s affairs that are not only ex-
trinsically, but also necessarily and normatively related. The argument of this section 
will bring us to the threshold of the next one, with its claim that Kant’s concept of 
worthiness to be happy corresponds to a particular understanding of desert. 
As I did with respect to my claim that Kant’s gloss shows that he takes morality 
and happiness to be extrinsically related, I must grant first, once again, that Kant’s 
thinking exhibits more than one tendency when it comes to the necessity that charac-
terizes the extrinsic connection that he takes to hold here. Before taking up the pri-
mary claim of this section, then, I will once again contend with and assess the 
significance of a second tendency in Kant’s thinking. 
Morality regarded as a (physical) cause of happiness 
In the second Critique, Kant expresses the view that, given certain of our aims as 
practical-rational beings, the affirmation that morality is connected, immediately, 
with happiness may be regarded as a particular kind of synthetic judgment whose 
validity is grounded a priori. This affirmation attests, more precisely, to the repre-
sentation of morality (and so, too, of freedom) as a physical cause, in the empirical 
medium of moral deeds, of happiness and so, of course, as a state of the agent’s af-
fairs that is not internal to morality (to the extent, that is, that effects are immediately 
connected with their causes, for Kant, but are not ‘internal’ to them—else true claims 
about causality would be analytic, not synthetic). Before coming to Kant’s argument 
for this position, however, it will be necessary to clarify a number of distinctions 
without which it is possible that my reading of Kant will be misunderstood. 
As we shall see, in the second Critique Kant expresses the view that we are per-
mitted to infer from the statement that such-and-such an agent is a moral that this 
same agent will end up happy.  We are permitted to regard the one claim as entailing 
the other.  But if it does so (as we are permitted to think), it does not do so without 
the support of an antecedently granted covering law, a conditional that states that if 
an agent is moral, then she will be happy (my expression, ‘will be happy,’ indicates 
that we are faced, in this context, in contrast to Kant’s deployments of the ‘worthi-
ness to be happy idiom,’ with a relationship between antecedent and consequent that 
is ‘natural’ and not ‘deontic’). That the statement that an agent is moral entails the 
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statement that she will be happy (given that we are permitted to postulate the cover-
ing law that opens this inference) is precisely what I mean when I claim that, in the 
second Critique, Kant regards the relationship between morality and happiness as an 
‘extrinsic,’ but not a normative one. 
Now, in the implicit thinking that finds expression in Kant’s habit of glossing 
‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy’ he appears to hold that the notions of unhap-
piness and immorality are bound to one another intrinsically. The respective states of 
an agent’s affairs that would instantiate these notions (her actual immorality, as em-
bodied in actually immoral deeds, and her actual unhappiness), however, are related 
extrinsically. In other words, here, although she ought unconditionally to be unhappy 
(eschatologically speaking) an immoral agent’s happiness remains a possibility for 
her; nothing about her being immoral assures that she really will be unhappy; her un-
happiness can only be unfailingly secured by being ‘forged’ (my term) by a kind of 
‘extra step’ (as Guyer says of the actualization of the notional relationship that he 
thinks holds, for Kant, between happiness and morality268). The relationship between 
these elements—as encapsulated again strictly, however, in Kant’s use of his ‘wor-
thiness to be happy’ idiom—is neither a causal one, nor an analytic one. I call it 
‘normative’ to signal the idea that, for Kant, its being actualized is valued and called 
for (indeed without conditions), but is never regarded an outcome whose eventual 
actualization we are permitted to simply take for granted (as we are, on Kant’s view, 
where moral deeds are regarded as causally related to happiness—the view that I 
discuss below). 
The only view on which the inexorable connection between immorality and un-
happiness is an analytic one is the view according to which an immoral agent is, by 
definition, incapable of being happy—no matter what the empirical conditions are 
vis-à-vis the realization of the desires that she happens to have. In that case, the rela-
tionship between immorality and unhappiness, at least, would be an intrinsic one. 
The statement that an agent is immoral would entail the claim that she is unhappy. 
But there is a normative or deontic sense of entailment too. With respect to immo-
rality and unhappiness, this would be expressed by saying that the statement that an 
agent is immoral entails the claim that she ought to be unhappy.  Again, however, 
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this entailment depends upon the antecedent establishment, or granting, or presuppo-
sition (as the case may be), of a covering law, a conditional, stating that if an agent is 
immoral, then she ought to be unhappy. 
In a moment I will turn to Kant’s second Critique argument for the claim that we 
are permitted, as I said above, in view of our combined interest in morality, on the 
one hand, and happiness, on the other, to regard morality (and so, too, freedom) as a 
physical cause, in the empirical medium of moral deeds, of happiness.  First, howev-
er, there is one other matter that requires clarification. I want to be clear, in particu-
lar, about how I understand the bearing of Kant’s notion of the ‘synthetic a priori’in 
this context. 
As we have seen, some of Kant’s thinking about happiness entails that the latter 
is intrinsically related to morality, or that happiness is constituted in such a way that 
morality is internal to it, such that the happiness of immoral agents is precluded from 
the outset. I am also conceding, now, that—particularly in the second Critique—
Kant sometimes expresses the view that, with a view to certain of our fundamental 
aims as practical-rational beings, morality (or moral deeds) may be regarded as a 
cause of happiness—as able, at least under some ideal set of circumstances, to bring 
it about that moral agents are happy ones. As I pointed out in my introduction, given 
Kant’s understanding of causality, this way of relating morality to happiness entails 
that the connection between them is a necessary one; but it also entails that the con-
nection is an extrinsic one. In other words, the assertion that this connection holds is 
a claim to synthetic knowledge whose objective validity is grounded a priori. 
That bolts of lightning, for example, cause peals of thunder, is not a synthetic a 
priori judgment. Nevertheless, for Kant, it is a condition of the ‘objective validity’ of 
(fallible) particular generalizations like this one that we be warranted a priori in 
holding that, whatever its cause may actually turn out to be, every event has one. 
And, as Kant argues in the first Critique, we are warranted a priori in making the 
general synthetic assertion that every event has a cause, which is to say that every 
event has temporally antecedent necessary and sufficient conditions—and that the 
relationship between any event and its conditions may be described with reference to 
universally binding laws (of nature). 
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The synthetic claim that morality causes happiness is not warranted a priori in 
the manner that the claim that every event has a cause is.  But it is not like particular 
claims about empirical matters of fact, either: the claim that morality (or moral 
deeds) is (or are) the cause of (ultimate) happiness is not like the claim that bolts of 
lightning cause peals of thunder. With respect to the latter, it is Kant’s view merely 
that, if the proposed (or supposedly observed) connection holds, then it holds neces-
sarily.  This is what it means to say that it is an instance of causality, rather than of 
merely happenstantial conjunction. But that there really is a causal connection be-
tween lightning and thunder is not something that can be ascertained a priori (in con-
trast to the general claim about events having causes). The view, which we will 
explore now, that there really is a causal connection between moral deeds and the 
happiness of their agents is not like this.  Kant does not claim to be able to show that 
this is so, but only that we are permitted to think it is.  In other words, he takes us to 
be permitted to regard the claim that moral deeds cause happiness as a claim to syn-
thetic a priori knowledge—and so, to this extent, like the general assertion that every 
event has a cause.  We are not permitted to regard specific empirical claims about 
causation in this way: they remain claims to synthetic a posteriori knowledge, even 
though their ‘objective validity’ is grounded in the synthetic a priori claim that—our 
fallibility in specific matters aside—every event does have a cause. 
Now, after defining virtue and happiness as a pair of ‘determinations necessarily 
combined in one concept’ (i.e., in the concept of the highest good), Kant goes on to 
make an argument concerning such necessary combinations in general. Their ele-
ments, he argues 
must be connected as ground and consequent, and so connected that this unity is considered 
either as analytic (logical connection) or as synthetic (real connection), the former in accord-
ance with the law of identity, the latter in accordance with the law of causality. The connec-
tion of virtue with happiness can therefore be understood in one of two ways: either the 
endeavour to be virtuous and the rational pursuit of happiness are not two different actions but 
quite identical…or else that connection is found in virtue’s producing happiness as something 
different from the consciousness of virtue, as a cause produces an effect.269 
Kant insists that, conceptually speaking, happiness and virtue are ‘extremely hetero-
geneous’270 (hence the futility of searching out an analytic connection between them) 
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and that if happiness is to be regarded as a consequence of morality (and the latter, 
then, as ground) then this will be a matter of a synthetic a priori relation. Obviously, 
it is possible to affirm that Kant takes the notion of the highest good to be a represen-
tation of the co-inhering of morality and happiness and still take it that ‘the specific 
relation [that] they bear to one another in the highest good’271 is a merely extrinsic 
one,272 or to regard it as perpetually deferred to another ‘world,’ or to a future state of 
this one,273 where it is realized as an expression of a material connection that he does 
not take to be discernable in advance.274 Here, Kant’s ‘critical’ aim is merely to 
block anyone’s pretension to know that a causal relationship between moral actions 
and happiness is impossible.275 
There are two immediate problems with Kant’s argument, however. First, Kant 
does not show that morality’s and happiness’ conceptual connection (their being 
‘two determinations necessarily combined in one concept’) is a necessary one. He 
appears to simply assert it by way of his two-part claim that, first, in addition to their 
virtue, ‘happiness is also required’ for ‘the whole and complete good as the object of 
the faculty of desire of rational finite beings,’ and, second, that this is so ‘not merely’ 
in the eyes of such beings alone, ‘but even in the judgment of an impartial reason.’276 
As I will show below—with reference to another of Kant’s uses of the notion of the 
‘impartial spectator’ and in connection with this spectator’s further appearance in the 
commentary—it is easy to misrepresent such a spectator’s concurrence or acquies-
cence in what is deemed necessary from the point of view of the human being (the 
‘rational finite being’) as this spectator’s acquiescence in a demand of pure reason 
(hence necessary—as Kant indicates). The ease with which this misunderstanding 
arises can be attributed to a certain ambiguity in Kant’s description in this context. 
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The second problem is that Kant appears to elide a third possibility here—a se-
cond kind of synthetic ‘real connection’—and the one which, as I claim, is anticipat-
ed by Kant’s habitual gloss. I say that he ‘appears’ to elide it since he does advert to 
it—in spite of himself—twice within the same text: firstly, on the two occasions on 
which he glosses ‘morality’ and ‘virtue’ as ‘worthiness to be happy’ and, secondly, 
when he defines ‘the highest good of a possible world’ (which is related to, but dis-
tinct from, ‘the highest good in a person’) as ‘happiness distributed in exact propor-
tion to morality.’277 This third possibility is the connection or conceptual 
‘combination’ that would be actualized by being forged by a third party (here inde-
terminate) acting in accordance with a categorical imperative commanding that this 
practically (hence morally), but not physically, necessary ‘distribution’ take place. 
Apparently, Kant’s near elision of this possibility has the effect, at times, of a 
complete obfuscation. When Guyer focuses on this same text, his explanation of 
Kant’s use of the concept of worthiness to be happy slips comfortably from the nor-
mative focus of his reading of Kant’s unpublished notes from the 1770s (where the 
emphasis is on questions of the fairness of happiness’ distribution, or of the moral 
agent’s right and entitlement to it) to Kant’s ‘critical,’ causal construal of the syn-
thetic a priori (‘real’) ground-consequent connection that Kant claims here for mo-
rality and happiness.278 He simply follows where Kant apparently leads. 
Guyer observes that Kant’s concept of the ‘highest good’ has sometimes been 
misinterpreted as a ‘composite’ ideal consisting in ‘two independent aims or ends,’ 
virtue and happiness, whose independence and distinctness entails that they can only 
be ‘reconciled’ to the extent that we ‘pursu[e] our natural end of happiness within the 
limits set by virtue.’  This misunderstanding, he argues, is grounded in the assump-
tion that virtue ‘intrinsically has nothing to do with happiness.’279 Earlier in his ar-
gument, however, Guyer points out that ‘if happiness in that sense [i.e., in the 
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ordinary, natural sense that distinguishes the latter from moral contentment] simply 
has no connection with virtue, then it is hard to see why the two should be connected 
in the sentiments of any rational observer at all.’280 
Of course, Kant does take happiness and virtue to be ‘connected in the senti-
ments’ of such an observer.281 By turning in this direction, however, we—along with 
Guyer and, ultimately, Kant—are faced, again, with a notion of morality’s and hap-
piness’ conceptual ‘combination’ that is distinct from the notion of physical causality 
whose relevance for answering the question (how morality and happiness are related) 
both Kant (and Guyer) are depending upon. Again, however, the notion of (well-
ordered, morally oriented) freedom’s causality with respect to happiness (i.e., under 
a widened corpus of natural laws) does not fit well with the ‘sentiments’ of the ob-
server that Kant has in mind. He veers in this other direction, however, towards the 
‘is’ and ‘will be’ of an inscrutable natural order (framed by his theological-practical 
‘postulate’ of God’s authorship and oversight of nature) and away from the norma-
tivity, the ‘ought’ to which those impartial sentiments have reference. 
As Guyer puts it, Kant ‘claims [that] the connection must be synthetic, which he 
takes to mean that it must be causal. But here an antinomy arises because both of the 
obvious candidates for a causal relation between virtue and happiness seem impossi-
ble.’282 Kant argues, however, that it is only apparently false ‘that virtue can be the 
cause of happiness’ and that this appearance of falsehood ‘aris[es] from an empirical 
restriction of our conception of causality to our own causality in the sensible world 
of appearance.’283 In the section of the second Critique entitled ‘The Existence of 
God as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason,’ Kant argues that 
there is not the least ground in the moral law for a necessary connection between the morality 
and the proportionate happiness of a being belonging to the world as part of it and hence de-
pendent upon it, who for that reason cannot by his will be a cause of this nature and, as far as 
his happiness is concerned, cannot by his own powers make it harmonize thoroughly with his 
practical principles.284 
However, Kant continues, since ‘we ought to strive to promote the highest good 
(which must therefore be possible),’ ‘the existence of a cause of all nature, distinct 
from nature, which contains the ground of this connection, namely of the exact cor-
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respondence of happiness with morality, is also postulated.’285 Guyer follows Kant in 
this direction, and associates Kant’s deployment of the worthiness to be happy idiom 
with the latter’s argument for this postulate. In terms of the text, of course, Kant does 
associate the various elements of his causal approach (include this theological postu-
late) with his concept of worthiness to be happy. The latter shows up in the midst of 
Kant’s account here, after all. Theoretically, however, the two frames of reference 
diverge. The thinking that Kant’s gloss expresses does not drift in the direction of the 
synthetic aprioricity of causality (which would have to subsume even ‘a causality,’ 
embodied in ‘a supreme cause of nature,’ that is ‘in keeping with the moral disposi-
tion,’286 i.e., that physically ‘permits’ happiness only to those agents with such a dis-
position), but remains with the synthetic aprioricity of the normative judgment that 
those ‘sentiments’ signify.  
Guyer reconciles Kant’s causal approach with his notion of worthiness to be 
happy by naturalizing the latter. That agent deserves to be happy who participates 
fully (all the way down into the heart of her motives) in the commission of deeds 
which, taken in tandem with the deeds of all other such participants, would physical-
ly cause the happiness of each and all in an ultimate scenario where the laws of na-
ture turned out to have been conducive to this all along (i.e., to the extent, precisely, 
that these laws turn out to have had the author of the moral law as their author as 
well). As Guyer observes, ‘Kant generally conceives of the highest good as a condi-
tion to be realized in nature.’287 But the difference between the ‘is’ of the causal con-
ception of this ‘realization’ (precisely ‘in nature’) and the ‘ought’ of the normative 
emphasis of Kant’s gloss must be smoothed over. Kant’s unpublished notes offer 
abundant resources for achieving this. 
There, for example, Kant argues that practical reason regards happiness as a 
state of the human agent’s empirical affairs which, objectively speaking, ‘is only 
possible through the consensus of the whole with [the individual agent’s] natural 
universal [and not merely her particular, self-serving] will.’288 Kant sees happiness 
as a product of the agent’s will, so construed; happiness is tied causally to the pro-
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gressive activity within nature of practically-rational subjects, but it is also imbued 
with a certain dimension of justice or fairness. Again, this means seeing happiness, 
ambiguously, as the upshot of both remunerative/distributive justice and physical 
causality. As Kant argues in a note to IPP from the latter part of the 1770s, the virtu-
ous agent is equipped with principles in accordance with which she and any other 
rational being could come to consensus concerning what she ought to do in the future 
(i.e., moral principles in the primary, forward-looking sense). But he adds that these 
agents are equipped, at the same time and for this very reason, with ‘the principium 
of the epigenesis of happiness.’289 Virtue is connected with happiness to the extent 
that the universal happiness of moral agents is a direct consequence of what the mor-
al law actually enjoins. But there is a sense, then, in which this happiness is enjoined 
as well.290 
It is important to recognize that, whether in these Reflexionen or in his published 
work, when it comes to this causal construal of the connection between morality and 
happiness, Kant does not make God the cause of moral agents’ happiness. Rather 
Kant approach is to represent the connection between morality and happiness as an 
ultimate outcome that would be brought about by moral agents themselves, that is, 
by actions (of theirs) that put into empirical practice their antecedent, irrevocable, 
free adherence to the moral law. This felicitous outcome is entailed, indeed necessi-
tated, by the laws of nature (authored by God), but caused by these agents—or it 
would be, ultimately, on the assumption, again, that these laws include some (un-
knowable by us) in conformity with which such agents’ free and moral deeds would, 
in some ultimate scenario, turn out to have been necessitating their happiness all 
along. 
Kant, in any case, does not outright cheat and naturalize a necessary, a priori 
‘combination’ that is better regarded as normative. These two tendencies, one of 
which antedates the other, simply coexist in his thinking. Guyer, as we saw in chap-
ter 1, is struck by the ‘profound mystery’291 of Kant’s constant articulation of his 
worthiness to be happy idiom and tries to harmonize it with Kant’s dominant critical 
period thinking. This is an unhelpful strategy, however. Kant’s gloss represents a dis-
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tinct point of view on the connection between happiness and morality, one of several 
tendencies in his thinking and the most subterranean. In this case, we are faced with 
a tendency that constantly (as it were, parenthetically) transects arguments in which 
it plays no substantive role. The really mysterious thing is that Kant never separates 
it out and thematizes it as such—in spite of its remarkable pervasiveness. 
The second Critique account of the relationship between morality and happiness 
that I have discussed above is obviously a view that Kant holds. But it does not really 
express the thinking to which his gloss refers—even though the gloss appears in it. 
Again, Kant’s work is pierced repeatedly by uses of this idiom that do not always 
connect directly—or not well—with their immediate context. There are degrees of fit 
here, however. The causal account relates the two elements, happiness and morality, 
extrinsically and necessarily, which brings this account into the conceptual vicinity 
of Kant’s gloss. The sticking point, however, is that the causal account does not re-
late happiness and morality in a truly normative manner. Indeed, because it turns on 
a particular notion of natural causality, it precludes this normative dimension alto-
gether. And this is of the essence. In the next sub-section I explain why. 
Morality as a condition without which happiness is deontically 
impossible 
Kant’s second Critique account of morality’s and happiness’ relationship entails that 
their relationship is a peculiar kind of physical fact (peculiar because inflected by 
Kant’s theological ‘postulate’ and hence outside the purview of anything that might 
be brought within the ambit of empirical enquiry). It is a matter of the ‘synthetic’ 
combination, in a ‘real connection,’ of elements that are conceptually combined a 
priori (in the idea of the summum bonum). But its upshot is natural and factual. The 
notion of necessity that is at work in Kant’s causal account of the relationship be-
tween morality and happiness makes the ultimately perfect disposition of these ele-
ments physically inexorable.292 If it were really so that the moral deeds of rigorously 
moral agents could bring it about, within the ambit of nature, that all were happy 
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then not only their happiness, but even (if we take ‘all’ in as broad a sense as possi-
ble) the happiness of immoral agents would be an inevitable fact.293 
The normativity with which Kant imbues this outcome—and which Guyer traces 
and explicates in remunerative/distributive terms—is not the normativity that is ex-
pressed in Kant’s habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy’. Guyer 
sees that Kant’s use of this idiom antedates the critical period, but then tries to make 
it fit more comfortably within the latter framework than is either necessary or possi-
ble. Instead, Kant’s gloss directs us to a way of conceiving of the relationship be-
tween morality and happiness where the relevant necessity is not physical (not even 
in the peculiar sense detailed above), but rather normative; and where the ultimately 
perfect disposition of these elements would have to be forged, by being put into prac-
tice as it were, by a third party for whom this task was merely practically necessary. 
However, as I will show below, the connection whose ‘forging’ Kant’s gloss 
represents as necessary holds (or ought to hold), not between morality and happiness, 
but between immorality and unhappiness. In short, Kant’s gloss expresses the idea 
that immoral agents are perfectly capable of happiness (my ‘extrinsicness’ claim), 
but that they ought to be unhappy (my normativity claim) and, indeed, that they un-
conditionally must be unhappy (my necessity claim). 
This abrupt transition from talk about morality and happiness to talk about un-
happiness and immorality is no accident. It is an inevitable requirement for properly 
understanding the expressive force of Kant’s gloss, as I will show. The normativity 
that Kant’s gloss signifies pertains to morality and happiness, to be sure, but it per-
tains in a different sense and with even greater urgency to unhappiness and immo-
rality. 
Guyer associates the concept of worthiness to be happy with a physically neces-
sitated state of distributive or remunerative justice in which all deserving agents are 
assured of their happiness to the extent that they have aimed at the happiness of all. 
On this view, there is no reason that the happiness that morality (causally) entails 
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must exclude immoral agents.294 Here, in fact, the (here physical) possibility of an 
immoral, but happy, agent is not ruled out. Guyer aligns his reading of Kant’s Reflex-
ionen with this causal account and comes up with the idea that, again, to be worthy to 
be happy just means that an agent has contributed to this ultimate happiness. But this 
is the happiness, precisely, ‘of all.’ Moral agents are worthy of it and immoral 
agents—also caught up in it295—unworthy. 
This comes closer to what I take Kant’s gloss to represent. The happiness that 
morality causes, by being the happiness of all, subsumes the happiness of moral and 
immoral agents alike. There is just the one happiness—and immoral agents are sus-
ceptible to it. Again, the (physical) possibility of an immoral, but happy, agent is not 
ruled out. If morality—or maximally (hence morally) ordered freedom—were to turn 
out to be the cause of the happiness of all within some order of things overseen by 
God (i.e., if this, the world that we know, that is, nature, were to turn out to be the 
order in question), it might be possible for immoral agents to get caught in this hap-
piness’ net. Then, they would not deserve it—in the sense that they had not originally 
participated in its actualization. But this would not entail that their happiness ought 
to be taken away. This is a significant oversight in Guyer’s explanation of Kant’s 
concept of worthiness to be happy. Kant’s habitual gloss shows that he takes the pos-
sibility of immoral, hence unworthy, and yet happy agents to be a worrying, morally 
problematic one. 
Without intending to, Vleeschauwer offers us a way back to the normativity of 
Kant’s gloss and the worried ‘sentiments’ of Kant’s impartial spectator. This entails 
reading this commentator against the grain, however. He writes, 
The autonomy of the will forbids us to make an immediate synthetic connection between the 
two constituents of the practical nature of man [the two ends, the moral good and happiness, 
the objects of pure practical reason and inclination respectively]. It does allow nevertheless a 
mediate synthetic connection, an external connection between them, that is, a connection 
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which does not arise from the very nature of man but from the intervention of another being 
who would have nature within his power.296 
Of course, this is Vleeschauwer’s gloss on Kant’s causal resolution of the problem of 
morality’s and happiness’ relationship, the account of the second Critique. However, 
he construes God as the cause of the happiness of moral agents—rather than as the 
author of the laws in accordance with which they, by means of their moral deeds, 
bring their happiness into being. Here, as elsewhere, Kant’s gloss creates confusion. 
It is possible, though, to read Vleeschauwer’s interpretation as a declaration concern-
ing what the gloss itself signifies: the notion of ‘a mediate synthetic connection, an 
external connection between [morality and happiness]…a connection which…[could 
only arise by way of] the intervention of another being who would have nature with-
in his power.’ There is one other thing that would have to be added here, however: 
this being would have to have a reason to forge this connection. Kant does not take 
pure reason to offer one. Kindness, however, does. By contrast, the forging of an 
‘external connection’ between immorality and unhappiness, the forging of ‘a mediate 
synthetic connection’ between these elements is another matter. For Kant, I claim, 
pure practical reason does not demand that moral agents be happy. It does, however, 
demand that immoral ones be unhappy. Again, this is the necessity to which the gloss 
adverts. 
As we saw above, Kant’s second Critique discussion of virtue qua (physical) 
cause of happiness makes reference to what holds concerning the happiness of moral 
agents ‘in the judgment of an impartial reason’ and with respect to ‘the perfect voli-
tion of a rational being that would at the same time have all power.’297 I claimed that 
Kant’s ambiguous description seems to represent his impartial spectator’s concur-
rence or acquiescence in the happiness of the moral agent as something that is 
deemed necessary, not merely from the point of view of the ‘rational finite being,’ 
but from the impartial point of view of this spectator as such. I claimed, in other 
words, that Kant represents this concurrence as acquiescence in a demand of pure 
reason. 
The spectator that Kant has in mind, however, is—to be precise—impartial. If 
this observer is also a kind one, then nevertheless, to the extent that her judgments 
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are ‘the judgment[s] of impartial reason’298 then even her kindness, which is a partic-
ular kind of inclination, is set to one side. Kant’s Groundwork’s formulation of this 
spectator’s fundamental interest is far clearer than what we encounter in the second 
Critique. He writes: 
Power, riches, honor, even health and the complete well-being and satisfaction with one’s 
condition called happiness, produce boldness and thereby often arrogance as well unless a 
good will is present which corrects the influence of these on the mind and, in so doing, also 
corrects the whole principle of an action and brings it into conformity with universal ends—
not to mention that an impartial rational spectator can take no delight in seeing the uninter-
rupted prosperity of a being graced with no feature of a pure and good will, so that a good will 
seems to constitute the indispensable condition even of worthiness to be happy.299 
At least a couple of prominent commentators make the mistake of thinking, not only 
on the basis of Kant’s comments in the second Critique, but on the basis of the fore-
going as well, that, in Kant’s view, a rational, impartial spectator would be ‘pained’ 
or ‘dismayed’ at the sight (or mere prospect) of a moral, but unhappy agent. But this 
is not what Kant thinks.300 
Guyer, for example, asks ‘if freedom or autonomy has nothing to do with happi-
ness at all, why should virtue be equated with the worthiness to be happy, and why 
should it seem unacceptable to a rational being to see virtue unaccompanied with 
happiness.’301 More pointedly, he observes a bit later that, in the second Critique, 
Kant 
first proceeds as if virtue and happiness are two entirely separate goods connected only by 
what has recently come to be called a “reactive attitude”: his idea seems to be that although 
there is no intrinsic connection between the moral good of virtue and the natural good of hap-
piness, it would nevertheless pain an impartial rational observer to see someone who is suc-
cessful in striving after the moral good of virtue nevertheless be frustrated in her independent 
but acceptable natural desire for happiness.302 
Korsgaard, referring to both the second Critique’s and the Groundwork’s representa-
tions of this purely objective point of view, observes that while the ‘impartial ob-
server’ does of course disapprove of the idea of an immoral, hence unworthy, but 
                                                
298 KpV 5: 110 (92). 
299 Gr 4: 393 (7). 
300 In addition to the foregoing, see also R 6280 18: 547-8 (352). 
301 Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, 97 (my emphasis). 
302 Ibid.,  118 (my emphasis). See KpV 5: 110 (92-3). For the original appearance and use of the term, 
‘reactive attitude,’ see P. F. Strawson, ‘Freedom and Resentment,’ in Freedom and Resentment and 
Other Essays (London: Methuen, 1974). For further clarification and development of the notion see R. 




nevertheless happy agent, ‘the impartial observer is equally dismayed by the idea that 
the virtuous person be without happiness.’303 
Either these commentators err—or they need to be much more precise. Kant’s 
point in the second Critique is not that ‘an impartial rational observer,’ just as such, 
would experience a kind of ‘pain,’ as Guyer puts it, at the sight of a virtuous agent 
who was ‘frustrated in her independent but acceptable natural desire for happiness.’ 
Kant’s point—not clearly made—is that such an observer would acquiesce in the 
goodness of this desire, given the same observer’s antecedent acquiescence in that 
desire. In the second Critique ‘the perfect volition of a rational being that would at 
the same time have power’ calls out for happiness, but this same being (as described 
here only) is also apparently one that ‘need(s) happiness’ and is ‘also worthy of it.’304 
This seems to be what Kant is saying, although his sense is ambiguous. Another less 
specific possibility is that this ‘rational being’ simply has an interest in happiness (its 
own or others’). The ambiguity, here, inheres in Kant’s reference to ‘the judgment of 
an impartial reason,’ on the one hand, and his description of an all-powerful ‘rational 
being’ that has an interest in happiness (in short, a self-loving, or a benevolent one), 
on the other. The main point, however, is that impartial reason, just as such, has no 
interest of its own in happiness, but will assent to the happiness of moral agents, at 
least, and, only where supplemented by an interested benevolence, will will it. 
Korsgaard’s evident misreading is particularly problematic in that she refers to 
both the ambiguous second Critique text and the rather clearer Groundwork one. 
She, in particular, resolves an obvious asymmetry in Kant’s thinking, favouring an 
impartial spectator that is just as ‘dismayed’ by the unhappiness of moral agents as 
by the happiness of immoral ones. Korsgaard’s misreading of Kant’s position is typi-
cal of the style of her overall project (where the latter pertains to Kant), which articu-
lates and defends a ‘Kantianism’ that has rather cleaner edges and neater lines than 
one finds in Kant himself. Guyer’s misreading, I suggest, is a function of the fact that 
he has already interpreted worthiness to be happy as desert of happiness and thus as 
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an outcome that is practically necessary, as a matter of fair distribution, entitlement, 
and right.  
Pace Guyer, something very much like a reactive attitude is at work in the heart 
of Kant’s ‘impartial rational spectator.’ In a sense, Kant offers no complaint in the 
face of such a reading. The ‘judgment of an impartial reason’305 does find expression 
in an ‘attitude,’ indeed in a feeling: a feeling of disapprobation. Kant will simply 
claim (see chapter 4) that this feeling, like the feelings of respect for the moral law, 
the humiliation of ‘self-conceit’ before it, moral self-satisfaction through conformity 
to it, and moral self-contempt through disobedience of it, is a feeling whose ground 
lies in pure practical reason itself. For Kant, these attitudes are active—a sign of the 
pure activity of judgment—not ‘reactive,’ but they are still affective in their expres-
sion. I address this topic more fully in chapter 4. For now, it will suffice to say some-
thing about the judgment that the impartial rational spectator’s attitude of 
disapprobation expresses. 
In essence, the judgment of impartial reason is that the happiness of immoral 
agents is absolutely, objectively bad. It is the judgment that immoral agents ought 
not to be happy. And, consequently, it is the judgment that such agents’ unhappiness 
is a good that ought to be realized. 
Of course, this does not follow immediately from Kant’s claim that ‘an impartial 
rational spectator can take no delight in seeing the uninterrupted prosperity of a be-
ing graced with no feature of a pure and good will.’ All that Kant explicitly claims 
here is that, whatever else such a being might judge concerning it, or feel about it, 
the ‘uninterrupted prosperity of a being graced with no feature of a pure and good 
will’ can provoke no feeling of ‘delight’ in such a being’s heart (supposing that she 
is endowed with a faculty for such feeling). It does not follow from this, just as such, 
that some other response (disapprobation, repugnance) is provoked instead. It is 
compatible with such a being’s inability to delight in the happiness of an immoral 
agent, that the happiness of such agents is simply a matter of indifference to her. 
Guyer and Korsgaard, however, clearly take themselves to be warranted in asserting 
that Kant’s ‘impartial rational spectator’ is not indifferent to the happiness of immor-
al agents. They overlook the asymmetry that holds between this spectator’s value 
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judgment (and the ‘pure,’ moral ‘feeling’ that is correlated with it) concerning the 
unhappiness of moral agents and the happiness of immoral ones, but they are right, 
nevertheless, to affirm that Kant’s spectator is ‘pained,’ at least by the latter prospect. 
Of course, this ‘delight’ and ‘pain’ are affect—the ‘spectator’ that experiences 
these feelings is passively affected and not simply engaged in the activity of render-
ing moral judgments. Nevertheless, for Kant, ‘moral feelings’ do correspond directly 
to a certain class of judgment—moral ones. The impartial rational spectator’s ‘pain’ 
or ‘dismay,’ here, is of a piece with her ‘respect’ for the moral law—affect, again, 
but affect that arises from a certain stimulation of her general receptivity to being-
affected, by considerations, in this case, of pure practical reason. The ‘impartial ra-
tional spectator’s’ ‘delight’ (or otherwise) is not equivalent to the judgment that the 
thing delighted in is good—but it nevertheless signifies this judgment. 
Taken by itself, this passage from the opening of the Groundwork does not allow 
us to say definitively that, for Kant, the rational impartial spectator finds the notion 
of an immoral, but happy agent repugnant and that this affect arises from and gives 
empirical expression to a ‘pure’ judgment of practical reason. But, taken together 
with the rest of his thinking about this matter, it is clear that Kant does not mean to 
leave open the possibility that this spectator is simply apathetic when it comes to the 
prospect of an immoral agent ending up a happy one (delighting in the happiness, 
and suffering from the unhappiness, of moral ones, but indifferent to the happiness or 
unhappiness of immoral ones). Rather, along with respect for the moral law, the 
‘humiliating’ abasement of self-conceit before it, and moral self-contempt in the 
wake of disobedience of it, Kant takes the disapprobation of the happiness of immor-
al agents and the demand that they be unhappy to be a feeling and a demand that are 
grounded in pure practical reason 
It is in tandem with other key elements of Kant’s thinking and writing, then—his 
assertion, above all, that the law of punishment is a categorical imperative, his identi-
fication of punishment with the ‘forfeiture’ of happiness, his affirmation of that ‘ne-
cessity’ of punishment that warrants an ‘inference to a future life’—that this opening 
passage of the Groundwork supports my claim that it is disapprobation and not apa-
thy that the impartial rational agent, also receptive to the modification of affect, feels 
at the very prospect of an immoral, but happy, agent. She delights in the happiness of 
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the moral agent and this delight is both grounded in kindness and a sign that she 
judges this happiness to be good (she does not judge it to be absolutely good—if she 
did, then kindness would not be required to motivate her to will it). On the other 
hand, her disapprobation of the happiness of immoral agents is not, for Kant, 
grounded in the negative of kindness, which would be malice, or a desire for re-
venge, or some such thing. If it were, then it would not be possible to regard the ethi-
cal-eschatological analogue of the ‘law of punishment,’ Kant’s ‘law of unhappiness’ 
(the law, as I put it earlier of the ‘making-unhappy’ of immoral agents) as a categori-
cal imperative. But it is. The happiness of immoral agents is not merely bad from a 
parochial point of view; it is absolutely bad. Eschatologically speaking, the punish-
ment of an agent whose will is qualified by ‘inner wickedness’ is necessary. 
Now, it is common to characterize morality, virtue, possession of a good will as 
the source or condition of happiness’ goodness or value. Korsgaard, for example, 
argues that ‘[a] conditionally good thing, like happiness, is objectively good when its 
condition is met in the sense that it is fully justified and the reasons for it are suffi-
cient. Every rational being has a reason to bring it about.’306 Korsgaard thinks that 
this applies to both the happiness of our fellows and the highest good. On this read-
ing, the primary, forward-looking moral law is regarded as a law that tells us both 
what to do, and prescribes that our doing that be the condition sine qua non bearing 
on the possibility of happiness being judged good, or of its being deemed valuable at 
all from the point of view of the kind of being for whom the moral law is actually 
binding.307 The unconditional goodness of morality, the good will or its goodness, is 
‘the condition of the value of other good things’ and ‘the source of value.’ Happiness 
is not ‘fully justified,’ then, unless it ‘stand[s] in the right relation to’ that which is 
‘unconditionally good.’308 If we do meet this condition, however, as Wood puts it, ‘it 
is objectively good that we be happy.’309 
But the upshot of my argument, above, is that happiness is never absolutely, ob-
jectively good, for Kant. Happiness can never be ‘fully justified,’ as Korsgaard puts 
it, in a sense that would entail that its production was practically necessitated. Grant-
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ed: happiness is not unconditionally good. The impartial spectator makes a judgment 
concerning the value of happiness. But if the judgment that something is good gives 
the judging agent a reason for bringing it into existence, then the impartial spectator 
does not judge that the moral agent’s happiness is good in a straightforward sense. 
The impartial rational spectator, just as such, has to be endowed with benevolence as 
well as reason, in order to have a reason for bringing the moral agent’s happiness in-
to existence. Rather, the impartial rational spectator’s judgment is a negative one: it 
would not be an objectively bad thing for the moral agent to end up happy, given that 
someone (she herself, say, or God) had a reason to make her happy. But pure reason 
does not have any interest here; only ‘impure’ reason, reason inflected by, and in-
clined to, kindness does. 
I will argue all of this more closely in the coming chapters, in discussing the law 
that commands that immoral agents be unhappy (chapter 3) and the practices and 
agents that this law prescribes and binds (chapter 4). For now, I am simply setting 
these matters out for initial review. Here is what Kant’s impartial reason judges abso-
lutely, objectively good: the unhappiness of the immoral agent; objectively bad, his 
happiness. Here is what serves the interests of pure reason, on Kant’s view: the un-
happiness of immoral agents. Happiness is only an objectively good thing from the 
point of view of pure practical reason to the extent that the latter is inflected by be-
nevolence. Pure practical reason judges the unhappiness of immoral agents a good 
without any analogous inflection at all. 
But of course the unhappiness of immoral agents is a good, too, from the subjec-
tive, parochial points of view of malice, and pathological self-contempt, and venge-
ful wrath as well. Kant’s habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy’ is 
in play long before he gets to the point of distancing this habit, theoretically, from 
such attitudes; long before he gets to the point of theoretical efforts that serve the 
gloss by disposing (but not programmatically, or well) of the possibility that some-
thing ‘impure’ lies in back of it from the outset. In a sense, in its originary function, 
Kant’s gloss is the incipient form of a kind of ultimately explicit theoretical patrimo-
ny: that the judgment that immoral agents deserve to be unhappy is warranted a pri-
ori and that the feeling of disapprobation with which we greet the prospective 
happiness of an immoral, hence unworthy, but happy agent (oneself included), is a 
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feeling that it is incumbent on us to feel (just as, finally, Kant will imply, at least, 
that it is incumbent on us to respect the moral law—in addition to acting in accord-
ance with it). 
On Kant’s account, the judgment that something is good gives the judging agent 
a reason to actualize it (see chapter 4). The judgment that something is objectively 
bad gives the judging agent a reason to omit bringing it to pass and, perhaps, to oc-
clude its arrival on the scene. The judgment that the moral agent’s happiness is good 
is really the judgment that nothing militates against it. The judgment that an immoral 
agent’s happiness is objectively bad means that something ought to be done about 
it—in a special sense (see chapter 4). For now, suffice it to say that morality is prac-
tical reason’s a priori condition for approving of a hypothetical distribution (grant or 
apportionment) of happiness, for assenting to the state itself (were it realized), or for 
approving of the prospective wish for happiness, or of effort or work aimed at it.310 
The realization or distribution of what is wished and worked for, here, is regarded as 
a real possibility—even without consideration for morality. The notion that human 
effort (integrally supplemented, perhaps, by cooperative divine intervention) can 
bring happiness into existence—while disregarding the deeply ‘authentic’ morality 
of disposition—is entirely coherent. But, on Kant’s critical account, no rational and 
impartial being (including the agent herself, to the extent that she judges in accord-
ance with pure reason as such) would ever approve of this action (or its end). In 
short, the objectivity of the condition is strictly normative, not causal. 
Worthiness to be happy, unworthiness to be happy, and de-
sert 
In this final section I further explicate my claim that Kant’s habit of glossing ‘morali-
ty’ as ‘worthiness to be happy’ does not express the view that moral agents ought 
simply to be happy. More specifically, I argue that his gloss does not express the 
view that moral agents deserve to be happy in any sense of ‘deserves’ that subsumes 
the notion of practical necessity. By contrast, I show that his gloss signifies the view 
that immoral agents ought and deserve to be unhappy. 
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Kant’s concept of worthiness to be happy represents happiness and morality as 
elements that stand in a particular kind of extrinsic relationship to one another. The 
connection between them looks, at least, like a synthetic and necessary connection a 
priori. Kant tries to make sense of this appearance by developing an account with the 
notion of causality at its centre. But this is not the connection that his gloss signifies. 
With respect to some of its instances it would be egregiously anachronistic to say 
that the synthetic a priori connection that the gloss signifies is a normative one. 
Here, rather, the theoretical claim that something ought necessarily to be the case 
gives expression to an antecedent sensitivity to the inexorability of something (a 
practice) that cannot be given up, of a complete failure of imagination with respect to 
alternative courses of action. Ultimately, this coalesces in the appearance of what 
Kant—in his thinking both about causality and about the primary, forward-looking 
moral law—will come to identify as the synthetic a priori. 
In the course of this section I specify the normativity that marks the nearer edge 
or surface of this inexorable ‘something’ (i.e., the practices of punishment, that is, of 
retribution, and of ‘retribution-sensitive’ imputation). My point of departure, here, is 
my claim that the rational, impartial spectator’s displeasure at the prospect of im-
moral, unworthy, but happy agents is not balanced, on the other side, by similar con-
sternation (Guyer’s ‘pain,’ Korsgaard’s ‘dismay’) at the prospect of moral and yet 
unhappy ones. I argue, that there is a corresponding asymmetry in the case of desert. 
More than this, I show that there is a sense in which reason rejoices at the unhappi-
ness of immoral agents in a way that it cannot—on the view that is encapsulated in 
Kant’s gloss—in the case of the happiness of moral ones. 
Desert 
Obviously, there are many uses of ‘desert,’ none without its associated controver-
sies.311 My discussion treats desert as a state of an agent’s affairs that, practically 
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speaking, necessitates a further course of action by a third party. The basic idea may 
be laid out schematically in a manner that resembles my definition of worthiness to 
be happy in chapter 1. Desert is a three-place relation between a subject (A), a thing 
or state of affairs that A deserves (x), and a ‘desert-basis’ (y), or the property of the 
agent in virtue of which she is deemed to deserve x.312 One says, then, that ‘A de-
serves x in virtue of y.’313 It is key that x and y be related in an appropriate way 
(which point, too, will be a matter of debate). In the case of worthiness to be happy, 
the property that constitutes y is a fact about the deserving subject qua free agent, her 
morality. The same applies here. The claim that ‘A deserves x’ must have reference 
to a fact about A and, more specifically, must be such that A is somehow the source 
or author of the desert-basis (y).314 
It is a basic assumption of the theory of desert that desert claims translate into 
‘ought’ ones.315 I deploy this assumption here. If A deserves x in virtue of y, then, 
given y, A ought to have (or perhaps be) x. If immoral agents deserve to be unhappy, 
then immoral agents ought to be unhappy. To assert that something ought to be the 
case, moreover, is to regard this state of affairs (that ought to be the case) as the pos-
sible effect of the possible action of some agent—and it is to regard that action as a 
practically necessary one.316 
On this score, in relation to happiness and unhappiness, Kant’s thinking evinces 
a stark asymmetry between ‘positive desert’ (desert of ‘something desirable,’ or ‘nice 
treatment’), on the one hand, and ‘negative desert’ (desert of ‘something undesira-
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ble,’ or ‘nasty treatment’), on the other.317 Conceived in terms of an obligation to act 
(i.e., an obligation to bring it about that an agent is happy or unhappy), worthiness to 
be happy is not desert of happiness. Rather, it is the negation of desert of unhappi-
ness.318 
Worthiness to be happy is not desert of happiness 
Moral merit and morally necessitated reward 
For Kant, there is no such thing as moral merit and hence no moral analogue of 
‘rightful’ reward (i.e., remuneration). To fulfill the demands of the moral law is not 
even praiseworthy. Virtue, no matter how great, is never ‘deserving of wonder,’ Kant 
says; it is neither ‘extraordinary’ nor ‘meritorious.’319 In matters of morality (as op-
posed to mere legality) the human agent can produce no ‘surplus over and above 
what he is under obligation to perform.’320 Indeed, as Kant puts it in a note from the 
early 1780s, when it comes to morality (in its wide sense, as virtue), ‘everything is 
indebtedness.’321 
Some of Kant’s clearest expressions of this position are couched in theological 
language. Others are expressed in terms of the demands and judgments of con-
science. These are major topics that I will take up more fully in chapter 4. A couple 
of examples will suffice for present purposes. 
In The Metaphysics of Morals, for example, Kant asserts that 
there is no place for reward (praemium, remuneratio gratuita) in justice toward beings who 
have only duties and no rights in relation to another, but only in his [this other’s] love and be-
neficence (benignitas) toward them; still less can a claim to compensation (merces) be made 
by such beings.322 
My employer is obliged to pay me. My neighbour is obliged to reward me if I do 
something for him for which he has posted a reward (e.g., if I spend my time and 
money looking for his lost pet). But God is not obliged to compensate or reward 
me—no matter how much I exert myself and no matter how pure my motives are in 
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doing so. ‘We have no [claim of] merit against God,’ Kant writes, ‘but rather pure 
obligation.’ If Kant does imply, in the foregoing, that there is a ‘place for reward’ in 
God’s ‘love and beneficence,’ ‘reward,’ here, has reference to a ‘happiness,’ as Kant 
says elsewhere, ‘which one does not deserve,’ but which is, rather, ‘from [aus] 
grace.’323 
Elsewhere in The Metaphysics of Morals Kant expresses the same position in 
terms of conscience: 
[i]t should be noted that when conscience acquits him it can never decide on a reward (prae-
mium), something gained that was not his before, but can bring with it only rejoicing at hav-
ing escaped the danger of being found punishable. Hence the blessedness found in the 
comforting encouragement of one’s conscience is not positive (joy) but merely negative (relief 
from preceding anxiety); and this alone is what can be ascribed [beigelegt] to virtue, as a 
struggle against the influence of the evil principle in a human being.324 
This connects up with what Kant says in the Religion when he writes that 
‘[w]orthiness has…always only negative meaning (not-unworthiness), that is, moral 
receptivity to such goodness,’ by which ‘goodness’ he means, again, a happiness 
whose distribution is grounded in the distributor’s kindness.325 Or again, as Kant says 
elsewhere, ‘good behaviour’ (Wohlverhalten ) does not necessitate reward, ‘but ra-
ther contains only receptivity to it.’326 
To sum up, desert is calculated in accordance with rules that govern agents’ rela-
tions to one another within a system of rights and duties. The notion of desert cannot 
be applied to agents that have only duties in relation to another and no entitlements at 
all. For Kant, ethics, the part of ‘morality’ that cannot be externally coerced by the 
state, is such a system. From a moral-religious point of view, another way of looking 
at this is to say that the human being has only duties in relation to God, regarded as 
the source of the law. No matter how often I do my duty I can never accrue a right or 
credit in relation to the moral law (or its legislator). 
Virtue as juridically meritorious 
Again, on Kant’s view there is no such thing as moral merit and hence no moral ana-
logue of ‘rightful’ reward. Contrast this with the situation of juridical merit. The lat-
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ter arises from doing more than what is ‘due’327 and can necessitate reward as its 
consequence. In political life, as Kant says in the Metaphysics of Morals, ‘vir-
tue…can be said here and there to be meritorious and to deserve to be rewarded.’328 
This is because, by being moral in Kant’s ‘wide’ sense (i.e., virtuous), it is possible 
to ‘put others under obligation.’329 
These ‘others’ are of course other members of the polis, which Kant does not 
take to include God. Obligation is, here, a strictly political notion. For example, Kant 
writes, ‘[b]y carrying out the duty of love to someone I put another under obligation; 
I make myself deserving from him.’330 Simply doing what is owed (doing neither 
more nor less than what the law of the land demands), however, does not have this 
effect.331 If something can be coerced (i.e., if its omission can be punished by the 
state), then doing it does not entail juridical merit.332 Merit attaches only to what 
cannot be coerced, to those instances when ‘we think,’ as Johnson puts it, that ‘“she 
did not have to do it.”’333 This is so, too, particularly when the action in question re-
quires the overcoming of significant obstacles. The beneficence of a wealthy person, 
for example, is not particularly meritorious.334 However, to do precisely what the law 
demands is not even praiseworthy, whatever one’s motive may be.335 
Reward as ‘rightful effect’ and as kindness 
Johnson argues that Kant espouses no juridical notion of (deserved, necessitated) re-
ward either, but only of punishment—that neither juridical nor moral merit can be 
connected with the notion of desert in Kant.336 As far as what is necessitated goes, 
Johnson argues, juridical merit entails nothing more than praiseworthiness.337 This 
seems right. Admittedly, Kant refers to the ‘rightful effect…of a meritorious deed’—
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a deed through which an agent does more than the law constrains him to do—as ‘re-
ward (praemium).’ But this is a specifically rightful effect, not only because the 
agent in question has done ‘more’ than she legally had to do, but also only to the ex-
tent that this ‘reward’ was ‘promised in the law’ and was her ‘motive to it [i.e., to 
performance of that action].’ Barring these conditions, meritorious deeds do not ne-
cessitate reward. In fact, Kant says, ‘conduct in keeping with what is owed has no 
rightful effect at all.’338 
By contrast with the foregoing, ‘[k]indly recompense (remuneratio s. respensio) 
stands in no rightful relation [Rechtsverhältniss] to a deed.’339 Morality entails wor-
thiness (not moral merit), as Kant says elsewhere, to receive strictly ‘voluntary 
goods.’340 Happiness (or the means to it) may be regarded as a reward, but only if it 
is regarded as one that is voluntarily bestowed on the one that ‘deserves’ it and not at 
all as a ‘rightful effect’ of anything that the agent has done (i.e., such that the be-
stowal’s omission would have been permissible). One may say to an employer, ‘I 
will work for you only on condition that you promise to pay me’; but one may not 
say, ‘I will only be moral if I can be certain that this will entail that I am happy.’ 
Unworthiness to be happy is desert of unhappiness 
‘Whoever does evil,’ Kant avers, ‘is not worthy [nicht werth] to be indulged or 
spared.’341 This does not express a kind of option to punish, however, in the way that 
morality and, with it, worthiness to be happy gives rise to a kind of option to reward. 
Vice necessitates unhappiness. And, as we saw above, ‘unworthiness to be happy’ 
may be taken to denote a positive feature of the human being, a primary property of 
which ‘worthiness’ is the negation: ‘not-unworthiness.’342 If I am not moral, then I 
remain as I was: unworthy to be happy, deserving of unhappiness. Ethically speak-
ing, one can deserve to be unhappy in the sense that one can deserve to be punished 
in some hypothetical, ultimate, eschatological scenario. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, however, Kant’s thinking about capital punishment reveals a kind of over-
lapping of these political and eschatological frames of reference. 
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This chapter’s main purpose, again, was simply to answer the question how Kant 
takes morality and happiness to be related, given his habitual gloss. And it has been 
necessary to delineate the asymmetry described above in order to answer that ques-
tion clearly. The main part of my argument concerning the nature of ‘negative’ moral 
desert, however, which is unworthiness to be happy, and my further exploration of 
the asymmetry that cuts ‘not-unworthiness’ off from the political concept of ‘positive 
desert’ must wait for chapter 3.  
A bad habit in the commentary 
Before concluding this chapter, I will draw attention to a key difference between my 
approach and the approach of most of Kant’s other readers—and I will elucidate its 
upshot. In spite of what I have claimed above, many of Kant’s commentators do 
seem to regard ‘is worthy to be happy’ and ‘deserves to be happy’ (or relevantly sim-
ilar constructions) as synonymous expressions. They regularly deploy ‘desert’ and 
‘deserves’ as though these were synonyms for ‘worthiness’ and ‘worthy,’ confusing 
the concept of worthiness to be happy, which is an ethical notion, with desert of hap-
piness, which, for Kant, can only be a juridical, political one.343 In the main, this is 
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nothing more than a bad habit and a careless use of terminology. The conflation is 
not thematized and defended. In an offhand manner, it implies a view, I surmise, that 
few of these readers would espouse upon reflection. Nevertheless, their usage is 
problematic. It tends to obscure the actual significance of Kant’s ‘worthiness to be 
happy’ idiom precisely in its relation to desert.344 
As we have seen in Guyer’s reading of him, admittedly, from time to time, Kant 
does seem to suggest the possibility of moral merit, to characterize happiness as 
something that moral agents deserve, and to see happiness as a reward for virtue.345 
In such cases, however, ‘deserve’ does not imply the categorical obligation of a third 
party, or the idea of practical necessitation; nor does ‘reward’ entail anything that is 
so necessitated. Kant refers to happiness, in these instances, as the product of a kind-
ness that endows moral and hence worthy agents (exclusively) with a good that they 
are in fact not owed, but which it is permitted (a kind third party) to bestow on them 
(alone). Nothing prevents us from construing such ‘reward’ as a good that is ground-
ed in the giver’s kindness, a default kindness to which there is no normative impedi-
ment. There is no good reason to see this happiness as something whose bestowal is 
necessitated by the moral conduct of its object.346 
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There is no problem then, just as such, in referring to happiness as ‘reward.’ I in-
sist, however, that a distinction be made and maintained here so as not to elide the 
asymmetry that exists, for Kant, between the deontic possibility of moral agents’ 
happiness, on the one hand, and the absolute deontic necessity of immoral agents’ 
unhappiness on the other. The normative necessity that is affirmed by Kant’s habit of 
glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy’ pertains to the relationship between 
immorality and unhappiness alone, which the gloss represents in an indirect fashion. 
As for what the gloss represents directly, it signifies that an agent’s happiness is 
deontically possible (permitted her or, where it is regarded as the effect of another’s 
action, permitted that other qua aim or end) if and only if she is moral. It follows 
from the claim that an agent’s happiness is deontically possible (permitted) if and 
only if she is moral that if she is immoral then her happiness is deontically impossi-
ble (forbidden), and her unhappiness therefore deontically necessary (command-
ed).347 Thus unworthiness to be happy is, for Kant, desert of unhappiness, while 
worthiness to be happy is not desert of anything at all. Rather it entails a certain per-
missibility. In short, Kant’s gloss expresses the idea that, in some sense (the topic of 
chapters 3 and 4), the happiness of moral agents is permitted, while the happiness of 
immoral ones is forbidden and their unhappiness commanded. His gloss does not 
imply that he regards happiness as a mode of remuneration that is practically necessi-
tated a priori, just in case one is moral. It does imply, however, that he regards the 
unhappiness of immoral agents as a mode of (just) retribution (indeed retaliation) 
that is so necessitated. Another way of putting this is to say that, in accordance with 
the sense of Kant’s gloss, immoral agents deserve to be unhappy and their unhappi-
ness is a state of affairs that ought to be forged extraneously, by a third party. 
Kant’s use of the idiom expresses what he takes to be the kind and rational be-
ing’s benevolent interest in the happiness of moral agents. But it also expresses the 
rather less comfortable view that immoral agents ought simply to be unhappy and 
that their unhappiness is a demand of neither kindness (as it would be, for example, 
if unhappiness were regarded as something that could lead to insight and reform, a 
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better life, and so, too, happiness), nor of malice and resentment (as it would be if 
unhappiness were regarded from the point of view of an all too human spirit of 
vengefulness), but of pure practical reason, as such. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have executed three main tasks. First, I showed that Kant’s habitual 
glossing of ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy’ represents morality and happiness 
as states of an agent’s affairs that are extrinsically related. Next, I further specified 
this claim by arguing that Kant’s gloss represents two states of an agent’s affairs that 
are not only extrinsically, but also necessarily and normatively related. Third, I ar-
gued that Kant’s notion of ‘worthiness to be happy’ points to an extrinsic, normative, 
necessary relation that holds, not between morality and happiness, but between un-
happiness and immorality. I argued that Kant’s gloss pertains to the normative neces-
sity of the immoral agent’s desert of unhappiness. I showed that Kant’s use of the 
‘worthiness to be happy’ idiom expresses a concern, then, whose primary focus is 
not the happiness or unhappiness of moral agents, but rather the unhappiness and 
happiness of immoral ones. While Kant takes morality and happiness to be norma-
tively related, he does not take it to be the case that morality necessitates happiness. 
Kant’s idiomatic use of the notion of worthiness to be happy shows that, from 
the very outset of his thinking about the grounds of moral action, he takes the tension 
between morality and happiness to be resolvable in the actualization of a correspond-
ence which—to indulge an anachronism—is always already enjoined by pure practi-
cal reason, as such, hence normative for all rational beings a priori and not merely 
hoped for by rational finite ones.348  
In the next chapter I will take an even closer look at the ‘ought’ that is implicit 
in Kant’s gloss, in the ‘enjoinment’ that it promotes. I argue that Kant understands 
the unhappiness of immoral agents by way of an analogy to the punishment of crimi-
nals. I show that this correlation is implicitly eschatological. The sub-set of immoral 
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agents that are guilty of murder, in particular, ought to be put to death. This is Kant’s 
law of punishment. I argue that, for Kant, there is an equivalent law of unhappiness. 
Ultimately, I will ask who is subject to it (i.e., bound to do what it commands) and 
how it is to be put into practice. This will involve a first step in the direction of 




The Law of Punishment and the ‘Law’ of Unhappiness 
The law of punishment is a categorical impera-
tive.349 
Introduction 
In chapter 2 I showed that Kant’s gloss expresses the idea that immoral agents are 
perfectly capable of happiness, but that they do not deserve to be happy at all. In-
deed, I showed that, to the extent that the gloss expresses Kant’s thinking about the 
relationship between immorality and unhappiness, he thinks that immoral agents de-
serve to be unhappy. I showed, moreover, that this implies that, for Kant, immoral 
agents ought to be unhappy. In this chapter, I explicate this ‘ought’ more fully by 
showing how it is embodied in what I will refer to as Kant’s ‘law of unhappiness’ 
and by exposing the latter’s retributivist connections. In this way, more pointedly, I 
will advert to a particular mode of retributivism that is in the air whenever we en-
counter Kant’s gloss. 
In service of these ends, this chapter executes three main tasks. First, I explore 
Kant’s thinking about punishment and affirm that when it comes to the latter’s speci-
fication and justification Kant is a kind of retributivist. Second, I show that, especial-
ly in his late treatment of the topic in The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant’s conceptions 
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of the legal and the ethical encounter one another in the practice and justification of 
capital punishment. Indeed, I characterize Kant’s ‘scaffold’ as the liminal topos in 
which his thinking about law and politics extends deep into his thinking about ethics 
and eschatology. I argue that the unconditional, immediate necessity that Kant as-
cribes to capital punishment in cases of murder is key to understanding the retributiv-
ist tendencies of both his thinking about politically situated punishment and his 
eschatologically inflected thinking about unhappiness more generally. Third, I argue 
that the ‘ought’ that arises from Kant’s implicit conviction that immoral agents de-
serve to be unhappy (the ‘ought’ implicit in his gloss) may be expressed in the form 
of a normative law: ‘It is practically necessary that all immoral agents be unhappy.’  
I refer to this as Kant’s ‘law of unhappiness’ and argue that it is the ethical and ulti-
mately eschatological expression of his political ‘law of punishment.’ 
The law of punishment 
The law of punishment is the imperative that says, concerning ‘the one that did it’ 
(where ‘it’ has been judged a punishable deed): ‘Punish him!’  Kant’s law of pun-
ishment has three main properties. The first is that it is a categorical imperative. The 
second is its applicability to all and only criminals. The third is its stipulation that 
criminals be punished in exact proportion to their crimes, in accordance, that is, with 
the so-called ius talionis. To say that the ‘law of punishment’ is a categorical impera-
tive is to say that criminals ought, unconditionally, to be punished. It is to say that to 
punish is not an option, but a duty350 and—having said that it is a duty (in Kant’s 
sense)—it is to say that the subject that it binds (the sovereign) has a reason for doing 
it independently of any empirical incentives that can be adduced in favour of it. To-
gether, the second and third properties constitute the law’s core retributive character. 
In other words, these properties bear on the justification of particular punishments. 
The first property, the law’s ‘categorical’ nature is something else again. It may be 
regarded as an aspect of the law’s retributivism as well to the extent that, to claim 
that it is a categorical imperative, is to claim not only that this or that actual instance 
of punishment is justified, but that punishment as such—the having of the practice at 
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all—is demanded somehow, a priori. But it tokens more than this, too, for Kant—
something rather more obscure. 
I begin with this fundamental text: 
The law of punishment is a categorical imperative, and woe to him who crawls through the 
windings of eudaemonism in order to discover something that releases the criminal from pun-
ishment or even reduces its amount by the advantage it promises, in accordance with the phar-
isaical saying, “It is better for one man to die than for an entire people to perish.”’  For if 
justice goes, there is no longer any value in human beings’ living on the earth.351 
Note what is at stake here for Kant. ‘[I]f justice goes,’ he writes, ‘there is no longer 
any value in human beings’ living on the earth.’  And what is ‘justice’ (Gerechtich-
keit) here?  It is to punish criminals. The ‘value’ (Werth) that Kant ascribes to ‘hu-
man beings’ living on the earth’ is grounded, in the strongest terms, in our 
conformity to a law that categorically forbids amnesty to criminals or any action 
aimed at reducing the ‘amount’ (Grade) of harm due to them. Later, as we shall see, 
this is so above all in regard to the crime of murder. In passages filled with stirring 
language and imagery, at a loss for argument, as it were, Kant twice refers to the 
consequences of amnesty in such cases as a terrible ‘blood-guilt’352 that will cling to 
and contaminate the whole community where this is allowed to happen. 
We will come to this imagery in due time. In this section, however, I discuss the 
practice that puts Kant’s categorical law of punishment into effect, which enacts the 
‘justice’ without which the earthly existence of human beings would be, for Kant, a 
worthless thing. First, I outline Kant’s thinking about the constitution of punish-
ments. Next I discuss Kant’s retributivism, his thinking about what justifies punish-
ments. Then I examine the significance of his claim that the law of punishment is a 
categorical imperative. 
Punishment in connection with ‘a transgression of public law’ 
Kant’s thinking about punishment constitutes an enormous area of study and de-
bate.353  The various tensions that are present in this thinking have led several com-
mentators to question whether, in Murphy’s phrase, ‘Kant develops anything that 
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deserves to be called a theory of punishment at all.’354  I neither deny nor affirm that 
Kant has a consolidated, systematic theory of punishment. My main claim in this and 
the next section is that Kant is committed—immediately, in advance of his argumen-
tation—to a particular practice (the practice of putting murderers to death) and that 
the best way of describing this commitment is in the language of a retributivist theo-
ry of punishment. Before coming to that however, it will be necessary to say some-
thing about Kant’s conception of the practice of punishment more generally. 
Restricted to its core subject matter, which pertains to the justification of particu-
lar punishments, a retributivist theory of punishment tells us how the concepts of 
crime and punishment are related with an aim to articulating a standard that actual 
punishments have to meet in order to be justified. Restricted to this task, such a theo-
ry does not tell us what crime and punishment are—only how they are, or ought to 
be, related. Saying what crime and punishment are is an antecedent, independent 
task, whose results retributivism takes for granted. 
Fundamentally, before being anything else then, punishment is for Kant a form 
of ‘physical harm’355 or ‘pain,’356 which ‘(rightly) offends the accused’s feeling of 
honor, since it involves coercion that is unilateral only.’357  Of course, as far as the 
brute infliction of pain goes, there is a sense in which anyone may be punished for 
anything at all, ad hoc, but not ‘rightly’ so. In Kant’s view, of course, punishments 
must be preceded by crimes and the agents whose punishments are in question must 
naturally be the very ones that committed them. Each concept (crime, punishment) is 
implicated in the definition of the other. A particular crime is ‘of itself punishable,’ 
which means, as Kant says, that it (precisely ‘of itself’) ‘forfeits happiness (at least in 
part).’358  Punishments have other core features too: being unwanted,359 of course, 
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and being identifiable by way of penal law in determinate connection with a member 
of a class of actions that fall afoul of one or more primary imperatives, that is, identi-
fiable as an instance of action that contravenes one of the laws of the land. 
A number of questions press for an answer (here, from Kant): (1) Who is actual-
ly punishable?  (Who may be punished?); (2) How should those who are authorized 
to punish determine the degree and kind of harm that they may inflict on those who 
are punishable? (What ought punishments to consist in?); (3) Why punish at all?; (4) 
Are parties that are authorized to punish also bound to punish?  (If an agent is found 
to be punishable then is it necessary that she actually be punished?  And must the 
punishing authority punish, on every occasion, in strict accordance with a single cal-
culus for determining degrees and kinds of harm, or may this authority make excep-
tions?); (5) Who has the authority to punish?  (If anyone is bound to punish, who 
would that be?).360 
I discuss Kant’s answer to (5) in chapter 4, while I lay out his answers to (1)-(4) 
in this chapter. This sub-section pertains to (1), (2), and (3). I discuss Kant’s answer 
to (4) below. 
Who is punishable? 
In a sense, Kant’s answer to this question is straightforward: a man gets to be 
punishable, he says, ‘because he has willed a punishable action.’361  In fact, for the 
purposes of this thesis, this answer very nearly suffices. Criminals, people that break 
the laws of the land, are punishable. We need not tarry too long with Kant’s answers 
to the questions, ‘What is crime?’ and ‘What (or who) is a criminal?’ I will give only 
a very general outline. 
On Kant’s description, crime entails—or just is—forfeiture of one’s ‘civil per-
sonality’ (bürgerliche Persönlichkeit), the loss of one’s basic ‘dignity’ (Würde) as a 
citizen. This entails that a citizen can pass, by way of a crime, from his default state 
of (external) freedom, the state that he is in as long as ‘he has not yet committed a 
crime,’ to a state in which he ‘forfeits his personality.’  This can entail, among other 
things, another’s ‘right of ownership with regard to [the criminal],’ where ‘some-
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one…become[s] a slave through his crime.’362  ‘A transgression of public law,’ Kant 
says, ‘makes someone who commits it unfit to be a citizen.’363  In other words, ‘by 
his own crime,’ the criminal loses ‘the dignity of a citizen,’ which is the baseline of 
‘dignity’ that any ‘human being in a state’ possesses. Given this loss of dignity, 
‘though he is kept alive, he is made a mere tool of another’s choice (either of the 
state or of another citizen).’364 
In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant defines punishment (poena) as ‘[t]he rightful 
effect of what is culpable.’365  In other words, punishment is not subjective and arbi-
trary. It is an effect, which is to say that it is a necessary consequence, given an ante-
cedent of the right kind. But it is also ‘rightful.’  Punishment does not arise from 
innocence. It derives from culpability. Thus, no one is punishable unless, by a crime 
that they have committed, they have passed into a state in which they have forfeited 
their civil personality and lost their dignity as a citizen. But given that a human be-
ing’s punishability is granted, what may or ought to be done to them? 
Kant’s retributivism and the ‘ius talionis’ 
At this point, we need a more specific definition of punishment that adverts to what 
ought to be done to criminals and to what degree. Kant’s answer, here, makes use of 
the so-called ius (or lex) talionis—the law of (proportionate) retaliation.366  It is im-
portant to distinguish between Kant’s use of this standard and the other parts of his 
thinking that suggest that he is a retributivist. In fact, I suggest, in spite of Kant’s 
sometimes identifying ‘the law of retribution’ with the ‘ius talionis’ as such,367 his 
retributivism is better characterized without fundamental reference to this notion. 
Just as the categorical nature of the law of punishment (its first property) is distinct 
from its property of being applicable to all and only criminals (its second property), 
the law of punishment’s stipulation that criminals be punished in exact proportion to 
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their crimes is a distinct third property in relation to these others. And, I suggest, this 
is not its decisively retributivist element. 
The question of how the practice of punishment is justified, in general—the pri-
mary problem to which retributivism offers a solution—is distinct from the question 
of how particular punishments are determined and warranted. The ius talionis per-
tains to the latter problem. As Kant puts it in The Metaphysics of Morals: 
only the law of retribution (ius talionis)—it being understood, of course, that this is applied by 
a court (not by your private judgment)—can specify definitely the quality and the quantity of 
punishment; all other principles are fluctuating and unsuited for a sentence of pure and strict 
justice because extraneous considerations are mixed into them.368 
Just as such, in spite of his calling it ‘the law of retribution,’ Kant’s use of the ius 
talionis here does not necessarily entail that he is a retributivist about punishment, in 
general. Something more is needed for that. As Hill observes, ‘Kant does endorse 
standards of punishment commonly associated with retributivism.’  But, he argues, 
‘the retributive elements in Kant’s theory [here, these standards] are more firmly 
rooted in considerations of comparative justice and honesty in public expressions of 
moral judgment.’369  This is certainly plausible and, save with respect to Kant’s 
treatment of capital punishment, I will not dispute claims like this one. 
The law of punishment stipulates not only that criminals be punished, then, it al-
so specifies how. Kant proposes that we specify the judgment that someone ought to 
be punished by looking to the crime—and nowhere else. Kant argues that if a pun-
ishment were not precisely, reciprocally correlated with the crime of the punished 
person (‘if not in terms of [the penal law’s] letter at least in terms of its spirit,’ he al-
lows), if the criminal is unable to regard ‘what is done to him in accordance with the 
penal law’ as equivalent to ‘what he has perpetrated on others,’ then he would be 
permitted to ‘complain that a wrong is done him.’  This is what would happen if, in a 
move that ‘would be literally contrary to the concept of punitive justice,’ one were, 
under a general authorization to mete out punishments, ‘[t]o inflict whatever pun-
ishments one chooses [willkürlich Strafen].’370 
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Kant’s retributivism and ‘the one that did it’ 
If ‘what is done to him in accordance with the penal law’ is equivalent to ‘what he 
has perpetrated on others,’ then, says Kant, the criminal has no warrant for complain-
ing. But of course, his eligibility for being punished at all (in whatever manner) is 
predicated upon his being, in fact, ‘the one that did it’ (where it is granted that ‘it’ is 
‘a transgression of public law’). Barring this condition, of course, the punished per-
son has an even deeper warrant for complaint than in the case where he deserves to 
be punished, but is punished in the wrong manner or degree. Thus, as Hill aptly ob-
serves, among the ‘rules commonly associated with “retributivism”’ 371 that Kant in-
cludes in his account of punishment is the requirement ‘that the agent had the 
freedom necessary to conform to the law.’372  More precisely, for Kant, her non-
conformity has to have been a matter of freedom as well—but freedom in a sense 
that excludes the least reference to the involvement of other agents at any point in the 
genesis of the punishable deed. The agent is only punishable if she is ‘the one that 
did it,’ the one that broke the law, wholly and simply. It is Kant’s inclusion of this 
condition—which is included long before it is fully thematized—in tandem with his 
assertion that the law of punishment is a categorical imperative that makes Kant a 
retributivist. However, I suggest that the condition pertaining to the agent’s radical 
freedom (which turns out to have been, all along, a radical freedom to choose be-
tween good and evil, as such) is only really clearly pertinent in the case of capital 
punishment and, too, in the realm into which the latter practice penetrates, the ethical 
and the eschatological. Hence my claims about Kant’s retributivism ought not to be 
read as generalizations about Kant’s political and legal philosophy as a whole. It is 
capital punishment and, too, the irrevocable, eschatological making-unhappy of im-
moral agents that is modeled on it, whose rational justification are at stake here. 
Retributivism in general, as a doctrine that pertains to the justification of the 
practice of punishment, is far from monolithic. ‘[W]hat has been called by this name 
comes in many different forms and degrees,’ as Hill aptly observes.373  For the pur-
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poses of this thesis, there is no need to answer the question of what retributivism, in 
general, ‘is.’  The sense and purpose of my claims concerning Kant’s retributivism 
are relative to my discussion of his habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be 
happy.’  And my claim is simply that this gloss represents the connection between 
immorality and unhappiness in a manner which—when thematized—turns out to be 
best described as a variety of ‘retributivism.’ I will further elucidate this sense of the 
term below. 
Until relatively recently, the unqualified claim that Kant is a retributivist would 
have carried the weight of majority consensus. This is no longer so, or at least not in 
a straightforward manner. Hill speaks of ‘the formerly accepted view of Kant as a 
prime example of a retributivist’374 and he is correct to do so. While some commen-
tators proceed (or have proceeded) as though Kant’s retributivism is a relatively 
clear-cut matter,375 using epithets such as ‘strict,’376 ‘pure,’377 ‘classical,’378 ‘bold,’379 
‘deep,’380 and ‘thoroughgoing’381 to describe it, scholarly consensus is currently ra-
ther fractured on this score. It is now common, for example, to find affirmations of a 
retributivist tendency in some of Kant’s thinking about punishment, which makes his 
work relevant for discussions of contemporary versions of the doctrine, but tempered 
by the denial that Kant is a retributivist in every relevant respect.382  Such commenta-
tors concede no more than a ‘retributive current in [Kant’s] thought,’383 for example, 
or argue that ‘Kant’s mature theory of legal punishment,’ at least, is ‘not deeply re-
tributivist.’384  Yet others define ‘thoroughgoing retributivism’ in a manner that in-
cludes features that Kant does not espouse and argue that Kant’s thinking about 
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punishment has reference, not to retribution (under this other definition), but to a 
strictly political notion of justice, or ‘right,’ or ‘law and order.’385 
In the main, however, commentators continue to find a retributivist dimension, at 
least, in Kant’s work. The commentary evinces a variety of approaches to this di-
mension and its relation to the rest of Kant’s thinking, but it is possible to distinguish 
two main strategies. The first is to argue that, while Kant does explicitly espouse re-
tributivism, the latter position neither follows from, nor coheres with, the rest of his 
thinking about morality. The basic claim, here, is that he explicitly avows a position 
that, implicitly, he ought not to hold.386  The second strategy is to argue that Kant’s 
thinking about punishment more or less successfully combines retributivist and con-
sequentialist elements. The basic idea, here, is that while Kant is a retributivist in 
some sense, his retributivism is not inherently inimical to considerations bearing, es-
pecially, on the deterrent effect of punishment and that, indeed, such considerations 
are present in his thinking. In short, on this view, Kant’s retributivism is not nearly 
so ‘strict’ or ‘thoroughgoing’ as it has often appeared.387 
Now, I said above that Kant’s habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be 
happy’ represents the connection between immorality and unhappiness in a manner 
which—when thematized—turns out to be best described as a kind of retributivism. 
The sense of ‘retributivism’ that I have in mind is a position, more or less, that is 
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cognate with the one delineated by proponents of the claim that Kant is a retributiv-
ist. I want to qualify this, however, very carefully. I do not claim that Kant just is a 
retributivist; but to the extent that I affirm that he is (again, in respect, minimally, of 
capital punishment), then here are some useful descriptions of what I have in mind. 
Murphy, for example, observes that Kant takes ‘guilt,’ just as such, to be not on-
ly a necessary, but also a sufficient condition ‘for the legitimate infliction of punish-
ment.’388  Fleischacker notes ‘Kant’s insistence that punishment [of malefactors] is a 
worthy act in itself.’389  Scheid delineates a strategy for the justification of the prac-
tice of punishment that excludes considerations of utility (here ‘concern for crime 
control’) and, at the same time, takes ‘the view that whether a person may be pun-
ished and, if so, to what extent are questions to be decided solely by reference to [his 
or her] past legal offence.’390  Benn defines Kant’s ‘thoroughgoing’ retributivism as 
the view that ‘the punishment of crime is right in itself, that it is fitting that the guilty 
should suffer, and that justice, or the moral order, requires the institution of punish-
ment.’  Benn makes the important point, too, that ‘[t]his…is not to justify punish-
ment but, rather, to deny that it needs any justification’ and to affirm that ‘[i]ts 
intrinsic value is appreciated immediately and intuitively.391  Dolinko defines Kant’s 
retributivism as the view that ‘giving lawbreakers their just deserts is the only point 
or purpose of punishment.’392  Moore avers that ‘[r]etributivism is the view that pun-
ishment is justified by the moral culpability of those who receive it,’ so that ‘[a] re-
tributivist punishes because, and only because, the offender deserves it.’393  And 
Moore avers that, here, ‘[m]oral culpability (“desert”) is…both a sufficient as well as 
a necessary condition of liability to punitive sanctions,’ adding that this justification 
pertains to more than society’s ‘right to punish culpable offenders’; it also grounds 
the claim that ‘the moral culpability of an offender also gives society the duty to pun-
ish.’  This means, Moore concludes, that ‘[r]etributivism…is truly a theory of justice 
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such that, if it is true, we have an obligation to set up institutions so that retribution is 
achieved.’394 
In their various ways, each of the foregoing expresses the retributivism that I al-
so find in Kant. This is present in the second Critique, for example, when Kant avers 
that ‘[i]n every punishment as such there must first be justice and [that] this consti-
tutes the essence of the concept.’  Punishment ‘must…be justified as punishment, 
i.e., as mere harm in itself,’ he says, ‘so that even the punished person, if it stopped 
there and he could see no glimpse of kindness behind the harshness, would yet have 
to admit that justice had been done and that his reward perfectly fitted his behav-
ior.’395 
But why would everyone, up to and including ‘the punished person’ have to 
concede this?   Kant claims, simply but crucially, that ‘there is in the idea of our 
practical reason something further that accompanies the transgression of a moral 
law, namely its deserving punishment.’396  The one concept, the concept of ‘its de-
serving punishment [ihre Strafwürdigkeit],’ simply ‘accompanies’ (begleitet) the 
other, the concept of ‘transgression of a moral law [Übertretung eines sittlichen Ge-
setzes].’  Indeed, here at least, Kant seems to suggest that the first concept (the con-
cept of punishment), which is a notion primarily, before it is put into practice, 
accompanies the very ‘transgression’ itself, the ‘it’ that ‘the one that did it’ did—not 
as empirical fact, but strictly in the estimation ‘of our practical reason.’ 
Later, in The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant expresses the same view in different 
terms. 
Punishment by a court (poena forensis)…can never be inflicted merely as a means to promote 
some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society. It must always be inflicted upon 
him only because he has committed a crime…. He must previously have been found punisha-
ble [strafbar] before any thought can be given to drawing from his punishment something of 
use for himself or his fellow citizens.397 
The only good reason for punishing a criminal is that ‘he has committed a crime,’ 
which is to say that ‘he must previously have been found punishable.’  Punishment 
can only be ‘justified as punishment, i.e., as mere harm in itself,’ as we read above. 
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And it is, from the outset, Kant argues, because, ‘in the idea of our practical reason,’ 
the judgment that this transgressor deserves to be punished is already present, pre-
formed in accordance with a ‘pure’ canon for judging of such matters, which is simp-
ly, again, the concept of ‘transgression of a moral law.’ 
In this way, however, Kant not only closes off the possibility of morally repug-
nant ‘uses’ of punishment or of the punished person; he also closes up the space be-
tween the transgression and the judgment of punishability so precipitously that we 
cannot remain with the transgression long enough to ask whether, in spite of our 
concession that the transgressor in question is ‘the one that did it,’ their might not be 
some sense in which ‘it’ is not—cannot be—the sort of thing whose normative con-
sequence can be conceived of (let alone justified) altogether without reference to the 
natural and social order to which the transgressor belongs. 
With respect to Kant’s caveat that ‘[h]e must previously have been found pun-
ishable,’ Hill observes that ‘[s]ome previous translations misleadingly translated 
“strafbar” as “deserving of punishment” rather than “punishable,” thereby encourag-
ing the thought that intrinsic moral desert might be the justification for inflicting suf-
fering.’398  Hill’s basic impulse, here, is correct. The transgressor is ‘punishable’ 
(strafbar) if and only if she has done something that counts as ‘a transgression of 
public law’ and has thereby rendered herself ‘unfit to be a citizen.’399  This definition 
has no reference to ‘intrinsic moral desert’ at all—as long as we remain well within 
the boundary that separates the political from the ethical. However, the closing of the 
gap between the concepts of ‘deserving punishment’ and ‘transgression of a moral 
law’—indeed the claim that there is no gap here (just a conceptual distinction)—
prevents our asking or noticing whether there might not be a special case at that 
boundary in which the justification of punishment would require that intrinsic moral 
desert (in a special sense, modeled on the extrinsic desert entailed by crime) be de-
monstrably present, in addition to strict punishability, in this strict sense that has ref-
erence, not to the heart of the matter, or rather to the character of the man, but only 
to the character of the deed. 
It is important to note that Kant does not claim—nor claim to be able to show in 
general—that this or that instance in which someone is punished is actually just. As 
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Wood points out, it might be that the belief that the party in question is guilty is a 
mistaken belief in the sense that the person in question is not ‘the one that did it’ at 
all. Or it might be, even given that the person is guilty, that their punishment is either 
excessive or deficient in some way.400  Retributivism does not claim to be able to 
avoid outcomes like these.401 
What is at stake for Kant, here, is whether human beings are the kind of agent, in 
the first place, that could ever be regarded as culpable, hence punishable, in the sense 
that is entailed, specifically, if capital punishment, on the one hand, and the irrevoca-
ble, eschatological making-unhappy of immoral agents, on the other hand, are ration-
ally justifiable—given that Kant sees (correctly) that these can only be so justified in 
retributivist terms (i.e., without reference to anything empirical, hence parochial). 
Kant takes it that the class of justified instances of capital punishment is not empty in 
principle, even if it might turn out to be empty in fact. He and virtually everyone in 
his cultural milieu takes this for granted.402  And, given the coinciding instantiation 
of the law of punishment and of what I refer to as the law of unhappiness in the prac-
tice of capital punishment (which ‘coinciding’ I discuss in the third section of this 
chapter), his taking this for granted is an aspect of what is disclosed in his habit of 
glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy.’ 
The law of punishment qua ‘categorical’ 
So far we have seen that Kant takes it that (justified) punishments belong to a class 
of practices whose instantiation is always already enjoined by moral-practical ration-
ality, to the extent that we are actually faced with instances that embody the concept 
of ‘transgression of a moral law.’  Irrespective of whether any particular instance of 
punishment has ever been fully justifiable and thus a member of that class—by being 
the punishment of the right person in exactly the right manner and to just the right 
degree—our having the practice of punishment, just as such, is justified by its objec-
tively necessary correlation with the concept of ‘transgression of public law,’ whose 
instances we see all around us. 
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At the beginning of this chapter, I identified three main properties, which I as-
cribed to Kant’s law of punishment. We have now examined the second and third of 
these: this law’s property of being applicable to all and only criminals and its sub-
sumption of the stipulation that criminals be punished in accordance with the ius 
talionis. I will now turn to this law’s most basic property, the one that Kant ascribes 
to it directly and explicitly in his canonical formulation of it: its property of being a 
categorical imperative. This also brings us to the point of Kant’s answer to the fourth 
of the five ‘pressing questions’ that I laid out earlier: Are parties that are authorized 
to punish also bound to do so? 
Kant’s assertion that the law of punishment is a categorical imperative is his an-
swer to this question. It goes beyond the claim that all and only criminals be pun-
ished, which is still antecedent to the presupposition that punishments must take 
place and affirms that they must indeed. The former stipulation entails only that if 
punishments are going to take place, then there can be no exceptions. But this still 
leaves open the possibility of a perpetual state of universal amnesty—a politically 
untenable response to transgression, of course, but not so obviously an ethical-
ly/eschatologically untenable one. By asserting that the law of punishment is a cate-
gorical imperative, however, Kant blocks access to this fantastical possibility. 
 If an agent is found to be punishable then it is practically necessary that she ac-
tually be punished. The party that is authorized to punish such an agent is also bound 
to punish her. But note that this practical necessitation is not a matter of public law. 
To omit to punish—and so to transgress the law of punishment—is not itself a crime 
and hence punishable in turn. The authorized party’s failure to punish is immoral,403 
but it is not illegal. 
‘By categorical imperatives,’ Kant explains in The Metaphysics of Morals, ‘cer-
tain actions are permitted or forbidden, that is, morally possible or impossible, while 
some of them or their opposites are morally necessary, that is, obligatory.’404  And in 
the Groundwork, in the course of efforts aimed at showing that there are such things 
at all, Kant defines a categorical imperative as ‘a practical law, which commands ab-
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solutely of itself and without any incentives’; a law the ‘observance’ of which ‘is du-
ty.’405 
As I said earlier, to say that the ‘law of punishment’ is a categorical imperative 
is to say that criminals ought, unconditionally, to be punished, that it is obligatory to 
punish them.406  Wood suggests that the ‘full Kantian retributivist position [is] that 
the ruler is required by right to visit the criminal with harm equal to the wrong he 
has inflicted and does an injustice if he fails to do so.’407  Admittedly, Kant says just 
this. But his treatment of the topic is rather ambiguous. The ‘sovereign’ has ‘the right 
to grant clemency,’ but this is ‘the slipperiest one [among his rights] for him to exer-
cise.’  Kant suggests that action that expresses this ‘right’ is, at the same time, ‘injus-
tice in the highest degree’ and that, when it comes to ‘crimes of subjects against one 
another’ (in contrast to ‘case[s] of a wrong done to himself’), to exercise this ‘right,’ 
to fail to punish, ‘is the greatest wrong against his subjects.’408  But Kant also asserts, 
somewhat earlier, precisely in connection with the sovereign’s ‘right to punish,’ that 
the sovereign (or ‘head of a state’) cannot himself be punished’ and that ‘one can on-
ly withdraw from his dominion.’409  On Kant’s account of positive law, if an action 
cannot be coerced (by the threat or enactment of punishment), then it is not legally 
prohibited, hence not a crime to omit to do it. Therefore the sovereign’s failure to 
abide by the law of punishment counts as an injustice in a ‘wide,’ ethical sense, but 
not otherwise. 
If the law of punishment is a categorical imperative for the sovereign, then 
Wood’s characterization of the nature of the ‘ought’ in question is at least inade-
quate. If the law of punishment is a categorical imperative, then any party that is 
bound by it is bound ethically to act in accordance with it—unless the failure to pun-
ish can be construed as punishable. But the only party authorized (and commanded) 
to act in accordance with it is unpunishable on Kant’s account. If the law of punish-
ment is a categorical imperative, then what it commands is not an action, but the hav-
ing of a maxim. It is a law, conformity with which will take the latter form, first, and 
the form of outward action in a secondary sense only. To punish will be a ‘duty of 
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wide obligation.’410  The ‘ruler’ will be commanded to make (crime-proportionate) 
‘physical harm’411 to criminal in general, or their ‘pain,’412 or ‘rightful’ offense to 
‘the accused’s feeling of honor,’ or ‘unilateral’ coercion,413 an end—and to seek this 
end without taking recourse to ‘any incentives,’ that is, to do this on the ground that 
it is her duty to do so.414  On Kant’s account of such ends, the ruler will always al-
ready have a reason for pursuing it, independently of any of his or her parochial in-
terests. Not only is the sovereign to punish, but neither the ruler nor anyone else is to 
succumb to the temptation to subsume actual punishments under a description of 
what punishment consists in, in general, that has reference to anything that exceeds 
the bare requirements of retribution. 
Even if it were true, in general, that ‘Kant’s theory of legal punishment is not 
deontological,’415 as Tunick claims, if the law of punishment is a categorical impera-
tive and if this imperative pertains to the a priori ‘combination,’ as ground and con-
sequent, of the concepts of crime and authorized harm, in general, then this view is 
mistaken. I do not claim as much, here. I only claim that it is mistaken with respect 
to Kant’s attitude towards capital punishment.416  If, as Tunick argues, ‘deterrence 
[is] the justification for legal (but not moral) punishment,’417 then the law of punish-
ment, to the extent that that it is a categorical imperative, does not pertain to legal 
punishment in this sense at all. But of course, this is not what Kant says. Implicit in 
Tunick’s claims, in any case, is that retributivism does imply a deontological theory 
of punishment.418  He simply denies that Kant is a retributivist. To the extent that 
punishment is regarded as retribution, however, the punishment of crimes is regarded 
as a duty that binds the sovereign unconditionally. And to the extent the punishment 
of crimes is regarded as a duty that binds the sovereign unconditionally, punishment 
is regarded as retribution. 
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Punishment all the way down: the special case of capital pun-
ishment 
In this section I argue that, for Kant, the politically situated practice of capital pun-
ishment and the eschatologically situated practices associated with unhappiness (see 
chapter 4) are each conceived of, univocally, as moral (not merely legal) retribution. 
I argue that in each case (the political and the ethical-eschatological) the occasioning 
object of the practice is not a criminal or immoral deed, but the wicked agent as 
such. Political punishment, more generally, is addressed to the malefactor’s law-
transgressing deed(s). The politically (legally) punishable agent is punished under a 
description of the practice of punishment that has reference, strictly, to these. She is 
punished because she has done this or that. The murderer, however, is punished qua 
‘who’ or ‘what’ she is: a person whose murderous deed discloses the ‘inner wicked-
ness’ that makes her death good, in addition to being right. This is so, I argue, in the 
same sense that the immoral agent rendered (eschatologically) unhappy—of necessi-
ty, given that her will is an evil one—is subject to unhappiness because this is an 
outcome that is absolutely called for and absolutely good. It is particularly clear here, 
then, that Kant rules out, not only the political practicability of mercy, but mercy’s 
very goodness as such. I argue that in Kant’s justification of capital punishment he 
offers us his most vivid expression of the mercy-excluding immediacy of the connec-
tion that he takes to hold between crime and punishment, on the one hand, and im-
morality and unhappiness, on the other. 
As I mentioned earlier, some commentators concede that some of the things that 
Kant says about punishment suggest that he is a retributivist—even a strong one—
but then deny that his retributivism is entailed by, or coheres with, the rest of his 
thinking about morality. This is often taken to be especially true of the things he says 
about the value and justification of capital punishment. One strategy in response to 
this situation is to concede that Kant’s thinking about this topic is problematic, but 
that his views in this area are not central in any way and that a compelling reading of 
Kant’s ethics can be articulated without reference to this encumbrance.419  Another 
strategy is to recognize that Kant is a thinker who belongs very much to his time and 
place and to emphasize the improvement that his thinking represents over earlier ap-
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proaches.420  Another approach, which combines readily with the foregoing, is to ar-
gue that key elements of Kant’s moral theory, including other parts of this thinking 
about punishment, imply that the death penalty is in fact either immoral or juridically 
incoherent on his own terms.421  Yet another tactic is to aver that, along with Kant’s 
retributivist proclamations, his strong claims about how murderers ought to be treat-
ed are mistakes on his part, to the extent that these are not consistent with his most 
fundamental commitments.422 
I do not disagree, in principle, with any of this.423  I claim, instead, that the par-
ticular rigidity of Kant’s thinking about capital punishment is telling and that it sig-
nals a blind spot,424 not so much in his thinking his thinking about law and politics, 
but at its boundary and so, in a sense, on its outermost surface; not so much a mis-
take in reasoning,425 but the tenacious residue (at least) of an archaic practice that 
distorts Kant’s vision from the outset. I affirm that, in Kant’s thinking about punish-
ment more generally, one finds two things going on at once: one line of thought that 
proceeds relatively independently of the commitments that are expressed in his habit 
of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy,’ the other line of thought express-
ing and ratifying what the habit itself sanctions and conveys. If this is so and if, as I 
claim, Kant’s thinking about capital punishment is the ‘other line of thought’ in ques-
tion, then his statements concerning the death of murderers are not an aberration; 
they make sense relative to that trajectory. Later, I will show that this part of Kant’s 
thinking extends from the political context in which apparent instances of this think-
ing’s ultimate realization find expression (on the scaffold), out into the eschatologi-
cal. 
                                                
420 See, for example, Potter, ‘Kant and Capital Punishment’: 273, 277-8. 
421 For the former view see ibid.,  281.; for the latter, see A. Ataner, ‘Kant on Capital Punishment and 
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also Scheid, ‘Kant's Retributivism’: 281. 
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‘If…he has committed murder he must die’ 
Now we come to some of what Hill calls ‘Kant’s most off-putting rhetorical remarks 
on punishment in [The Metaphysics of Morals],’426 teachings that have seemed to 
some to be ‘defective in human sympathy and understanding.’427  Here especially, 
we are faced with ‘rules of punishment’ that are, at the very least, ‘tough and inflexi-
ble.’428 
Several pages along from his initial assertion that ‘the law of punishment is a 
categorical imperative,’ Kant refers more specifically to ‘the categorical imperative 
of penal justice,’ which he glosses as the demand that ‘unlawful killing of another 
must be punished by death.’429  This unique specification of Kant’s ‘law of punish-
ment’—in terms, that is, of punishment, specifically, for murder—is determined, in 
part, by the context of his discussion. But it signifies a focus that is evident through-
out this part of The Metaphysics of Morals: Kant has his eye on the practice of capi-
tal punishment. Some of his most concrete, urgent, and sustained pleas for the 
practice of punishment—above all for its absolute, irreducible necessity—pertain to 
the death penalty. Thus: 
If…he has committed murder he must die. Here there is no substitute that will satisfy justice. 
There is no similarity between life, however wretched it may be, and death, hence no likeness 
between the crime and the retribution unless death is judicially carried out upon the wrongdo-
er, although it must still be freed from any mistreatment that could make the humanity in the 
person suffering into something abominable.430 
On the one hand, to be precise, the murderer must ‘die’ (sterben). Unique among 
crimes murder does not admit of a variety of possible applications of the principle of 
ius talionis. On the other hand, to be equally precise, he ‘must’ (muß) die.431  And the 
sense of this ‘must’ is evident from a slightly later passage from the same text: ‘eve-
ry murderer…must suffer death; this is what justice, as the idea of judicial authority, 
wills in accordance with universal laws that are grounded a priori.’432 
                                                
426 Hill, ‘Kant on Punishment’: 291. 
427 Cohen, ‘Critique of Kant's Philosophy of Law’, 286 (but note that Cohen’s point is a more general 
one about the Rechtslehre as a whole). 
428 Hill, ‘Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment’, 311. 
429 MdS 6: 336-7 (109). 
430 MdS 6: 333 (106) (Kant’s emphasis modified). See also MdS 6: 463 (210); MdS 6: 436 (188). But 
cf. MdS 6: 441, 463-4 (191, 210); Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought, 134-5. 
431 See also Tunick, ‘Is Kant a Retributivist?’: 73. 
432 MdS 6: 334 (107) (emphasis added). 
 
 148 
In a famously dramatic passage, however, interposed between the two foregoing 
citations, Kant spells out this same claim to necessity in a rather different manner, 
insisting that 
[e]ven if a civil society were to be dissolved by the consent of all its members (e.g., if a peo-
ple inhabiting an island decided to separate and disperse throughout the world), the last mur-
derer remaining in prison would first have to be executed, so that each has done to him what 
his deeds deserve and blood guilt [Blutschuld] does not cling to the people for not having in-
sisted upon this punishment; for otherwise the people can be regarded as collaborators in this 
public violation of justice.433 
One of the remarkable things about this passage is that, instead of grounding his 
claim that ‘the last murderer…would…have to be executed’ in something along the 
lines of his slightly later reference to ‘what justice, as the idea of judicial authority, 
wills in accordance with universal laws that are grounded a priori,’ Kant refers in-
stead to the problem of ‘blood guilt’ (Blutschuld) and a ‘public violation of justice’ 
whose character as injustice is highly ambiguous, both because it takes place (ex hy-
pothesi) on the very threshold of this society’s disappearance, but also because, as we 
saw earlier, Kant cannot really take it to be the case the sovereign (here, presumably, 
‘the people’ as a whole) has a ‘narrow,’ coercible, legal duty to punish. I will return 
to these matters—especially Kant’s recourse to the notion of ‘blood guilt’—below. 
First, I want to point out that Kant’s unrelenting proposal for the treatment of 
this ‘last murderer’ is a sticking point for any reading of his thinking about punish-
ment that would claim that he is not a ‘strict,’ ‘bold,’ ‘deep’ (etc.) retributivist at all, 
that is, in any connection whatsoever. The passage very clearly cites the two main 
elements of such an approach in its justification of what it proposes. It is a problem 
for accounts of the kind that I referred to above, which construe Kant’s theory of 
punishment in its political frame-work in terms of primary purposes to do with ‘law 
and order,’ the prevention of hindrances to external freedom, or deterrence. Or, in a 
sense, it is not a problem for such accounts to the extent that these readers are able to 
argue that, on balance, Kant’s thinking is not what it appears to be here, or that he is 
simply being inconsistent, and that there are good reasons for prioritizing and fore-
grounding other tendencies in his thinking about punishment. 
Hill, for example, integrates this passage into the rest of his account of Kant’s 
rationale for the practice of punishment by arguing that, when Kant argues that fail-
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ure to put ‘the last murderer’ to death would lead to a situation in which the people of 
the former island kingdom would be susceptible to the accusation that they had been 
‘collaborators in this public violation of justice,’ Kant is endorsing these murderers’ 
punishment as no more than ‘a rigorous application of [his] extreme retributive poli-
cy that all of the guilty ought to be punished, following lex talionis so far as permis-
sible.’434  Hill’s argument turns in significant measure, however, on an opposition 
between the thesis that, for Kant, particular punishments are to be justified, in gen-
eral, on the basis of the ‘intrinsic’ or ‘moral’ desert of criminals—which Hill de-
nies—and the thesis that, for Kant, particular punishments are justified to the extent 
that they constitute an application of the ‘retributive policy,’ mentioned above, ‘that 
all of the guilty ought to be punished, following lex talionis so far as permissible.’  
Hill’s argument is aimed, then, at readers who take the ‘last murderer’ passage to be 
evidence favouring the general claim that Kant endorses the view that punishments 
are justified ‘because of, or even according to, intrinsic desert.’435  I will return to 
this latter notion below. Suffice it to say, for the moment, that I concede Hill’s claim 
that, generally, Kant does not take ‘intrinsic desert’ to be of the essence for the justi-
fication of punishment. But I do claim, however, that this is a central component of 
Kant’s thinking, specifically, about the justification of capital punishment in particu-
lar.  
Not all commentators are as confident as Hill about the fit between this passage 
and other, more evidently moderate approaches to the justification of punishment 
that might be found along with it in Kant. Again with respect to the ‘last murderer’ 
passage, Fleischacker, for example, notes ‘that Kant here clearly shows that his rea-
sons for the moral worth of punishment extend beyond even the universalizable aim 
of minimizing the hindrances to freedom within society.’436   This marks a significant 
departure from Hill’s reading. Fleischacker recognizes that Kant takes punishment—
even if only here in the case of putting murderers to death—to have ‘moral worth’ 
and not merely a political or legal value. 
                                                
434 Hill, ‘Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment’, 332. See also Tunick, ‘Is Kant a Retributivist?’: 74. 
435 Hill, ‘Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment’, 332. 
436 Fleischacker, ‘Kant's Theory of Punishment’: 438 (my emphasis). 
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The ultimate punishment: the political and the eschatological, to-
gether on the scaffold 
If punishment has moral worth, then this is because to punish is a moral undertaking 
on the part of someone in particular, the fulfillment of a moral obligation, action that 
conforms with what duty requires of such an agent, and so forth. In the person of the 
sovereign (or the latter’s representative) we have an agent and a possibility for action 
in which the political coincides with the (Kantian) good. It does not do so at all in 
cases where the sovereign rewards citizens in accordance with their juridical merit. 
To do that is no duty. It is possible that it does not do so, either, in the case of pun-
ishments for crimes apart from murder (if there are empirical reasons for those pun-
ishments). But desert, for Kant, where it is qualified as desert-of-death (given 
murder), is both an ethical and a juridical notion. The ‘law of punishment,’ in its 
form specifically as the ‘categorical imperative of penal justice’ (again, the stipula-
tion that the ‘unlawful killing of another must be punished by death’) is a moral and 
no merely legal imperative. But this requires, as I will now show, that unique among 
punishments, the death penalty (for murder) be both justified with reference to the 
deed (death in exchange for death, as it were), but also with reference to the ‘inner 
wickedness’ of the criminal and her ‘intrinsic desert’ of the treatment that she is also 
legally judged to deserve. 
‘Inner wickedness,’ intrinsic desert, and punishment all the way down 
‘Inner wickedness’ 
One way of distinguishing between the realm of politics or ‘legality,’ on the one 
hand, and ‘morality,’ on the other, is by pointing out, as Höffe does, that ‘the topic of 
evil,’ while an integral theme for thinking about ‘morality,’ ‘is dispensable in a legal 
ethical theory, since legal ethics concerns merely (juridical) legality.’437  This may be 
affirmed of Kant’s political and legal philosophy in general, to be sure, but not in a 
straightforward manner at the boundary that is marked by capital punishment. This is 
not, however, because an extension of morality in its primary, forward-looking sense 
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as action ‘from duty’ overtakes the legal or political with its ‘strict[er] demands’438 
and gives us ‘a philanthropic concept of law that aims at enforcing duties of virtue, 
such as beneficence,’ or ‘a disposition-based concept of law that is not satisfied with 
legality…but additionally demands inner recognition [of the moral law].’439 
Rather, this is because an extension of the backward-looking legal interest in ac-
tion that would tend to undermine the stability and well-being of the polis, overtakes 
and subsumes morality in its secondary, backward-looking sense as a point of view 
on human action that must contend with the problematic of human action as some-
thing both over and done with (not as deeds to be done, but as deeds accomplished) 
and, at the same time, a source of unpredictably ramifying consequences. At the 
boundary that is marked by the practice of capital punishment, the (Kantian) ‘topic of 
evil’ turns out not to be dispensable. If this topic is superfluous, for Kant, in matters 
pertaining to ‘merely (juridical) legality,’ as Höffe says, Kant does not quite retain 
the courage of his convictions here—and rightly so, as we shall see. He writes that: 
This fitting of punishment to the crime, which can occur only by a judge imposing the death 
sentence in accordance with the strict law of retribution, is shown by the fact that only by this 
is a sentence of death pronounced on every criminal in proportion to his inner wickedness 
(even when the crime is not murder but another crime against the state that can be paid for on-
ly by death).440 
Kant’s reference to other ‘crime[s] against the state that can be paid for only by 
death’ does not belie my claim that, on his account, the death penalty for murder is 
unique among juridically executed punishments. The high-minded rebels (Kant’s ex-
ample) whose sense of honour leads them to prefer death to ‘convict labor’ find, in 
being put to death, a fate that is proportionate to their crime—whereas forced labor 
would have been an unjust affront and disproportionately coercive. Here, the pun-
ishment (death) conforms to the ius talionis, but not qua death—only under a de-
scription of ‘death’ that has reference to the rebels’ high-minded desire to preserve 
their honour (hence not in relation to their ‘inner wickedness,’ which is not pro-
posed). Neither Kant, nor his imaginary rebels, interpret this punishment as some-
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thing that they intrinsically, that is, morally deserve.441  Again, however, in the case 
of the murderer put to death, the death penalty is justifiable only to the extent that it 
is both conformable to the ius talionis, precisely qua death, and also proportionate to 
the ‘inner wickedness’ of the criminal. In the case of the wicked murderer it is a mat-
ter, both of what she intrinsically (morally) deserves, which is to forfeit—as far as 
anyone can tell—the very possibility of happiness, and also of what she is judged to 
deserve in a legal sense, which is to suffer an equivalent consequence for having un-
lawfully taken a life.442 
I claim, again, that Kant is committed to a particular practice: the practice of put-
ting murderers to death—under a description of the deed that causes their death that 
foregoes all reference to any of the social or political benefits that might arise from 
it. Kant’s anomalous reference to ‘inner wickedness’ signals his understanding of 
what would have to be the case if particular instances of capital punishment, so un-
derstood, were actually to be justified.443  His antecedent, remarkably rigid commit-
ment to the practice in general, however, is readily mistaken for confidence that he 
has good reasons for taking the practice to be justified, in general. Kant himself mis-
takenly takes the prima facie inevitability and fittingness of the practice to which he 
is committed for rationally warrantable necessity. 
Kant gets no further, really, than this. If the death penalty is not regarded, from 
the point of view of the world in which it takes place, as retribution, then there is 
something especially hideous about it. But, too, if the death penalty is retribution in 
this sense, then the ‘sentence of death’ must also be ‘pronounced on every criminal 
in proportion to his inner wickedness’ since only the latter’s presence, which is the 
agent’s ultimate immorality, unveiled, justifies the absolute occlusion of the human 
being’s access to happiness. Clark observes that because, on Kant’s own account, 
none but God knows whether the agent instantiates this wickedness, then ‘[p]ublic 
justice is (in general) deterrent in aim, but to be distributed retributively,’ that is, in 
accordance with the principle that all and only criminals be punished and in accord-
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 153 
ance with the ius talionis. He adds that, for Kant, ‘divine justice,’ by contrast, ‘is 
purely retributive’ and that none but ‘God can punish us in accordance with our mor-
al guilt.’444  He asks whether, given that ‘Kant believes that ideally our happiness 
should match our virtue,’ he also holds that ‘the unhappiness of criminals should 
match their crimes?’  None but God ‘can punish us for our “inner wickedness,”’ 
Clark points out. In light of this, he asks, ‘should the courts punish to secure such a 
match?’445 
It is not that Kant’s thinking that this is so, uniquely, in the case of capital pun-
ishment is a piece of thinking that is internal to his theory of punishment. Of course, 
Kant does not think that ‘the courts [should] punish to secure such a match,’ here. Of 
course Kant knows better.446  But he also recognizes that there is at least one mode of 
punishment that must be regarded in precisely these terms or else given up. His 
anomalous reference to the fit that exists between the death sentence and the ‘inner 
wickedness’ of murderers expresses the grip of the practice itself, not a coherent el-
ement in Kant’s theory of punishment. 
Intrinsic desert 
The murderer’s ‘inner wickedness’ is the look of her immorality, as it were, the par-
ticularly dreadful look of her free acquiescence in evil, put on display in the act of 
murder. As I have shown, Kant’s habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be 
happy’ expresses a pair of related thoughts about the relationship between immorali-
ty and unhappiness: immoral agents deserve and ought to be unhappy. To put a hu-
man being to death is—from the point of view of the agent of the deed and of every 
spectator present—an unlimited, irrevocable annihilation of whatever happiness she 
possessed and whatever happiness was possible for her. No one need regard this as 
the death penalty’s aim, or the reason for its being meted out. This is, however, what 
it accomplishes. 
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Kant’s reference to the murderer’s unrivalled ‘inner wickedness’ exposes a cer-
tain discomfort in the face of this fact. It is Kant’s apology for a practice whose justi-
fication must include reference to the agent’s ‘intrinsic desert,’ which, as desert-of-
death, is the political incarnation of her moral unworthiness to be happy. Normally, 
of course, the state may not obliterate the very possibility of happiness in cases 
where agents are unworthy to be happy—in the cases, say, of you and I and, presum-
ably, Kant. However, thinks Kant, if that unworthiness to be happy, the agent’s im-
morality, is put on display in the act of murder the state may and must do so. 
‘The Tugendlehre,’ Kant’s ‘doctrine of virtue’ (and so, too, of vice), ‘teaches of 
internal actions of the will, opaque to perception,’447 as Gibbs points out. In general, 
Kant’s Rechtslehre does not deny this opacity. Kant’s notion of ‘inner wickedness,’ 
then, is an anomaly in the context of his discussion of political life, to the extent that 
it has direct reference to the agent’s immorality (‘internal actions of the will’). An 
agent whose will is so qualified—given that she is a murderer—is not only unworthy 
to be happy and thus intrinsically deserving of unhappiness (like any other immoral 
agent), but intrinsically deserving of the punishment that, justified first with refer-
ence to the political ius talionis, also ratifies and effects this other judgment on the 
spot. 
By contrast, for Kant, the desert that warrants other punishments in civil society 
is ‘extrinsic.’  In other words, particular deeds merit particular punishments, just giv-
en the class of deeds to which they belong. Capital punishment, too, is connected 
with a particular deed, homicide under a particular description (as vicious, unlawful 
killing). Here, however, the proportionate punishment’s conformity to the ius talionis 
goes deeper than the deed. The punishment’s fittingness encompasses not only the 
deed, but also the will from which the deed arises. It is this will, which is again ‘in a 
sense…the very person himself,’448 as Wolff observes, that deserves to die. Here, 
uniquely, the person is punished for being the kind of agent that she is. 
Hill observes that ‘a thorough-going retributivist theory of punishment’ might 
take one of the following two forms. On the one hand, he suggests, it might propose 
that the ‘amounts and kinds of punishment’ that offenders receive be determined in 
terms of the ‘ius talionis, as Kant presents this,’ which Hill takes to be a matter of 
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matching external, illegal deeds to the punishments that fit them.449  On the other 
hand, argues Hill, an equally retributive standard would be to ‘[p]unish in the way 
and degree appropriate to the “inner deserts” of offenders.’  And, as he goes on to 
observe, in order to do this we would have to ‘take into account their characters, 
commitment to morality, obstacles, effort of will, etc.’450  Hill objects to the latter, 
correctly, on the basis of the fact that, while this counts as a form of retributivism, ‘it 
is incompatible with Kant’s idea that public law should concern itself only with “ex-
ternal” actions.’451 
I do not claim otherwise—in general. Nor do I claim that, in the case of capital 
punishment, Kant actually argues that the murderer must die because he is wicked, 
or immoral, or because he deserves absolutely to be unhappy and because putting 
him to death is the best way of achieving this end. Kant says quite clearly that mur-
derers must die because death is the punishment that most perfectly fits their crimes. 
Kant nevertheless indicates, however, that when it comes to putting murderers to 
death, something more is present in our reflexive understanding of what we—the 
sovereign (or the latter’s avatar, the executioner), the spectator, and the murderer 
herself—take ourselves to be doing on (and around) the scaffold. 
Hill marks this intrusive element as well, by affirming that, in Kant’s view, 
‘criminals deserve, in some sense, to be punished,’ and that, at the same time, Kant 
also holds ‘that anyone who lacks a good will is, to some degree, unworthy to be 
happy.’  Kant’s actual thinking, here, is obscure, however, as Hill also points out. 
Hill responds to this irritant, however, by arguing that, in any case, these positions 
‘do not amount to an endorsement of the intrinsic desert thesis as an action-guiding 
(practical) principle.’452  Kant certainly thinks that none but virtuous agents are wor-
thy of happiness, Hill concedes, but this does not mean that he ‘endorse[s] the deep 
retributive idea that we ought to make the vicious suffer because they inherently de-
serve it’ (Hill calls this ‘the intrinsic desert thesis’). And, Hill suggests, ‘despite ap-
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pearances, this thesis is not implied by Kant’s official theory of punishment ei-
ther.’453 
As far as these ‘appearances’ go, Hill identifies two main grounds in Kant’s 
work for thinking that he ‘held that wrongdoers intrinsically deserve to suffer.’  First, 
there are Kant’s ‘remarks, sprinkled throughout his works, that a good will is the 
condition of the worthiness to be happy.’454  Second, there are Kant’s ‘tough-
sounding remarks about punishment’ in The Metaphysics of Morals.’  None of this 
implies, Hill argues, ‘that we are warranted, as individuals or state officials, to inflict 
suffering on wrongdoers or to deprive them of happiness.’455  Kant never implies that 
anyone possesses ‘a general warrant to interfere with the happiness of persons who 
are “unworthy” of it.’456 
The main practical impediment, here, is that ‘according to Kant’s moral psy-
chology we are so ignorant of the moral worth of others that we could not fairly un-
dertake to make others happy, and unhappy, in proportion to their worthiness.’457  
The upshot of this is that, although Kant endorses the notion of ‘intrinsic desert,’ he 
does not allow claims about the latter—which bear in the abstract on immoral agents 
in general—to have any ‘action-guiding’ significance in regard to the punishment of 
criminals, or at least, Hill argues, not ‘in his more mature, systematic work.’458  By 
contrast, Hill does allow that the idea that immoral agents intrinsically deserve to 
suffer, and so to be unhappy, has a ‘more anemic,’ ‘nonpractical,’ ‘faith-guiding,’ 
‘wish-expressing,’ significance.459  Hill’s general apologetic aim extends too far, 
however. He does not recognize, as Kant does, that there is something exceptional 
about capital punishment and that the latter’s justification, uniquely, must have refer-
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ence to an ‘intrinsic’ mode of desert that does coincide with the immoral agent’s un-
worthiness to be happy.460 
Murphy contrasts ‘the official theory presented in the Rechtslehre,’ with its ‘ra-
ther self-righteous tone’—self-righteous because it comes to the point of identifying 
the murderer’s ‘inner wickedness’—with the Religion’s ‘insights’ concerning the 
pervasiveness (indeed the universality) of radical evil and, as a consequence of this, 
the ‘position of humility’ which that work evinces. No one may claim, on Kant’s ac-
count of ‘radical evil in the Religion…that he has, from a morally creditable motive, 
restrained himself.’461 
But this is to concede that Kant’s thinking about capital punishment in The Met-
aphysics of Morals goes too far, that it really does mark a connection between the 
death penalty as consequence, on the one hand, and unworthiness to be happy as 
ground, on the other. And this is an anomaly within the Rechtslehre. This does reveal 
that the law of punishment, ‘the categorical imperative of penal justice,’ the demand 
that ‘unlawful killing of another must be punished by death,’ has become the law of 
unhappiness and rendered this law—at least upon the scaffold—an ‘action-guiding’ 
principle. Officially, the murderer’s death conforms to the ius talionis, just given his 
or her deed. In this way it is like any other legal sanction. But it is nevertheless a 
counter-example, too, that belies all claims that Kant’s retributivism qua adherence 
to the ius talionis and punishment of none but ‘the one that did it’ is warranted by an 
aim that falls within the bounds of the polis alone. The murderer’s death also match-
es the absolute occlusion of her access to happiness with her immorality, her ‘inner 
wickedness.’  That is not a description of what the punishing agent is doing from 
within the discourse of politics, but rather a (re)description that has reference to an 
ultimate end. 
Note that when I say, above, that the law of punishment (‘the categorical impera-
tive of penal justice’) has ‘become’ the law of unhappiness and when I claim that the 
latter must be then, for Kant, as much a ‘moral imperative,’ as much an instance of 
universally practically necessitating law, as the former, it may be that my way of ex-
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tion of ‘intrinsic desert.’  For Hill’s full discussion of this notion in relation to other senses of ‘de-
serves’ see ibid.,  324-5. 
461 Murphy, ‘Kant's Theory of Criminal Punishment’, 440. 
 
 158 
pressing myself will lead to misunderstanding. Note, however, that I do not claim 
that either the political law of punishment, or the eschatological law of unhappiness, 
really does qualify, even in Kant’s own terms, as a categorical imperative. I only 
claim that, (i) given that Kant takes the law of punishment to be a categorical impera-
tive, and (ii) given Kant’s understanding of what it is that qualifies a practical princi-
ple for designation as an imperative of this kind, and (iii) given the theoretical upshot 
of Kant’s special plea for the practice of capital punishment, it follows that (iv) if 
Kant takes immorality and unhappiness to be connected a priori and necessarily, but 
only normatively (that is, as something that is called for, that ought to be so, but is 
not necessarily so in fact), not physically, nor analytically, then (v) Kant takes it to 
be the case that the law of punishment has a kind of ‘reach’ that extends to the escha-
ton and a necessitating force that subsumes and constrains even divine action in re-
gard to immoral agents. At that limit, I suggest, the law of punishment—which finds 
its primary mode of expression as an imperative whose object is the having of a par-
ticular political end—has ‘become’ the law of unhappiness, that is, a law that com-
mands that God (and, in the special sense that I discuss, we) adopt and effect (as far 
as possible) an eschatological end: the unhappiness of immoral agents, which is, pre-
cisely, their punishment (but qualified now as an eschatological and not merely a po-
litical undertaking). 
All the way down 
In a moment I will take up Kant’s own turn towards this end, which comes at the 
very end, fittingly, of The Metaphysics of Morals. First, however, I will draw atten-
tion to the most important consequence of the foregoing discussion of ‘inner wicked-
ness’ and ‘intrinsic desert’: the demand that, if she is to be put to death, then the 
punishable subject must be (and always already is) regarded as ‘the one that did it,’ 
all the way down. The demand, here—which derives surreptitiously from a descrip-
tion of what we actually do—is that we exclude all reference to the involvement of 
other agents in our account of the genesis of the punishable deed. The agent is only 
punishable, as I said earlier, if she, ‘the one that did it,’ broke the law, wholly and 
simply. This demand is internal to Kant’s endorsement of capital punishment, which 
is in effect from the outset, long before he thematizes it. It is the inchoate theory that 
is embodied in his habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy.’ 
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Again, the subject has to be ‘the one that did it,’ all the way down. This ‘depth’ 
has two aspects. As Kant says in Theory and Practice: ‘punishments happen only to 
a will that is free but contrary to the law.’462  The first aspect (mentioned here se-
cond) is the deformation of the agent’s will, its evil orientation, which may be openly 
revealed in the obvious wickedness of murder, or remain the agent’s secret, evident 
nowhere but in the inner experience of moral self-contempt. The second element is 
the absolute ascribability to the agent herself, to her will, all the way down, without 
remainder, of this very deformation (see my discussion of the imputable ‘Gesinnung’ 
in the introduction to this thesis). This is why the human being is always already in-
trinsically, morally ‘strafbar.’ This is why she deserves, utterly, to be cut off from 
happiness. 
The ascribability of particular deeds is of the essence for Kant’s distinction be-
tween ‘punitive justice’ and ‘punitive prudence.’  In The Metaphysics of Morals, he 
writes that 
the argument for the former is moral, in terms of being punishable (quia peccatum est [be-
cause a crime has been committed]) while that for the latter is merely pragmatic (ne peccatur 
[so that the law will not be broken]) and based on experience of what is most effective in 
eradicating crime.463 
In this context, Kant is not using the epithet, ‘moral’ (moralisch), in its primary, for-
ward-looking sense. That is ‘moral,’ here, which bears on the secondary, backward-
looking question of whether a particular deed is actually ascribable to someone in 
particular and the question of whether the deed may be subsumed under a description 
(of it) that has immediate reference to the punishability of anyone who commits it 
(i.e., whether the deed may be subsumed under the concept of transgression—here, 
of ‘public law’—which Kant takes to be immediately, analytically connected to the 
concept of punishment a priori). 
For Kant, both the theory and the practice of capital punishment (as the actual-
ization of the a priori conceptual ‘combination’ of the notions of murder and of the 
murderer’s death), and the theory and the practice of the activity which (assuming 
that any subject were authorized and commanded to do it) would consist in the actu-
alization of the a priori notional connection between unhappiness and immorality, 
require and deploy the notion of ascribability, on the one hand (and so, too, of ‘abso-
                                                
462 ÜdG 8: 288 (289) (my emphasis). 
463 MdS 6: 363 n. (130 n.). 
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lute causal spontaneity’464), and the notion of a freely undertaken rejection, itself un-
normed and unintelligible, of a particular mode (but not every mode) of law-
governedness, on the other. As Kant puts it in his lectures on the philosophy of reli-
gion, ‘[a]s soon as the human being recognizes his obligation to the good and yet 
does evil, then he is worthy of punishment, because he could have overcome his in-
stincts.’465 
The eschatological post-script to The Metaphysics of Morals 
I suggested earlier that Kant’s anomalous reference to the fit that exists between the 
death sentence and the ‘inner wickedness’ of murderers expresses the grip of the 
practice of capital punishment itself, not an integrated element of Kant’s theory of 
punishment. The same is true with respect to his references to ‘blood-guilt.’ 
According to its title, the conclusion of The Metaphysics of Morals concerns a 
matter that lies ‘beyond the bounds of pure moral philosophy,’ namely, ‘religion as 
the doctrine of duties to God.’466  After presenting a brief argument concerning ‘reli-
gion,’ ‘the boundaries of the science to which it belongs,’467 and the possibility ‘of a 
“Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason,”’468 Kant offers a ‘Concluding Re-
mark’ in which, among other things, he returns—not in an offhand manner, but as if 
returning to a theme of absolutely integral importance—to the topic of punishment. 
He returns to the topic of punishment and, one sentence into this recapitulation, he 
returns, again, to the topic of murder. The tone and language of Kant’s argument is 
not merely religious, but also superlatively mythic and biblical, 
Punishment (according to Horace) does not let the criminal out of its sight as he strides proud-
ly before it: rather, it keeps limping after him until it catches him.—Blood innocently shed 
cries out for vengeance.—Crime cannot remain unavenged; if punishment does not strike the 
criminal, then his descendants must suffer it, or if it does not befall him during his lifetime, 
                                                
464 See this thesis’ conclusion for a very brief discussion of this topic. Kant’s notion of ‘spontaneity’ 
and the distinction between the latter and ‘autonomy’ is an important and complex matter whose de-
tailed discussion, however, lies without the limits of my current project (see Allison, Idealism and 
Freedom, 111, 140; Ameriks, Kant and the Fate of Autonomy, 189; Lewis White Beck, ‘Five 
Concepts of Freedom in Kant,’ in Stephan Körner: Philosophical Analysis and Reconstruction, ed. J. 
T. J. Srzednicki (Hingham: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1987); Hill, Dignity and Practical Reason 
93-4, 106-10). 
465 Vorlesungen-Religionslehre 28: 1079 (412). 
466 MdS 6: 486 (229). The work’s ‘Conclusion’ is subtitled: ‘Religion as the Doctrine of Duties to God 
lies Beyond the Bounds of Pure Moral Philosophy.’ 
467 MdS 6: 487 (229). 
468 MdS 6: 488 (230). 
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then it must take place in a life after death, which is accepted and readily believed expressly 
so that the claim of eternal justice may be settled.469 
And then, in a return to language that he used in dealing with the problem of the ‘last 
murderer,’ Kant adds, immediately: 
I will not allow blood-guilt [Blutschuld] to come upon my land by granting pardon to an evil, 
murdering duelist for who you intercede, a wise ruler once said.—Guilt for sins must be expi-
ated, even if a completely innocent person should have to offer himself to atone for it (in 
which case the suffering he took upon himself could not properly be called punishment, since 
he himself had committed no crime). All of this makes it clear that this judgment of condem-
nation is not attributed to a person administering justice (for the person could not pronounce 
in this way without doing others wrong), but rather that justice by itself, as a transcendent 
principle ascribed to a supersensible subject, determines the right of this being.470 
To his earlier remark about punishment’s ‘tak[ing] place in a life after death’ Kant 
adds a footnote that deploys key ‘critical’ distinctions in order to insure that his read-
ers understand that (given certain of our practical interests) we can believe and af-
firm what we neither know nor perceive: 
It is not even necessary to bring the hypothesis of a future life into this, in order to present that 
threat of punishment as completely fulfilled. For a human being, considered in terms of his 
morality, is judged as a supersensible object by a supersensible judge, not under conditions of 
time; only this existence is relevant here. His life on earth—be it short or long or even ever-
lasting—is only his existence in appearance, and the concept of justice does not need to be de-
termined more closely since belief in a future life does not, properly speaking, come first, so 
as to let the effect of criminal justice upon it be seen; on the contrary, it is from the necessity 
of punishment that the inference to a future life is drawn.471 
Contrast this with Kant’s ‘postulates of pure practical reason’ in the second Critique, 
the immortality of the soul and the existence of God, ‘practical’ belief in which is 
justified with reference to the inexorability of the a priori claims of morality in its 
primary, forward-looking sense: a call to the (self-wrought) transformation of the 
will, the human being’s vocation, and the summum bonum as a state of affairs causal-
ly connected to the fulfillment of that vocation.472  Here, however, we are faced with 
a different a priori: ‘the necessity of punishment.’ 
Earlier, in the ‘last murderer’ passage, Kant’s emphasis seemed to fall upon the 
murderer’s deeds. The necessity that such a one be put to death was elucidated in 
terms of both the general requirement ‘that each [have] done to him what his deeds 
deserve’ and the somewhat startling worry about the ‘blood-guilt’ that would ‘cling 
to the people’ otherwise. In that earlier passage it seemed that, having failed to pun-
ish their prisoner with death, ‘the people’ would be susceptible to the judgment that 
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471 MdS 6: 490 n. (231-2 n.) (my emphasis). 
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they were ‘collaborators in [a] public violation of justice,’ where ‘justice’ referred, 
again, to the requirement ‘that each [have] done to him what his deeds deserve.’  
This emphasis on ‘deeds’ and what they ‘deserve’ allowed Hill, as we saw, to deny 
that this text counted as an instance in which Kant was representing ‘intrinsic desert’ 
as the justifying ground of punishment. In Kant’s second reference to ‘blood-guilt,’ 
however, we encounter something rather different. The ‘wise ruler’s’ worry about 
‘blood-guilt’ does not have immediate reference to anyone’s deeds, but rather to the 
consequence that would ‘come upon [his] land’ if he were to ‘[grant] pardon to an 
evil, murdering duelist’ (by way of concession, moreover, to some unnamed party or 
parties interceding on the latter’s behalf). It is clear that punishment’s necessity—or, 
as here, the necessity of omitting to show mercy—is not a matter (merely) of the ius 
talionis, given instances of a certain class of deed, but a matter of what is deserved 
by a certain class of agent (‘evil,’ ‘murdering’). 
Taken together with the earlier passages on capital punishment in The Metaphys-
ics of Morals we are faced with an astonishingly rigid stance. One of its key features 
is the sheer immediacy of the move that progresses from the judgment that a murder 
has been committed to the judgment that the definitive, irrevocable occlusion of the 
murderer’s access to happiness must take place. The move in question gives the mis-
leading impression of being an inference from ground (the first of the foregoing two 
judgements) to consequent (the second).  But this is not what we are presented with 
here. As we have seen, Kant construes this immediacy in terms of the a priori de-
mand of a universal practical law. We have also witnessed his insistence that the ne-
cessity of the consequent is so absolute that it must be regarded as a judgment whose 
execution will be realized no matter what—and that this gives rise to and warrants 
‘the inference to a future life.’  In this way, Kant discloses that he regards what takes 
place there, upon the scaffold (‘criminal justice’), as uniquely eschatological in char-
acter—unique among all other political phenomena. 
The unconditional immediacy, in Kant’s thinking, of punishment’s attachment to 
transgression merits closer scrutiny. This will bring us to the threshold of my claim 
that the categorical bond and the eschatological enactment of the law of unhappiness 
are grounded in, and give expression to, the same mode of a priori ‘combination’ 
that Kant insists upon in the case of murder and the murderer’s own death—in the 
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law of punishment, that is, to the extent that it is put into effect there, on the scaffold, 
primarily and most exactly. 
Kant’s retributivism and the immediate connection of punishment 
to crime 
Again, the move by which Kant’s retributivism progresses from the judgment that a 
murder has been committed to the judgment that the definitive, irrevocable occlusion 
of the murderer’s access to happiness must take place gives the impression of being a 
kind of inference.473 It is not, however. Kant’s retributivism moves directly (immedi-
ately) from the claim that an agent ‘has committed murder’ (P) to the claim that ‘he 
must die’ (Q).  To be sure, Kant’s thinking here does not proceed immediately from 
P to Q, but rather, by way of modus ponens from PQ, together with P, to Q.  The 
‘immediacy’ to which I am adverting characterizes Kant’s commitment to the idea of 
a warrant for Q, given P, which does not depend upon his ever showing that the con-
ditional, ‘if he has committed murder, then he must die’ is itself true. 
Kant’s ‘must’ (‘he must die’), then, gives expression to the unanalyzable imme-
diacy of his commitment to the practice of putting murderers to death, the absolute 
proximity, the mercy-excluding immediacy so to speak, in Kant’s thinking of the no-
tions of transgression, immorality, or crime, on the one hand, and punishment, on the 
other. Kant’s habit of thought, here, gives the impression of endorsing a theoretical 
move, which is his repeated affirmation of a particular way of thinking the connec-
tion between happiness and morality. 
Among commentators who either take Kant to be a retributivist, or make tem-
pered claims to that effect, or who seek to elucidate the nature of retributivism more 
generally, it is common to point, momentarily at least, to the immediacy of Kant’s 
                                                
473 One is reminded here, of Descartes’ claim that ‘cogito ergo sum,’ a piece of apparent reasoning 
that is generally not regarded as an inference at all. Descartes himself writes that ‘[w]hen someone 
says “I am thinking, therefore I am, or I exist,” he does not deduce existence from thought by means 
of a syllogism, but recognizes it as something self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind (Replies 
2, AT 7:140).  Kant’s assertion that ‘If…he has committed murder he must die’ (MdS 6: 333 [106]) 
does offer a premise that, taken together with the claim that ‘x has committed murder,’ allows us to 
infer that ‘x must die.’  The first premise (the conditional) remains undefended in Kant, however.  
Kant really does seem to hold that to say that ‘he has committed murder, therefore he must die’ is not 
a deduction of the normative necessity of murder from the claim that a murder has been committed, 
but is rather something akin (at least formally speaking) to Descartes ‘simple intuition of the mind.’  
Kant’s key claim that ‘there is in the idea of our practical reason something further that accompanies 
the transgression of a moral law, namely its deserving punishment’ (KpV 5: 37 [34]) suggests some-
thing along these lines. 
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procedure here (and either to affirm or to deny that Kant proceeds in this way). Thus, 
by calling the law of punishment a categorical imperative, Kant ‘impl[ies] 
that…moral grounds [for punishment] exist,’ which ‘he never clearly provides.’474  
Kant takes the law of punishment to be self-evident.475  Kant’s retributivism is 
‘grounded on a categorical imperative which is inscrutable.’476  Kant’s exemplary, 
retributivist position ‘maintain[s] that the punishment of crime is right in itself.’  But 
this is ‘not to justify punishment.’  ‘[R]ather, [it is] to deny that it needs any justifica-
tion’ and, moreover, that ‘[i]ts intrinsic value is appreciated immediately and intui-
tively.’477  Kant insists that ‘punishment is a worthy act in itself,’478 such that ‘the 
reason-giving connection between wrongdoing and the infliction of harm is immedi-
ate and necessary, not indirect or contingent.’479  And the claim that ‘guilt merits 
punishment’ may be regarded as ‘a primitive and unanalyzed proposition that is mor-
ally ultimate.’480  ‘[D]eep retributivism,’ at least, espouses the ‘fundamental princi-
ple’ that ‘it [is] a moral necessity, independently of the consequences, that 
wrongdoers ought to be made to suffer in proportion to their offenses’—and takes 
this principle to be ‘in need of no further justification.’481 
The retributivist, as Bedau points out, must either appeal to ‘some good end,’ 
over and above punishment itself, ‘that is accomplished by the practice of punish-
ment,’ or he must forego appeal to ‘something else’ altogether. If he takes the first 
approach, then it may be objected that his justification for punishment is not a retrib-
utivist one at all. If he takes the second, then ‘his justification…is open to the criti-
cism that it is circular and futile.’482  This, however, is a problem that faces ‘any 
other deontological theory,’ as Moore points out. ‘Retributivism is no worse off in 
the modes of its possible justification than any [of those].’483   Thus, ‘[o]nce the de-
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ontological nature of retributivism is fully appreciated, it is often concluded that such 
a view cannot be justified. You either believe punishment to be inherently right, or 
you do not, and that is all there is to be said about it.’484 
Kant takes immoral agents to be unworthy to be happy. Unhappiness is what 
they deserve. In the sense of ‘deserve’ in play here, it is not only ‘fitting’ that they 
receive this punishment, as one commentator puts it,485 it is necessitated a priori. 
They unconditionally ought to be unhappy. Recall that the main point of this chapter 
is to explicate this ‘ought,’ to show how it is embodied in Kant’s ‘law of unhappi-
ness,’ to expose this law’s retributivist connections, and so to clarify the mode of re-
tributivism that is in the air whenever Kant glosses ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be 
happy.’ 
The ‘ought,’ here, may be explicated in terms of the immediacy of Kant’s com-
mitment, its unanalyzability. Why ought immoral agents to be unhappy?  They ought 
to be unhappy because, just given that they are immoral, it is good that they be un-
happy. It is what they deserve, intrinsically. Their unhappiness is not good for any-
thing—it is simply required of them. It is not that the purposes of justice are 
inscrutable here; it has none. There is nothing more to be said. 
This means, in a sense, that retributivism is not a theory at all. It marks a refusal 
to theorize and so to justify a particular practice. It is a stubbornly reiterated ‘be-
cause’ and a repetitive indication of the malefactor that proceeds by way of pointing 
at her deed (‘Just look at what she did!’). The retributivism expressed in Kant’s claim 
that the necessity of punishment grounds ‘the inference to a future life’ gives expres-
sion to the extent of this utter silence. The rest of Kant’s thinking about the punish-
ment of criminals may move freely around this point, flowing like water around a 
fixed mass. Again, I do not claim that retributivism or its ‘deontological nature’ con-
stitutes the whole of Kant’s thinking about punishment. But this other thinking is 
there, too, and its presence affects other aspects of Kant’s thinking about freedom 
and moral accountability. 
In regard to murder, Kant’s ‘law of punishment’ is the logic that constrains the 
inference that moves from the judgment that ‘he has committed murder’ to the judg-
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ment that ‘he must die.’  (Note that the first judgment subsumes two moments: first, 
the judgment that he is ‘the one that did it’; second, that the ‘it’ in question is an in-
stance of something in particular, that is, a member of the kind, murder.) 
Kant expresses the absolute immediacy of the relationship between transgres-
sion, immorality, crime, on the one hand, and punishment, on the other, in a variety 
of ways. He shows, in each of these instances, that ‘punishment’ (Straf) and the for-
feiture of happiness are one and the same. When, in the second Critique Kant states 
that ‘there is in the idea of our practical reason something further that accompanies 
the transgression of a moral law, namely its deserving punishment,’486 nothing is re-
quired to link the one thing (the particular transgression) to the other (‘its deserving 
punishment’). ‘[E]very crime,’ Kant goes on to say, ‘is of itself punishable,’ which 
means that it—precisely ‘of itself’—‘forfeits happiness (at least in part).’487 
Or again, to cite another passage that we encountered above, ‘every murderer—
anyone who commits murder, orders it, or is an accomplice in it—must suffer death.’  
Why?  Kant’s answer is that ‘this is what justice, as the idea of judicial authority, 
wills in accordance with universal laws that are grounded a priori.’488  Again, noth-
ing is required to link the particular murderous act, on the one hand, to the death that 
must be suffered, on the other. By murdering (ordering murder, being an accomplice 
in the commission of murder) the agent forfeits happiness—and here, not ‘in part,’ 
but, as far as we can tell, altogether. Justice demands as much—the ‘idea’ of justice 
as punishing authority ‘wills’ that this be so ‘in accordance with universal laws that 
are grounded a priori.’  Kant does not, however, offer a deduction489 that shows that 
the concepts here combined are combined a priori, let alone that their combination 
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accords with a universally binding norm for thinking and then forging their ‘real 
connection.’ 
Kant makes all of this very clear in his ‘Theodicy’ essay of 1791, writing that 
‘punishment in the exercise of justice is founded in the legislating wisdom not at all 
as mere means but as an end: trespass is associated with ills not that some other good 
may result from it, but because this connection is good in itself, i.e., morally and 
necessarily good.’490  Yet again, nothing is required to link ‘trespasses,’ on the one 
hand, to ‘ills,’ on the other. Their ‘connection,’ their being so connected, is uncondi-
tionally (necessarily) required because it is morally ‘good in itself.’  In Kant’s view, 
then, the practice of punishment is warranted a priori. It is disconnected from the 
will of anyone in particular, from the projects or interests of any particular agent, 
punishing or punishable, endorsed by the general will, by pure practical reason, the 
perfect upshot of perfect justice (or ‘judicial authority’) as such.491  And yet Kant 
does not take it that this immediacy—this unqueried silence about aims and conse-
quences that is so suggestive of universal necessity a priori—is actually embodied in 
the polis. 
This concession finds expression in the LEC, in a passage that shows that Kant 
does, in general, make a distinction between the aim or justification of punishments, 
to the extent that the state metes them out, and to the extent that God does. ‘All pun-
ishments are either deterrent or retributive.’  The first he defines as ‘those which are 
pronounced merely to ensure that the evil shall not occur.’  The latter, however, ‘are 
those pronounced because the evil has occurred.’  On the one hand, punishments are 
‘a means of…preventing the evil,’ on the other, of ‘chastising it.’492  The LEC then 
adds that ‘[a]ll punishments by authority are deterrent, either to deter the transgres-
sor himself, or to warn others by his example.’  By contrast, ‘the punishments of a 
being who chastises actions in accordance with morality are retributive.’493  Punish-
ments of the latter kind express justice; the former, however, are merely pruden-
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tial.494  Here, at least, Kant’s view is that princes, governments, and other embodi-
ments of ‘authority’ punish for pragmatic reasons only. 
Kant expresses this distinction even more pointedly, about a decade later, in a 
letter to J. B. Eberhard (dated 21 December, 1792): 
In a world of moral principles governed by God, punishments would be categorically neces-
sary (insofar as transgressions occur). But in a world governed by men, the necessity of pun-
ishments is only hypothetical, and that direct union of the concept of transgression with the 
idea of deserving punishment serves the ruler only as a prescription for what to do…  [Pun-
ishment for crime], even if its goal is merely mechanical for the criminal and setting of an ex-
ample for others, is…a symbol of something deserving punishment.495 
This ‘direct,’ but merely ideal ‘union of the concept of transgression with the idea of 
deserving punishment,’ in other words, is the telos of a particular imperative (here ‘a 
prescription for what to do’). The actions that it commands, particular punishments, 
do not rise to the level of this goal. They cannot do so. They are, rather, symbolic 
gestures that declares that ‘something,’ a particular instance of transgression, by be-
ing that (precisely a transgression), also instantiates ‘the idea of deserving punish-
ment.’496  The goal itself, however, would be realized only where every 
transgression—not merely legal, but ethical—was punished, met with the forfeiture 
of happiness, always, everywhere. 
But this is just what the law of unhappiness commands. The ‘direct’ conceptual 
‘union,’ which ‘serves the ruler only as a prescription for what to do,’ by command-
ing that the ruler obey the injunction, also assures the ruler, along with the whole 
body of the polis, that if we could ever identify ‘the one that did it’ and if it were ever 
possible to confirm that what this one did was immoral, then this same one would 
deserve, intrinsically and morally, to be punished—even if there were no further war-
rant for actually punishing her (then, of course, punishment would be illegal). Re-
flecting on this same passage from Kant’s letter to Eberhard, Murphy writes, ‘[h]ere, 
Kant seems to be admitting that human society is not the kind of society, and human 
criminals not the kind of individuals, corresponding to the ideals of community and 
personality needed to make punishment as retribution legitimate.’497  This is not 
wrong, but I would add that Kant means to say that we cannot know whether human 
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society and human individuals are like this. If the question pertains to the legitimacy 
of punishment in a particular case, that is one thing; but Kant does not deny that, giv-
en the antecedent (‘A is the one that did it’ and ‘it’ was a criminal act), then the con-
sequent follows necessarily (‘A deserves to be punished’). 
Actual instances of ‘punishment as retribution’ cannot be justified as such (as in-
stances) because the judgments upon which such punishments are based cannot be 
shown with any certainty to be true. But Kant balks (correctly I think) at conceding 
this point with respect to capital punishment. The latter cannot be justified as a sym-
bolic gesture towards an impossible-to-ascertain moral desert, while being, in fact, 
‘merely mechanical’ and exemplary. The death of the murderer must be regarded as 
an actual achievement of the retributive ideal at which other punishments gesture. 
The murderer’s death is not justified if it does not forge, in the ruler’s practice of 
punishment, in a ‘real connection,’ there, upon the scaffold, the a priori combination 
(‘union’) of the ‘the concept of transgression’ and ‘the idea of deserving punish-
ment.’  The murderer’s being put to death must be an expression of the law of pun-
ishment, but only to the extent that this law appears, here, in the eschatological guise 
of a law that commands that the condemned person be cut off from the very possibil-
ity of happiness. 
Kant does not thematize matters in this way of course; but this, I suggest, is why 
he makes confused (and evidently confusing) reference to the ‘inner wickedness’ of 
murderers in particular. Here, at least, the standard had better be realized: the con-
demned must be ‘the one that did it,’ wholly and simply, all the way down, inde-
pendently of all others, and the ‘it’ that he did must be both an utterly discrete effect 
of his freedom and subsumable under an unambiguous description as the transgres-
sion of laws that are universally and necessarily valid a priori. Barring these condi-
tions, Kant recognizes that the agent’s being put to death is an abominable mistake. 
If retributivism connects crime, as ground, to equal harm, as consequence, and 
regards this harm (just given the crime) as an end in itself, then, politically speaking, 
Kant’s paradigm for retribution is capital punishment. The latter is unique among 
punishments in that no question can be raised concerning the fit between crime and 
punishment in its instances. As we saw earlier, here uniquely ‘there is no substitute 
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that will satisfy justice.’498  Moreover, as Kant adds with surprising confidence a few 
sentences later, ‘one has never heard of anyone who was sentenced to death for mur-
der complaining that he was dealt with too severely and therefore wronged; everyone 
would laugh in his face if he said this.’499  Capital punishment is unique among pun-
ishments, too, in that no question can be raised about its having been undertaken with 
a view to the good that it would do the one that suffers it (as deterrent vis-à-vis future 
crimes, or as a component in some rehabilitative strategy). The one that suffers it is 
to all appearances obliterated, removed entirely from the polis. All other punishments 
constitute lost freedom—in the form of lost time or lost opportunity. They ‘forfeit’ 
happiness, but only ‘in part.’ Capital punishment, however, is constituted by the ir-
revocable obstruction of any further expressions of the condemned person’s freedom 
whatsoever. 
If the rest of Kant’s thinking about punishment’s justification is struck through 
with retributivism then this is because this rigid paradigm, this recalcitrant knot of 
uninterrogated certainty, subsumes all other instances of punishment as though it 
were itself the category, ‘punishment,’ come down from heaven. Punishments in 
general must be regarded as poenae vindicativae so that capital punishment can be. 
The order of priority here, however, is obscure. 
I pointed out, earlier, that the sense and purpose of my claims concerning Kant’s 
retributivism are relative to my discussion of his habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘wor-
thiness to be happy.’  And I said that I was claiming no more than that this gloss rep-
resents the connection between immorality and unhappiness in a manner which—
when thematized—turns out to be best described as a kind of retributivism. It is im-
portant to note that this claim, because it is a claim about Kant’s representation of the 
relationship between immorality and unhappiness pertains, first, to his ethical and, 
indeed, to his eschatological thinking. In other words, it does not pertain, in the first 
instance, to his political theory. (This is not to say that it does not apply to the latter 
as well.)  As we have seen, Kant takes the connection between unhappiness and im-
morality to be an immediately accessible, fundamental datum, an a priori conceptual 
‘combination’ whose actualization is enjoined in some sense by practical reason, in-
dependently of any extraneous considerations. If Kant takes the connection to be ana-
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lyzable in terms of some warrant distinct from the connection’s own intrinsic value 
he does not say so. It does not follow from this, however, that he takes the connec-
tion between crime and state-authorized harm, understood in the ultimate terms, es-
pecially, of the first part of The Metaphysics of Morals (the ‘Metaphysical First 
Principles of the Doctrine of Right’) to be of the same sort. 
In fact, I have not (and will not) address the question whether Kant really, in 
general, takes the notions of state-authorized harm, on the one hand, and crime, on 
the other, to be a pair of ‘determinations necessarily combined in one concept’ (to 
borrow language that we encountered in chapter 2500), that is, in the empirical con-
cept of punishment, and made actual by the forging of their ‘real connection’ in the 
practice of it. I have argued only that this is the case when it comes to Kant’s think-
ing about capital punishment, the concept of which (I argue) does combine two ele-
ments, the concept of murder, on the one hand, and the notion of the murderer’s 
deserved death, on the other, necessarily, and effects their ‘real connection’ upon the 
scaffold. There at least, I argue, the political encounters and even coincides with the 
ethical. My point is that even if no other part of his thinking about punishment does 
so, Kant’s endorsement of capital punishment expresses or reflects the stubborn knot 
with which this thesis is concerned.501 
The law of unhappiness 
As we saw in chapter 2, the notions of merit and reward (or desert thereof) belong, 
for Kant, to the ‘doctrine of right’; they do not belong to the ‘doctrine of virtue,’ un-
less specially qualified. The notion of worthiness to be happy, by contrast, belongs to 
the latter and not to the former. There is a sense, however, in which the notion of 
unworthiness to be happy belongs to both. The agent who is unworthy to be happy 
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deserves unhappiness. If omission of the action by which she discloses that she is 
unworthy to be happy can be coerced, then its commission is a crime and she can be 
punished for it. If such an action’s omission cannot be coerced, then its commission, 
though a moral failure, cannot be punished by the state. In Kant’s eschatological per-
spective, however, the notions of unworthiness to be happy and desert of punishment 
coincide. In that framework, the law of punishment, read as a command that immoral 
agents be made unhappy, and the law of unhappiness, understood as the injunction 
that they be punished, are one and the same.502 
On Kant’s account, the grounds for eternal punishment are not distinct from the 
grounds for empirical judicial punishment in cases of murder. To demonstrate the 
objective validity of the former mode of judgment would be, a fortiori, to show the 
validity of the latter: the judgment of condemnation declares the same thing to be 
true. In other words, only an agent whose eternal ejection from the human communi-
ty can be a normatively necessary consequence of the use of her freedom, in general, 
is an agent that can be subject to the death penalty, consequent upon a particular use 
of that freedom. 
A number of other commentators have taken note of the ambiguity that I am ex-
ploring here. In general, however, they take the ambiguity to arise from a modeling 
that moves from the ethical and the eschatological, as image, to the realm of the legal 
and the political, as reflection (to some degree, in a confused manner, etc.).503 
Am I making the mistake of trying ‘to draw a “Kantian” theory of law and poli-
tics from Kant’s ethical theory’?504  I am not. I have nothing substantive to say, real-
ly, about a ‘Kantian,’ or any other ‘theory of law and politics.’  I claim only that in 
his thinking about capital punishment, Kant himself touches a boundary at which the 
directionality of influence—from ‘law and politics’ to ‘ethics,’ or vice versa—
becomes unclear. And I suggest that the immediacy of the connection between 
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ground and consequence in the case of capital punishment then functions as a para-
digm for the justificatory style that Kant adopts in regard to punishments more gen-
erally, and that this is the reason why it is hard to get a clear answer from him on this 
very topic. 
‘Sometimes Kant asserts retributivism in general moral or religious contexts,’ 
Wood observes. But, he adds, ‘[t]hese passages cannot possibly be read as statements 
from within a legal practice.’505  This is fair enough. I do not take the retributivist 
orientation that is implicit in Kant’s habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be 
happy,’ to be an orientation that is structured by an interest in ‘legal practice.’  Nev-
ertheless, I claim that Kant’s habit expresses the same commitment that is expressed 
by his remarks about capital punishment in The Metaphysics of Morals. Wood makes 
his point (Kant’s retributivism as expressed in ‘general moral or religious contexts’ 
cannot to be seen ‘as statements from within a legal practice’) in the course of a cri-
tique of commentators, however, who take Kant to be a retributivist only when he is 
‘writing and lecturing…from within the practice of punishment.’  And Wood denies 
that Kant ever speaks from this perspective.506  My claim, however, is that Kant’s 
remarks about capital punishment in The Metaphysics of Morals are not instances in 
which he is ‘writing and lecturing…from within the practice of punishment.’  Kant’s 
remarks about the necessity of putting murderers to death are not a theoretical activi-
ty that takes place ‘from within’ that practice at all. They are habitual, just like his 
gloss, and evince the same commitment (they are marked by the practice, continuous 
with it, also practical). 
Wood concedes, in any case, that ‘Kant does try to link the idea that the good 
will is a condition of worthiness to be happy with his retributivism about punish-
ment.’  But this, Wood argues, ‘is chiefly (or even exclusively) when he is thinking 
about God as a judge of the world.’  And, adds Wood, ‘Kant even sometimes repre-
sents God’s proportioning of human happiness to worthiness as the doing of punitive 
justice.’507  This, I suggest, is just what the law of unhappiness commands. I will take 
up the question of who it commands—and so, too, its ‘action-guiding’ significance, 
in chapter 4. 
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The idea of eternal punishment, the practice of capital punishment 
One of my main claims is that Kant’s juridical notion of (negative, objective, intrin-
sic) desert of punishment coincides at a certain point with his ethical notion of un-
worthiness to be happy. I also claim that both notions supervene on the practice that 
they rationalize and that Kant’s commitment to this practice constrains him to some 
of his key theoretical moves, up to and including moves belonging to his theory of 
radical evil. Kant places morality and so, too, worthiness to be happy, at the centre of 
our attention. But he does so in a manner that obscures our view of the thing that is at 
the centre of his attention: the (today still-ongoing) problematization of the notion 
that it is possible for a human being to deserve to die at the hands of her community 
(or one of the latter’s avatars). 
The priority of Kant’s commitment to the idea of an unconditionally punishable 
agent (i.e., an agent that is punishable irrespective of the fact that nothing is gained 
by punishing her) is embodied in his commitment to the idea of an agent that is able 
to be worthy of happiness, not because worthiness is equivalent to deservingness (it 
is not), but because, in one special case, the unworthiness to be happy of every radi-
cally evil one of us is disclosed as desert of the ultimate punishment. We are not all 
murderers, but we are all agents who, just in case we commit murder, will have put 
one and the same thing on display. Cohen thinks that, when he ‘speak[s]…of making 
the punishment proportional to the internal wickedness of the criminal’ Kant ‘for-
get[s]…that no human being can determine the internal wickedness of another.’508  It 
is true, here, that Kant ‘forgets,’ but again only with respect to the scenario in con-
nection with which he speaks of this ‘internal wickedness’ in the first place. This is 
not a general pattern in Kant’s thinking about punishment. 
Divine poenae vindicativae and unworthiness to be happy as intrinsic desert 
of unhappiness 
We have already witnessed the transition from the political to the eschatological that 
occurs at the end of The Metaphysics of Morals. Again, I do not claim that Kant’s 
thinking about politics is modeled on his thinking about eschatology; but nor do I 
claim, exactly, that his thinking about the latter is modeled on his thinking about po-
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litical life. The model for each (in its backward-looking sense) is, in a sense, the 
practice of capital punishment: the obliteration of ‘the one that did it.’  The impera-
tive to do that is the law of punishment, in one frame of reference, and the law of un-
happiness in the other. 
If ‘the necessity of punishment’ warrants ‘the inference to a future life,’ it also 
warrants a particular set of theological claims. Thus, in the first Critique, Kant ob-
serves that ‘everyone also regards the moral laws as commands.’  Everyone does this, 
Kant says, and then he says that the moral laws could not even be commands, in his 
sense, ‘if they did not connect appropriate consequences with their rule a priori, and 
thus carry with them promises and threats.’509  Next, he adds a condition on the fore-
going: the moral laws could not ‘connect appropriate consequences’ with their rule a 
priori ‘if they [these laws] did not lie in a necessary being, as the highest good, 
which alone can make possible such a purposive unity,’ i.e., by distributing happi-
ness and unhappiness and so carrying out these threats and fulfilling these promis-
es.510  More specifically, as the later LEV (1793-4) puts it:  
[W]hen once we acknowledge our act to be worthy of punishment, we straightway think of 
someone who has the authority to punish us, and for this reason, and because we cannot pun-
ish ourselves for our offences, there naturally follows the idea that we think of God as the 
moral judge, who will deal out evils appropriate to our own unlawful actions, as to those of 
other men.511 
The Opus Postumum adds a significant dimension here, too, by adverting to moral 
self-contempt as the affective counterpart of the agent’s acknowledgement that she is 
unworthy to be happy. Her unworthiness to be happy, Kant writes, is ‘the transgres-
sor[’s] own reprehensibility.’  It is disclosed to the subject ‘in’ the categorical imper-
ative’s ‘rigorous command of duty,’ by way of her failure to conform to the latter. 
Then, Kant says, ‘if abstraction is made from sensible appearance, not only is the 
transgressor’s worthiness of being happy [diese Würdigkeit] denied him, but he him-
self [is] condemned through an irrevocable verdict (dictamen rationis). Not tech-
nical-practical but moral-practical reason absolves or condemns.’512 
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This late reference to ‘moral-practical reason’ as the source of absolution and 
condemnation is a key component of Kant’s thinking about the rules in accordance 
with which God judges. Kant is being inconsistent on this score when, in the first 
Critique, he claims that ‘promises’ (of reward) are ‘connected’ with the laws a pri-
ori.513  The ‘threats’ are; the ‘promises,’ however, are not. In his lectures on the phi-
losophy of religion Kant is more careful—at least some of the time. There he is criti-
critical of what he takes to be the typical view of God’s justice, where the latter is 
‘divided into justitiam remunerativum et punitivam, according as God punishes evil 
and rewards good.’  He denies that divinely ordained ‘rewards’ proceed from God’s 
justice at all. These are expressions of God’s benevolence and we have no ‘right to 
demand them.’  God is not ‘bound to give them to us.’  They do not express justice to 
the extent that ‘[j]ustice gives nothing gratuitously,’ but rather ‘gives to each only the 
merited reward.’  Kant could not be clearer: ‘Human beings may certainly merit 
things of one another and demand rewards based on their mutual justice; but we can 
give nothing to God, and so we can never have any right to rewards from him.’514  In 
short, God owes ‘no justitiam remunerativam toward us’ and ‘all the rewards he 
shows us must be ascribed to his benevolence.’ 
God’s ‘justice,’ however, ‘is concerned…with punishments.’515  Moreover, by 
‘punishment’ Kant means ‘poenae vindicativae’ or retributive punishments, ground-
ed in the mere fact that an agent broke the law (punishment given ‘quia peccatum 
est’). ‘[W]e see that there must be poenae vindicativae,’ Kant writes, ‘because they 
alone constitute what is proper to justice.’516  Deterrent punishments (punishments 
given ‘ne peccatur’), whether corrective (‘poenae correctivae’) or exemplary (‘poe-
nae exemplares’), must be ‘grounded on poenae vindicativae.’  Kant affirms here, 
again, that ‘an innocent human being may never be punished as an example for oth-
ers.’  But neither, however, may a guilty one be punished just in order to set such an 
example. An agent may be punished only on condition that ‘he deserves the punish-
ment himself.’517 
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Even if benefits accrue to punishment, ‘all [divine] corrective punishments’ must 
be regarded as ‘avenging punishments.’  Kant is aware, however, that the idea of 
vengeance ‘always presupposes a feeling of pain impelling one to [reciprocal acts of 
revenge].’  If ‘vengeance’ is associated with God, this absolutely may not have refer-
ence to ‘feeling,’ ‘pain,’ or ‘impulse.’  It might be safer, Kant says, to regard ‘the 
punishments inflicted by divine justice on sins’ as a mode of distributive justice 
(‘justitiae distributivae’). God is that rational being that distributes rewards and pun-
ishments, but the criterion for the latter is such that not rewards, but only punish-
ments are distributed necessarily in accordance with justice. Here, as elsewhere, 
Kant sees this ultimate distribution of punishment in negative terms. Distributive jus-
tice ‘limit[s] the apportionment of benevolence’ in accordance with ‘the laws of holi-
ness.’  But even here Kant is compelled to return to the earlier, more basic idiom. He 
does this so as not to betray its ostensibly rational core. Again, he says, ‘we see that 
there must be poenae vindicativae, because they alone constitute what is proper to 
justice.’518 
Ethical-eschatological punishment 
Earlier in these same lectures, a certain enthusiasm and good nature takes the upper 
hand in Kant’s thinking, when he paints a picture of 
the human race [as] a class of creatures which through there own nature are someday to be re-
leased and set free from their instincts [and so too, in this context, from evil]…. The whole is 
someday to win through to a glorious outcome, though perhaps only after enduring many pun-
ishments for their deviation.519 
Obviously, upon reflection, Kant cannot take this ‘whole’ in such a way that it in-
cludes every one of us. The subject(s) of the ‘glorious outcome’ and the object(s) of 
the ‘many punishments’ that he mentions can hardly turn out to be one and the same. 
Only a few pages later, Kant’s thinking evinces a much less hopeful perspective. 
Moral perfection in this life will be followed by moral growth in the next, just as moral dete-
rioration in this life will bring a still greater decline of morality in that life…. [One] has no 
reason to believe that a sudden reversal will occur in the next life. Rather, the experience of 
his state in the world and in the order of nature in general gives him clear proofs that his moral 
                                                
518 Vorlesungen-Religionslehre 28: 1086 (418). For Kant’s official, carefully qualified, endorsement 
of ‘Rache’ see MdS 6: 460 (207-8). See also LEV 27: 688 (417). Cf. Smith, ‘Worthiness to Be 
Happy’: 183). 
519 Vorlesungen-Religionslehre 28: 1079 (412). 
 
 178 
deterioration, and the punishments essentially necessary with it, will last indefinitely or eter-
nally, just as will moral perfection and the well-being inseparable from it.520 
Add to this Kant’s insistence that there is no sense in which these divine (or any oth-
er justified) punishments are grounded in benevolence. Divine justice does ‘not or-
dain punishments…in order to teach.’  It has no other aim than ‘to punish the offense 
by which [an agent] has violated the law,’ to punish a violation, altogether imputable 
to him, through which the agent himself has ‘made himself unworthy of happi-
ness.’521 
Because of their evil disposition, Kant says in the Religion, ‘every human being 
has to expect infinite punishment and exclusion from the Kingdom of God.’522  In 
that text, Kant describes punishment as ‘satisfaction [that] must be rendered to Su-
preme Justice, in whose sight no one deserving of punishment can go unpunished.’  
The fact that an agent has freely opted for the changed disposition that is consequent 
up a radical, self-effected conversion of the will, does not change the ‘moral’ fact of 
her still intact ‘punishability.’523 
The ‘Concluding Remark’ of the ‘Conclusion’ of The Metaphysics of Morals 
seems to set forth a caveat here, however, in relation to any possible discourse con-
cerning God’s relation to human beings. ‘[I]t is clear that in ethics,’ Kant writes, 
as pure practical philosophy of internal lawgiving, only the moral relations of human beings to 
human beings are comprehensible by us. The question of what sort of moral relation holds be-
tween God and human beings goes completely beyond the bounds of ethics and is altogether 
incomprehensible for us. This, then, confirms what was maintained above: that ethics cannot 
extend beyond the limits of human being’s duties to one another.524 
Questions about the kind of ‘moral relation’ that ‘holds between God and human be-
ings’ go, as Kant says, ‘beyond the bounds of ethics.’  But it is not entirely clear 
what limit he means to effect by claiming that this ‘question’ is ‘altogether incom-
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prehensible for us.’  Beyond the ‘critical’ limitation that turns such questions back at 
the boundary separating the theoretical from the practical, Kant certainly does not 
mean to say that nothing can be said about the ‘moral relation’ in question. In any 
case, if the ‘question’ takes us ‘beyond the bounds of ethics’ it does so by tarrying at 
the differential moment of transition and creating an opening in this boundary. There, 
as I will show in chapter 4, it turns out, not that God and human beings stand in a 
‘moral relation’ analogous to ‘the moral relations of human beings to human beings’ 
in any sense of ‘moral’ that pertains to morality’s primary, forward-looking con-
cerns, but rather that human beings, together with God, must submit together to the 
secondary, backward-looking, categorical law of punishment/unhappiness and that, 
to this extent, they are members in common of the single community for which this 
law is constitutive—called to submit, in common, and tempted, together, by the al-
lure of mercy. 
The law of unhappiness is a categorical imperative 
On Dews reading, Kant holds that ‘glaring discrepancies between virtue and happi-
ness…mar our world,’ and that ‘morality demands [that these] should be over-
come.’525  As I have shown, this is not quite right. The pair, ‘virtue and happiness,’ 
does not name a ‘demand’ that is set by ‘moral-practical reason,’ just as such. First 
the latter commands. And then, as we saw above, it ‘absolves or condemns.’526  But 
then, after that, it commands again concerning immorality and unhappiness. And the 
law of unhappiness is a categorical imperative. If the law of punishment is a categor-
ical imperative, then punishment’s condition, which is crime, must necessitate it in-
ternally. The same is true of the law of unhappiness. Kant says that punishment is 
connected with transgression necessarily as the latter’s inexorable consequence; any 
other kind of connection is contestable. The same is true of unhappiness and immo-
rality. 
Now, while I use the term, ‘law,’ in my expression, ‘the law of unhappiness,’ in 
a manner that is meant to be understood, univocally, as a term that signifies the same 
notion that is put forth in Kant’s expression, ‘the law of punishment,’ Kant does not 
himself ever speak of a law of unhappiness in my sense of an eschatological, or pro-
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spective ‘extension’ of his law of punishment. This fact—and an associated worry 
about being misunderstood—led me to place the word ‘law’ in this thesis’ title’s ref-
erence to ‘the “law” of happiness’ in scare quotes. I would have preferred, in fact, 
not to take this approach (and do not generally do so in the body of this work), since 
this tends to dilute the force of my claim that some of Kant’s basic commitments re-
ally do suggest that, in a mostly unthematized manner, he is committed to the exist-
ence, coherence, and bindingness of such a law. 
Nevertheless, I do not think that there is, or could be, such a thing as a genuinely 
Kantian (i.e., categorical, moral) ‘law of unhappiness.’ I do not think that the ‘law’ of 
unhappiness could qualify as such a law, anymore than Kant’s so-called ‘law of pun-
ishment’ could, since what the supposed ‘law’ commands in both cases is not that an 
empirical state of affairs (being-punished, being-made-unhappy) ‘per se’ (qua empir-
ical) be brought to pass, but that a particular notional relationship, the one that sup-
posedly holds, a priori, between immorality and unhappiness, or crime and 
punishment, be actualized or instantiated. It is important to note that I would make 
the same claim (regarding each one’s possible failure to really be a ‘law’ in Kant’s 
sense) concern both the ‘laws’ of punishment and unhappiness. If I signal my doubt 
in this regard by referring to ‘the “law” of unhappiness’ (with the scare quotes in 
place), I could do the same by referring to ‘the “law” of punishment’—and for the 
same reason. In neither case, is it obvious that the (supposedly normative) associa-
tion in question (crime-ought-to-be-punished, immorality-ought-to-be-met-with-
unhappiness) is given to us a priori, rather than a posteriori, by way of nature, or in 
the form of habits of judging socially acquired. 
Indeed, it is my view, more generally (a view that I will confess to holding, but 
will not defend here), that there are no such things at all as the kind of imperatives 
that Kant calls ‘categorical’ and that—as Kant fears—‘morality’ really is a ‘chaem-
era’ (but who needs Kant’s ‘morality’ anyway?—only retributivists like Kant, as far 
as I can see). Again, I do not need to press this point, however, since arguing that the 
law of punishment is not really a law in Kant’s sense, but rather a practical ‘rule’ lies 




But this is a really bald assertion on Kant’s part.  As far as I can see, the punish-
ing, or making-unhappy, of criminals and/or immoral agents is an undertaking whose 
justification is possible only a posteriori, with reference to the empirical ends served 
by the practice, rather than with reference to any supposedly pure interests of practi-
cal reason. And yet Kant’s use of his ‘worthiness to be happy’ idiom, which gives 
expression to certain of his deep practical commitments, has the theoretical upshot, 
never thematized by him, that punishment is an undertaking whose justification is 
possible a priori (that is what Kant means when he asserts, baldly, that the law of 
punishment is a categorical imperative). This upshot remains implicit, as far as its 
eschatological context goes, but comes out into the open in his comments about ‘the 
law of punishment,’ to the extent that these comments belong, specifically, to his 
thinking about capital punishment for murder. 
That is all that I claim. There is a danger that I have caused confusion by calling 
this law ‘the law of unhappiness,’ which might sound to some readers too much like 
the converse of a kind of ‘law of happiness,’ which would be obviously an entirely 
un-Kantian construct. Perhaps, as I said earlier in this thesis, ‘the law of the-making-
unhappy-of-immoral-agents’ would be a clearer rendering of what I intend. Never-
theless, trusting that the foregoing (along with my discussion of this matter in this 
thesis’ introduction) clarifies matters adequately, I will maintain my current idiom—
and proceed. 
Now, the context of the law of unhappiness has an enormous breadth, for Kant. 
In his essay on ‘The End of All Things,’ Kant remarks that Jesus Christ ‘announces 
punishments,’ 
as a loving warning, arising out of the beneficence of the lawgiver, of preventing the harm 
that would have to arise inevitably from the transgression of the law (for: lex est res surda et 
inexorabilis [the law is deaf and inexorable]. Livy.); because it is not Christianity as a freely 
assumed maxim of life but the law which threatens here; and the law, as an unchanging order 
lying in the nature of things, is not to be left up to even the creator’s arbitrary will [Willkür] to 
decide its consequences thus or otherwise.527 
The law of unhappiness is binding for a universe of beings that subsumes even God. 
In general, as Kant explains in The Metaphysics of Morals, ‘[t]hat action is permitted 
(licitum) which is not contrary to obligation; and this freedom, which is not limited 
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by any opposing imperative, is called an authorization (facultas moralis). Hence it is 
obvious what is meant by forbidden (illicitum).’528  It is clear enough what is forbid-
den here. Under the limiting law of punishment, the sovereign is permitted benefi-
cently to reward a subject for the latter’s (juridically) meritorious deeds, commanded 
categorically (hence morally) to put him to death in case he turns out to be, for ex-
ample, an ‘evil, murdering duelist’, and (morally, but not juridically) forbidden to 
show mercy. Under the limiting law of unhappiness, the ‘creator’ is granted, in ef-
fect, the same authorization and made to submit to the same command and proscrip-
tion—with respect to each creature’s happiness or unhappiness, as such. If the law of 
punishment is a categorical imperative, I argued, then to punish is a ‘duty of wide 
obligation’529 for the ‘ruler.’  It is not illegal for him to show mercy, but it is unethi-
cal. What of the law of unhappiness? 
Kant takes the judgment that all immoral agents ought to be unhappy to be 
grounded, a priori, in a principle of pure practical reason to which God is also sub-
ject (as we shall see in chapter 4, Kant cannot regard God as ‘holy’ in this connection 
at all). Here again, the necessity that immoral agents be unhappy must have immedi-
ate and exclusive reference to each one’s being ‘the one that did it.’  Ultimately, the 
‘it’ in question, for Kant, will turn out to be the unique deed/fact/law that, in the Re-
ligion, he identifies with the agent’s irreducibly radical nature, the disposition 
(Gesinnung) of her power of choice (Willkür). 
For the moment, it is important to see that Kant does not hold merely that im-
moral agents deserve to be unhappy. He needs to block access to any account of the 
‘ought’ that is implicit in this claim which, while including this concession, would 
nevertheless deny that this desert (i.e., unworthiness), just as such, entails that such 
an agent’s unhappiness is objectively good, or deny that this desert absolutely de-
mands that God secure the unhappiness of human agents (i.e. that mercy is evil), or 
deny that human beings ought, unconditionally, to contemplate its hypothetical actu-
alization with an attitude of prospective approbation (see chapter 4). 
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The a priori ‘combination’ revisited 
Kant says in the first Critique that ‘the true original’ of virtue (or morality, or moral 
goodness) is ‘[un]changeable with time and circumstances.’530  Kant thinks that the 
same is true of the idea of worthiness to be happy. We know that the representation 
of the relationship between morality and happiness encapsulated in it is valid, even 
though we never encounter it, as such, in experience: its content ‘rest[s] on mere ide-
as of pure reason and [can] be cognized a priori.’531 
Kant never shows, however, as he attempts to do, at least, with respect to the 
concept of duty or moral obligation, that his understanding of the relationship be-
tween morality and happiness—as encapsulated in his habit of glossing ‘morality’ as 
‘worthiness’ to be happy—is ‘cognized through reason.’  As I pointed out in chapter 
two, he does not demonstrate, in other words, that reason, rather than nature, or hab-
its of judging socially acquired, is the source of this idea. 
As I said earlier, Kant offers no ‘deduction’ on this score. And, I suggest (assert-
ing, I think, what is obvious), the claim that the relationship in question holds is not 
‘an a priori synthetic practical proposition’532 whose validity, whose demand on our 
thinking and acting, can be established a priori. It is a claim whose appearance of 
validity is forged and secured in the course of human practices whose inevitability—
from the point of view, precisely, of mercy—is far from obvious. 
For Kant, however, the products of the human being’s free agency (i.e., her 
deeds, the radical disposition of the will) and her wellbeing or ill (i.e., as states of the 
affairs of a being whose wellbeing must be conceived under the empirical rubric of 
‘happiness’) are always to be regarded as constituents of a single system, not logical-
ly (analytically), but normatively put together: a deferred, eschatological possibility, 
on the one hand, but also realized, in exceptional cases, upon the scaffold (on the as-
sumption, of course, that the relevant judgments of action-ascription and guilt are 
true). 
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In this chapter I executed three main tasks. First, I explored Kant’s thinking about 
punishment and affirmed that, at least in a qualified sense, when it comes to the spec-
ification and justification of punishments, Kant is a retributivist. Next, I showed, 
with particular reference to his treatment of the topic in The Metaphysics of Morals, 
that Kant’s thinking about the ‘narrow,’ ‘external’ domain of ‘public law,’ on the one 
hand, and his thinking about the ‘wide’ domain of ethics, on the other, interpenetrate 
one another in his treatment of capital punishment. 
I argued, moreover, that the two domains themselves coincide in the practice of 
it. Indeed, I characterized Kant’s ‘scaffold’ as the liminal topos in which his thinking 
about law and politics punctures and extends deep into his thinking about ethics and 
eschatology. I argued, in particular, that the unconditional, immediate necessity that 
Kant ascribes to capital punishment in cases of murder is key to understanding, not 
only the retributivist tendencies of his thinking about politically situated punishment, 
in particular, but the retributivism of his eschatological notion of unhappiness, more 
generally. 
Finally, I argued that the ‘ought’ arising from Kant’s implicit conviction that 
immoral agents deserve intrinsically to be unhappy may be expressed in the form of 
an imperative that is binding, not only on the agent tasked with temporal punish-
ments (the sovereign), but on God himself. I characterized this imperative as the eth-
ical and ultimately eschatological expression of Kant’s political ‘law of punishment’ 
and referred to it as his ‘law of unhappiness.’ 
This is the retributivism, then, that is in the air whenever we encounter Kant’s 
gloss. It remains to be shown, however, that Kant’s law of unhappiness, construed in 
terms, strictly, of its reference to unhappiness—without referring it, that is, to the 
exceptional case of capital punishment for murder—has ‘action-guiding’ signifi-
cance. The plausibility of my claim that Kant’s gloss evinces a deep, antecedent, du-
rable commitment to a particular set of practices depends upon my showing that the 
law of unhappiness as such, and so, too, Kant’s mundane uses of the worthiness to be 




Kant’s God and the Practical Significance of the Law 
of Unhappiness 
[A] judge who pardons is not to be thought 
of!533 
Introduction 
As we have seen, Kant’s habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy’ 
signifies his assent to the thesis that immoral agents deserve intrinsically to be un-
happy. We have also seen how this converts to the view that immoral agents ought to 
be unhappy. In the last chapter I showed that this ‘ought’ may be expressed in the 
form of a categorical imperative. I referred to the latter as Kant’s ‘law of unhappi-
ness.’  As I showed in chapter 2, however, it is in the nature of the relationship be-
tween morality and happiness, as represented by Kant’s gloss, that the unhappiness 
of immoral agents is only assured to the extent that their access to happiness is 
blocked extraneously, by circumstances or by a third party. I characterized the latter 
mode of occlusion as the ‘forging’ of a ‘real connection’ between immorality and 
unhappiness that conforms to their ostensibly a priori, normative, conceptual ‘com-
bination.’ 
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In this chapter, I discuss the ‘action-guiding’ significance of Kant’s law of un-
happiness, the ostensibly a priori legislation that commands that this forging take 
place. I concede that the latter has such significance only to the extent that Kant also 
takes it to be binding on some agents or other. I identify the latter and show what 
their enactment of the imperative consists in. 
To these ends, this chapter executes four main tasks. First, I open with a brief 
review of the practical significance of Kant’s law of punishment. Second, I demon-
strate that Kant’s commitment to the thesis that immoral agents ought to be unhappy 
is a fundamentally practical commitment as well. Third, I argue more specifically 
that Kant’s law of unhappiness is binding on two kinds of agent, human and divine, 
in two distinct contexts: one mundane, the other eschatological. I argue that these 
two contexts correspond to two distinct ways in which the law of unhappiness is put 
into practice. Fourth, I argue that these two contexts of the law’s realization coincide 
to the extent that, under the law of unhappiness (but not under the primary moral 
law), we, together with God, are members in common of a single community, a 
community for which the law of unhappiness is uniquely constitutive. And I argue, 
finally, with respect to this community, that for Kant it must be an absolutely mercy-
free zone. 
The action-guiding significance of the law of punishment 
In this section, I review the sense in which Kant’s commitment to the thesis that all 
murderers ought to die (just given that they are murderers) may be regarded as a fun-
damentally practical one. My discussion here sets up a framework for the main in-
quiry of this chapter’s subsequent sections. 
The subject of the law of punishment 
In chapter 3, although I did not construe matters in precisely these terms, I already 
identified the subject of Kant’s ‘law of punishment.’  This was a relatively straight-
forward matter: Kant’s categorical ‘law of punishment’ has action-guiding signifi-
cance for the sovereign. The latter is its subject, the one that it binds. I will make this 
point again now, briefly, in a more programmatic manner. But I will also argue that 
there is a special sense, too, in which Kant’s law of punishment has action-guiding 
significance for the sovereign’s subjects. 
 
 187 
In the face of a transgression of ‘public law,’ that is, action that obstructs or in-
terferes with the ‘external’ freedom of other members of the polis, (proportionate) 
punishment is unconditionally necessary. The laws of the land are correlated with 
particular sanctions. However, that criminals be (proportionately) punished, in gen-
eral, is the object of Kant’s categorical ‘law of punishment.’  The subject of this law 
is the sovereign (or the state regarded as a ‘moral person’) and its object(s) is (are) 
the sovereign’s subject(s).534  With respect to the sovereign, as such, no punishment 
is possible.535  It is the sovereign’s unique right to punish,536 but also—given Kant’s 
law of punishment—his moral duty. Admittedly, the deeds that actualize what the 
law of punishment demands are undertaken by the sovereign’s representatives (jail-
ers and executioners), executive figures who act legitimately, not in their capacity as 
individual citizens, but in their authorized capacity as executor’s of the sovereign’s 
will.537  In short, the law of punishment is not an imperative that is binding upon 
concrete, specific persons, qua individual citizens—at least, it does not command 
that they do anything. 
It does, however, command a response from them. There is a sense, in other 
words, in which the law of punishment does have a mode of expression, for Kant, 
such that its subjects include the criminal’s fellows. As Hill points out, one of pun-
ishment’s ‘constitutive element[s]…is expression of public disapproval of wrong-
doing.’538  The ‘deliberate infliction of undesirable consequences in response to overt 
injuries’539 is not an undertaking of any private citizen in particular, to be sure; but, 
to the extent that this ‘public disapproval’ is embodied in the affective makeup of 
individual citizens, it is a sign of the individual’s judgment that (given crime) pun-
ishment is a good, a sign of their (impotent) will that punishment be carried out. The 
‘citizen’s disapproval of wrong-doing’ converts to an approval of particular punish-
ments, which, as affective endorsement of them, signifies the individual citizen’s will 
that something be done which, however, he defers to the subject actually authorized 
to carry it out. 
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Thus, while the law of punishment is normative for the realm of sovereign ac-
tion, it is also normative (but of course not coercible) for the citizen’s judging and a 
certain mode of feeling about crime and punishment. When, after asserting that ‘[t]he 
law of punishment is a categorical imperative,’ Kant goes on to write, ‘ woe to him 
who crawls through the windings of eudaemonism in order to discover something 
that releases the criminal from punishment or even reduces its amount by the ad-
vantage it promises,’540 he is addressing anyone who might be tempted to crawl 
about in these ‘windings.’  Both sovereign and subject are warned (‘woe to him’) of 
the consequence that threatens if each fails to endorse, to will, to approve of the 
criminal’s full, adequate punishment: ‘if justice goes, there is no longer any value in 
human beings’ living on the earth.’541 
Does the law of unhappiness have action-guiding signifi-
cance? 
In his article on ‘Worthiness to be Happy and Kant’s Concept of the Highest Good,’ 
Steven Smith points to a possible ‘objection…against construing virtue as worthiness 
to be happy, and consequently against the alleged a priori connection between virtue 
and happiness,’ namely, that this construal lacks any ‘practical (action-guiding) sig-
nificance’ and that it ‘answers only to the concern of hope.’ 542 Smith is onto some-
thing important here. Kant’s idiomatic construal of ‘virtue as worthiness to be happy’ 
does not express the idea, merely, that there is an ‘a priori connection between virtue 
and happiness.’ It indicates that this ideal connection, which obviously does not hold 
now, ought to hold. So understood, the problem with Kant’s construing morality and 
happiness in this way is that it expresses an imperative in a situation where the only 
agents around are incapable of realizing the end that it prescribes. In Kantian terms, 
an imperative that commands what cannot be done is no imperative at all, a contra-
diction in terms. 
In this section, I argue that, by implying that there is a categorical ‘law of un-
happiness,’ Kant’s habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy’ suggests 
indirectly, too, that someone or other is bound by it and that there is (or are) in fact a 
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practice (or practices) that would count as enactments of it. In other words, I argue, 
the ‘action-guiding’ significance of Kant’s gloss is, at the same time, the action-
guiding significance of the law of unhappiness to which it adverts. And whenever 
Kant glosses ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy,’ I argue, he signals his commit-
ment to the practice (or practices) that execute(s) and conform(s) to this law. 
Smith’s response to the ‘objection’ that Kant’s construal of the relationship be-
tween morality and happiness lacks action-guiding significance is to point to an ethi-
cal ‘interest’ that is directly correlated with the primary, forward-looking ‘problem of 
the determining ground of the will.’  For Smith, this other interest finds expression, 
not in a new articulation of the latter problem—in relation, now, to the question 
whether anyone ought to undertake to actualize the ‘a priori connection between vir-
tue and happiness’—but instead in the ‘irreducible dimension of moral experience’ 
that consists in our ‘approving or disapproving contemplation of real states of af-
fairs.’  He characterizes the latter as ‘a direct corollary’ of the ‘formal rule of willing’ 
and ‘an exhibition and confirmation’ of the latter.543  This is not so much to affirm 
that Kant’s construal of matters has action-guiding significance after all, however, 
but rather to show that the backward-looking, affective ‘dimension of moral experi-
ence’ in which it finds expression is directly connected to the forward-looking one. 
This is to affirm that Kant’s mysterious construal of virtue as worthiness to be happy 
has a kind of significance for us as moral agents, to be sure, but it is also to concede 
the original objection. Kant is simply pointing to something that we inevitably and in 
some sense rightly feel in connection with (moral, free) success and failure in matters 
pertaining to the ‘formal rule of willing.’ But on Smith’s reading, when Kant glosses 
‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy’ (or vice versa) he is not expressing the idea of 
a call to do something.  
Like Smith, Hill notices that there is an objection to be made here. He affirms 
that when Kant construes virtue as worthiness to be happy he expresses the view that 
‘anyone who lacks a good will is, to some degree, unworthy to be happy,’544 that 
there is some sense in which ‘we are liable to suffer for our wrongdoing’ or, more 
generally, ‘that wrongdoers deserve to suffer.’545  Kant appears to employ a notion of 
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desert here, however, ‘that floats free from systems of law and systems of informal 
social sanctions.’546  Hill, as we saw in chapter 3, refers to this as ‘intrinsic moral 
desert.’  He affirms that Kant’s construal of virtue as worthiness to be happy ex-
presses the view that human beings are, or can be, deserving in this way. But then he 
denies that, for Kant, ‘wrongdoers deserve to suffer in any practical sense that enti-
tles others to contribute to their suffering,’547 or that Kant’s use of the worthiness to 
be happy idiom ‘amounts to an endorsement of the intrinsic desert thesis as an ac-
tion-guiding (practical) principle.’548  In essence, Hill ends up where Smith does, but 
without connecting Kant’s idiom to the affective dimension of moral feeling. Implic-
itly, Smith concedes the objection’s corollary claim that Kant’s gloss ‘answers only 
to the concern of hope’; and Hill allows, as we saw in chapter 3, that Kant’s idea that 
immoral agents deserve to be unhappy has an ‘anemic,’ ‘nonpractical,’ ‘faith-
guiding,’ ‘wish-expressing,’ significance.549 
But I claim that Kant’s habitual construal of virtue as worthiness to be happy 
does have action-guiding significance. It has such significance because it is tanta-
mount to Kant’s assertion that there is a law of unhappiness that, just like his politi-
cal law of punishment, is a categorical imperative. As I showed in the last chapter, it 
has such significance, at least, in the special case where the sovereign is called upon 
to forego mercy and to put murderers to death. But it has a broader significance than 
that. 
‘That it is fitting for God to take up this task [of ensuring that wrongdoers get 
what they deserve],’ Hill allows, ‘is a faith-guiding idea that Kant sometimes seems 
to endorse, but it is not what grounds or determines our responsibilities.’550  I claim 
however, first, that there is a special sense in which the ‘idea that Kant sometimes 
seems to endorse’ does determine a particular kind of activity for us. And I claim, 
second, that Kant’s habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy’ also ex-
presses the idea that it is more than merely ‘fitting’ that God ‘take up this task.’  It is 
demanded of him. At first glance, this would seem to be out of the question, since 
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God, on Kant’s account, is not subject to moral imperatives at all. Nevertheless, as I 
will show below, although he is bound by no forward-looking moral imperatives (the 
forward-looking laws that are imperatives for us are, for God, laws of the latter’s 
very nature), Kant’s God is among the agents that are bound by the backward-
looking law of unhappiness.551 
Indirectly, in spite of his concession, Smith also points to the imperative that is 
encapsulated in Kant’s gloss. ‘The criterion of worthiness to be happy,’ he writes, 
‘does not command the creation of happiness ex nihilo; rather, it controls the appor-
tionment of the well-being that happens to be possible.’552  The agent that is subject 
to the ‘command’ is not commanded to create happiness out of nothing, but rather to 
ensure that happiness (whatever ‘well-being happens to be possible’) is distributed in 
a particular manner. Whatever else this entails, it entails that immoral agents are to 
have no access to happiness (or the means to it) at all. The ‘criterion of worthiness to 
be happy’ commands that. 
Before taking this matter up, however, and before turning to the sense in which 
human beings are also called upon to act in conformity with the law of unhappiness, 
we need to be clear about Kant’s thinking, more generally, about imperatives, their 
subjects and their objects. The first thing to note is that to affirm that the law of un-
happiness is an imperative is to say that what it demands (the choice, the course of 
action, the end) is not merely natural for the being that must put it into effect. The 
law takes the form of an imperative for such a being because the latter is endowed 
with inclinations upon which the law itself puts ‘pressure.’553  By saying that it is a 
categorical imperative I am affirming that the agent, called unconditionally to act 
against the pull of these inclinations, is called to do what is objectively good. 
All of this follows directly from Kant’s definition of an imperative: 
The representation of an objective principle, insofar as it is necessitating for a will, is called a 
command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an imperative. 
All imperatives are expressed by an ought and indicate by this the real relation of an objective 
law of reason to a will that by its subjective constitution is not necessarily determined by it (a 
necessitation). They say that to do or to omit something would be good, but they say it to a 
will that does not always do something just because it is represented to it that it would be 
                                                
551 Cf. Smith, ‘Worthiness to Be Happy’: 185. 
552 Ibid.,  189. 
553 I owe this very evocative mode of expression to Ameriks observation that, for Kant, if ‘the basic 
laws of value’ exert ‘an imperative “pressure” on us [this] presupposes a context of sensibility’ 
(Ameriks, Kant and the Fate of Autonomy, 137). 
 
 192 
good to do that thing. Practical good, however, is that which determines the will by means of 
representations of reason, hence not by subjective causes but objectively, that is, from grounds 
that are valid for every rational being as such.554 
‘Ought,’ says Kant, ‘expresses a possible action, the ground of which is nothing oth-
er than a mere concept.’555  In the present instance, the concept is the notion of a 
state of affairs in which unhappiness and immorality are perfectly correlated. ‘[A]ll 
imperatives,’ as Paton puts it, ‘tells us that something would be good to do or to 
leave undone,’556  but, as Kant puts, it ‘[imperatives] say [this] to a will that does not 
always do something just because it is represented to it that it would be good to do 
that thing.’  Where the law of unhappiness is pronounced, the object of the rational 
will, or ‘the state of affairs which [the rational agent’s] action is intended to pro-
duce,’557 is a state of affairs whose production requires a kind of asceticism on the 
agent’s part.   
It is good that immoral agents be unhappy, thinks Kant; and, as Engstrom ob-
serves, ‘[Kant] identifies the good in general with the practically necessary’ (in con-
trast, that is, to the merely ‘agreeable’).558  ‘The good…according to Kant,’ as Paton 
puts it, is ‘a necessary object of a rational will in accordance with a principle of rea-
son.’559  In the present instance, this means that, by affirming the objective goodness 
of the unhappiness of immoral agents, Kant indicates the practical necessity of the 
demand that this good be realized. But the demand that this conjunction be realized 
(as too the proposed—but never demanded—conjunction of morality and happiness) 
is, at the same time, a sign that Kant is thinking of something that is ‘not yet actual,’ 
that is first ‘postulated’ as practically necessary and only then achieved.560  Kant de-
fines a ‘moral world’ as ‘the world,’ hence presumably this world, ‘as it would be if 
it were in conformity with all moral laws.’  Kant adds parenthetically that this con-
formity is possible, on the one hand, ‘in accordance with the freedom of rational be-
ings’ and also practically necessary, on the other hand, that is, called for ‘in 
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accordance with the necessary laws of morality.’561  The world as it ought to be, 
then, is an idea of reason. And, as Neiman observes of such ideas more generally, it 
‘is linked to reality by its claim that it ought to be realized in the future.’562 
The subjects of the law of unhappiness and its modes of en-
actment 
In this section I answer the questions, ‘Who is the subject of Kant’s law of unhappi-
ness?’ and ‘How is it enacted?’  I argue that Kant’s God is a subject of the law of 
unhappiness and that human beings are too. I argue that, for the former, conformity 
to the law takes the form of a suspension of kindness and an occlusion of access to 
happiness or the means to it (irrespective of whether or not this entails a further pro-
duction of unhappiness). For human beings, I argue, the law of unhappiness entails a 
class of practically necessary dispositions of the will, which find expression in atti-
tudes (but not outer actions) that bear on the happiness and unhappiness of immoral 
agents (in general). 
I argue, to be more precise, that on Kant’s gloss the judgment that a particular 
agent is moral implies, maximally, that her being rendered happy would be deonti-
cally possible (i.e., permissible) for any being capable of acting in her behalf to actu-
ally secure her happiness and, minimally, that the (hypothetical, prospective) 
approbation of such action is deontically possible for beings such as ourselves, who 
are capable of willing or intending that moral agents (in general) be happy, but who 
are not endowed with power or insight adequate to the task of securing this end. On 
the other hand, the judgment that an agent is immoral implies maximally, for Kant, 
that her being rendered happy is deontically impossible (i.e., forbidden) and that her 
being rendered unhappy is deontically necessary (i.e., commanded) for any being 
capable of actually effecting or occluding her happiness and, minimally, that the (hy-
pothetical, prospective) approbation of such action is either deontically impossible 
or necessary (as the case may be) for beings such as ourselves, who are capable of 
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willing or intending that immoral agents (in general) be unhappy, but who are not 
endowed with power or insight adequate to the task of securing this end. 
Human beings as subjects of the law of unhappiness 
In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that the human being is morally obligated 
to promote the happiness of others (to make their happiness an end)563 and, indeed, 
without confusing this with the ‘meek toleration of wrongs,’ to be ‘forgiving.’564  If, 
like the political ‘law of punishment,’ the ethical ‘law of unhappiness’ is a categori-
cal imperative, then in what sense does this law necessitate, precisely for human be-
ings, a determinate course of action a priori? 
In this sub-section I argue that the first context in which the law of unhappiness 
is enacted is the mundane context in which human beings are called to live in ac-
cordance with the demands of morality in Kant’s primary, forward-looking sense and 
the demands of the political law of punishment. This mundane context has both an 
external aspect, in so far as it is the spatio-temporal context in which the deeds of 
moral or immoral agents are enacted, and an internal one, which is the individual 
human being’s conscience. 
I argue that in the case of human beings (apart from the sovereign, that is, at 
least in the case of empirical punishment) the law of unhappiness is enacted in this 
‘inner’ world only. The free activity that conforms to it is a particular class of judg-
ment that finds expression in an attitude of (prospective) disapprobation of the hap-
piness of immoral agents (in general) and in the (prospective) approbation of their 
unhappiness. But it is at the same time an impotent or ‘virtual’ will that immoral 
agents (in general) be unhappy, a kind of ‘need of reason’ that this turn out, some-
how, to be always and everywhere the case. Deploying Kant’s notion of ‘respect’ 
(Achtung), I argue that these attitudes of approbation and disapprobation, far from 
being merely ‘reactive’ ones, are in Kant’s view the empirical manifestations of a 
priori judgments of practical reason concerning the badness of happiness and the 
goodness of unhappiness—given any agent’s immorality. 
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Affect, interests, virtual and deferred practice 
Moral self-contempt and the disapprobation of the deeds and character of immoral 
agents are the affective correlates of objectively valid judgments of pure practical 
reason, as such (i.e., irrespective of the deity or humanity of reason’s bearers). The 
mere representation of immorality and unhappiness as necessarily combined, the 
‘act’ of taking an interest in the actualization of this representation, the act of repre-
senting this actualization as practically necessary—all of this is already an expres-
sion of freedom. Allison is helpful on this score, explaining that ‘Kant…takes 
seriously the conception of practical spontaneity and therefore distinguishes between 
having a desire, which is a matter of nature, and being interested, which is (at least 
partly) a matter of freedom.’565  To ‘have’ an interest in something is to spontaneous-
ly ‘take’ an interest in it: interests ‘are products of practical reason’ for Kant. If they 
were not, then they would be indistinguishable from inclinations. This spontaneous 
‘taking,’ Allison argues, ‘necessarily involves the projection of some end as in some 
sense desirable,’ whether in a moral sense or any other.566  To be sure, as Kant rec-
ognizes, only the ‘causality of the will’ is able to ‘bring about the existence of its ob-
ject.’567  Nevertheless, the law of unhappiness is normative for this antecedent 
activity of taking an interest in seeing this realized. It ‘practically’ necessitates the 
production of this representation and forbids the production of one that is formed 
along the contours of the ‘windings of eudaemonism.’ 
Even if this practice and the (divine) agent capable of undertaken it must remain 
‘problematic,’ or hypothetical for us, a practice that would gratify reason, as embod-
ied in a subject whose justified contempt and disapprobation are stirred by the very 
thought of a happy but immoral agent, serves an interest, not of the kind of being for 
whom such contempt and disapprobation happen to be natural possibilities (i.e., the 
affectively modifiable human one), but an interest of all rational beings as such (in-
cluding, if there were such a thing, any rational being that was capable of undertak-
ing the practice in question). Kant’s commitment to this thesis is the theoretical 
counterpart of his more basic commitment to these affects and these practices, of his 
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unwillingness or inability to forego them, to do without them—or even to imagine 
what it would be like to do so in a decisive manner. 
Affect 
Kant is struck by the fact, noticed classically by Plato’s Socrates, that the immoral 
agent, when she suffers empirical ill, is constituted in such a way that she is able, in 
an important sense, to appreciate, value, and approve of the latter, precisely to the 
extent that she regards herself as immoral.568  ‘[B]y deviating from [virtue],’ as Kant 
points out in Theory and Practice, ‘a human being can…bring upon himself reproach 
and purely moral self-censure and hence dissatisfaction.’569  Indeed, Kant adds a few 
pages later, ‘someone’s transgression of [duty], even without his considering the dis-
advantages to himself resulting from it, works immediately upon his mind and makes 
him reprehensible and punishable in his own eyes.’570  For Kant, the lack of fit be-
tween my happiness and my morality instigates an immediate itch in reason, as it 
were. Reason relieves this irritation, not by way of (unwarranted571) action aimed at 
bringing about the suffering that the agent evidently deserves, but by way of a par-
ticular mode of representation of the moral law, which gives rise to self-contempt 
and which, as a painful feeling, undermines my happiness. 
Kant holds that ‘observance or transgression of [one’s duty] is indeed connected 
with a pleasure or displeasure of a distinctive kind (moral feeling).’572  This even 
means that ‘an aesthetic of morals’ corresponds, as a ‘subjective presentation’ of its 
content, to the objective metaphysics of morals. This ‘aesthetic’ pertains to ‘the feel-
ings that accompany the constraining power of the moral law (e.g., disgust, horror, 
etc., which make moral aversion sensible)’ and ‘make its efficacy felt’ (albeit with-
out being the absolute ground of this efficacy).573  The primary ‘a priori feeling’574 is 
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respect for the moral law. It is an immediate, felt ‘effect’ of the latter upon finite 
agents. It is a product of the subject’s own spontaneity, a matter of ‘what we our-
selves do,’575 a mode of paradoxical self-affection and not ‘something that we merely 
passively feel.’576  But it may also be regarded as ‘the effect of pure practical reason 
upon our sensuous nature.’577  As such it allows the moral law to serve as an incen-
tive for agents, like us, that are motivated by sensible enticements.578 
There is a close relationship, for Kant, between respect for the moral law, on the 
one hand, and moral self-contentment, morally motivated self-contempt, and other-
directed moral approbation and disapprobation, on the other.579   Each of these is an 
affective state that relates to ‘the representation of the law.’580  Of course, respect 
contrasts as a priori and prospective with the feelings that are correlated with judg-
ments about action and character, which are a posteriori and retrospective. Neverthe-
less, Kant’s affirmation of these retrospective feelings is a further inflection of his 
concession of a role to affect in his view that reflection on the notion of duty modi-
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fies the latter.581  That which respect is, in prospect, the feelings of self-approbation 
and moral self-contempt are, in retrospect. The former evinces an awareness that one 
has done one’s duty, the latter an awareness that one has failed in this respect. One 
responds ‘to one’s own moral failure,’ in particular, with ‘misery.’582 
The distinctively moral feeling of ‘displeasure’ take two main forms, first as 
‘awe,’ which is ‘respect coupled with fear’583 at the mere thought of running afoul of 
the moral law. First, pure practical reason ‘strikes down self-conceit altogether.’  
This is entailed by the fact that ‘all claims to esteem for oneself that precede accord 
with the moral law are null and quite unwarranted.’584  This is not pleasurable at all, 
as Kant explains in the second Critique. The ‘intimidating respect’ that we have for 
the moral law is directly connected with the agent’s consciousness of her own moral 
inadequacy before it. The human being ‘want[s] to be free’ from having to feel this 
respect because it reveals this inadequacy ‘with such severity.’585  This painful moral 
‘sensation’ is not connected with transgression, however, but rather warns against it. 
A second form of moral ‘displeasure’ arises when the agent ‘forgets himself so 
far as to act’ immorally. Then, Kant writes, his ‘own reason bears witness against 
him…and makes himself despicable and abominable in his own eyes.’586  ‘Con-
tempt’ (Verachtung), in general, is the affective correlate of the judgment that some-
thing is ‘worthless.’587  Moral self-contempt is correlated with the reflexive judgment 
that one is morally worthless. ‘Humiliation’ in the shadow of the moral law is not 
equivalent to moral self-contempt. The latter, but not the former, presupposes that an 
agent has disobeyed the law. Moral self-satisfaction, on the other hand, is connected 
with consciousness of conformity to this law. And, as Kant says in the second Cri-
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tique, the human being is capable, in principle, of ‘certainty of a disposition in ac-
cord with [the moral] law’ and so capable of consciousness that she has met ‘the first 
condition of any worth of a person.’588  ‘Moral happiness’ is ‘the assurance of the 
reality and constancy of a disposition that always advances in goodness (and never 
falters from it),’589 or is ‘inherent in the consciousness of his progress in the good.’590 
Of course, for Kant, the context in which the relevant judgments and the associ-
ated affective states take shape is an internal one. Conscience hosts a scene in which 
the one ‘I,’ ‘the same human being (numero idem),’ as Kant puts it, is both accused 
and accuser (the latter being prosecutor and judge together). The two roles, however, 
are completely distinct.591  The ‘human being who accuses and judges himself in 
conscience must think of a dual personality in himself,’ Kant argues, ‘a doubled 
self.’592  We accuse ourselves, Kant says, and we find ourselves guilty, punishable, 
and finally condemned.593  But of course, as Wood observes, this implies no ‘duty to 
punish ourselves for our misdeeds (as by depriving ourselves of the happiness of 
which we judge ourselves unworthy).’  Rather, ‘Kant…insists that our happiness or 
misery is left for the ruler of the world to decide.’594 
When it comes to questions about the unhappiness of other agents, however, 
there is a danger that the feeling of resentment and a desire for revenge will come 
into the foreground. Not only Kant, but some of his main predecessors had already 
noticed this and attempted to offer a general warrant for the having of feelings along 
these lines. For Hume, moral feeling, whether as ‘indignation’ or ‘resentment,’ on 
the one hand, or as ‘approbation’ or ‘approval,’ on the other, is not grounded in an 
antecedent thinking, not a matter of judgment by means of moral concepts. Rather, it 
arises immediately through exposure to certain social states of affairs (even by way 
of hearsay): ‘I feel an immediate indignation arise in me against such violence and 
injury’595 and ‘our breasts are affected with the liveliest resentment against the author 
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of these calamities.’596  If the feeling itself is warranted, then this is because it gives 
expression to interests that human beings actually have and which they have, moreo-
ver, in common. As Hume puts it 
[i]n all determinations of morality, this circumstance of public utility is ever principally in 
view; and wherever disputes arise, either in philosophy or common life, concerning the 
bounds of duty, the question cannot, by any means, be decided with greater certainty, than by 
ascertaining, on any side, the true interests of mankind.597 
In this same connection, Adam Smith goes to great lengths to show that, when it 
comes to the treatment of malefactors, action arising from sympathy with the latter 
(mercy) ought never to be allowed to take priority over action grounded in resent-
ment.598  Like Hume and Smith, Kant takes sympathy (no matter how broadly con-
strued) to be a kind of partiality that is grounded in sensibility or inclination. But 
unlike these predecessors, he wants to deny this of his analogue of resentment—
which is moral contempt (Verachtung). For Kant, the latter—as expressed, for exam-
ple, by the thief’s judgment that ‘I am a worthless man although I have filled my 
purse’599—signifies a normative judgment that is not only categorically true of a 
whole class of deeds (in a way that subsumes even that deed-like thing, the evil char-
acter from which they spring), but enjoys a universal validity whose ‘universe’ ex-
tends beyond the merely anthropological one. 
When we are faced with the idea of punishment as divine ‘justitiam remunera-
tivum,’ Kant takes it that an agent’s self-contempt and, with the latter, her conscious-
ness of deserving to be unhappy, implicitly concedes the objective (practical) reality 
of this idea. But the concession does not pertain to her merely. It is a universally val-
id judgment to affirm that all immoral agents deserve this treatment. Kant secures the 
normativity of both legal and theological notions of retributive punishment within 
this ‘virtual’ format: that is, as both a free interest-taking judgment and its correlative 
affect. In our actual practice, with respect to others—even given the apparent ‘perva-
siveness’ of radical evil—we are to be sympathetic and humane. We are to be ‘stern 
with ourselves in the pursuit of moral self-perfection,’ but we are not warranted in 
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seeking to undermine the happiness of our immoral (but non-criminal) fellows.600  
Nevertheless, this humaneness aside, Kant takes it that the human being’s endorse-
ment of the unhappiness of immoral agents in general (her own included), is ground-
ed in an interest of the same faculty (pure practical reason) that is concerned with 
answering the forward-looking question, ‘What ought I to do?’—the pure faculty to 
which Kant adverts when he solves the ‘problem of the determining ground of the 
will’ by identifying the ‘formal rule of willing.’601 
But Kant never demonstrates this thesis. He never shows that this interest is 
more than a merely anthropological datum, a property of our ‘common life,’ a habit 
that we share. Kant takes it that the feeling of respect plays a mediating role between 
pure practical reason and sensibility. Likewise, pure practical reason mediates its 
backward-looking demand—the law of unhappiness—by way of the feeling of moral 
self-contempt, which is then generalized affectively as the prospective disapproba-
tion of the happiness of immoral agents in general. 
Indeed, in the fascinating R 7202 Kant claims to ‘find in [himself] a principle of 
disapprobation [Missbilligung] and of inextinguishable inner aversion [unauslöschli-
chen innern Abscheu].’  In a sense, he stacks the deck by referring to this as ‘a prin-
ciple,’ from the outset. Nevertheless, Kant goes on to ask what ‘this disapprobation 
rest[s]’ upon. He cites various possibilities, including an ‘immediate feeling of 
shamefulness,’ ‘hidden reflection on harmfulness,’ and ‘fear of an invisible judge.’  
He does not offer a positive answer to the question that he has posed, but insists, in 
any case, that whatever the ground of this disapprobation turns out to be ‘it cannot be 
habit’—an assertion that he bases in the claim that the disapprobation in question is 
‘universal and unconquerable.’  Habit, he implies, is not ‘universal and unconquera-
ble’ and so moral disapprobation cannot be founded in that.602 
Even if we concede this, however, in relation to judgments about the moral 
goodness and badness of prospective or already undertaken courses of action—what 
of the approbation of the unhappiness of immoral agents and the disapprobation of 
their happiness?  For Kant, nothing short of the purity and rationality of their ground 
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vindicates ‘moral sentiments.’603  Pure and rational, then, this ground must be. Bar-
ring this originary purity, the impartial spectator’s prospective disapprobation of ‘the 
uninterrupted prosperity of a being graced with no feature of a pure and good will’604 
may readily be called into question. So too practical reason’s supposedly pure, antic-
ipatory judgment that the eschatologically deferred, divine practice of punishment, 
conceived in strictly retributivist terms, is absolutely good.605  And so too, more 
proximately, practical reason’s ostensibly pure judgment that the sovereign’s merci-
ful cancellation of the death penalty is so morally repugnant that were it made policy, 
there would ‘no longer [be] any value in human beings’ living on the earth.606 
Kant is no revolutionary in these matters.607  We are faced here, to be sure, with 
one tendency among several, but Kant’s thinking with respect to mercy and punish-
ment (capital, divine) is highly conservative. Even if it is true, in general, that Kant’s 
‘narrative of progress and universal history constitutes a delegitimation of practices 
and institutions that might otherwise be taken for granted,’608 it is not true here. And 
if, as Taylor puts it, a ‘revolutionary project’ is one that is ‘put forward’ as some-
thing that ‘ought to supersede the status quo,609 then Kant is no radical here. Ameriks 
is right to describe Kant’s project in terms of a ‘realiz[ation] that what he needed 
was…a good apology, a story of how the best examination of all the latest options of 
metaphysics and science…shows that there is still room for (what he took to be) our 
most important common beliefs.’610  But in a sense not intended by Ameriks611 it al-
so turns out that the importance of these ‘most important common beliefs’ turns to 
some significant degree, at least, upon the importance of certain cherished, evidently 
universal, apparently inevitable practices.612 
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Here, even in this ‘virtual’ format, we witness the priority of the practical in 
Kant’s thinking—by which I do not mean so much the priority of practical reason 
over theoretical, but, to deploy Cicovacki’s useful distinction, of the ‘practical realm’ 
over the theoretical one.613  Just as Kant ‘offered a detailed reconstruction of our 
cognitive experience,’ he ‘sought to reconstruct the underlying principles of our 
moral practice.’614  But this does not apply to the practice with which this chapter is 
concerned—the ‘virtual’ and ‘deferred’ practice (see below) that conforms to the law 
of unhappiness. If these practices were to turn out not to be ‘reconstructable’ in the 
way that Kant requires, then this would be equivalent to the discovery that we have 
no objectively, readily shareable good reasons for keeping on with them (in Kant’s 
sense of ‘good reasons’). In a sense, here, the practical outstrips Kant’s efforts at ‘re-
construction’ and persists more or less ‘as is.’ 
But Kant clearly takes the feelings in question to be ‘principled’ ones—and not 
merely ex post facto, to the extent that they might turn out to have given rise to the 
very principles that he thinks they express. Kant observes, rather, that it is a special 
‘propensity of reason’ in them that leads (in his example) young people ‘to enter 
with pleasure upon even the most subtle examination of the practical questions put to 
them.’615  Kant allows that 
frequent practice in knowing good conduct in all its purity and approving it and, on the other 
hand, marking with regret or contempt the least deviation from it, even though it is carried on 
only as a game of judgment in which children can compete with one another, yet will leave 
behind a lasting impression of esteem on the one hand and disgust on the other, which by 
mere habituation, repeatedly looking on such actions as deserving approval or censure, would 
make a good foundation for uprightness in the future conduct of life.616 
But Kant does not conclude that these judgments of ‘approval or censure’ and the 
feelings of ‘regret or contempt’ and ‘esteem’ or ‘disgust’ reflect interests that human 
beings have independently of pure reason. And yet both morality, on the one hand, 
and the happiness or unhappiness of immoral agents, on the other, are practical pos-
sibilities in whose realization human beings always already take an interest, without 
                                                                                                                                     
(Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, 204). His definition of ‘practice’ is 
apposite for my purposes as well: ‘By “practice”, I mean something extremely vague and general: 
more or less any stable configuration of shared activity, whose shape is defined by a certain pattern of 
dos and don’ts…. [I]deas frequently arise from attempts to formulate and bring to some conscious 
expression the underlying rationale of the patterns.’ (ibid.). 
613 Cicovacki, ‘Illusory Fabric’: 396 
614 Ibid.,  385. 
615 KpV 5: 154 (127) (my emphasis). 
616 KpV 5: 154-5 (127). 
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the benefit of, and well in advance of, philosophical reflection. Kant does not have to 
persuade us to take an interest, here, or teach us what to attend to. At the same time, 
however, the consistency and frequency of Kant’s deployment of the notion of ‘wor-
thiness to be happy’ show that he takes the practical impulse to which it refers to 
have become eroded in some way. Kant’s notion of ‘worthiness to be happy,’ then, 
may be regarded as a tool for reconstituting and stabilizing a ‘virtual’ practice (as 
free judgment and correlated affect) whose end is the universal connection of unhap-
piness and moral unworthiness, a practical possibility concerning which human be-
ings are or have become ambivalent. 
Interests 
Kant’s habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy’ indicates the presence 
of an implicit interest, which pertains to a particular practice, a form of willing, and 
an affective attitude, each of which takes as its object the state of affairs in which the 
correspondence between immorality and unhappiness is, or would be, realized. Kant 
holds that it is as rational beings, as such, and not as specifically human and so also 
earthly ones, that we are interested in the proportionate distribution of happiness in 
accordance with morality. We notice that this proportionality is lacking and this fact 
bothers us. But Kant thinks that our irritation in this respect expresses the frustration 
of a need of pure reason. 
This is the thrust of Kant’s claim, in the Groundwork, that ‘an impartial specta-
tor can take no delight in seeing the uninterrupted prosperity of a being graced with 
no feature of a pure and good will.’617  And in his philosophy of religion lectures, 
Kant puts the same point in theological terms, asserting that ‘God could [never] take 
pleasure in seeing other beings happy without their being worthy of it.’618  This does 
not get us quite as far as saying that reason is positively pained at the sight of such a 
thing, nor need it.619  In his essay on ‘Orientation in Thinking’ Kant writes, in any 
case, that 
‘[r]eason does not feel; it has insight into its lack and through the drive for cognition it effects 
the feeling of a need. It is the same way with moral feeling, which does not cause any moral 
                                                
617 Gr 4: 393 (7). See also R 6090 18: 450. 
618 Vorlesungen-Religionslehre 28: 1102 (430).  
619 See, however, R 6871 19: 187 (445) and R 7196 19: 270 (461). 
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law, for this arises wholly from reason; rather, it is caused or effected by moral laws, hence by 
reason, because the active yet free will needs determinate grounds.’620 
Generally, for Kant, there is a direct relationship between the feelings of pleasure 
and displeasure, on the one hand, and what it means to take an interest in some 
course of action or in the effect that it aims at, on the other. In The Metaphysics of 
Morals, he cites our ‘susceptibility to feel pleasure or displeasure merely from being 
aware that our actions are consistent with or contrary to the law of duty.’  And he 
goes on to argue that ‘[e]very determination of choice proceeds from the representa-
tion of a possible action to the deed through the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, 
taking an interest in the action or its effect.’621  In another context, Kant avers that 
‘well-pleasedness is pleasure in an object,’ irrespective of whether or not the object 
exists (e.g., being ‘well-pleased with a house, even if I can see only the plans’), while 
an ‘interest’ (Interesse) is ‘well-pleasedness in the existence of an object.’622  This 
brings us to the threshold of practice since ‘a necessary practical postulate is the 
same thing in regard to our practical interest as an axiom is in regard to our specula-
tive interest.’623  In each case, movement from the axiom/postulate to the conclu-
sion/effect serves the interest in question by establishing its object. 
It is generally accepted that Kant’s notion of rational interest may be specified in 
two distinct ways. Reason has theoretical interests, on the one hand, and it has prac-
tical ones, on the other.624  Kant avers, however, that ‘all interest is ultimately practi-
cal.’625  The theoretical interests of reason are served by the practice of explanation, 
at least in part, while reason’s practical interests are served, in the first instance, by 
action that conforms to ‘the law of duty.’  When it comes to the possibility of achiev-
ing the latter, pure reason’s needs with respect to ‘doing or acting’626 render the 
claim that ‘everything is mere nature’ (the Third Antinomy’s antithetical position627) 
untenable. When it comes to the human being’s freedom, her immortality, and the 
existence of God, reason’s practical interest demands that the reality of these things 
                                                
620 Orient 8: 140 n. (12 n.). 
621 MdS 6: 399 (160). 
622 Vorlesungen-Religionslehre 28: 1065 (400). 
623 Vorlesungen-Religionslehre 28: 1083 (415). 
624 For a typical formulation see P. Rossi, ‘Kant's Doctrine of Hope: Reason's Interest and the Things 
of Faith,’ New Scholasticism 56, no. 2 (1982): 229. 
625 KpV 5: 121 (102). 
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be postulated ‘as an hypothesis,’ even though it is understood that the postulates in 
question can be neither proven nor disproven.628  These ideas ‘have not been thought 
up arbitrarily,’ Kant argues. They answer directly to this need or interest of reason. 
The projection of ‘thinking’ beyond the bounds of nature leads reason to these ideas 
necessarily. And this projection is warranted to the extent that the interests that it 
serves reflect a demand of pure reason itself.629 
What, however, of the thesis ‘that wrongdoers deserve to suffer’?  ‘To many,’ 
Berman observes, this ‘seems truer [even] than that they deserve particular treatment 
from a contingent entity, the state.’630  Hegel notes critically that 
[t]he designation of an individual as immoral necessarily falls away when morality in general 
is imperfect, and has therefore only an arbitrary basis. Therefore, the sense and content of the 
judgment of experience is solely this, that happiness simply as such should not have been the 
lot of some individuals, i.e. the judgment is an expression of envy which covers itself with the 
cloak of morality.631 
Hegel’s ‘judgment of experience’ and Berman’s reference to what ‘seems truer,’ 
here, are apposite, not because I am setting out specifically to demonstrate that some-
thing sinister is going on in Kant’s thinking at this point. Instead, these observations 
raise the stakes in connection with my proposal that Kant does not, in any case, show 
that, in addition to its forward-looking interest in the agent’s ultimate conformity to 
‘the law of duty,’ pure practical reason, just as such, has an interest in the happiness 
or unhappiness of immoral agents. This is not to question whether reason is involved 
here, at all, but only to question reason’s ‘purity’ on this score. But this is what Kant 
claims when, in the third Critique, he proposes that we 
[c]onsider a person at those moments in which his mind is disposed to moral sensation…. 
Cleverly to dig for incentives behind these feelings would be in vain, for they are immediately 
connected with the purest moral disposition, since thankfulness, obedience and humiliation 
(subjection to deserved chastisement) are particular dispositions of the mind toward duty.632 
The fact that the human being freely ‘takes an interest’ in some end or other does not 
mean, however, that her having that end in the first place is a function of anything to 
do with reason (anymore than her taking an incentive to be a good reason for acting 
implies that the incentive itself is given to her by reason). For Kant, particular affec-
tive states are connected with judgments concerning the goodness or otherwise of 
                                                
628 MdS 6: 354 (123). 
629 KrV A462/B490. 
630 Mitchell N. Berman, ‘Punishment and Justification,’ Ethics 118, no. 2 (2008). 
631 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, § 625 (379). 
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prospective courses of action. But it does not follow from the claim that this forward-
looking approbation and disapprobation expresses an interest of reason, that this is 
so in connection with judgments concerning the goodness or badness of the happi-
ness of the members of a particular class of agent. Even if we concede Kant’s point 
with respect to these ‘particular dispositions of the mind toward duty,’ does this real-
ly tell us anything about the incentives that one might find (if one were to ‘dig’) ‘be-
hind these feelings,’ behind ‘moral sensation,’ in the case of the prospective 
approbation of the unhappiness of immoral agents—or, say, in cool reflection on the 
prospect of letting ‘the last murderer’ go free? 
Virtual and deferred practice 
I propose that, when they anticipate and endorse the eschatological forging of the 
connection between immorality and unhappiness whose objective goodness is repre-
sented by Kant’s notion of worthiness to be happy, the affects of approbation and 
disapprobation may be regarded as virtual or deferred forms of that ultimate practice. 
The disapprobation or approbation of the deeds of morally worthless or upright men 
is a corollary of the judgment that such men or deeds possess or lack a certain kind 
of goodness. It is not a deferred practice. But the disapprobation that one feels at the 
very prospect of an immoral, but happy agent—including a ‘passively healed’ one 
(see below) that has not repaid her debts—is practical. It does not merely approve of 
a particular deed—it adopts and (impotently) wills a particular end. 
The attitudes that Kant describes, these moral ‘sensations,’ ‘feelings,’ and so 
forth are virtual practices. On Kant’s view, the interests that these practices serve are 
pure ones. Although both ‘reactive attitudes’633 and the attitudes that Kant describes 
‘attribute responsibility to others,’634 Kant’s moral feelings are no mere reactions. 
Rather they give expression to moral judgments, made freely, concerning interests 
freely ‘taken.’  That is ‘virtual,’ in the sense that I intend, then, which would be the 
case if pure reason had a power that was commensurate with that which interests it, 
with what it wills, in this regard. 
                                                
633 The idea of ‘reactive attitudes’ originates in Strawson, ‘Freedom and Resentment’). See also 
Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2006 [1985]), 36-8. 
634 See Korsgaard, ‘Creating the Kingdom of Ends’, 196; Langton, ‘Duty and Desolation’: 486; 
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‘[N]ot everyone can or should sustain every complaint,’ notes Williams. But ‘[i]t 
is another consequence of the fiction of the moral law that this truth does not occur to 
us. It is as if every member of the notional republic were empowered to make a citi-
zen’s arrest.’635  This ‘arrest,’ however, is deferred, by which I mean that, while it is 
willed and practiced virtually, it is left to another to execute. Analogously, the actual, 
political practice of punishment is an outworking of that which remains virtual in the 
spectators’ approbation of it and which is deferred to the sovereign. If our disappro-
bation of the happiness of immoral agents were efficient then we would be beings 
who could, at least, occlude it. But our disapproval is not efficient and we are not 
such beings—or we are, with respect to the manner of our judging and willing, but 
no further than that. As finite agents operating under the conditions of space and 
time, we lack the insight and power that would be required to insure that no immoral 
agent was happy.636  As immoral agents ourselves, too, we would also have to regard 
the end of our action as a form of self-punishment, which, for Kant, is a contradiction 
in terms.637  Nevertheless, in spite of the impossibility of our doing what we will 
here, Kant thinks that we have insight a priori into the principle in accordance with 
which, if we possessed adequate power and insight and were ourselves morally supe-
rior to the objects of the practice (immoral agents), we would be constrained to pro-
ceed. This is part of what it means to say that the law of unhappiness is a categorical 
imperative. 
Contrast Kant’s implicit view, here, with his explicit treatment of the theoretical 
‘a priori’ of the first Critique. Both of these modes of aprioricity constitute a horizon 
within which the service of particular interests unfolds. There is no going beyond this 
limit, nor is their any sense in which the horizon offers clues as to its origin or the 
origin of these interests. On the one hand, there is that which lies a priori and so 
‘pure’ in reason, as its ideals, in the understanding, as its categories, in sensibility, as 
the formal properties (space and time) of any possible human receptivity to affection 
by independently existing things. This marks out a horizon within which, for Kant, it 
is possible to find out, and to think about, what merely happens to be the case and 
                                                
635 Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 192. 
636 In fact, Kant allows that, empirically speaking, we cannot really establish the presence of immoral-
ity at all (see A551 n/B579 n.). See also Jacob Rogozinski, ‘It Makes Us Wrong: Kant and Radical 
Evil,’ in Radical Evil, ed. Joan Copjec (London: Verso, 1996), 35. 
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what is necessarily the case. On the other hand, there is that which is always-already 
of practical interest to the human being. This marks a horizon for thinking about 
norms, about what ought to be the case, about what ought to be done or left undone. 
In the juxtaposition of ‘theory’ and ‘practice,’ theory is not merely a matter of 
what is ‘intellectual,’ but of what is normative—for both cognition and practice. But 
to the extent that it is normed, there is a sense in which thought may be regarded as a 
mode of practice.638  The normative may be regarded as theoretical in the sense that 
it inflects a kind of judgment. The judgment that ‘x ought to be the case’ is, after all, 
a knowledge claim proposing that, as a matter of fact, something (x) has a particular 
value. 
‘Normative,’ here, refers to something that is related to the thinking, hoping, 
planning, and so forth of a particular kind of agent. The putting-into-practice of what 
has been judged normative does not, in this case, lie within our physical capacities. 
Nevertheless, we do empirically follow the law in a virtual format. ‘Ought,’ here, 
implies not ‘can achieve,’ but rather ‘can intend,’ or ‘can will.’  The same is true of 
the moral law. This is why the good will and not the good deed is the primary object 
of moral assessment. The moral law does not command, primarily, that one do this or 
that, but rather that one will a particular class of deeds, in a particular manner. In re-
spect of the law of unhappiness, human beings must will that which none but ‘God’ 
can do; they must have this same leaning, but without being able to actualize it, a 
‘leaning’ that is embodied in a certain mode of judging and feeling. 
Hill remarks that ‘Kant did not focus much on issues of moral praise and 
blame.’639  This is a surprising contention, given what we have seen so far. But if 
Hill misses the point, this is in part because the point is an eschatological one. Kant 
does not think that, in addition to the concept of worthiness to be happy, we are 
equipped with the necessary insight for making supra-legal judgments that would 
ground specifically moral (and not merely legal) praise and blame. He only thinks 
that our possession of the concept of worthiness to be happy—and its interchangea-
bility with a particular concept of ‘morality’—shows that there is nothing incoherent 
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about claiming that, given such insight, or given an agent that had it, the class of 
such judgments is possible. 
God as subject of the law of unhappiness 
With respect to the second context in which the law of unhappiness is enacted, my 
task is to make explicit a point of view that is generally implicit in Kant’s thinking. 
In this sub-section I argue that this second context is the eschatological scenario in 
which God is called upon to omit the mercy to which he is universally inclined (as 
benevolent) and to act in strict accordance with the categorically imperative law of 
unhappiness. I argue that the virtual and deferred practice by which human beings 
conform to the demand of this law, the end that is impotently willed by them and de-
ferred to another more powerful being—a deferral that leaves, as its sign, the pro-
spective disapprobation of the prospective happiness of immoral, but happy agents—
can only be put into full effect by a special kind of rational agent. Kant refers to this 
agent as ‘God.’ 
The term ‘God’ is not univocal in Kant’s thinking and there are several uses to 
which he puts it. From among these, however, I focus on contexts in which ‘God’ 
refers to a being that, though unlike any of the human community’s members in 
some key respects (i.e., vis-à-vis cognition and morality in its forward-looking 
sense), is nevertheless regarded, from the point of view of the law of unhappiness, as 
a member of that community and the ultimate guarantor of that community’s interest 
in this regard. 
As we saw above, when it comes to the law of unhappiness, human beings are 
its subjects, putting it into effect in a format that constitutes it as both virtual and de-
ferred, as an impotent will, expressed in an affective attitude of approbation, which 
also surrenders the task itself to another. We are commanded by the law of unhappi-
ness to disapprove (prospectively) of the happiness of immoral agents, forbidden 
therefore to approve of (wish or hope for) the latter, and permitted (but not com-
manded) to approve of the happiness of moral ones. ‘God,’ on the other hand, is 
Kant’s name for the unique agent who—assuming there is such a being—is bound to 
actualize the state of affairs that we endorse from within the structure of our capacity 
for ‘pure feeling.’ 
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Reverse engineering Kant’s ‘God’ 
In his philosophy of religion lectures of the mid 1780s, Kant says that ‘[m]orality 
alone…gives me a determinate concept of God.’640  Later, in the second Critique, 
Kant will argue that the concerns of morality are the source of the postulate of God’s 
existence.641  In the lectures, however, Kant emphasises morality’s role as the ground 
of specific claims concerning God’s nature, rather than the latter’s existence.642  And 
there is no need to argue with Kant about whether morality really does give you or 
me or anyone else ‘a determinate concept of God.’  It is sufficient simply to allow 
that Kant’s ‘determinate concept of God’ is implicit in Kant’s understanding of mo-
rality—which is what he claims. But recall that Kant regularly glosses ‘morality’ as 
‘worthiness to be happy.’  Is Kant’s ‘determinate’ concept of God grounded, then, in 
‘morality,’ precisely in its secondary, backward-looking sense, as encapsulated in the 
notion of worthiness to be happy as well?  If so, it should be possible to work back-
wards, reverse engineering Kant’s description of this agent, to get at his thinking 
about ‘morality’ in this connection, particularly in relation to its action-guiding sig-
nificance. 
The priority of Kant’s ‘morality’ over his ‘determinate concept of God’ is, at the 
same time, the dominion of pure practical reason over this concept’s formation. This 
is so whether ‘the practical’ is specified, further, in terms of the absolutely universal 
requirement of duty, or the inexorable demand that immoral agents be allowed no 
access to happiness. Kant describes a ‘faith in God’ that is ‘as certain as a mathemat-
ical demonstration.’  The ‘foundation’ of this faith ‘is morals, the whole system of 
duties, which is cognized a priori with apodictic certainty through pure reason.’643  
The great teacher, here, is reason. And what the latter ‘has taught us about God is 
faultless and free from error.’644  This priority entails that ‘the mark of [any revela-
tion’s] divinity (at least as the conditio sine qua non) is its harmony with what reason 
pronounces worthy of God.’645 
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641 See, for example, KpV 5: 125 (104). 
642 The experience of the demand of the moral law, along with the affective consequences that accrue 
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Indeed, in the Religion, Kant ‘ask[s] whether morality must be interpreted in ac-
cordance with the Bible, or the Bible, on the contrary, in accordance with morali-
ty.’646  Morality and so pure practical reason takes priority here again. Witness this 
strange parthenogenesis:647 ‘the teaching of the Bible’ is ‘a father which our reason 
can develop out of itself.’648  In a related vein, Kant’s ‘pure moral religion’ is ‘the 
euthanasia of Judaism,’ religion ‘freed from all the ancient statutory teachings, some 
of which were bound to be retained in Christianity (as a messianic faith).’649  To say 
that the foundation of this faith is ‘morals,’ in Kant’s ultimate sense, means that the 
associated sense of ‘religion’ cannot entail a faith that is, to be precise, ‘faith that we 
can obtain God’s favor or pardon by anything other than a pure moral attitude of 
will.’650  Indeed , in this sense of the terms ‘moral’ and ‘religion,’ ‘the only thing that 
matters in religion is deeds.’651 
Omniscience, omnipotence, and eternity: God’s non-moral attributes from the 
point of view of morality 
What morality ‘gives’ us, here, in addition to the postulate that God exists, is the no-
tion of a being who is entirely like us, qua rational being,652 denuded of the proper-
ties that are specific to our earthliness (‘the human being according to his species [is] 
an earthly being endowed with reason’653), but enhanced by way of the addition of 
omniscience, omnipotent, and eternity. Firstly, God is all-knowing. This accords 
with morality’s demand that someone ‘be acquainted…with the most secret stirrings 
of my heart.’  Kant thinks that morality presupposes, at least, the possibility of a 
point of view on the human being whose subject, if there were such a thing, would be 
competent to judge ‘according to the principles of morality, whether I am worthy of 
happiness.’  Secondly, God is all-powerful. Although morality does not put happi-
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ness forward as an incentive, I cannot coherently make worthiness to be happy (or 
my being a decisively moral agent, under precisely this description) an end, thinks 
Kant, unless I take it to be the case that an agent exists who, just in case I turn out to 
be worthy of it, ‘must also make me actually participate in happiness.’  Therefore 
morality postulates a being who, when it comes to ‘matters of morality,’ judges just 
as I do (to the extent that I judge impartially, as I ought to do), but who has ‘the 
whole of nature under his power.’654  Thirdly, morality proposes that God is eternal. 
To the extent that the latter is regarded as a being that will ultimately ‘arrange and 
direct the consequences of the different states of my existence,’ God must be regard-
ed, too, as unconstrained by the condition of time.655 
God’s ‘moral perfections’ 
God’s non-moral attributes answer to the requirement that the systematic correlation 
of happiness with morality be thinkable as a physical possibility. But the ‘objective 
reality [of] moral duties,’ where the latter’s fulfillment is regarded as a ground of the 
moral agent’s worthiness to be happy, also presupposes God’s unlimited ‘moral per-
fections’: holiness, benevolence, and justice. God’s moral perfections are the ele-
ments of Kant’s determinate concept of God that most clearly have their ‘source’ in 
morality. But this is predominantly a matter of morality in its secondary, backward-
looking sense. Kant gives a careful account of the relation between these attributes, 
which is a consequence of the priority of ‘morality,’ regarded as worthiness to be 
happy, over ‘ecclesiastical’ religion. Holiness is primary, benevolence secondary. 
Justice is a property of the relation of these other attributes to one another. Holiness 
is an attribute of ‘the laws,’ or the ‘supreme principle of legislation.’  The latter’s 
demand is unconditional: ‘strictly good conduct or the highest virtue.’  Benevolence, 
on the other hand, ‘is a special idea whose object is happiness,’656 or ‘an immediate 
well-pleasedness with the welfare of others.’657  Its object is not an unconditional 
one, however. Rather, ‘a restrictive condition always precedes God’s benevolence,’ 
namely, that ‘human beings are to become worthy of the happiness flowing to them.’  
Kant says that, like God’s other attributes, ‘in and for itself benevolence is without 
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limit.’658  However, we read a little later, ‘the application of [God’s] benevolence is 
limited in concreto through the constitution of the subject in which it is to be 
shown.’659  Kant does not explain how it is that this aspect of his ‘determinate con-
cept of God’ is put forward by ‘morality.’  Benevolence is only necessary in order to 
explain the happiness of the moral agent on the counterfactual assumption that it is 
actualized. But this actualization is not in itself necessary. God is not constrained, at 
least not immediately, to make the moral agent happy. As Kant defines it in another 
context, worthiness is a property of the human agent that ‘must in God’s decision be 
the condition of his benevolence.’660  But Kant adds that ‘under divine rule even the 
best of human beings cannot found his wish to fare well on divine justice but must 
found it on God’s beneficence, for one who only does what he owes [seine Schuldig-
keit] can have no rightful claim on God’s benevolence.’661 
If God is not regarded as benevolent, then the human being has no grounds for 
hoping that she will be made happy, even on condition that she is moral. If God is 
not regarded as benevolent, but as merely just and holy, then the only being capable 
of making human beings happy would have no interest in doing so, no reason for act-
ing to this end. Morality in its primary, forward-looking sense does not ‘give’ us this 
notion of God at all. Morality in that sense gives us the idea that God is holy—the 
idea of a being for whom the categorical imperative is no imperative, but rather a law 
of this being’s very nature.662  Holiness demands ‘strictly good conduct or the high-
est virtue,’ but it does so without promising anything in return. Holiness has no direct 
reference to happiness at all. And the Kantian notion of divine justice is directly con-
nected with morality only to the extent that the latter is regarded as a condition with-
out which action aiming at the happiness of the human being is forbidden. The fact 
that this leaves action aiming at the happiness of moral agents merely permissible 
demands the addition of kindness to the roster of divine attributes. As one commen-
tator puts it, ‘[f]or actions…which are morally acceptable but neither prescribed nor 
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forbidden, we need other (nonmoral) reasons for action.’663  This holds true here, for 
Kant, of God as well. 
Our reverse engineering of Kant’s notion of God shows that his concept of be-
nevolence is not an element of the ‘determinate concept of God’ that Kant’s ‘morali-
ty’ offers us. It would only have been present there if worthiness to be happy were 
intrinsic moral desert of happiness. However, as we have seen, it is not. God’s kind-
ness would have to be regarded either as ex pacto, or as something that exceeds mo-
rality. Either way, to affirm the presence and expression of this divine attribute is to 
go beyond what Kant’s ‘morality,’ or pure practical reason, offers us. 
There is an instructive tension here. On the one hand, Kant seems to want to say 
that the limit that is applied to God’s benevolence is in no way ascribable to God. 
This limitation ‘in concreto’ arrives ‘through the constitution of the subject in which 
it is to be shown.’  Neither this constitution, nor this limitation is ‘in’ God, up to 
God, God’s work, or from God. The only possible obstacle to God’s benevolence is 
set up by the very beings who hope to be happy through God’s omnipotent arrange-
ment and direction of ‘the consequences of the different states of [their] existence.’  
This occlusion is their work; they are its authors; it is imputable to them without re-
mainder.664  As Kant puts it in another context, God’s kindness is ‘in itself infinite 
[an sich unendlich].’  God’s goodness is limited only by the human agent’s own 
‘unworthiness [Unwürdigkeit],’ which is ascribable to her. In the medium of God’s 
holiness, the transgressor limits God’s benevolence absolutely, which limiting-
relation is justice.665  But then, on the other hand, Kant wants (and needs) to show 
that there is something in God that necessitates this limitation of what is supposed to 
be unlimited, otherwise, to the extent that it is a property that inheres in God: thus, he 
says, it is an expression of justice, God’s third moral perfection. Justice is the ‘limita-
tion of benevolence by holiness in apportioning happiness.’  In short, justice demands 
that benevolence ‘express itself in the apportionment of happiness according to the 
proportion of worthiness in the subject.’666  It is a matter of kindness, not justice, that 
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happiness be distributed at all, but it is a matter of justice that it be distributed in this 
particular way: that is, ‘only according to the subject’s worthiness.’667  Since Kant is 
a rigorist about morality, this reference to ‘proportion’ is de trop. Finite rational 
agents (or their wills) are either wholly good or they are wholly evil. Human beings, 
in particular, are evil, even if, as Kant will argue in the Religion, an original, inef-
faceable disposition to good remains in them.668  The will is innocent or corrupt, 
even if the arbitrary freedom of Willkür holds open the possibility of change; agents 
are therefore destined to be either happy or unhappy rather than to enjoy some meas-
ure of each. 
God’s attributes and the idea that the unhappiness of immoral agents is good 
in itself 
Kant’s discussion of ‘counterpurposiveness’ in his ‘Theodicy’ essay of 1791 further 
elucidates his commitment to a concept of God that is in thrall, as it were, to the an-
tecedent thesis that the a priori combination of the notions of immorality and unhap-
piness is utterly inexorable. 
After defining ‘theodicy’ as ‘the defense of the highest wisdom of the creator 
against the charge which reason brings against it for whatever is counterpurposive 
[das Zweckwidrige] in the world,’669 Kant describes three kinds of counterpurposive-
ness. First, there is ‘absolute’ or ‘moral’ counterpurposiveness, which is ‘evil [Böse]’ 
or ‘sin.’  Second, there is ‘conditional’ or ‘physical’ counterpurposiveness, which is 
‘ill [Übel]’ or ‘pain.’  Significantly, however, Kant insists that ‘the proportion of ill 
to moral evil, if the latter is once there’ is not a matter of counterpurposiveness, but, 
to the contrary, an instance of ‘purposiveness [Zweckmäßigkeit].’  As such ‘the con-
junction of ills and pains, as penalties, with evil, as crime’ neither ‘can nor should be 
prevented.’  And this implies, finally, that ‘the disproportion between crimes and 
penalties in the world’—but not, let us note, between virtue and reward—is a third 
kind of counterpurposiveness.670 
Kant now relates these three modes of counterpurposiveness to the three divine 
attributes to which they ‘stand out as objections.’  These are God’s holiness, good-
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ness, and justice, respectively. Kant’s understanding of divine justice, here, is partic-
ularly significant. Although he denies that there can be a ‘philosophical’ (i.e., theo-
retical or speculative) resolution of these matters, he affirms that, from the point of 
view of practical reason’s pure interest in morality, ‘the disproportion between the 
impunity of the depraved and their crimes’ is indicative of a ‘bad state…in the 
world.’  This means that, for Kant, the objection to the claim that God is just has a 
special status. Remarkably, it also means that, for Kant, this problem does not bear at 
all on the problem of the suffering of moral agents.671 
Now, Kant thinks that these three attributes (holiness, goodness, and justice) are 
basic and irreducible; he also thinks that their ‘rank’ reflects what is always already 
established in the human being’s ‘own pure (hence practical) reason.’  This ranking 
implies that the ‘dignity’ of moral legislation and the ‘firm concept of duties’ pre-
cludes any compromise on the condition that the human being must meet if God is to 
regard her happiness as a good. Echoing the second Critique, Kant says that ‘the hu-
man being wishes to be happy first,’ but understands and accepts (‘though reluctant-
ly’) ‘that the worthiness to be happy, i.e., the conformity of the employment of his 
freedom with the holy law, must in God’s decision be the condition of his benevo-
lence.’  Why?  Because ‘the wish that has the subjective end (self-love) for founda-
tion cannot determine the objective end (of wisdom) prescribed by the law that 
unconditionally gives the will its rule.’672 
This opposition of subjective and objective ends, however, applies to the human 
being, not God. In God’s case, for Kant, the subjective end is a matter of his kindness 
or goodness vis-à-vis his creatures and the objective end is a matter of what is pre-
scribed, not by the moral law—which for God is no imperative at all—but by the law 
of unhappiness. Thus there is this other objective end: the resolution of ‘the dispro-
portion between the impunity of the depraved and their crimes’ and repair of this 
‘bad state…in the world.’  This end is the unhappiness of evildoers, which is regard-
ed as absolutely good in itself and an inexorable demand that is placed on God as a 
being that is not entirely inclined to execute it—to the extent that this rubs God’s be-
nevolence the wrong way. 
                                                
671 ÜdM 8: 257 (25-6). 
672ÜdM 8: 257 n. (26 n.).  
 
 218 
As we saw in chapter 3, Kant tends predominantly towards the view that God 
owes ‘no justitiam remunerativam toward us,’ that ‘all the rewards he shows us must 
be ascribed to his benevolence,’ and that God’s ‘justice is concerned…with punish-
ments.’673  It is good that moral agents be happy. And it is good that immoral ones be 
unhappy. In these two affirmations, however, ‘good’ is not univocal. In the first case 
‘good’ has reference to a state of affairs of which a rational and kind being would 
approve. In the second, ‘good’ has reference to a state of affairs of which all rational 
beings, just as such, would approve, however much it might pain them to see it—
whether because of their inclination to ‘self-love’ or their other-directed kindness. 
As we saw in chapter 2, an impartial and merely rational observer, one that 
lacked the attribute of kindness, would not be disposed even to notice the unhappi-
ness of moral agents, let alone to do anything about it. In the first Critique, Kant 
makes it clear that the ‘wish’ for happiness is an inclination of the being that harbors 
it, whether the happiness wished for is one’s own or another’s (the happiness, say, of 
a loved one). For Kant’s God, too, kindness is a mode of inclination. Reason ap-
proves or disapproves of happiness (and unhappiness), but this is not a matter of in-
clination for Kant, as we have seen.674  So, too, with respect to the ‘hope to partake 
of [happiness].’  If, ‘[i]n order to complete [happiness], he who has not conducted 
himself so as to be unworthy of happiness must be able to hope to partake of it,’675 
this hope cannot be grounded, entirely, in considerations about what God will do qua 
rational being, but must add to God’s strictly rational interests a benevolent interest 
in the happiness of his creatures.676 
The impartial, rational, and kind observer’s disapprobation of the unhappiness of 
moral agents, and so too a positive demand for their happiness, can only be traced 
back as far, then, as the inclination to see them happy. What, however, of such a be-
ing’s disapproval of the happiness of immoral agents and the positive demand that 
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they be unhappy?  Is this grounded in nothing more profound than an inclination to 
see them suffer, given that they have failed to measure up morally?  Is it a mere habit 
that mistakes for something necessitated the regular contiguity of the judgment that 
an agent is immoral and the disapprobation of her (actual or prospective) happiness?  
In Kant’s view the answer to these questions is clearly negative. Kant does not both-
er to justify the implicit claim that, along with respect for the moral law, the ‘humili-
ating’ abasement of self-conceit before it, and moral self-contempt in the wake of 
disobedience of it, disapprobation of the happiness of immoral agents and the de-
mand that they be unhappy are a feeling and a demand that are grounded in pure 
practical reason. 
God’s ‘virtue’ 
Far from being a law of God’s very nature (as Kant takes the primary, forward-
looking moral law to be), the law of unhappiness is an imperative that puts ‘pressure’ 
on that nature. This is so to the extent that Kant’s God is a kind being whose kind-
ness is limited by and so subordinated to his justice. With respect to the end that this 
commands, however, I construe Kant’s God not as ‘holy’ (which, in a special sense, 
Kant takes him to be vis-à-vis the primary moral law) but ‘virtuous.’677  In order to 
‘obey’ the law here, as I make explicit, he must overcome his ineliminable desire to 
make and see his creatures happy. Relative to the happiness of immoral agents, 
God’s desire to show mercy has the form of a constant temptation to disobedience. 
God’s holiness consists in the fact that the moral law, for us an imperative, is for 
God an aspect of God’s nature. This just means, in effect, that God is not endowed 
with any attribute whose practical upshot resists that law. The secondary, backward-
looking ‘law of unhappiness,’ however, must be regarded as an imperative even for 
God, just given the fact that he is endowed with an attribute, kindness, whose practi-
cal upshot does resist it. Conversely, the law of unhappiness is an imperative for God 
because it puts ‘pressure’ on God’s kindness, commanding that his tendency towards 
limitless benevolence be suppressed. This is God’s duty and so, as Kant says in an-
                                                
677 Virtue, for human beings, is moral ‘strength’ (MdS 6: 392, 405, 477 [155, 164, 221]), or ‘self-
overcoming’ (Vorlesungen-Religionslehre 28: 1075 [409]; see also MdS 6: 383 [148]). The same ap-




other connection, an ‘objective constraint’ and ‘a moral imperative limiting our [here 
God’s] freedom [here God’s freedom to act benevolently].’678 
The distinction between the moral law, in its primary, forward-looking sense, 
and the ‘law of unhappiness,’ as a kind of secondary moral law, sets up a ‘third man’ 
problem. Kant’s account of finite rational agency and the distinction between the lat-
ter and the agency of a ‘holy’ being implies the following. For every class of being 
that is subject to laws of its ‘nature,’ on the one hand, but also subject, on the other 
hand, to imperatives whose expression is not necessitated by the latter laws at all, it 
is possible to conceive of a distinct class of being for whom these imperatives are 
laws of nature, but to whom the laws that govern the nature of the first class are not 
applicable at all. A problem emerges, however, when one goes on, as I suggest that 
Kant does, to posit a law that is distinct from both those laws that are, for you and 
me, laws of nature, and those laws that are, for us, on the one hand, imperatives 
while being, for a ‘holy’ subject, on the other hand, laws of such a being’s (‘super-
sensible’) nature. This is precisely what the ‘law of unhappiness’ consists in; and its 
postulation opens up the possibility of an infinite regress that render Kant’s moral 
notion of ‘holiness’ merely relative. 
God and human beings together under a single constitution 
The human community’s practice of expelling, from its midst, individual members 
belonging to it, by way of death, is a practice that, whether conceived under the ru-
bric of criminal punishment or not, forms and has always already formed a specifi-
cally human, practical horizon. Kant’s God falls within this horizon to the extent that 
he is subject to the law that Kant takes to command this. Like the earthly sovereign, 
judge, or executioner, Kant’s God is disbarred from coming to the defense of, or 
providing refuge for, the one that is ‘rightly’ accused by the members of this unani-
mous community. 
As I argued above, the ‘determinate concept of God’ that Kant’s morality offers 
up is the notion of a being who, as far as the rules for judging concerning what it is 
good to do or to omit to do go, is entirely like us, a rational being like any other. As 
Häyry aptly puts it, ‘the universality of practical reason [makes] God and all his ra-
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tional creatures equal in the domain of morality.’679  The difference between God and 
us does not pertain to these rules, but to God’s way of knowing, his power over na-
ture, his freedom from the limitations of time and space, his absolute conformity to 
the moral law, and his unlimited resolve in the face of the temptation to be kind or 
merciful. 
Steven Smith’s ‘discover[y] [of] the true basis of the idea of virtue as “worthi-
ness to be happy”’ affirms, first, that ‘worthiness implies desert’ (but of course Smith 
means primarily the moral agent’s desert of happiness) and, second, that ‘desert im-
plies either a previous stipulation—a contract in the mechanical sense—or a solicited 
concurrence of free will’ with respect to the actualization of whatever it is that is de-
served. He goes on to argue that ‘[t]he moral contract offered by the universalizing 
will is to be taken up and fulfilled by other members of the moral community’ and 
avers that ‘it remains problematic whether God, the author and controller of nature as 
well as the giver of the moral law, is a member of that community.’680  On my read-
ing, however, given Kant’s revelation that his ‘determinate concept of God,’ at least, 
derives from his understanding of ‘morality,’ there is no good reason to doubt that 
God—Kant’s ‘God’ to be precise—is regarded, at least, as a member of the commu-
nity that is constituted by the law of unhappiness. 
With respect to ‘the ushering in of the highest good,’ Kant says in the Religion 
that God’s role is simply to make up for what is lacking by way of ‘human capacity’ 
(Menschenvermögen) when it comes to the causal connection that is supposed to 
hold between ‘the strictest observance of the moral laws,’ on the one hand, and this 
ultimate end, on the other. ‘[A]n omnipotent moral being must be assumed as ruler 
of the world, under whose care this would come about.’681 God is not a transcendent 
other, here, but a powerful ally in a matter of shared interest. But God’s and moral 
agents’ shared interest in the latter’s happiness runs in parallel with their and all ra-
tional agents’ shared interest in the conjunction of immorality and unhappiness. Kant 
refers to ‘[t]he verdict of conscience upon the human being,’ which ‘acquit[s] or 
condemn[s] him with rightful force.’682  This ‘rightful force’ is a kind of impetus of 
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the condemnation that extends, virtually, into the consequence that is attached to it: 
punishment, unhappiness. ‘[T]he proceedings are concluded,’ Kant writes, and ‘the 
internal judge, as a person having power, pronounces the sentence of happiness or 
misery, as the moral results of the deed.’  And, he continues,  ‘[o]ur reason cannot 
pursue further his power (as ruler of the world) in this function; we can only revere 
his unconditional iubeo or veto [“I command” or “I forbid”].’683 
In connection with this shared interest Michalson writes, ‘[t]he issue is not one 
of morality, but of proportionality.’684  He takes there to be a contradiction here. But 
this is to miss the point, to evince a typical problem. It is true that 
on the grounds of Kant’s own moral theory, to be worthy of happiness (i.e., to be virtuous) 
and yet to be without it probably does not confront us with a genuinely moral issue. The spec-
tre of an unhappy person of great virtue may be distressing and deeply poignant, but it hardly 
threatens the moral status of the person in question.685 
It is also true that ‘[p]ostulating God’s existence hinges on the idea of happiness; yet 
happiness…satisfies a rational yet non-moral need.’686  Michalson does not notice 
that the conjunction of immorality and happiness, however, does pose a problem that 
Kant clearly regards as a moral one: a problem that finds expression in a judgment of 
‘counterpurposiveness’ and an attitude of disapprobation that are grounded a priori, 
for Kant, in reason. 
God and human beings are not merely bound by the same law in terms of what is 
to be done about happiness, given that human beings are immoral. Kant also identi-
fies the Good with the moral in both senses—as an interest in doing what is good and 
right and an interest in seeing happiness distributed in a good manner. Because of 
this unqualified sameness of the rules in accordance with which both we and God 
judge concerning that, it is possible to read Kant’s ‘Fragment of a Moral Catechism’ 
as a query whose interlocutors are the human being and God himself. 
The catechist, drawing his student forward into an awareness of what he always 
already knows, asks for more than a clear answer in the matter of what one ought to 
do, what duty consists in. He asks his student to imagine a counterfactual scenario—
really, an eschatological one. ‘[I]f it were up to you to dispose of all happiness (pos-
sible in the world),’ he asks, ‘would you keep it all for yourself or would you share it 
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with your fellow human beings?’687  The pupil responds as Kant’s benevolent God 
would do: ‘I would share it with others and make them happy and satisfied too.’  In 
response, the teacher observes ‘that [this] proves that you have a good enough heart.’  
He then proposes to test the student, to ‘see whether you have a good head to go 
along with it.’688 
This contrast of ‘heart’ and ‘head’ signals a transition, of course, from kindness 
to reason—which is to say, to the determination and doing of duty (or, for God, 
simply holiness), on the one hand, and the determination and doing of justice, on the 
other. The teacher then describes a series of types, ‘a lazy fellow,’ ‘a drunkard,’ ‘a 
swindler,’ and ‘a violent man’ and—here trafficking, apparently, in a notion of hap-
piness that reduces the latter to nothing more than the pleasure of the moment689—
asks the student whether he would ‘really’ hand over the various things that these 
types of people most want (as a means to happiness, each ‘in his own way’): ‘soft 
cushions,’ ‘wine and whatever else [one] needs to get drunk,’ ‘a charming air and 
manner to dupe other people,’ and ‘audacity and strong fists.’690 
In a sense, the catechist makes it too easy for the pupil to answer as he does: 
‘No, I would not.’691  It is as though he is being asked, simply, to agree that he would 
refrain from aiding and abetting immoral agents in their immorality. Happiness is 
identical, here, with persistence in immorality and, indeed, a deepening of it. Kant’s 
point, however, is rather broader. So too is the teacher’s point when he observes, 
building on the student’s answer, that ‘you…would not give [happiness] without 
consideration to anyone who put out his hand for it; instead you would first try to 
find out to what extent each was worthy of happiness.’  Kant distracts from the gen-
erality of this ‘each’ by describing situations in which obviously deleterious conse-
quences accrue to providing the means to (idiosyncratically determined) happiness, 
where there are good reasons, distinct from their unworthiness to be happy, for not 
                                                
687 MdS 6: 480 (223-4). Other instances in which Kant refers to happiness’ principled disposition, dis-
tribution, granting, or apportionment (Kant’s vocabulary is similarly varied) appear, for example, in 
KrV A806/B834; Gr 4: 450 (55); ÜdG 8: 278 n. (281 n.); Orientierung 8: 139 (12); Vorarbeiten-MdS 
23: 404, 413; R 7049 (19: 235 [457-8]); R 6975 (19: 218 [454]; R 4277 (17: 493 [125]). 
688 MdS 6: 480 (224). 
689 Note that I adverted to this peculiar text in chapter 2 in my discussion of Kant’s thinking about 
happiness. Kant’s main point here, however, is not to give his thoughts about what happiness consists 
in, but to show that the distribution of happiness ought to be grounded in the morality of its benefi-
ciaries. 
690 MdS 6: 480-81 (224). 
691 MdS 6: 481 (224). 
 
 224 
providing access to happiness ‘without consideration to anyone who put out his hand 
for it.’ 
The generality of the matter comes to the fore, however, in the very next ques-
tion, when the teacher asks: ‘But doesn’t it occur to you to ask, again, whether you 
yourself are worthy of happiness?’ and the pupil answers, ‘[o]f course.’692  Naturally, 
posed as a question to God, this would make no sense. As Kant says a page later, ‘a 
human being’s observance of his duty is the universal and sole condition of his wor-
thiness to be happy, and his worthiness to be happy is identical with his observance 
of duty.’693  This does not apply to God. Nevertheless, the basic structure of the hu-
man being as a being that is called upon to do her duty, mirrors the elements of 
Kant’s ‘determinate concept of God.’  The teacher declares that 
the force in you that strives only toward happiness is inclination; but that which limits your 
inclinations to the condition of your first being worthy of happiness is your reason; and your 
capacity to restrain and overcome your inclinations by your reason is the freedom of your 
will. 
In God, of course, in relation to duty, ‘freedom’ is just holiness—and so, in a sense, 
not freedom at all (rather the divine nature). The ‘capacity to restrain and overcome 
your inclinations by your reason’ is, precisely, the capacity of the agent to do her du-
ty—and to do her duty for reasons that are entirely independent of any inclinations 
she might have to do so (i.e., so that she can do so even if such inclinations are lack-
ing, or others militate against it). In God, ‘the force…that strives only toward happi-
ness’ strives towards the happiness of God’s creatures. God is inclined, without 
internal limitation, to make them happy. God is, in short, benevolent. But note that 
reason makes two appearances here: first, in connection with ‘freedom of the will’ 
and the ability to do one’s duty independently of inclination, not identical with that 
capacity, but a feature of it; second, simply as ‘that which limits your inclinations to 
the condition of your first being worthy of happiness.’  This is rule-making reason as 
the source of the idea of justice and of the demand that justice be done. It is not na-
ture, even in God, but freedom. It meets resistance in the form of the human inclina-
tion that strives after happiness for oneself. And it meets resistance in the form of the 
divine inclination that seeks the happiness of creatures. Reason in this sense, ‘a rea-
son,’ as Kant says at one point, that both judges and ‘distributes happiness universal-
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ly,’694 ‘the morally disposed reason [that] cannot conceive of happiness without good 
conduct,’695 is predicated univocally of both God and human beings. 
In this respect, God is called to follow the same rules as human beings. That 
which God (setting aside the warrant for taking God to exist) would both judge to be 
good to do and put into effect, is equivalent to that which human beings qua rational 
also judge to be objectively good and would put into effect if only they had sufficient 
insight and power. As Kant’s catechetical pupil puts it, at the close of the fragmen-
tary ‘moral catechism,’ ‘with regard to the moral order, which is the highest adorn-
ment of the world, we have reason to expect a…wise regime, such that if we do not 
make ourselves unworthy of happiness, by violating our duty, we can also hope to 
share in happiness.’696 And if we do violate our duty?  Then, of course, we have rea-
son for dread. 
In his first Critique Kant uncovers the limitations under which reason operates, 
at least in human beings, in order to show that there can be no warrant for metaphys-
ical (i.e., cosmological, psychological, or theological) dogmatism. By showing these 
limits, however, Kant also sets forth the regulative ideal of a perspective from which 
all of our claims about the way things ‘really’ are might yet be subject to a mode of 
judgment that is not constrained by the conditions of possibility of our specifically 
human kind of knowledge. 
Kant’s critique of pure reason’s theoretical pretensions shows that claims per-
taining to specifically human experience or cognition are subject to a kind of ‘last 
judgment’ whose specific content no finite agent could ever determine, but whose 
possibility such agents can nevertheless take into account. Kant shows that our 
knowledge claims do not have the status of ultimate judgments and that they lack this 
status, not as a matter of happenstance (as though they could be grounded in some 
unconditioned insight, but happen not to be), but inevitably, because of the way in 
which they are constituted. The human word, in short, where this is a ‘theoretical’ 
one, is never the ‘last’ word—irrespective of whether any such word is forthcoming 
from some non-empirical ‘elsewhere’ or not. 
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If this is ‘Kantian humility,’ to borrow Rae Langton’s apt epithet,697 one finds 
something very different when one turns from Kant’s treatment of the theoretical 
pretensions of pure reason to his thinking about the interests that reason has in its 
character as practice-guiding. One is confronted with something else when one turns 
to interests that are associated with pure reason in its character as both practice-
guiding and action-motivating. Here, too, judgment is at issue. This is not assertoric, 
but rather normative judgment; not judgment concerning what exists and what exist-
ing things are like, but rather judgment concerning what ought to be case even if, in 
fact, nothing is as it should be. 
Of course, Kant does not take all normative judgments to have the same status. 
Judgments concerning what ought to be done, given an agent’s interest in this or that 
end, are normative, certainly, but these rest on fallible judgments concerning the 
means that would actually be effective relative to particular ends. It is possible to be 
mistaken, here, since the truth of such judgments depends upon what happens empir-
ically to be the case. By contrast, judgments about what human beings ought or 
ought not to do, unconditionally, do not depend for their truth upon anything that 
merely happens to be the case. Such judgments are not shadowed by the ideal of a 
‘last judgment,’ as metaphysical, or even empirical knowledge claims are. To the 
contrary, Kant thinks that we are equipped to make such judgments, a priori. He 
thinks that, like other judgments of this kind, our judgments about what human be-
ings ought, or ought not, to do can be ‘apodictically’ certain. 
If we lack access to that non-discursive mode of understanding that Kant con-
trasts with our own, that ‘divine’ intellectual intuition in comparison with which our 
own knowing (combining elements both intellectual and sensible) is infinitely more 
humble, there is nevertheless no such distinction when it comes to the judgments of 
pure practical reason. God and human beings judge in accordance with the same 
rules. 
The mercy-free community 
In the foregoing, I argued that the law of unhappiness is constitutive for a community 
of which we, together with God, are members in common. I will now argue that the 
                                                




upshot of this community’s constitution is that, like the merely human polis, this 
larger community is a mercy-free zone—here, however, with a view to the broad 
scope of immorality (regarded, in a manner of speaking, as crime against morality), 
as such, rather than the narrow scope, merely, of external crimes against ‘public 
law.’  I characterize this coinciding of the two contexts (in which the law of unhap-
piness is put into practice) in terms of a puncturing of the ethical, by which it is sus-
ceptible to incursions of an antecedently, politically constituted notion of the Good, 
or a conflation of good and right.698  More precisely, I argue, this is so to the extent 
that Kant regards murder, uniquely, as a political manifestation of the ‘inner wicked-
ness’ of immoral agents and converts the (political) necessity of systems of criminal 
sanctions, in general, into the objective badness of mercy. This means that, for Kant, 
the enactment and the approbation of particular instances of capital punishment are 
practices (one actual and the other ‘virtual’) that conform, not merely to the law of 
punishment, but to the law of unhappiness as well. Capital punishment (conceived as 
retribution), as I argued in chapter 3, has a uniquely political and eschatological 
character for Kant. I argue, here, that long before he ever gets to the point of the the-
oretical moves with which this thesis is concerned, he is already committed to this 
long extant, really archaic practice—and to the ‘virtual’ practice that consists in the 
desire and the will (albeit a generally, but not universally, impotent one) that mur-
derers be removed from the world. 
Two key notions and two distinctive Kantian claims bear directly on the matter 
at hand, expressing universally applicable claims about punishment and giving espe-
cially clear expression to the thinking that is implicit in Kant’s gloss. The first of the-
se is Kant’s key assertion, which we discussed in the last chapter, that ‘[t]he law of 
punishment is a categorical imperative.’  The second is a view that the latter encap-
sulates, implicitly, and which Kant expresses with particular clarity in his lectures on 
the philosophy of religion, when he declares that ‘a judge who pardons is not to be 
thought of.’699 
                                                
698 For a classic argument detailing the deleterious consequences of these notions’ conflation see Ross, 
The Right and the Good. 
699 Vorlesungen-Religionslehre 28: 1086 (418). See Kant’s equivalent, but less dramatic declaration in 
Rel 6: 146 n. (171 n.). These pronouncements sum up the canonical point of view on mercy that we 
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In its context, Kant’s assertion concerning the ‘law of punishment’ refers to pun-
ishment in its political articulation as state-authorized harm. But Kant specifies ‘the 
categorical imperative of penal justice’ as the demand that ‘unlawful killing of an-
other must be punished by death,’700 which restricts this imperative’s scope, politi-
cally, but, at the same time, extends the law to the point where the practice that con-
conforms to its demand coincides with action that conforms, too, to Kant’s law of 
unhappiness. 
In its context, the second assertion refers a general elucidation of what it means 
to be a judge back to its immediate (contextual) subject: God. Kant’s law of punish-
ment and Kant’s law, as it were, of judging (Thou shalt not pardon!) apply across the 
board; the first within an ethical as much as a political frame of reference, the second 
within a political as much as an eschatological (and so, too, an ethical) one. I have 
avoided claiming that Kant’s thinking about the relationship between crime and pun-
ishment, in general, is modeled on his thinking about murder and capital punish-
ment, in particular. I do make such a claim, however, with respect to Kant’s 
representation of the normative ‘combination’ of immorality and unhappiness. The 
direction of the ‘modeling’ moves from the political to the eschatological. Moreover, 
the theoretical dimension is subordinated to its antecedently (indeed archaically) 
practical one: Kant’s understanding of the relationship between unhappiness and 
immorality is informed by his antecedent attitude towards the practice of capital pun-
ishment—an attitude of approbation whose object is not this or that (maybe hideous) 
instance of the thing, but the practice as such. This attitude, or the commitment that it 
expresses, is not thematized, in Kant, in retributivist terms from the outset. Rather, its 
being a retributivist commitment is, as I argued in chapter 3, a function of its stub-
born, philosophically unanalyzable immediacy. 
Mercy as immorality for God 
In this sub-section I argue that the main place where Kant’s commitment to capital 
punishment, on the one hand, and to the (prospective) approbation of the unhappi-
ness of immoral agents, on the other, is evident, is in his denigration of mercy, his 
                                                                                                                                     
cerning treatment of ‘the last murderer’ (6: 333 [106]), and the wise ruler’s refusal to ‘allow blood-
guilt to come upon [his] land’ (6: 490 [232]). 
700 MdS 6: 336-7 (109). 
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view that mercy is absolutely and unmitigatedly bad, an expression of kindness that 
remains eternally out of reach to both politics and ethics, forbidden to both the hu-
man judge and to God. Again, Kant is unable to articulate a notion of the Good such 
that while justice (or ‘right’) is good, mercy is good in some sense as well.  
Once again, I connect Kant’s strong bias against mercy and his habitual manner 
of representing the relationship between immorality and unworthiness to be happy 
with his retributivism. And I claim that, when it comes to ‘matters of morality,’ Kant 
is fundamentally opposed to any other idea of God and of God’s action in behalf of 
human beings. Thus he excludes, from the outset, the merciful God of scripture, God 
the Paraklete, God as shelter for ‘the one that did it’ in the face of the executioner 
and the mob who—in accordance with justice—would effect and approve of his or 
her death. For the same reason, I argue, when it comes to the question whether it is 
good for immoral agents to be happy, Kant is opposed to any answer that would tend 
to weaken our resolve for the mundane (deferred, impotent, ‘virtual’) forms of the 
practices that his God (God the merciless judge, God the executioner, God the mob) 
and earthly judges and executioners actually (in God’s case eschatologically) enact. 
‘Kant has loaded upon us the guilt of the past, which Kantian practical reason 
will not allow God to forgive.’701  In short, a merciful God is not to be thought of.702  
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and the Destiny of Humankind, Suny Series in Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 2005); Philip J. Rossi, ‘Reading Kant through Theological Spectacles,’ in Kant and the New 
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And this goes beyond the notion that God, being just, must punish sinners, occlude 
their happiness, make them unhappy. This means that the hope that breaks into the 
desperate experience of moral inadequacy, the hope that what one can never achieve 
on one’s own can be done for and to one—from sheer love—is a delusion. Divine 
‘indulgence’ or a ‘dispensation’ that regards an agent as ‘fully adequate to God’s 
will,’ when she clearly is not, ‘do[es] not harmonize with justice.’703  Forgiveness is 
out of the question for agents that have not themselves retrieved what was lost 
through their own fault. ‘The justice of [moral] judgment must be unexceptionable 
and unrelenting.’704  But this pertains directly, not merely to the question whether or 
not agents have done well, or failed, morally. It pertains to the consequences accru-
ing necessarily to their failures. When Kant teaches that ‘a judge who pardons is not 
the be thought of!’ he means, specifically, that the object of God’s judgment must be 
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allowed no more than ‘that measure of happiness which is proportionate to his wor-
thiness.’705 
The immediacy that is embodied in the claim that the law of punishment is a 
categorical imperative closes off the possibility of imagining mercy as a good. ‘[T]he 
concept of duty includes unconditional necessitation,’ Kant says in the Religion, ‘to 
which gracefulness stands in direct contradiction.’706  To punish is God’s duty, God’s 
grace notwithstanding.707  And this punishment is conceived of in retributivist terms 
as proportionate to the offense—which is total (immorality all the way down)—as a 
consequence that is addressed, wholly and simply, to none but the entirely discrete 
‘one that did it,’ and as a consequence that must be addressed to the latter. If the 
grace of mercy or forgiveness is possible, then this cannot be understood in any 
sense that compromises this retributivism. In general, commentators have not appre-
ciated this specific problem, but frame matters in terms of the general importance 
that Kant places on freedom.708 
It is not merely that Kant’s ‘determinate idea of God’ is offered up by his think-
ing about morality. His thinking about religion, faith, revelation, grace, original sin, 
his Christology, his soteriology—all of this may be reverse engineered in a manner 
that gets back to ‘morality’—but often in the sense with which I have been con-
cerned in this thesis. Detailing all of this would take us far beyond the scope of this 
project. For now, the main thing—in connection with the present task of establishing 
as far as possible that Kant’s law of unhappiness has action-guiding significance for 
the agent that he calls ‘God’ (which is what gives content to my claim that our law-
conforming practice is both virtual and an act of deferral)—is to show that mercy is 
occluded, not just in the sense that it is shown to be injustice, but in the sense that it 
cannot be regarded as good at all. 
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For Kant, nothing can be good that is not a product of freedom. Thus, as we saw 
before, ‘religion itself’ or ‘the faith in question cannot be faith that we can obtain 
God’s favor or pardon by anything other than a pure moral attitude of will.’709  Or 
again, ‘true religion is not to be placed in the knowledge or profession of what God 
does or has done for our salvation, but in what we must do to become worthy of 
it.’710  God is ‘the loving one,’ but, as Kant adds parenthetically, he is the one ‘whose 
love is that of moral approbation of human beings so far as they conform to his holy 
laws.’711  Kant decries ‘the lazy and timid cast of mind (in morality and religion), 
which has not the least trust in itself and waits for external help.’  This attitude, he 
writes, ‘unharnesses all the forces of a human being and renders him unworthy even 
of this help.’712  As for faith, Kant maintains that ‘the improvement of [one’s] life 
[is] the supreme condition under which alone a saving faith can occur.’713  In short, 
‘[i]t depends only on us whether we will become objects of [God’s] grace or of his 
punitive justice.’714  And Kant really means this in the most radically individualistic 
manner possible: ‘if the teaching of the church were directed straight to morality, the 
judgment of his conscience would be…that he must answer to a future judge for any 
evil he has done that he cannot repair, and that no ecclesiastical means, no faith or 
prayer extorted by dread, can avert this fate.’715  But instead, the (ecclesiastically) 
religious subject thinks of God on the model of the merciful human sovereign and 
God’s wisdom on the model of ‘the fallible wisdom of the human will’ so as to sepa-
rate out and bypass God’s justice ‘by appealing exclusively to his grace.’716 
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The rigorous, universal requirement that human beings prove themselves worthy 
of happiness by a self-transformation and an ultimate, irrevocable turn towards the 
moral law—the perfection of perfect virtue—is not susceptible to exceptions. The 
universality of the primary, forward-looking law’s demand, on the one hand, and the 
universality of the law of unhappiness, on the other, find expression in Kant’s decla-
ration that ‘God’s impartiality consists in the fact that God has no favorites.’  God, 
Kant argues, is not like a parent who has ‘a special love for a child which has not es-
pecially distinguished itself.’  To the contrary, says Kant, ‘it cannot be thought of 
God that he would choose some individual subject over others as his favorite with no 
regard to the subject’s worthiness.’717  But this is very telling for what it excludes: 
not to have favorites, to be impartial, is perfectly consistent with loving each one of 
one’s children without regard for the degree to which each or any of them has ‘dis-
tinguished’ himself or herself. Kant cannot say, however, that ‘it cannot be thought 
of God that he would choose some individual subject over others as his favorite’—
and leave it at that. The supplementary qualification with regard to ‘the subject’s 
worthiness’ is a necessary addendum. Or again: 
It is arduous to be a good servant (here one always hears only talk of duties); hence the human 
being would rather be a favorite, for much is then forgiven him, or, where duty has been too 
grossly offended against, everything is again made good through the intercession of some one 
else who is favored in the highest degree, while he still remains the undisciplined servant [der 
lose Knecht] he always was.718 
It is not a question of God’s favouring this or that ‘individual’ without making this 
favour turn on worthiness to be happy. The issue is not the condition that has to be 
met for God’s favour—it is rather the individuation that has to be presupposed if 
God’s disfavor expresses nothing in or about God, but is rather an effective ‘pres-
sure’ that comes to bear on God in view of the agent’s unworthiness to be happy, and 
if God’s occlusion of access to happiness is regarded as good in itself, independently 
of anything that either God or the subject derives from it. The unhappiness of im-
moral agents is unconditionally good; their happiness bad. 
The mercy of forgiveness does not follow upon anything. It is not a consequence 
of anything. It makes no connections. Like punishment, it puts a stop to consequenc-
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es,719 but unlike punishment it is not called for. It is something ‘new,’ unprecedent-
ed. There is no need to dispute Kant’s point: a merciful judge is a contradiction in 
terms. Mercy is a good whose goodness cannot be explained from within any system 
of penal law that presupposes that ‘the one that did it,’ did ‘it,’ wholly and simply, all 
the way down. Kant is only able to imagine the good in terms of his two candidates: 
in relative terms, as the happiness of the individual finite rational agent, or, in abso-
lute terms, as the goodness of the will. But there is a third option that he does not im-
agine: reconciliation between enemies, between rival neighbours, brothers, parents 
and children, siblings, husbands and wives, in a situation where the task of identify-
ing ‘the one that did it’ is as easy as ever, while the task of saying what ‘it’ is that 
this one did is virtually impossible.720  
This is why, again, when it comes to the sovereign’s ‘right to grant clemency to 
a criminal,’ Kant must insist that this is ‘the slipperiest one [of his rights] for him to 
exercise.’  Kant thinks that it must be regarded as ‘doing injustice in the highest de-
gree.’  I argued in chapter 3, however, that this has to be qualified; that the merciful 
sovereign is doing what is immoral, on Kant’s own terms, not what is illegal.721  The 
sovereign’s mercy cannot be punished, in turn; but it is absolutely bad. 
There is no higher good than ‘morality,’ for Kant. But if morality is not to be 
had, then it is also good, within a new frame of reference, that happiness not be ‘the 
lot’ of certain agents. Wolff points out, with respect to Kant’s opening moves in the 
Groundwork, that ‘[i]t is noteworthy that the philosopher most completely identified 
with the doctrine of stern duty should begin, not with a statement about what we 
ought to do, but rather with a judgment of what is unqualifiedly good.’722  But of 
course this is Kant’s strategy: to work from the notion of absolute goodness to an 
answer to the question what we ought to do—by way of the ascription of this kind of 
goodness to, precisely, a will, a ‘doer’ of deeds. 
The rational, impartial spectator’s attitude of disapprobation at the very thought 
of a happy, but immoral agent, expresses a value that Kant takes to be universally 
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shared—if only we will judge impartially; if only God will suffer the aim of his 
kindness to be thwarted by evildoers. In contrast, Kant cannot conceive of an act of 
mercy to which everyone would agree since, in effect, he always regards pure practi-
cal reason itself as both the injured party and as the legislator of the (rightly) retalia-
tory sanction. ‘[T]he verdict of the highest judge (supremi iudicis) [i.e., pure practi-
practical reason] is irreversible (cannot be appealed).’723 
Wood indicates that Kant’s problem with forgiveness, which finds expression 
especially in Kant’s strong claims about divine justice in the Religion, is that it ap-
pears to be ‘something “outside” morality, or something “higher than” it.’724  Like-
wise, Wood points to Kant’s worry that grace is not ‘something rational.’725  Kant 
wants to be able to ‘distinguish forgiveness from simple immorality and inhumanity, 
from avarice, murder, or deceit,’726 or even just ‘immoral leniency.’727 His solution is 
to describe grace and mercy in terms that accord with ‘a definite moral standard or 
rule’728 and so, really, to put these within the limits of what pure practical reason is 
able to warrant a priori. But this is just to evacuate the notions of grace and mercy 
and to replace them with something else. 
One consequence, here, is that the representation of God as an agent who, 
uniquely, stands alongside the accused (even the ‘rightly’ accused) against the multi-
tude of her accusers, out of love for that one, altogether without reference to anything 
that the accused has done or will yet do is, for Kant, repugnant, if not incoherent. 
This is not to say that Kant would take the unanimity of human communities with 
respect to those of their members that they call to account and expel from their midst 
as a guarantee that justice and reason are on the side of the ‘many,’ rather than on the 
side of ‘the one that did it.’  But, for Kant, the unanimity of the whole class of ra-
tional beings, or of all human beings just qua rational, does ground such an infer-
ence. It is this ‘many,’ or the human ‘many’ so conceived, with whom the agent that 
Kant calls ‘God’ would inevitably side—if such an agent existed. In short, for Kant, 
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the practically-rational, even if not the theoretically-rational, ‘many’ includes both 
this ‘God’ and human beings among its members. 
The good that is aimed at receptivity, the given and received, is happiness, flour-
ishing, eternal life. The good that is produced by spontaneity is the created. No good 
that is merely received is good enough, for Kant. Again, Kant thinks there is no high-
er good than morality, that nothing is really good that is not grounded in freedom. 
Contrast the ‘unconditionally good’ with the unconditionally given. Kant presuppos-
es that the given is valueless, inert. As Korsgaard puts it, Kant’s ‘argument [in 
Groundwork I] is essentially that only human reason is in a position to confer value 
on the objects of human choice.’729  Or again, 
[n]othing else justifies our ends and actions; it is our rational autonomy itself that does so…. 
[W]e regard them as good whenever they are chosen with full rational autonomy; so full ra-
tional autonomy itself is the source of their value. Since this holds for other rational beings as 
well as myself…so it turns out to be a good will that is the source of all value.730 
‘God’ is the avatar of this ‘all’ that includes ‘myself.’  With respect to ‘a good will 
that is the source of all value,’ Korsgaard is right. Only agents that have been forgiv-
en see the value of mercy. It is still possible to choose the standards of justice and of 
the good will instead of mercy. On this account the community is always split.  
Indeed Kant does say in the second Critique that ‘[w]hat we are to call good 
must be an object of the faculty of desire in the judgment of every human being.’731  
Note that Kant does not say: ‘in the judgment of every kind being.’  Surely, then, this 
applies to the unhappiness of the immoral agent. And if, as Korsgaard argues, ‘the 
reasons for “calling” a thing good must be universalizable,’ then this unhappiness 
cannot be such an object unless it can be ‘called’ good for such universally shareable 
reasons. There are such reasons in the case of the happiness of moral agents. In the 
case of the happiness of an immoral agent, however, there are none: ‘rational beings 
[alone]…determine what is good; rational nature confers value on the object of its 
choices and is itself the source of all value.’732  Kant’s God embodies this ‘rational 
nature.’  This leaves the immoral agent defenseless against her accusers and deprived 
of all refuge in the face of the unhappiness that she deserves. 
                                                
729 Korsgaard, ‘Aristotle and Kant’: 499. 
730 Ibid.,  500. 
731 KpV 5: 61 (53). 
732 Korsgaard, ‘Aristotle and Kant’: 500. 
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The problem of the immoral, but happy agent: the special case of 
‘passive healing’ 
In this sub-section I show that the main consequence of Kant’s denigration of mercy 
is that his God is barred, not merely from rendering immoral agents happy, but from 
intervening in their immorality, as it were, by healing their evil wills, rendering them 
good, and adding happiness to this healing as well. I show that, for Kant, an agent 
whose will’s goodness is a consequence—in any way or degree—of another agent’s 
intervention, such that, without this intervention, this transformation would never 
have been achieved, remains just as unworthy to be happy as she was when her will 
was an evil one. In short, I argue, the notion of unworthiness to be happy to which 
Kant’s gloss adverts is connected to a notion of immorality that subsumes even the 
goodness of a good will whose goodness is a consequence of such healing. 
Immoral and happy? 
As I argued in chapter 2, it hardly seems likely—assuming that Kant does not mean 
by ‘happiness’ (Glückseligkeit) the mere pleasure of the moment—that the happiness 
of which Kant takes immoral agents to be unworthy is a state of affairs that could 
subsist for long in the presence of moral self-contempt. Kant describes this in partic-
ularly vivid language in his philosophy of religion lectures: 
We must not be blinded by the outward glitter that frequently surrounds the vicious person. If 
we look within, we read constantly…his reason’s admission: You are nevertheless a villain. 
The restlessness of his conscience torments him constantly, agonizing reproaches torture him 
continually, and all his apparent good fortune is really only self-deceit and deception.733 
Either Kant intends by ‘happiness’ something that is incompatible with the presence 
of self-contempt (not immorality, but this affect would be the problem here), or else 
he intends something weaker, to the point of that which inheres in his description of 
the fraud, the drunkard, and so forth. 
But if such an agent’s happiness, qua empirical, as satisfaction of desire or grati-
fication of inclinations, were attended by her consciousness that, though happy, she 
was alienated from humanity, not worthy to be happy after all or, indeed, that she 
positively deserved to be unhappy, then what kind of happiness would that be? If 
immoral agents can be happy and happiness is impossible in the absence of (genuine) 
moral self-satisfaction, then there must be a sense of ‘immoral’ that is compatible 
                                                
733 Vorlesungen-Religionslehre 28: 1081 (413-14). 
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with being morally self-satisfied. If happiness is impossible in the presence of self-
contempt and immoral agents can be happy, then either there is sense of ‘immoral’ 
that is compatible with the absence of self-contempt due to the presence of moral 
self-satisfaction or the only immoral and happy agents are ones that have no pangs of 
conscience even when they have reason to have them. 
Here, as elsewhere, Kant evinces more than one tendency. Sometimes the two 
tendencies appear together. Just as Kant’s causal and normative accounts of the con-
nection between morality and happiness, or his distributive and retributive represen-
tations of justice, are not always clearly distinguished, representations of the 
‘capacity’ for happiness are mixed up with talk of ‘worthiness.’734  Kant’s main ten-
dency, however, is to regard the relationship between morality and happiness in the 
very way that he appears to do when he deploys the idea of ‘worthiness to be happy.’  
His main tendency is to regard morality as a necessary, normative condition bearing 
on the distribution, or the approval, of a mode of empirical well-being that may be 
achieved without reference to morality, through skill, prudence, ‘rational self-love,’ 
the cooperation of nature, of other human beings, or of God—an illegitimately pro-
curable happiness. 
The question of the possibility, for Kant, of an immoral, but happy agent is sel-
dom raised as such.735  As we have seen Kant’s habitual glossing of ‘morality’ as 
‘worthiness to be happy’ implicitly affirms this possibility. The famous opening lines 
of the Groundwork’s first section also express the view that such a thing is both 
thinkable and unconditionally, objectively bad. Evidently, here, Kant does not take 
‘[t]he uninterrupted prosperity of a creature graced with no feature of a pure and 
good will’ to be unthinkable.736  If he did, he would not problematize this (perhaps 
counterfactual) prosperity as he does. To do so would be de trop; there would be no 
need. If Kant holds such ‘prosperity’ to be possible, then the happiness that is possi-
                                                
734 See, for example, LMM 29: 907 (272-3). 
735 See, however, Hill, ‘Happiness and Human Flourishing in Kant's Ethics’: 144; Römpp, ‘Kant’s 
Ethics as a Philosophy of Happiness: Reflections on the “Reflexionen”’: 275. More typically, Kant’s 
readers implicitly affirm this possibility by referring to such things as happiness that lacks objective 
value or worth (Hill, ‘Happiness and Human Flourishing in Kant's Ethics’: 158; Korsgaard, ‘Aristotle 
and Kant’: 499; Sikka, ‘On the Value of Happiness: Herder Contra Kant’: 531; Wood, Kant's Ethical 
Thought, 128, 312); happiness that is morally ‘bad’ (Paton, ‘Kant's Idea of the Good’: xx; Wood, 
Kant's Ethical Thought, 24); or happiness, the means to, or the pursuit of, which conflicts with what 
morality requires (Acton, Kant's Moral Philosophy; Hills, ‘Kant on Happiness and Reason’: 243-4). 
736 Gr 4: 393 (7). See also KrV A813/B841; Idee 8: 26 (116); R 6317a (18: 632 [373-4]). 
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ble without morality cannot be a state of the agent’s empirical affairs for which her 
morality is a transcendental or any other kind of necessary internal or causal condi-
tion. 
When he thinks the relationship between morality and happiness by way of the 
notions of worthiness and unworthiness to be happy Kant does not think that the 
wish for happiness-without-morality is an incoherent one, based upon a misunder-
standing. It is not like the case of an agent that aims at mutually exclusive gratifica-
tions (seeing the sunrise, sleeping in) or disregards the ways in which her own well-
being shares some of its integral grounds with the well-being of other members of 
her community. Rather, he holds only that a fundamental, unwavering, irreversible 
commitment to morality is a condition independently of which it is wrong to seek 
happiness for oneself, or to approve of its (ultimate) distribution to others. 
Kant’s recourse, in The Metaphysics of Morals, to the very idea of an agent that 
can ‘dispose of all happiness,’ along with the possibility of a principle in accordance 
with which this would (perhaps counterfactually) be undertaken, implies that none of 
the necessary conditions for happiness are irreducibly and solely in the power of the 
kind of agent whose happiness is in question. This is implicit in what Kant says. We 
may conclude, again, that Kant does not take the agent’s morality—the goodness of 
her will or of its character—nor the ascribability of this goodness to her, wholly and 
simply, to be transcendental, constitutive conditions without which her happiness is 
simply impossible. 
If the notion of worthiness to be happy is not conceptually de trop, then, if we 
take this Kantian idiom seriously, affirming that it is more than a mere manner of 
speaking, then we have two options. Either we follow Wike and others and take 
‘happiness’ in Kant to refer to the concept of a system of empirical ends, with refer-
ence to a logically and prudentially-practically integrated will (or such a will’s ‘will-
ing’), but without logically intrinsic or analytic reference to Kant’s critical notion of 
morality; or we take Kant not to have had any account of happiness that is compati-
ble with the conception of the relationship between morality and happiness that is 
represented by the notion of worthiness to be happy. In short, happiness must not 
demand anything that pertains to pure practical reason; it must be compatible with 
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the immorality of the subject (in Kant’s sense). This must be the happiness of which 
moral agents are worthy and immoral ones unworthy. 
Kant’s observations about the cheat and the ‘upright man’ show that it is in the 
nature of the satisfaction of specifically human beings (agents that are both ‘earthly’ 
and ‘endowed with reason’) that a lack of fit between the character in accordance 
with which an agent acts and the character of the empirical satisfaction that she en-
joys tends to undermine this satisfaction. This is so irrespective of whether this is in 
consequence of her acting, or through some more haphazard natural or social ar-
rangement. The gratification of the desires of a particular human animal has too shal-
low a reference to the specifically human good, in a sense, for it to interest the 
human being, per se, in the kind of sustained manner implicit in the framing of a 
whole life. This conclusion is based upon empirical observations that stand in need 
of further clarification and reinforcement, but seems quite plausible. Kant, however, 
thinks that the experience of moral self-judgment and moral self-contempt give ex-
pression, not to principles of empirical anthropology and psychology, but to a priori 
principles of pure, practical reason, principles that are aligned with what he takes to 
be the pure idea of ‘nomos’ itself. 
Kant does not demonstrate that this is so. I want to affirm the general claim, 
however, that the value of the human being’s empirical ‘well-being’ or ‘gratification’ 
is not unconditional, neither to her, nor to others. It lacks objective value wherever 
there is a lack of fit between the empirical state of her affairs and the state of those 
transcendental, deed-grounding and deed-governing features of her agency that also 
figure in the way that she comes to find her life significant in the first place; her life 
regarded as a whole that is greater than the mere concatenation of her gratifications 
and frustrations, a life qualified as happy or unhappy. 
But imagine, against the backdrop of this concession, that one agent says to an-
other: ‘I am neither happy, nor “fit” to be happy; but you (perhaps through my coop-
erative entanglement with you and others) can make me both happy and fit to be so.’  
Imagine, for example, the Christian believer who says: ‘Domine, non sum dignus, ut 
intres sub tectum meum, sed tantum dic verbo, et sanabitur anima mea.’737  To say 
this is not to presuppose that I could have made myself worthy at some earlier time, 
                                                
737 ‘Lord, I am not worthy that Thou shouldst enter under my roof: but only say the word and my soul 
shall be healed.’ 
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but failed to do so. An agent may well say that she is not worthy to be happy if she 
has recourse to something like Kant’s notions of worthiness and morality, perhaps 
because she has acquired these concepts from other members of her community, 
even if she is nevertheless, all the same, irremediably an agent that could never in-
stantiate the kind of agency that is thought in this concept—and not through moral 
frailty or through the self-corruption of which she stands accused, but just because it 
is not in the nature of her agency as such. 
Here, the sense of ‘worthiness’ implicated in the Christian believer’s assertion 
that she is not ‘dignus’ in no way resembles what Kant has in mind. This is nowhere 
more obvious than in the petition that follows the prayerful concession of unworthi-
ness: ‘but only say the word and my soul shall be healed.’  Whatever else Kant 
means by ‘worthiness to be happy’ and ‘morality,’ he does not take the latter to be a 
qualification of the agent that could ever be achieved in her by another. In that case 
neither her happiness, nor the agent’s ‘dignity’ would be unambiguously ascribable 
to the individual human agent as her product. The very possibility of individuation 
by way of action-ascription is, for Kant, of the essence of morality. 
Kant thinks that the non-empirical condition of the deontic possibility of a 
‘grant’ of happiness is an endogenous, or ‘autogeneous’ transformation of the agent. 
It cannot be, say, an exogenous transformation of the cooperating ‘many’ with whom 
she is entangled. Her morality is something that can be traced back to her, to the 
agent herself, without any social or natural remainder. The approach that is here im-
plicitly rejected takes ‘worthiness,’ now an excessive designation, to be an exoge-
nous, or heterogeneous outcome: a transformation of the agent—perhaps in and 
through the transformation of her social and natural situation as a whole—that is un-
dertaken by another, or others, perhaps, or by the agent, but only by way of her co-
operation with one or more simply indispensable partners. To be ‘healed’ and so to 
be made fit for happiness (prepared, as Blake says, to ‘bear the beams of love’738) 
leaves one unworthy to be happy—and indeed immoral, in Kant’s sense. 
                                                
738 William Blake, ‘The Little Black Boy,’ in Songs of Innocence & Songs of Experience (Mineola, 




In the Opus Postumum, Kant asks ‘Whether God could…give man a good will?’  
The answer: ‘No,’ he replies, ‘rather, that requires freedom.’739  The immoral agent 
is in a fundamental predicament, then, which cannot be resolved by way of God’s 
mercy. How, then, is it to be resolved?  In his draft ‘catechism’ Kant has the teacher 
ask, ‘[c]an another…make you worthy’ and has the pupil answer, ‘I must do it my-
self.’740  Guyer observes that this question in particular 
makes it plain that worthiness is only earned or merited by one’s own action, not by the action 
of another…. [And Kant] seems to assume that what makes you worthy of happiness is that 
you choose to act in a certain way even when you could have done otherwise. Merit depends 
on one’s own action, and on one’s free action; so worthiness to be happy can stem only from 
one’s own free action.741 
Leaving aside Guyer’s reference to ‘merit,’ here, this must be generalized from ac-
tion-on-an-occasion to the goodness of the will’s character itself, its disposition to-
wards unconditional obedience. As Kant puts it in the Religion, ‘whatever does not 
originate from himself and his own freedom provides no remedy [Ersatz] for a lack 
in his morality.’742  And for Kant, as Sikka points out, ‘only acts of the will are truly 
one’s own.’  Indeed, ‘[t]he rest of the human psyche…[is] outside the will.’743  Ob-
viously, third parties are even more decisively alien than this. As Kant puts it in his 
Conflict of the Faculties, ‘[a]ction must be represented as issuing from the human 
being’s own use of his moral powers, not as an effect [resulting] from the influence 
of an external, higher cause by whose activity the human being is passively 
healed.’744  In a similar vein Kant says that 
[w]hen it is said that it is in itself a duty for a human being to make his end the perfection be-
longing to a human being as such (properly speaking, to humanity), this perfection must be 
put in what can result from his deeds, not in mere gifts for which he must be indebted to na-
ture; for otherwise it would not be a duty.745 
But note that the ‘lack’ (Mangel) that Kant describes is the particular problem that it 
is precisely to the extent that it is imputed to the agent with the ethical analogue of 
                                                
739 OP 21: 34 (237). In fact, the question concerns the human being’s original creation, but the ques-
tion—or, especially, its answer—is relevant subsequently as well. 
740 R 7315 19: 312. 
741 Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, 121. 
742 Rel 6: 3 (57). For an illuminating contrast with the approach of ‘the ancients,’ which demonstrates 
the radical character of Kant’s innovation, see Hume, An Equiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, 
Appx. 4.20 (182-3). 
743 Sikka, ‘On the Value of Happiness: Herder Contra Kant’: 521. 
744 Streit 7: 42-3 (267). See also ibid. 7: 55-6 (277-8). See also Anderson and Bell, Kant and 
Theology, 68. 
745 MdS 6: 386 (150). 
 
 243 
‘rightful force.’746  If the human being is to be transformed, if she is to find herself 
whole, saved from the shadow of desert in relation to her own unhappiness, her 
transformation must be imputable to her. It cannot be a matter of ‘healing’ or a gift 
of ‘nature.’  Otherwise, nothing will have changed, really, with respect to what is 
demanded by the law of unhappiness. The ‘healed’ agent, as much as the agent with 
an evil will, would still owe a debt—minimally for having ever chosen to have an 
evil will in the first place—and so still instantiate an unremedied gap with respect to 
the ius talionis. It is in the nature of ‘worthiness to be happy’ that God’s ‘external’ 
influence on the human being could never make her worthy of anything that she was 
unworthy of before.747  That is obvious enough. The issue, however, is whether the 
happiness of such an agent could count as good and whether God would be permitted 
to offer it to her. Kant’s answer is that both the mercy of this transformation and the 
mercy of this gift of happiness are barred. Kant’s ‘woe’ concerning ‘the windings of 
eudaemonism’ is addressed to these eschatological mercies as much as it is to the 
temptation to forego capital punishment in cases of murder. 
For Kant, then, gifts bestowed on immoral agents are not good and the healing 
of their wills is without value. As Korsgaard puts it, Kant’s critical view is that ‘[t]he 
only value there is is that which human beings give to their own lives.’748  This is 
true of both morality and empirical well-being. The former is a function of freedom, 
all the way down, but it must be possible, too, to regard the latter as, in some essen-
tial respect, a state of affairs that is her very own unassisted production. Her good-
ness cannot be regarded as a gift, a gift that entails a transformation that also renders 
her both ‘fit’ for happiness and actually happy. On Kant’s view, there can be no sub-
ject who, like Alastair Sims’ Ebenezer Scrooge, rejoices in his happiness, while aver-
ring both that he does not ‘deserve to be so happy’ and that he ‘cannot help it.’749  
There can be no such thing as a human subject whose fitness-for-happiness was 
                                                
746 See MdS 6: 227, 440 (19, 190). I should like to take this matter up in greater detail, but cannot, 
given the restrictions of this thesis. The basic idea is that imputation ‘with rightful force’ is a judg-
ment that both imputes a deed to the agent and simultaneously sentences her to be punished. 
747 See Anderson and Bell, Kant and Theology, 69. 
748 Korsgaard, ‘Aristotle and Kant’: 505. 
749 Brian Desmond Hurst, "A Christmas Carol,"  (UK: United Artists, 1951). One can easily imagine 
what Kant would have to say about a subject, transformed in spite of himself, but also driven to con-
version and happiness along the channels of his own past resistance, a subject who exclaims, ‘I am as 
light as a feather, I am as happy as an angel, I am as merry as a schoolboy. I am as giddy as a drunken 
man…. I don’t know what day of the month it is...I don’t know how long I’ve been among the Spirits. 
I don’t know anything. I’m quite a baby. Never mind. I don’t care. I’d rather be a baby’ (ibid.). 
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achieved through cooperation with, or surrender to, another (or others). The Christian 
subject who says, ‘Domine, non sum dignus’ (etc.), not only remains, on the present 
account, unworthy of happiness (regarded, say, as intimate reception of such a sub-
ject’s ‘Lord’), ‘healed’ though she be—but her happiness is objectively bad, evil, 
forbidden. What is missing in these instances is not the transformation of the subject, 
the subsequent goodness of her will (ultimately, say), but rather this transformation’s 
being her own unassisted achievement, so that the order in her life, the integrity of 
her will, is an effect of her own spontaneous activity. Nothing strictly given one, re-
ceived by one, can be regarded as fundamentally, or ‘originally’ good.750  Only the 
free deliverances of a will constrained by duty, on the one hand, and justice, on the 
other are good. 
Think of an agent whose heart was so transformed that she had been rendered 
unfailingly kind-hearted, unfailingly merciful, who loved others as she did herself, 
but whose entire motivation was her loving care for others, her identification with 
them in their joys and sorrows, and so on: the happiness of this agent would be re-
pugnant to reason. In other words, you and I, in Kant’s ultimate view, ought to dis-
approve of the prospective happiness of such an agent. The problem, however, is 
simply this: the agent’s transformation is not an independent achievement; she had 
help and the help that she had was (ex hypothesi) absolutely integral for her being 
changed. 
Suppose that one’s empirical interests were fully served, every inclination that 
one happens to have gratified, and every source of empirical distress occluded. It is 
important to be clear that Kant is not saying that if this gratification or occlusion 
were secured through immorality, then a more profound moral suffering would per-
sist in the agent’s consciousness, right alongside the enjoyment associated with the 
gratification of her inclinations. This is merely to claim that the agent’s full satisfac-
tion in its empirical and moral registers requires that she be free of any sense that she 
has secured the gratification of her desires through immorality, or at the expense of 
others, or in a manner that blocks others’ access to happiness. Hill makes a point 
along these lines, writing that, for Kant, ‘none of us…could live without inner con-
flict and self-disapproval if we pursued personal happiness by plainly immoral 
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means.’751  But this is not precise enough. It is not just that one’s achieving happi-
ness by immoral means undermines happiness; nor, in any case, does becoming hap-
py by moral means, just as such, render happiness secure. The point is that no matter 
how one becomes happy—whether by fortune, or by the intervention of a super-
human agent, or by effort that conforms perfectly to the conditions of the possibility 
of human beings (not just oneself) being happy in general—an ‘I am moral’ must be 
able to accompany one’s empirical qualification as ‘happy.’  And here, for Kant, 
‘morality’ references not merely the goodness of the will’s character, but the radical 
ascribability to her of the sheer fact that her will is a good one. The moral goodness 
of the good will is not its property of being a will that wills what is good, just as 
such. Rather, it is this property under the limiting condition that the will’s having this 
property at all be ascribable to the agent herself. This property of being-ascribable is 
something that the good and the evil of good and evil wills have in common, on 
Kant’s account. Good is not good without it, evil not evil.752 
To be healed is thus an intolerable shortcut. Indeed, the hope for healing is im-
moral and forbidden. The rejoicing of a passively healed agent, or of one that gets a 
glimpse of such healing, or of one that takes herself to be caught up in a process of 
being healed, is incompatible with Kant’s disapprobation of her happiness. If the re-
joicing were justified, then this disapprobation could not be. Kant holds, however, 
that the objective badness of the happiness of such an agent is obvious. And there is 
a sense in which he is right about this—if we take mercy-excluding penal justice to 
be good in itself. But if the objective badness of the happiness of the ‘healed’ agent 
is conceded, then the value inherent in the objectivity of the judgment that deems it 
so is not a value whose endorsement is consistent with a Christian understanding of 
divine mercy. The issue is not that Kant says that happiness is impossible without a 
special receptivity to the gift of happiness, nor that he identifies morality with efforts 
aimed at becoming thus receptive. The problem is that Kant does not allow—and 
takes himself to have a rational warrant for disallowing—that in the event that an 
agent fails to make herself adequately receptive to happiness, God might be regarded 
as an agent that would willingly assist her in this, irrespective of what she has done 
so far and of how hard she has tried. 
                                                
751 Hill, ‘Happiness and Human Flourishing in Kant's Ethics’: 174-5. 




In this chapter, I executed four main tasks. First, I reviewed the practical significance 
of Kant’s law of punishment. Next, I demonstrated that Kant’s commitment to the 
thesis that immoral agents ought to be unhappy is a fundamentally practical one as 
well. Third, I further specified this claim by arguing that Kant’s law of unhappiness 
is binding on two kinds of agent, human and divine, and that it is binding in two dis-
tinct contexts. I characterized the first of these as mundane, the other as eschatologi-
cal and I argued that these two contexts correspond to two distinct ways in which the 
law of unhappiness is put into practice. Finally, I argued that these two contexts co-
incide to the extent that, under the law of unhappiness (but not under the primary 
moral law), we, together with God, are members of a single community. I described 
this community as an order for which the law of unhappiness is uniquely constitutive 
and I showed that, for Kant, this community must be an absolutely mercy-free zone. 
I reject this representation of the human community. By doing so, however, I am 
not claiming that Kant is wrong about the goodness of justice in some general sense. 
I am only suggesting that his taking mercy to be immoral (and so, in his terms, root-
ed in evil) shows that his notion of the good is not a Christian one. The Christian no-
tion of divine mercy is a threat to the practice of punishment, as Kant conceives of it, 
and, theoretically speaking, a threat to the justification of punishment in retributivist 
terms. This, I suggest, is as it should be. 
Kant insists that God’s involvement at the origin of the human being qua moral 
agent ‘is not thinkable,’ irrespective of whether this involvement be direct and ‘mi-
raculous,’ or mediated by the social and natural order in which the human creature is 
embedded. The radical involvement, at the source of specifically human action as 
such, of ‘something’ not identical to, but nevertheless incorporating, ‘the one that did 
it,’ would render human action ‘mechanism and not freedom,’ Kant thinks. He em-
phasises the central point, here, by saying that ‘[m]an is himself regarded as cause of 
his actions that take place in the world.’753  To repeat an earlier cited formulation of 
this integral focus: ‘[t]he human being must make or have made himself into whatev-
er he is or should become in a moral sense, good or evil’;754 and ‘what is to be im-
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puted to us as morally good conduct must take place not through foreign influence 
but through the use of our own powers.’755  Moves like these block access to the 
tools for thinking and hoping that inhere in the Christian notions of original sin, 
grace, creator-creature cooperation (divine concursus), redemption, and conver-
sion—tools for thinking the possibility of mercy and for hoping that this possibility 
can never be limited by mere human trespass. 
                                                




In this thesis I have argued that Kant’s habit of glossing ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to 
be happy’ discloses the presence of an implicit, durable cluster of unjustified com-
mitments. I showed that these are, at bottom, an immediate devotion to a particular 
set of practices: on the one hand, that is, the practice of capital punishment and, on 
the other, the practice—‘virtual’ and ‘deferred’ for us, but taken up eschatologically 
by Kant’s ‘God’—that occludes immoral agents’ access to happiness. I demonstrated 
that Kant’s steadfastness in relation to these commitments (or to what remains, at 
least, unexamined in them) both antedates and survives his ‘critical period.’ 
The law of unhappiness is practically significant if there is a subject that it binds 
and a practice that it prescribes. I have shown that, for Kant, there is such a subject 
and such a practice. What, however, of the object of this practice?  Is the human be-
ing really an agent such that the goodness and badness (or evil, in Kant’s sense) of 
her will may be ascribed to her as the consequence of an utterly unassisted undertak-
ing on her part?  In the Religion, as we have seen, Kant claims that the human being 
is such an agent. In this way, he affirms that the practice that puts the law of unhap-
piness into effect has an object. 
Space does not permit me to take the next step here, to orient the results of my 
discussion, so far, to the ultimate standard that such an object must meet: a particular 
conception of her susceptibility to the imputation of deeds, a standard that is equiva-
lent to a particular way of being free. An adequate discussion of the latter topic, be-
ginning with the question, ‘What does the imputability of deeds consist in for Kant?’ 
lies without the scope of this thesis. The latter merely sets the scene for this inquiry, 
as well as for an investigation of other questions concerning Kant’s thinking about 
freedom. 
In my introduction I pointed to the fundamental motivation for the task executed 
in the foregoing chapters. I claimed that there are good reasons for thinking that the 
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commitments that I describe condition the trajectory by which Kant’s ‘critical’ think-
ing about freedom and moral accountability passes from its initial state in about the 
‘Third Antinomy’ of the first Critique to its final state in the Religion’s theory of rad-
ical evil. I cannot offer, here, a robust demonstration of the claim that the commit-
ments expressed by Kant’s habit warp the conceptual space within which his 
thinking about moral agency develops in the critical period. I cannot show now, deci-
sively, that the Kantian commitments that I have identified operate like an enormous, 
but mostly invisible, mass that distorts the theoretical space within which his think-
ing develops—that the final disposition of Kant’s theory of moral accountability, as 
embodied in his theory of radical evil, takes the form that it does as a consequence of 
the constant proximity of this ‘black star.’ 
All of this remains to be shown. This thesis sets the scene, merely, for a story of 
the development of Kant’s thinking about freedom and moral accountability that re-
mains to be told—a story whose climactic moment would be Kant’s Groundwork 
(re)description of ‘matters of morality’ (Sittlichen) as a topos in which ‘imitation’ 
(Nachahmung) simply does not ‘take place’ (findet…gar nicht statt) and whose de-
nouement would be the developments leading to the Religion’s description of the 
human being as an agent whose radical ‘disposition’ (Gesinnung), the very character 
from which she acts, is imputable to her alone, wholly and simply. Indeed, these two 
moments mark the implicit horizon within which the argument of this thesis has un-
folded, fundamental concerns that I have had to exclude almost entirely from my 
presentation. 
By way of conclusion, however, I will offer a sketch of the account that builds 
upon the point of departure that I have established here. This sketch will situate the 
contribution that this thesis makes (in itself, in terms of the treatment of Kant’s 
‘gloss,’ the significance of his retributivism, the consequences of the latter for his 
thinking about divine mercy) relative to the further avenues of research to which this 
project is already oriented. 
The first of these pertains to the distinction (and relationship) between what I 
have referred to in this thesis as ‘forward-looking’ (or ‘primary’) and ‘backward-
looking’ (or ‘secondary’) senses of Kantian ‘morality’: on the one hand, that is, the 
ab origine open-ended, forward-looking inquiry that is inspired by the primary ques-
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tion of ethics, ‘What ought I to do?’; on the other hand, the backward-looking disci-
pline inspired by Kant’s always already settled answer to the question, ‘How are 
happiness and morality related?’ Together, these two perspectives express an im-
portant bifurcation in Kant’s thinking. 
In this thesis, I unpacked the first component of the implicit cluster of commit-
ments that I claim are present whenever Kant glosses ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be 
happy.’  I showed that these commitments are most fundamentally speaking com-
mitments to particular practices or, at least, to a set of ‘virtually’ practical attitudes. 
There is more to be said on this score, however—in relation, that is, to Kant’s deep 
practical commitments. The practice of capital punishment, on the one hand, and the 
practical attitude of approbation with respect to such punishment, along with the hu-
man being’s deferral to God’s ultimate treatment of immoral agents, on the other, do 
not constitute the most primary practical objective to which Kant is committed. The 
primary, most immediately proximate practice—the practical threshold across which 
the human community must pass in order to get to the point, say, of regarding the 
putting-to-death of one of its members as an undertaking that is justified with refer-
ence exclusively to that one and what she did (hence retributivistically)—is a par-
ticular inflection of the practice of imputation. This is the second component of the 
core of practical commitments that Kant brings along, by way of his habitual gloss, 
into his critical period thinking about human agency. 
Kant expresses the decisiveness of this focus relatively late in his career when, 
in a draft version of his contest essay on ‘Progress in Metaphysics,’ he identifies the 
‘[o]rigin of the critical philosophy’ as ‘morality, in regard to the imputability of ac-
tions [der Zurechnungsfähigkeit der Handlungen].’756  In spite of the rudimentary 
form of the source here, this concession is very illuminating: Kant retrospectively 
(ca. 1791) characterizes the ‘origin’ (Ursprung) of the ‘critical philosophy,’ in terms 
of an antecedent orientation towards ‘morals’ (Moral) whose primary focus is not the 
objective goodness, but rather the ‘imputability’ (Zurechnungsfähigkeit) of actions. 
Generally speaking, accounts of the course of developments leading into and 
through Kant’s ‘critical’ thinking about morality regard his interest in the latter in 
terms amenable to the tradition of enquiry and critique embodied in the projects of 
                                                
756 Fort 20: 335 (413-14) (translation modified). 
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influential predecessors such as Hume, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Smith.757  Here, 
Kant’s main focus may be described in terms, for example, of ‘the foundations of 
morals,’758 ‘the “roots of oughtness,”’759 or the ‘source’ of ‘our obligations.’760 
However, if we take seriously Kant’s revelation concerning the ‘Ursprung’ of 
the critical philosophy, as specified above, we find ‘morals’ construed as a science 
focused, not only on the question of what finite rational agents ought unconditionally 
to do (or to have done), but ‘morals’ regarded as a disciplined thinking about practi-
cal agency that is always already oriented to the practice of imputation. I do not want 
to over-stress Kant’s concession, here. It strikes me, however, as extremely compel-
ling. And there is more to my claim than this, something else that warrants my fore-
grounding this retrospective assessment from Kant’s own pen. For this is the sense of 
‘morals’ or ‘morality’ that Kant deploys whenever he glosses the latter as ‘worthi-
ness to be happy.’ 
Kant’s retrospective assessment confirms that the durable backward-looking 
perspective has theoretical priority over the open-ended forward-looking one. And it 
is incumbent on Kant’s readers, I suggest, to give the backward-looking perspective 
its full and distinctive due when reflecting on the development of Kant’s thinking 
about freedom and moral accountability. The path that leads to the Religion’s ac-
count of the imputable ‘Gesinnung’ is not simply an extension of the path that passes 
through the Groundwork’s ‘invention of autonomy,’761 for example. In a sense, I 
propose, both paths—the paths along which Kant pursues the interests of forward- 
and backward-looking morality respectively—pass together through this and a num-
ber of other key points (I catalogue some of these below), overdetermining them. In-
deed, I would suggest that the path that Kant pursues in the interest of his forward-
looking inquiry terminates (roughly speaking) with his theory of autonomy. 
                                                
757 See, for example, Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors 
(Cambridge, MA: Thoemmes Press, 1996); Darwall, ‘Norm and Normativity’; Norton and Kuehn, 
‘The Foundations of Morality’; J. B. Schneewind, ‘Autonomy, Obligation, and Virtue,’ in The 
Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. P. Guyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); J. B. 
Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
758 Norton and Kuehn, ‘The Foundations of Morality’, 976. With respect to the relationship between 
Kant and his British and German predecessors see ibid., 976ff. 
759 Darwall, ‘Norm and Normativity’, 988. 
760 Neiman, The Unity of Reason, 106. 




An important task for the future, then, would be to show how Kant’s worries 
about the backward-looking problems of imputation and punishment orient his think-
ing in the direction of the Religion’s notion of the imputable ‘Gesinnung.’ In both its 
forward- and backward-looking senses, Kant is aware that ‘morality’ could turn out 
to be a chimaera—something to which we only seem to be called, given that it en-
tails our doing something that we are not in fact able to do (and given that, for Kant, 
‘ought implies can’).762 This worry is common to both kinds of moral inquiry, but 
evinces a distinct peril in each case. 
The topic of imputation is a central element in discussions of law and its applica-
tion, particularly as this relates to questions of desert, punishment and reward. As we 
saw in chapters 3 and 4, the influence and contemporary significance of Kant’s 
thinking is evident in recent work in this area. It is at least atypical, however, to ar-
gue that, for Kant, concerns bearing on the problem of imputation and imputability 
play a decisive, fundamental role in the development of his thinking about morality, 
in general, as I am suggesting now, and not merely in his thinking about ‘rightful,’ 
‘external’ relations in civil society.763  It is more typical to hold, for example, that 
‘Kant did not focus much on issues of moral praise and blame.’764 
I have shown that this is false: Kant’s thinking about morality, when this has 
primary reference to the ‘internal’ scene of ‘ethics’ and not merely to the ‘external’ 
one of ‘rights,’ has constant reference, too, to the categorically imperative ‘law of 
unhappiness,’ which is directly analogous to the civil-political ‘law of punishment.’  
Indeed, we saw that in (non-dogmatic, practically oriented) theological-
eschatological contexts, Kant uses the language of punishment in relation to immo-
rality as such—i.e., where the latter is regarded as unworthiness to be happy, or in-
trinsic desert of unhappiness. I argued that here, at least, Kant’s thinking about the 
ethical is based on his understanding of the political. Pace Hill, not only is their 
‘room for moralistic praising and blaming’765 in Kant’s ethics, but the stability of the 
political practice of blaming and punishing murderers (at least) for their crimes is of 
                                                
762 See Gr 4: 402, 445 (15, 51); ZeF 8: 368 (337). 
763 See, however, Dean Moyar, ‘Practical Apperception: Self-Imputation and Moral Judgment,’ in 
Law and Peace in Kant’s Philosophy / Recht Und Frieden in Der Philosophie Kants (Akten Des X. 
Internationalen Kant-Kongresses), ed. Valerio Rohden et al. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 281-2. 
764 Hill, ‘Is a Good Will Overrated?’, 55. See also ibid., 56; Hill, Dignity and Practical Reason 176-
95; Korsgaard, ‘Creating the Kingdom of Ends’, 189. 
765 Hill, Dignity and Practical Reason 176-95. 
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fundamental interest to Kant. Kant thinks that the wicked ought to suffer, that they 
ought not to be happy—but he thinks this is so in a specifically moral, hence, intrin-
sic and categorical sense, as something that is good in itself. 
Hill, for example, does not see the eschatological character of praise and blame, 
as Kant conceives of these, and the way that this eschatology arises from a pressure, 
as it were, a pushing forward, in Kant’s thinking, from his political into his ethical 
theory, which shapes the latter’s development. Hill’s view (tempered, admittedly, by 
his concession of ‘surprise’ in this regard) is simply mistaken. The bare possibility of 
‘moralistic praising and blaming’ is very important for Kant. This means, too, that 
the conditions of the possibility of imputation are also a key object of inquiry. 
Again, the practice of imputation, rather than the practice of (ultimate) punish-
ment, which is mostly ‘virtual’ and ‘deferred,’ is the most immediate or proximate 
focus for Kant’s thinking about freedom. Imputation is a major focus for him. But his 
commitment to the practice of capital punishment and to the practical attitude of ap-
probation with respect to such punishment, along with the human being’s deferral of 
the ultimate treatment of immoral agents to God, are the source of the urgency that 
characterizes Kant’s late claims concerning, especially, the imputability of the hu-
man being’s underlying moral disposition to her alone. 
Building upon the work done in this thesis, then, the next step would be to ex-
plore Kant’s account of imputation and to connect the latter both with these other 
commitments and with his thinking about freedom. I foresee three main foci here. 
First, I would rehearse Kant’s analysis of imputation into its two constitutive mo-
ments: action-ascription, which is also agent-identification, and action-qualification, 
or the subsumption of particular actions under the concepts or categories that they are 
taken to instantiate.766 Next, I would discuss Kant’s descriptions of our actual prac-
tice of imputation, along with his unearthing of the ‘thoughts’ that he takes to be im-
plicit in it.767 Finally, I would establish that, as ‘imputation with rightful force,’768 
imputation is the avant garde, as it were, of the movement by which Kant’s thinking 
about the political punctures and extends into his thinking about the ethical and the 
                                                
766 See, for example, MdS 6: 223, 227, 438 (16, 19, 189); Vorarbeiten-MdS 23: 245; LEC 27: 288 (80-
1). 
767 See, for example, KrV A554-6/B582-4; KpV 5: 99-100 (83-4). 
768 See MdS 6: 227, 438, 440 (19, 189-190). 
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eschatological. Here, the relevant topos would turn out to circumscribe, not merely 
the practice of capital punishment, but the antecedent practice of imputation. 
With this reading of Kant on imputation in hand, a further step would be to ad-
vert to one of the main consequences of his analysis of this notion and its practice. I 
call this Kant’s ‘casus datae legis problem.’ This problem bears, as its name sug-
gests, on the requirement that, in addition to being ascribable to an agent (qua their 
author or cause), imputable actions must always be regarded as cases that instantiate 
(or fall foul of) a given law, that fall within or without a given legal or ethical catego-
ry, or as instances of a juridically or ethically salient kind, falling under some de-
scription or other, and so on. Because these two elements of the practice of 
imputation place distinct, and at points conflicting, demands on Kant’s thinking 
about freedom, the casus datae legis problem is a key aspect of the material that 
fuels the thinking that ends in his theory of radical evil. I suggest that, in the casus 
datae legis problem, we have a key that will help us to identify the conditions under 
which Kant would have to concede that his backward-looking notion of morality, in 
particular, had turned out to be a chimaera. I contend, that is, that Kant would have 
to concede that his backward-looking morality (in the sense that we get, again, 
whenever he glosses ‘morality’ as ‘worthiness to be happy’) was a chimaera if he 
could not show that the human agent was susceptible to the imputation of her actions 
in a sense that goes all the way down with respect to both of imputation’s moments 
(action-ascription, action-qualification). I would suggest, indeed, that Kant never 
does manage to show that human beings are like this. He simply insists upon it, par-
ticularly and ultimately, in his theory of the imputable ‘Gesinnung.’ 
Ameriks speaks of ‘the conception of the human as free being that is the basis of 
Kant’s moral philosophy.’769  And he affirms ‘the central role of the notion of free-
dom in the development of Kant’s entire system’ and ‘Kant’s attachment to absolute 
freedom.’770   But which ‘freedom’ constitutes this ‘basis’? Is it Kant’s notion of ‘ab-
solute causal spontaneity’ (which he calls the ‘the real ground of [any action’s] im-
putability’771) or is it ‘autonomy’? And if ‘moral philosophy’ is at issue, then ‘moral’ 
with which orientation and emphasis? I propose that the terminus towards which 
                                                
769 Neiman, The Unity of Reason, 120. 
770 Karl Ameriks, Interpreting Kant's Critiques (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), 162. 
771 KrV A448/B476. See also Versuch 2: 202-3, 239-40; LMH 28: 12; LMV 28: 404. 
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Kant’s thinking tends here (the theory of radical evil) is not a consequence of his 
commitment to the thesis that ‘freedom is autonomy.’ Rather, it derives from his 
commitment to the thesis that ‘[f]reedom is imputability [Freiheit ist die Zurech-
nungsfähigkeit].’772 
Kant sees ‘absolute causal spontaneity’ as a necessary condition for action-
ascription, for the absolutely unambiguous identification of ‘the one that did it.’ And 
he recognizes too, from the outset, that this gives rise to a problem for action-
qualification, to the extent that the individual deliverances of a merely lawless will 
cannot be regarded as instances of any kind in particular.773 Kant’s notion of absolute 
causal spontaneity refers to the absolutely unconditioned originality of a being that is 
able to bring certain phenomena, namely her actions, into existence ex nihilo. An 
agent that can do this is one to whom actions may be ascribed wholly and simply, 
without remainder. An immediate problem arises, however, with respect to the reali-
zation of this condition. I call this Kant’s ‘nomological problem’ since it pertains to 
the question whether the kind of freedom that is required for action-ascription is a 
law-governed, hence intelligible, form of causality, or whether it is merely a kind of 
unfettered, lawless surging. I suggest that Kant’s answer to this question bears direct-
ly on his solution to the casus datae legis problem. 
This is because Kant recognizes that if the unhappiness of immoral agents is re-
garded as retribution—that is, as good in itself, as perfectly proportionate to the con-
duct that grounds it, and as addressed, wholly and simply, to the unique subject of 
that conduct—then, when it comes to the qualification of individual human actions 
in moral terms, reference to any nomological constraints not of the agent’s own leg-
                                                
772 Vorarbeiten-MdS 23: 245. 
773 In the Dialectic section of the first Critique Kant evinces two tendencies with respect to the ques-
tion whether ‘absolute causal spontaneity’ entails the sheer lawlessness of the will endowed with it. 
The argument for the antithesis of the Third Antinomy seems to presuppose that the parties to the con-
flict (the proponents of the two sides of the antinomy) simply agree that transcendental freedom, or 
spontaneity, is a matter of unqualified lawlessness (KrV A447/B475; see also Michelle Kosch, 
Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
33). The basic opposition that emerges in this context is a dichotomy between a causality that is gov-
erned by laws (simpliciter) and one that is not. In his account of empirical and intelligible ‘character,’ 
later in the Dialectic, however, Kant experiments with a different approach (KrV A538-47, 557/B566-
75ff, 585; see also Fort 20: 336 (413); Henry E. Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An 
Interpretation and Defense, Rev. and enl. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 10). I cannot 
go deeper into this here. Kant’s position at this point is unstable in any case, I suggest, and he is ac-
tively working on a problem whose solution does not come onto the scene until his ‘invention of au-
tonomy’ in the Groundwork. 
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islating (physical, social, psychological, spiritual, religious, or any other kinds of 
heteronomous legislation) belies the radical individualism that his eschatologically 
inflected retributivism demands.774 In other words, although Kant’s commitment to 
the practice of imputation is a function of his antecedent commitment to the practice 
of punishment, as expressed (indirectly) in his use of the ‘worthiness to be happy’ 
idiom, his understanding of imputation (given its two distinct moments, action-
ascription and action-qualification) raises a problem for the practice of punishment or 
making-unhappy—precisely, again, given Kant’s specifically retributivist under-
standing and justification of it. I suggest that the casus datae legis problem is the 
problem (for punishment qua retribution) to which Kant’s theory of imputable 
‘Gesinnung’ is supposed to be a solution. 
One of the upshots of this solution, I suggest, is that, to the extent that punish-
ment and unhappiness are regarded as retribution, the claim that human beings are 
ineluctably heteronomous agents must be problematic for Kant, from the outset—
independently of his invention and elevation of the notion of autonomy. I would 
sketch the generative consequences of the problem of heteronomy (as the problem, 
say, of nomological plurality, cooperation, collectivity, mutual participation, imita-
tion, and other forms of mimetic entanglement) in terms of the moves that Kant 
makes in order to remain one step ahead of it. To this end, I would argue that the 
analysis of imputation into its two moments, action-ascription and action-
qualification, follows the contours of a distinction between two aspects of human 
agency, which might be described under the rubric of ‘nomos’ and ‘dynamis.’ 
In the next phase of the account that I am outlining here, then, I would argue that 
Kant’s retribution-sensitive understanding of imputation demands a truly radical so-
lution, as follows. Among the habits, patterns, rules, and principles (in sum, the ‘no-
moi’) relative to which an agent’s action (regarded, dynamically, as something of 
which she is the unique author) can be said to be a determinate instance of some kind 
or other, are the habits, patterns, rules, and principles that constitute her character. 
Thus Kant is compelled, having made a variety of other moves in this direction, to 
say that the human being is endowed with an underlying disposition whose instaura-
                                                
774 Kant expresses his basic presupposition concerning this radical discreteness of the human being 
when, in his Anthropology, he declares that, ‘taken collectively,’ the human race is fundamentally ‘a 
multitude of persons, existing successively and side by side’ (Anthro 7: 331 [236]). 
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tion, configuration, and decisively rigorous orientation towards good or evil, is her 
doing, one of her deeds, and hence an originary, radical constraint whose functioning 
allows us to say in a perfectly decisive manner that not merely each deed, but the 
very being-moral or being-immoral of every one of her particular deeds, is entirely 
her fault. 
There are two ways then, relative to ‘nomos’ and ‘dynamis,’ respectively, in 
which a human being might turn out not to be ‘the one that did it.’ And, I contend, 
Kant has to show that neither of these characterizes human agency across the 
board—else backward-looking morality, in his sense, would turn out to be a chimae-
ra. One way is not to have done ‘it’ (dynamically speaking)—whatever it is—at all. 
The other way is to have done ‘it’—so that this action can be unambiguously as-
cribed to you as its author—but to have done this thing too, whatever it is, in accord-
ance with principles (‘nomoi,’ principles relative to which it is an instance of the kind 
that it is) that cannot be taken to have been legislated by you qua individual human 
being. Then, while you will have done ‘it,’ you cannot be taken to have done ‘it’ on 
your own, alone—radically and utterly alone—under any description of what you 
have done that has integral reference to those principles. Kant sees this possibility 
and it worries him. 
What Kant requires then, I suggest, is an account of human agency such that, 
when it comes to ‘Sittlichen’—that is, to her morality or to her immorality—the hu-
man being is unassisted in every respect. She acts without any dynamical assistance 
whatsoever (without, say, anything like a push or a pull) and she legislates, originari-
ly and decisively, that her actions will be exactly and necessarily whatever kind of 
deeds they turn out to be, morally speaking—whether good or evil. As I said in my 
introduction, we might refer to this ideal as the originary and terminal unity of the 
acting and suffering subject: ‘the one that did it’ and ‘the one that ought to be unhap-
py’ are an utterly consolidated unit, one dynamis, one nomos, without remainder. 
Kant’s account of ‘Gesinnung’ may be regarded as a solution that, by excluding 
all reference to other agents, human or divine, is tailored to a particular line of ques-
tioning that might be articulated in defense of ‘the accused.’  This line of questioning 
might run as follows. In what sense and on what grounds may the individual human 
agent be, first, held accountable for her actions and then, second, judged deserving of 
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unhappiness in light of them, if the specific form of her practical subjectivity (her 
fundamental character, or the complex of reasons, laws, loves, or principles in ac-
cordance with which she is motivated to act) is radically ‘unoriginal’?  In other 
words, what if she is constituted from the ground up through her mimetic entangle-
ment with various models—not themselves chosen by her—from the moment of her 
birth; models, moreover, whose own practical activity is governed antecedently in 
the same manner?  Then, even if she may be regarded, dynamically speaking, as the 
independent source of her own deeds, so that these are ascribable to her in some 
sense uniquely, does her motivational dependence upon others for shared ‘reasons 
for acting’ not mean, nevertheless, that there is always a legislative remainder, a log-
ic that is prior to her particular undertakings, whose origin cannot be so ascribed? 
The tasks that I have executed in this thesis set the scene for an account that 
would show why and how, when it comes to the problem of heteronomous agency, 
Kant’s decisive theoretical elimination of imitation (Nachahmung) is the climactic, 
the most characteristic, and the most troubling of his moves in service of that prob-
lem’s resolution. In this particular regard, this thesis opens onto a number of addi-
tional tasks. There is the task of saying what the specifically intersubjective 
phenomenon of ‘Nachahmung’ consists in, for Kant, and showing how his treatment 
of the latter relates to his thinking about other, related phenomena: ‘Nachmachung,’ 
‘Nachäffung,’ and, especially, ‘Nachfolge.’  There is the task of showing how Kant’s 
resolution of the problem posed by imitation has specific, pernicious theoretical and 
practical consequences for theology, anthropology, politics, and ethics. And there is 
the task of connecting the anthropological datum that human beings are born imita-
tors (which Kant readily concedes) with an account of imputation and ‘punishability’ 
that comes to the defense of the human subject by declaring that mercy is a good. 
Kant’s work contributes to the occlusion of earlier resources for thinking about 
the consequences of this fact for our understanding of imputation and punishment. In 
particular, the significance, sources, and consequences of Kant’s trivialization of imi-
tation cannot be adequately identified or addressed without recourse to theological 
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tools with which many (but by no means all775) serious readers of Kant have dis-
pensed: the doctrines, especially, of grace and original sin. 
Instead, commentators often focus on Kant’s view of imitation in relation to the 
themes of genius and fine art, particularly as expressed in the third Critique,776 or in 
relation to his thinking about the special a priori status of philosophy’s subject mat-
ter.777  Few attend to Kant’s thinking about imitation as a specifically intersubjective 
phenomenon,778 while those who do omit to connect the latter with the practical 
problems of imputation and punishment.779  A number of others, however, provide 
rich resources for work in this area, albeit without immediate reference to Kant in 
every case. Interdisciplinary work aimed at repairing Kant’s extremely influential 
thinking about human agency might make use, especially, of key figures such as 
René Girard780 and Horkheimer and Adorno,781 as well as a growing body of re-
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search on imitation and cognate phenomena (e.g., ‘joint attention’) in psychology, 
neuroscience, and related disciplines.782 
This thesis opens onto further work, then, that would foreground the phenome-
non of imitation as a mode of deeply social interaction and, more precisely, as the 
ground of an especially social mode of entangled, heteronomous agency. Future re-
search along these lines would offer an alternative to Kant’s assessment of ‘imita-
tion’ in ‘Sittlichen’ that is both cognizant of his central importance for thinking about 
human agency, but that also holds open the possibility that the latter’s moral dimen-
sion is not merely compatible with intersubjective imitation, but, for better and for 
worse, profoundly conditioned and sustained through a radical, mutual ‘motivation-
al’ entanglement of agents that takes place by means of it. 
To the extent that this future work would seek, too, to build upon and deploy 
Kant’s ‘critical’ insights into the structure and limits of human cognition, it would 
not entail a wholesale repudiation of the key distinctions to which Kant’s mature phi-
losophy points his readers. Rather, the extended account that I envision would clarify 
the development of Kant’s thinking by distinguishing between his epistemological 
concerns and his worries about morality in the latter’s primary, forward-looking 
sense, on the one hand, and the thinking to which Kant is constrained by the com-
mitments that I have detailed in this thesis, on the other. The account that I propose, 
then, would situate some of Kant’s major moves in relation, specifically, to the 
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781 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life, trans., E. F. N. Jephcott (New 
York: Verso, 1974); Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans., Robert Hullot-Kentor, Continuum 
Impacts (London: Continuum, 2004); Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of 
Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, trans., Edmund Jephcott (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2002). 
782 See, for example, Susan Hurley and Nick Chater, ‘Introduction: The Importance of Imitation,’ in 
Perspectives on Imitation: From Neuroscience to Social Science: Vol. 1: Mechanisms of Imitation and 
Imitation in Animals, ed. Susan Hurley and Nick Chater (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005); C. 
Moore, ‘Intentional Relations and Triadic Interactions,’ in Developing Theories of Intention: Social 
Understanding and Self-Control, ed. Janet W. Astington, David R. Olson, and Philip David Zelazo 
(Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1999); Chris Moore and Philip J. Dunham, Joint 
Attention: Its Origins and Role in Development (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1995); 
Giacomo Rizzolatti and others, ‘From Mirror Neurons to Imitation: Facts and Speculations,’ in The 
Imitative Mind: Development, Evolution, and Brain Bases, ed. Andrew N. Meltzoff and Wolfgang 
Prinz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Michael Tomasello, The Cultural Origins of 
Human Cognition (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1999); Michael Tomasello and 
Malinda Carpenter, ‘Intention Reading and Imitative Learning,’ in Perspectives on Imitation: From 
Neuroscience to Social Science: Vol. 2: Imitation, Human Development, and Culture, ed. Susan 
Hurley and Nick Chater (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). 
 
 261 
Groundwork’s imitation-excluding (re)description of ‘matters of morality,’ on the 
one hand, and his account of the imputable ‘Gesinnung,’ on the other. These moves 
would include Kant’s distinction between the practices of ‘explanation’ and ‘imputa-
tion,’ practices whose conditions he discusses in his treatment of the thesis and an-
tithesis positions of the ‘Third Antinomy’; the first Critique’s distinction between 
‘intelligible’ and ‘empirical’ character; that work’s discussion of ‘absolute causal 
spontaneity’ in relation to the unique ascribability of actions; the first Critique’s wor-
ries about the lawlessness of mere spontaneity; the eclipse of heteronomy, in general, 
in the context of Kant’s Groundwork ‘invention of autonomy’; the problem, at-
tendant on Kant’s earliest treatment of autonomy, of the imputability of evil deeds 
(not qua actions, as such, but precisely qua evil); Kant’s distinction between Wille 
and Willkür; and, in relation to the latter, his articulation of the so-called ‘incorpora-
tion thesis’ along with his claim, in the Religion, that the human being’s Willkür 
(‘power of choice’) is endowed with an ineliminable predisposition to moral good-
ness. 
I have claimed that Kant’s ultimate description of the human being, as an agent 
whose deepest moral properties are imputable to her alone, is a key and ultimate 
move in a project aimed at rationalizing and securing the practice of imputation, un-
der a description of the latter that has integral reference to punishment, where pun-
ishment is understood in strictly retributivist terms. Kant works hard to get to his 
description of the ultimately, retributively ‘punishable’ subject. This thesis does not 
traverse the path by which Kant reaches this description in his theory of radical evil. 
The more detailed story of these rather desperate measures remains to be told. Al-
ways anterior to the stages along this path, in any case—an obscure presence that 
conditions his thought—Kant’s antecedent commitment to (retributive) punishment 
and, with it, to radical, retribution-sensitive imputation, remains in force. In another 
sense, however, it is not really in the background at all: it is right there, under our 
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